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The arrest of ships is a truly Private International Law (PIL) institution. Its 
main rationale is to provide a useful device for international commerce and to 
compensate for the difficulty of enforcing judgments abroad. The arrest of ships is 
the typical provisional measure used in maritime claims; but it is as typical for 
maritime claims as it is atypical as a provisional measure. Arrest of ships is also a 
typical jurisdictional basis in the maritime sphere; but outside maritime claims it is 
nowadays completely atypical as a jurisdictional basis, i.e. arrest of non -maritime 
property to found jurisdiction is regarded as unacceptably exorbitant. Moreover, 
arrest of ships is a means of security, but its security- related effects are differently 
understood in comparative law. What is it about the arrest of ships that makes it so 
distinctive, particularly from a PIL perspective? 
This thesis analyses the theme in English and Scots law in the light of the 
international Conventions in the field. It examines the three main functions of arrest 
of ships, i.e. its protective function, its security function and its jurisdictional 
function, within the three classical domains of PIL, i.e. applicable law, jurisdiction, 
and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It looks at the role of the 
lex fori; its impact on characterization issues; its subtleties when applied qua lex 
causae; and its so often too far -reaching scope when applied qua lex fori. In practice 
its influence is unhelpful and poses a drawback to the uniformity sought by the 
international community. Its downside is apparent in English law where the frame 
in which arrest of ships currently develops is the action in rem, and where the 
impossibility to separate the two has complicated matters in various ways. In Scots 
law, due to the fact that arrestment of ships pertains to the broader law of diligence, 
the distinction between the different functions of the arrest of ships is clearer. 
Furthermore, recent law reform has brought the arrestment of ships in Scotland into 
line with the latest international trends in the sphere of provisional and protective 
measures. 
Central to this thesis is the jurisdictional function of arrest of ships. Forum 
arresti, the paradigmatic forum selection criterion in English and Scots law, has 
survived as a specific jurisdictional basis for maritime claims in the process of 
Europeanization of PIL. This thesis establishes that forum arresti in the case of arrest 
of ships is a cooperative forum. It advances the dynamic objective of PIL, i.e. the 
juridical continuity of legal relations across national borders. In this context, the 
conceptual distinction between jurisdiction on the merits and jurisdiction for the 
sole purpose of interim relief becomes paramount. 
Ultimately, the whole analysis shows that the combination of civilian legacy, 
common law creativity and international attempts for uniformity has profoundly 
affected the nature of arrest of ships; not only in England and in Scotland, but, 
through their influence on international Conventions, in the entire shipping world. 
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The topic of this thesis belongs to the more general and interesting field of 
enforcement of maritime claims) In maritime litigation conflict of laws and conflict 
of jurisdictions are more likely to arise than not. Ships trade worldwide2 and they 
are often owned by one -ship companies ;3 they spend their economic life moving 
between different jurisdictions often far from their country of registry; and their 
commercial management places peculiar problems for those faced with an unpaid 
debt incurred in the course of shipping. Since its earliest developments the law has 
been trying to provide a facilitative framework for all those involved in shipping to 
do prosperous business. Upon this background, the arrest of ships, inherently 
connected with jurisdiction and security, has played a key role since ancient times.4 
It is the speed with which the defendant's main asset could leave the jurisdiction 
that arrest of ships has been always trying to counteract. Hence, the possibility to 
arrest a ship in an appropriate jurisdiction is of paramount importance to the 
international shipping and trading community, and to their legal advisors. 
I For a treatise on the topic in English law see the authoritative work of D C Jackson, 
Enforcement of Maritime Claims (LLP London 1985; 2 ̂ d edn 1996; 3rd edn 2000; 4th edn 2005). 
Jackson refers to the tripartite nature of maritime claims, i.e. the interim or provisional 
remedy aspect, the jurisdictional aspect, and the security aspect. Arrest of ships is 
inextricably intermingled in these three facets of maritime litigation. 
2 Shipping is probably the most international of the world's industries. More than 90 
per cent of global trade is currently carried by sea (see IMO, 'International Shipping- Carrier 
of World Trade' World Maritime Day 2005 Doc. IMO J/9015 available at 
www. imo. org /includes/blastData.asp ?doc_id =5261 last accessed 15 September 2007) (IMO 
J /9015.doc). 
3 Very often a shipping company sets up a separate subsidiary company to own each 
ship. 
4 In the opinion of Jackson arrest became connected to jurisdiction and security 
through the concept of lien, enforceable under a particular kind of action (action in rem), 
since that kind of action carried with it a provisional remedy (arrest) (D C Jackson (2005) 2). 
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The historical evolution of maritime law has always had the ideal of 
harmonization at its very centre. The inherent internationalism of the maritime 
adventure has fostered the trend towards uniform law at the international sphere 
and this tendency has been increasing since the early twentieth century. Arrest of 
ships as a typical admiralty institution is not alien to that process. 
In this field international Conventions coexist with national law and regional 
law, together with the ever growing significance of the lex mercatoria. The 
application of such different sources of law is cumbersome and Private International 
Law (PIL) comes into play to offer different theoretical and methodological options 
to the conflict of laws and to the conflict of jurisdictions aiming ultimately at the 
juridical continuity of legal relations across national borders. 
1.1.1. The Selected Field of Research 
Arrest of ships is a very powerful interim measure of protection in maritime 
litigation worldwide. It is so potent not only due to the eventuality of the judicial 
sale of the ship if the arrest is not released, but because in the commercial shipping 
industry the mere threat of a ship being paralysed due to its arrest is significant: the 
arrest could generate immense losses for all those involved in the business.5 Thus, a 
claimant who has the possibility to arrest because of the nature of his claim has 
strong bargaining power. Therefore, one of the sine qua non considerations in 
maritime litigation is where to arrest a ship of the defendant; once arrested the res 
will be detained until the defendant gives security to the claimant for his claim. On 
that basis, it has been argued that arrest is not itself the security but it is the best 
5 In fact, judicial sale may be made prior to judgment on the merits where the 
security of the arrester is reducing in value through the continuation of arrest; see The Myrto 
[1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243 (QBD (Admlty)) 259 -260; The Emre II [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 182 (QBD 
(Admity)). 
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mechanism of obtaining alternative security;6 it has been said that the most salient 
feature of arrest is its being provisional.' Looking at maritime law practice indeed it 
is. 
Failing this initial stage, legal systems usually provide for the judicial sale of 
the ship. The claimant who has arrested will be in most cases treated as a secured 
creditor in the distribution of the sale proceeds. This, however, means that arrest 
implies a certain kind of security by itself in most legal systems, even in the absence 
of any other alternative security given. This varies significantly from one legal 
system to another and even within one legal system between the different kinds of 
arrest of ships available therein. In practice judicial sale is not the most often 
outcome round arrest. Ship- owners or charterers, or actually their insurers (P & I 
Clubs), do in most cases give security to the claimant to prevent arrest or to release 
the ship from arrest. 
The arrest of ships is available in most legal systems but is differently 
approached and exercised in each country. The common features are its provisional 
character; its security function; its relation with jurisdiction and its inherently 
protective nature. These features and functions have developed so intermingled, 
that it is difficult to draw lines and establish clear -cut categories for the sake of legal 
certainty. Therefore, aware of that, and inspired by the remark of JACKSON in 
Enforcement of Maritime Claims that 'the desirable framework calls for connection with but 
6 Admiralty arrests are not so frequent in England. Undertakings in individual suits 
brought upon causes of action in rem are the usual practice since the 1960s (K C McGuffie, P 
A Fugeman, P V Gray, Admiralty Practice (Stevens London 1964) 104 [243]) and this is 
reflected in the issue of warrants for arrest that, already then, numbered less than twenty per 
cent of the quantity of writs in rem issued (F L Wiswall, The development of Admiralty 
jurisdiction and practice since 1800: An English study with American comparisons (CUP 
Cambridge 1970) 187). However, it is important to point out that the importance of arrest of 
ships is not necessarily measurable by the number of arrests effectively granted but by the 
powerfulness of the availability of such a measure; the arrest of ships has been regarded as 
'the most effective provisional remedy' in maritime litigation (D C Jackson (2005) 3). 
7 R Herbert and C Fresnedo de Aguirre, 'El Arresto de Buques y el Principio de 
Jurisdicción más Próxima' [1993] Revista de Transporte y Seguros (RTSS) 158. 
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distinction between the concepts and functions of arrest, jurisdiction and liens',8 one dips 
ones toes into the water. 
1.1.2. Problems and Theses 
1.1.2.1. The arrest of ships is the typical provisional measure used (or 
threatened to be used) in maritime claims but it is as typical for maritime claims as it 
is atypical as a provisional measure. Its oddity does not only relate to its features as 
an interim measure of protection but affects most of its salient roles. Arrest of ships 
is also a typical jurisdictional basis in the maritime sphere; but outside maritime 
claims it is nowadays completely atypical as a jurisdictional basis, i.e. arrest of non - 
maritime property to found jurisdiction is regarded as unacceptably exorbitant. 
Finally, arrest of ships is a means of security, but the effects of its security function 
are left to the lex fori arresti whereas the security- related effects in the adjacent field 
of maritime liens present applicable law problems that do not have a definite 
answer yet. The resulting situation has been described as chaotic.9 What is it about 
s D C Jackson (2005) 395. Jackson has explained the more profound problem in 
English law in the following terms '... the strands of the process remain confused. The time has 
surely come for a determined attempt to separate what are quite distinct matters of policy. Failure to 
do so has played its part in ratification of at least one international Convention (the Convention 
Relating to the Arrest of Sea Going Ships 1952) without compliance domestically with its provisions, 
a surprising inability to adapt fully the availability of the most effective provisional remedy (arrest) to 
arbitration, in uncertainty as to the security aspects of actions available to maritime claimants and 
priority as between maritime claims' (D C Jackson (2005) 3). Jackson shows chronologically how 
English law has missed several opportunities to bring Admiralty jurisdiction in line with the 
international Arrest Convention (D C Jackson (2005) 5 -7). In his opinion, in the significant 
latest developments of civil procedure in English law 'nothing has changed in relation to the 
various fundamental and confused aspects of the approach to enforcement of maritime claims in 
English law' (ibid 7). He argues that the 1999 Arrest Convention (not yet in force) represents a 
further opportunity for a comprehensive framework change. 
9 Bankers Trust International v Todd Shipyards Corp (The Halcyon Isle) [1980] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 325 (PC) 339. The dissenting opinion (Lord Salmon and Lord Scarman) held that PIL 
had an important role to play in 'the present chaos of the law of the sea governing the recognition 
and priority of maritime liens and mortgages' (339). Note the step forward in the international 
sphere achieved by the entry into force of the The International Convention on Maritime 
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the arrest of ships that makes it so distinctive, particularly from a PIL perspective? 
This thesis seeks to show that it is the combination of a civilian legacy, common law 
creativity and international attempts for uniformity that has profoundly affected the 
nature of arrest of ships not only in England and in Scotland, but through their 
influence on the international Conventions, in the entire shipping world. The 
modern institution of arrest of ships as recognised today by the international 
community is the result of the migration of legal ideas, institutions, concepts and 
structures; the upshot of a chain of amalgamations over the centuries. In traditional 
English law, it is an institution generated from the efforts of the common lawyers to 
build upon the practices of a civil law court, the High Court of Admiralty. In 
traditional Scots law, it is the result of the mixture between original Scots law and 
Scotland's inheritance from the European systems, particularly that of the 
Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, France. Internationally, features of the arrest of 
ships are a compromise between common law and civil law conceptions and, in 
turn, it is this mixture that makes it unique as a provisional measure. 
1.1.2.2. Despite the fact that the legal institution has been the object of 
substantive harmonization there are characterization10 problems that derive from, 
and result in» different interpretations of the international Arrest Conventions in 
the State parties.12 Bearing in mind that there is no international tribunal capable of 
Liens and Mortgages 1993 (Geneva, May 6, 1993) in force since September 5, 2004. States 
party as at 1 April 2007: Ecuador, Estonia, Monaco, Nigeria, Peru, Russian Federation, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Ukraine, Vanuatu (UN 
Treaty website, http: / /untreaty.un.org, last accessed September 3, 2007). 
10 As to the English understanding of characterisation as a PIL technique see 
Macmilland Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387 (CA) 407 (Auld LJ) 
'characterisation... is governed by the lex fori. But characterisation or classification of what ?...1T]he 
proper approach is to look beyond the formulation of the claim and to identify according to the lex fori, 
the true issue or issues thrown up by the claim and defence. This requires a parallel classification of 
the rule of law'. Cf. Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC (The 
Mount I) [2001] EWCA Civ 68, [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep 597 (CA) (Mance LJ) [26 -27]. 
11 Characterization as a process is two -sided. 
12 For several examples of such characterization problems and the lack of uniformity 
in the application of the 1952 Arrest Convention in the State parties see F Berlingieri, 
Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships (London LLP 2006). 
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establishing the most authoritative autonomous interpretation to those provisions, 
this generates lack of legal certainty. This thesis seeks to show that these problems 
are mainly created by the disruptive impact of the lex fori arresti via the so- called lex 
fori characterization. In practice its influence is unhelpful and poses problems for 
attaining uniformity in the application of the international Convention currently in 
force. This impact is apparent in English law where the framework in which arrest 
of ships currently develops is the action in rem; the impossibility of casting aside the 
two concepts has complicated matters in various ways. In Scots law, due to the fact 
that arrestment of ships pertains to a broader area of law, that of diligence, the 
action in rem plays a more limited role. 
1.1.2.3. Traditionally, English and Scots law have considered the applicable 
law issues connected with the security function of the arrest of ships as governed by 
the lex fori. Against this background, it is here submitted that the far -reaching 
concept of 'procedure' in English law as to cover the existence of maritime liens 
should be seen as a thing of the past. The modern doctrinal approach is consistent in 
asserting that the characterization of certain aspect of a claim as 'procedural' should 
be restricted to manners directly related to the conduction of court proceedings. 
Matters that affect the existence, scope and enforceability of the rights themselves, 
are inherently substantive, therefore, should be left to the lex causae.13 Moreover, it is 
here submitted that it is inconvenient to refer the connected issues of existence and 
ranking of maritime liens to different laws; it could lead to incoherencies that would 
not advance the policies underlying neither the lex causae nor the lex fori. This thesis 
seeks to show that time is ripe for the re- examination of PIL rules in this sphere, 
both in English and in Scots law. The ultimate aim of PIL is the juridical continuity 
of legal relations across national borders, and in that sense there are no arguments 
in favour of the lex fori arresti in this regard. 
13 D C Jackson (2005) 681 -682. 
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1.1.2.4. Finally, the jurisdictional function of arrest of ships (forum arresti) 
which is paradigmatic in English and Scots law, has consolidated into a forum 
selection criterion specific to maritime claims in the international sphere. The 
triumph of the forum arresti in the international context has mainly historical and 
practical foundations rather than theoretical ones. This thesis seeks to establish also 
from a more abstract consideration that forum arresti in the case of arrest of ships is a 
cooperative forum. In this context, the conceptual distinction between, on the one 
hand, jurisdiction on the merits and, on the other hand, jurisdiction for the sole 
purpose of interim relief, becomes paramount, since it is in the general framework 
of judicial cooperation where the arrest of ships is meant to develop an important 
role as a provisional and protective measure in the international sphere. 
1.1.3. The Selected Scope of Research 
The delimitation of the scope of this thesis is very much defined by the 
international Arrest Conventions regulation of the matter at hand. This lead to 
major boundaries in the examination inter alia of the following matters (i) arrest of 
ships in execution of a judgment is outside the scope of it;14 (ii) only privately owned 
ships will be included, leaving state owned and war ships out of the discussion; (iii) 
the various issues in relation to arrest of ships in the sphere of maritime arbitration 
is also left aside and (iv) arrest of cargo will not be dealt with.15 
14 The rationale of this exclusion may be open to criticism. The justification for 
leaving arrest in execution aside is that it is completely reserved to national law and 
international Conventions have not had a say on it so far. The idea of harmonising the law of 
arrest has since its beginnings in the 1930s in the Comité Maritime International (CMI) mores 
been related to the arrest as a provisional measure (saisie conservatoire). Furthermore, it does 
not present the PIL concerns analysed in this thesis. 
15 Arrest of cargo is part of the law of admiralty arrest /arrestment in English and 
Scots law and has received special treatment as far as its jurisdictional function in the 
European jurisdictional scheme. The Brussels and Lugano Conventions and currently 
Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 provide for arrest of cargo in article 5.7. in relation to 
29 
In terms of the legal systems examined the study of the international Arrest 
Conventions is to be expected due to the very nature of the topic.16 In contrast, the 
selection of English and Scots law is based on several considerations. First of all, the 
thesis intends to highlight the differences within Great Britain;" such differences 
have been sometimes neglected18 due to the fact that treaty- making powers rests 
with the Crown. The United Kingdom is a signatory to the 1952 Arrest Convention 
salvage. The reference in the European regime is indeed a consequence of the lack of 
treatment of arrest of cargo by the 1952 Arrest Convention. Due to that gap, article 57 of the 
Conventions [article 71 of the Regulation] could not provide for a special jurisdictional basis 
in those circumstances, hence, article 5.7. was introduced to fill that gap (J J Alvarez Rubio, 
Derecho Maritimo y Derecho Internacional Privado, Problemas básicos (Servico Central de 
Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco Vitoria -Gasteiz 2000) 123). The aim of such inclusion was 
to adapt the benefits of forum arresti to the case of arrest of cargo as it is in respect of the 
arrest of the ship. From an economic analysis the possibility is essential in the case of total 
loss of the ship where cargo was secured via salvage operations. From a PIL perspective this 
provision constitutes an exemption expressed in the European regime itself (as opposed to in 
a special Convention, like in the case of arrest of ships) to the general detachment between 
ancillary jurisdiction (for the sole purpose of interim relief) and jurisdiction on the merits. 
Another interesting point in this area is that, differently from the case of arrest of ships 
according to its current international regulation, in the case of arrest of cargo in connection 
with salvage, effectual arrestment is not indispensable and the jurisdictional function is 
displayed even if arrest was prevented through the provision of a guarantee (art 5.7 (b) 
Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001); this is indeed commercially sound. The scope of the 
provision has generated doubts in relation to whom this special jurisdictional basis could be 
used against; see G Brice, 'Maritime Claims: The European Judgments Convention' [1987] 
LMCLQ 281, 296 -297. 
16 There are other international instruments that deal with arrest of ships in the 
international sphere. The most important one in the United Kingdom apart from the Arrest 
Convention is the Collision (Civil Jurisdiction) Convention 1952 (Convention on Certain 
Rules concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision, Brussels, 10 May 1952). This 
Convention has been enacted into English and Scots law through the Administration of 
Justice Act 1956; now replaced in English law by the Supreme Court Act 1981. The Collision 
Convention is concerned with jurisdiction based on arrest; it does not rule on arrest as a 
provisional measure, hence, is relevant only for the study provided in Chapter 6 (Arrest of 
Ships and Jurisdiction on the Merits) of this thesis. 
17 This selection would have been probably criticised by T B Smith who considered 
the 'use of the other British [English] system alone of the purpose of comparison' as 'pseudo - 
comparative methods'; see T B Smith, British Justice: The Scottish Contribution (Stevens London 
1961) 3, 156, 225. 
18 W Tetley has addressed the theme in 'Arrest, Attachment and Related Maritime 
Law Procedures' (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1895, but he fails to distinguish between 
English and Scots law. Unfortunately the whole of Tetley's scholarly work on the field, not 
only in that article but in his several books on maritime litigation, encounter the same 
omission. The same happens with the work of J J Alvarez Rubio (2000). 
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which was enacted in the United Kingdom by the Administration of Justice Act 
1956. Due to that statutory enactment it has wrongly been assumed by some 
commentators that the United Kingdom has a unique system of arrest of ships in its 
territory. In fact the situation is quite the opposite; aware of the very different 
approach to arrest of ships in Scotland as compared with England the amendments 
made to Scots law were introduced in a separate self -contained section of the Act.19 
Moreover, it has been argued that the wording used in the provisions applicable to 
Scotland is much closer to that of the 1952 Arrest Convention than those which 
apply to England.20 
As a very oversimplified outline the differences can be overviewed as 
follows. First, ship arrestment in Scotland forms part of a general theory of 
arrestment derived from the Scottish inheritance from the European systems; the 
right to arrest moveable property or debts belonging to the defender has been part 
of the Scottish legal system for several hundred years.21 In England arrest does not 
exist outside admiralty jurisdiction and there is no general theory of arrest: arrest in 
civil and commercial litigation is necessarily ship arrest. Secondly, in Scotland 
arrestment of a ship is available on the dependence of an action in personam and this 
possibility is not available in England. Thirdly, there is a very peculiar kind of 
arrestment in Scotland that is not available in England: arrestment jurisdictionis 
fundandae causa or arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem. The mere presence of the 
ship (or any other moveable asset of the defender) in Scotland is sufficient under 
traditional Scots law of procedure to give the Scottish courts general jurisdiction 
79 Administration of Justice Act 1956 Ch 46 Pt V (Admiralty Jurisdiction and 
Arrestment of Ships in Scotland) arts 47- 51/57. 
20 I G Inglis, 'Arrest of Ships in Scotland' in C Hill (ed), The Arrest of Ships Series 
(vol 4 LLP London 1987) 83; Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the MV Erkowit y Owners of 
the Eschersheim (The Eschersheim, the Jade and the Erkowit) [19761 2 Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL) (Lord 
Diplock). 
21 I G Inglis (1987) 75. 
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over the defender.22 General jurisdiction based on arrestment is no longer available 
within the European Union by virtue of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 
1982 and the Brussels I Regulation (44/2001). However, such jurisdictional basis is 
still available in cases involving extra -community parties. It has been argued that 
the limitations of the 1952 Arrest Convention do not affect this peculiar arrestment 
ad fundandam jurisdictionem since this kind of measure does not establish a right in 
security over the ship and, more surprisingly, does not even prevent the ship from 
sailing. 
Finally, bearing in mind that the Scottish system was taken into 
consideration to bridge the differences between English law and continental law in 
the process leading to the 1952 Arrest Convention and foremost, that the Scottish 
dual formula of forum arresti-forum non conveniens has been adopted in the 1999 
Arrest Convention, its analysis should be enlightening to the face of the more 
general process of Europeanization of PIL. 
1.1.4. Literature Review 
Surprisingly, arrest of ships has not attracted much academic attention. 
Being historically and presently an important device in maritime litigation, it has 
not convoked much discussion in English or Scottish legal literature.23 Arrest is 
studied in every shipping law textbook and in all the main admiralty law books, but 
monographic studies devoted to its analysis are rare. An important opera is a 
collective work dedicated to ship arrest compounded in seven volumes24 compiling 
22 Rule 2 (8) of Schedule 8 to the 1982 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act. The 
European regime has expressly banned this ground of jurisdiction. 
23 The Scottish Law Commission Report on Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty 
Arrestments (Scot Law Corn Report No 164 (1998)) takes account of such 'scant attention' 
[1.9]. 
24 See C J S Hill (ed), The Arrest of Ships Series (LLP London 1985 -1988) with great 
practical usefulness, outlining the institution in several jurisdictions such as England and 
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brief descriptions of the law of arrest of ships in several jurisdictions, where 
England and Scotland are treated separately. Even though some of these 
descriptions are practitioner- orientated, the whole work is informative. 
Internationally, the most well known work on the field is the one of BERLINGIERI25, 
and is fundamentally concerned with the international Conventions on the topic. 
TETLEY26 has addressed the topic of arrest of ships with a comparative perspective 
and his work is clearly of value but he does not distinguish between English and 
Scots law. From the PIL point of view, the literature is even more scant. General PIL 
operas usually consider that admiralty causes contain so many specialities that are 
best left aside.27 
1.1.5. Methods, Aims and Presentation of the 
Research 
Inasmuch as the research theme has an international character there is direct 
incentive to a comparative law approach. The core element of comparative law as a 
research method is that of functionality. Institutions are comparable if they are 
Wales, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and The United States (vol 1, 1985); Belgium, 
The Netherlands, India and Yugoslavia (vol 2, 1986); Malta, Panama, Sweden, United Arab 
Emirates (vol 3, 1987); People's Republic of China, Nigeria, Oman, Scotland (vol 4, 1987); 
Bangladesh, Finland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa (vol 5, 1987); Denmark, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Kuwait, Qatar (vol 6, 1987); Cyprus, Egypt, Pakistan, Poland (vol 7, 1988). On the 
same line see A D Mc Ardle (ed), International Ship Arrest: A Practical Guide (LLP London 
1988). 
25 F Berlingieri, Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships (LLP London 1992; 2nd edn 1996; 3rd edn 
2000; 4th edn 2006). 
26 W Tetley (1999). 
27 For example, A E Anton and P R Beaumont, Private International Law (2nd edn 
Green Edinburgh 1990) 193. Nonetheless, in Spanish law the analysis of arrest of ships from 
a PIL perspective in J J Alvarez Rubio (2000) is noteworthy; as it is the analysis of Aguirre 
Ramirez, Herbert and Fresnedo de Aguirre in relation to this topic in Uruguayan law; see R 
Herbert and C Fresnedo de Aguirre (1993); C Fresnedo de Aguirre, 'Embargo de Buques 
como Medida Cautelar en el Derecho Internacional Privado Uruguayo' (1997) 14 Anuario de 
Derecho Marítimo 385; F Aguirre Ramirez, 'Embargo y Arresto de Buques en Uruguay' 
(2005) Revista de Transporte y Seguros 275. 
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functionally equivalent, if they fulfil similar functions in different legal systems.28 
That is the case with arrest /arrestment of ships in England and in Scotland. 
This study does not focus on domestic law. It is a study of the PIL effects of 
arrest of ships. The real challenge is not from a comparative perspective, i.e. to 
contrast the main features in each legal system; but from a PIL perspective, i.e. to 
examine issues of characterization, applicable law, jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in relation to the arrest of ships. 
The research results are presented in two parts. The first part analysis aims 
to contribute to the characterization of arrest of ships as a provisional measure, 
addressing the issue in different spheres, i.e. in transnational, international and 
national law. The second part is divided into three chapters, and each chapter 
presents a specific function of arrest of ships in relation to a specific question 
germane to PIL. 
1.2. THE ARREST OF SHIPS 
This study starts from the assumption that the arrest of ships can be said to 
be a truly PIL institution. Its main rationale is to provide a useful device for 
international commerce and to compensate for the difficulty of enforcing judgments 
abroad. Against the foreign defendant, the most common one in maritime litigation, 
the ship is in most cases the sole asset that eventually the claimant is able to secure 
for the purposes of enforcing his claim. The international community has taken this 
view since the 1930s; that is why harmonisation efforts have been put forward in 
this sphere, and international Conventions have been agreed and are in force in 
most of the shipping countries. Nonetheless, the success of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention, despite more than 80 ratifications, is debatable. It is certainly difficult to 
28 R Michaels, 'The Functional Method of Comparative Law' in M Reimann and R 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP Oxford 2006) 339. 
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reconcile the territorial limits of mindsets and the free flow of cross -border 
transactions. More importantly, policy considerations sometimes outweigh technical 
ones. However, this research has been conducted in the hope that the mindsets of 
different legal systems are becoming increasingly harmonised in the procedural 
mores29 and this may bring in further harmonisation in the field. 
The arrest of ships as an institution used in civil and commercial matters 
does not have an exact equivalent in every legal system; nonetheless most countries 
provide for the arrest of ships 30 In England it is known as ship arrest and in 
Scotland as ship arrestment. Neither of those institutions is identical to the French 
saisie conservatoire or the Spanish embargo preventivo or the Italian sequestro preventivo 
and certainly differs as well from the ancient English maritime attachment and the 
current North American preliminary attachment with regard to ships. 
Undoubtedly the differences are not only linguistically relevant but 
connected to the difference of approach used in the different legal systems for the 
same or similar purposes. A brief description of the different institutions could 
29 J A Jolowicz, 'On the Comparison of Procedures' in J A R Nafziger and S C 
Symeonides (eds), Law and Justice in a Multistate World, Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von 
Mehren (Transnational Publishers 2002) 721, 740; Kerameus, K 'International Procedural 
Harmonization and Autonomous Interpretation in K Siehr and T Einhorn (eds), International 
Cooperation through Private International Law: Essays in Memory of Peter E Nygh (T M C Asser 
Press The Hague 2004) and 'Procedural Approximation and Legal Pluralism in the European 
Union' in T Andersson (ed) Parallel and Conflicting Enforcement of Law (Nijhoff Leiden 2005). 
30 For the latest developments in Europe see: P Wetterstein, 'Arrest of vessels in 
Finland' (2000) 7 (6) International Maritime Law 183; P Perivolaris, 'Arresting ships the 
Greek way' (2001) 14 Maritime Advocate 34; T Eilertsen, 'Arrested development' (Norway) 
(2003) 23 Maritime Advocate 19; E Sinivali and M Greinoman, 'When not to arrest' (Estonia) 
(2003) 24 Maritime Advocate 25; G Vilgerts, 'Out with the old' (Latvia) (2003) 24 Maritime 
Advocate 21; F Askvig, 'Keep it simple' (The Netherlands) (2004) 27 Maritime Advocate 15; 
A von Bohm -Amolly, 'Ship arrest in Portugal' (2005) 29 Maritime Advocate 30; L Lewis, 
'Arrest in France' (2005) 29 Maritime Advocate 26; A Nitsevych, 'Shipping in Ukraine' (2005) 
19 (1) MRI 19; V Looks, 'New aspects regarding the arrest of foreign sea -going vessels 
according to German law' (2006) 12 (6) Journal of International Maritime Law (JIML) 420; C 
Van Aerde, 'The Belgian method' (2006) 20 (11) MRI 12; H Noble, 'Arrest of ships in Ireland' 
(2007) 13 (1) JIML 56. Most of these short articles are practitioner- orientated but they provide 
a glimpse on the different approaches to the arrest of ships in comparative law. 
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contribute to present the general spectrum. The United States preliminary 
attachment37 permits a claimant having an in personam claim in admiralty to attach 
property of the defendant (whether movable or immovable) within the district, 
when the defendant cannot be found in the district, the attachment thus serving as 
well as a jurisdictional basis founding jurisdiction where there is otherwise no in 
personam jurisdiction over the defendant.32 Due to its civilian origins, this institution, 
which comes from the ancient maritime attachment originated in England, 
resembles the saisie conservatoire of civil law systems such as the French. The later - 
literally translatable as conservatory attachment- gives the claimant 'physical' 
security before judgment. In the case of ships the measure prohibits the ship from 
leaving port but does not otherwise affect the rights of the owner.33 In that sense it 
has similar effects to the recently created English freezing order but differs from the 
Spanish embargo preventivo. The protective embargo restrains the defendant from 
selling the ship and sets up a privilege in the eventual posterior judicial sale of the 
ship ranking after mortgages but before posterior embargoes and unsecured 
creditors. All in all, what these measures have in common is their provisional nature 
and protective character, which have been the most salient features of arrest since its 
very beginnings.34 And they do differ in their 'security' function and in their relation 
with jurisdiction. 'Arrest of ships' is the preferred expression by the international 
community. Internationally, arrest has been defined as 'any detention or restriction on 
31 The legal systems of the United States and Canada do have similarities and 
dissimilarities with English and Scots law (arguably as developments of both). However, 
due to the limitation in terms of the scope of this PhD thesis, the examination of these other 
legal systems in the field had to be eliminated ab initio. Nonetheless, some references to them 
are included in Chapter 5 with regard to the law applicable to maritime liens. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the outstanding work of W Tetley in those legal systems on 
the theme of this thesis is noteworthy. 
32 W Tetley (1999) 1934. 
33 Decree No 67 -967 of October 27, 1967; R Rodière and E Du Pontavice, Droit 
Maritime (12th edn Dalloz Paris 1997) 178. 
34 P Miranda, História e Prática do Arresto ou Embargo (Saraiva Sao Paulo 1929 reprint 
Bookseller Campinas 1999). 
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removal of a ship by order of a Court to secure a maritime claim' and 'does not include the 
seizure of a ship in execution or satisfaction of a judgment or other enforceable instrument'.35 
1.2.1. The Provisional and Protective Character of 
Arrest of Ships 
The provisional and protective character of arrest of ships is related to its 
temporary condition and to its intrinsic feature as supportive of the case on the 
merits in a particular way, ensuring that the final award or judgment can be 
enforced by safeguarding a particular asset of the defendant.36 This is recognised 
without reservations in most legal systems.37 
35 International Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999 art 1(2). 
36 See the distinction amongst provisional and protective measures according to its 
purpose in C A McLachlan, Second Interim Report on 'Provisional and Protective Measures 
in International Litigation', Report of the Sixty- Seventh Conference, Helsinski (ILA London 
1996) 185, 202. The ILA in its Helsinski Resolution identified two objectives as central to 
provisional and protective measures: a) to seize goods which can meet the demands of an 
order in the final judgment; and b) to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are 
settled. Hence, within this broad category of provisional and protective measures a 
distinction must be made between measures such as preliminary attachment, 
arrest /arrestment, and freezing injunctions, on the one side, and provisional measures 
relating directly to the subject- matter of the case on the other side. This second kind of 
measures, generally tending towards the preservation of the status quo until the merits of the 
case are settled, intrinsically form the heart of the case. In Scots law, arrest of ships in the case 
of claims under s 47(2) (p) to (s) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 could come into this 
second type. 
37 For example, in Spain arrest of ships has been acknowledged as having as its 
characteristics features, being accessory, provisional and supportive to the case on the merits 
(J J Alvarez Rubio (2000) 92). In the United States it has been understood that 'arrest' in the 
1952 Arrest Convention is used in the sense of 'attachment', with the purpose of compelling 
the appearance of the owner in an action in personam and to cause him to furnish security as 
a condition for release of the ship, pending determination of the merits of the case; thus, in 
this opinion arrest in the Convention is not synonymous with commencement of an in rem 
proceeding; rather arrest is analogous to the provisional remedy of attachment (in US legal 
parlance) (J M Kriz 'Ship Mortgages, Maritime Liens, and Their Enforcement: The Brussels 
Conventions of 1926 and 1952. Part Two' (1964) 1 Duke Law Journal 70, 80). 
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The universally recognised requirements of this kind of provisional 
measures are the need to prove the fumus boni iuris and the periculum in mora; 
therefore the main criteria for granting them are reasonableness and proportionality 
(following that, the lack of such conditions results generally in liability for wrongful 
arrest); and consequently, courts are usually empowered with the discretion to 
order the claimant to provide a cross -undertaking in damages. However, in English 
law, in the case of arrest of ships it is not necessary for the claimant to prove the 
fumus boni iuris or the periculum in mora, or to give any undertaking in damages. 
As a consequence of the influence of English law the 1952 and 1999 Arrest 
Conventions, which aim to provide a uniform international legal framework in this 
sphere, do not require such conditions either. Their irrelevancy under the 
Conventions and under English law jeopardises its characterization as a provisional 
measure and undermines uniformity of application, which is the ultimate goal of 
the Conventions. 
The characterization of arrest of ships as a provisional and protective 
measure presents a problem in the case of arrest of ships to enforce maritime liens. 
In such cases arrest forms part of the enforcement procedure of a tacit right in 
security; it is not accessory or supportive to the case on the merits; it is indeed an 
essential element of the case on the merits. The intricacies of the relation between 
arrest of ships and action in rem, in the particular case of the enforcement of 
maritime liens, in English and in Scots law, is analysed through out this thesis. 
1.2.2. Different Functions of Arrest of Ships 
1.2.2.1. The Security Function 
The nature and extent of this function is differently understood in the 
diverse world of legal systems. It has been argued that the security function of arrest 
is indeed its most relevant one. On this token the argument is that the ultimate 
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rationale of arrest of ships is to give the creditor the chance to create a right in 
security over the ship, and in turn that possibility puts pressure on the debtor in 
order to comply with the eventual judgment; that is actually what makes it so 
effective.38 
Internationally, the security function of arrest as such (independently from 
maritime liens) does not have a uniform framework. The issue is not clearly framed 
in English39 or Scots law and this carries the uncertainty of the effect of arrest of 
ships on third party proprietary interests. To make matters even more obscure the 
1952 Arrest Convention has received the following title in its Spanish version: 
'Convenio sobre unificación de ciertas reglas relativas al embargo preventivo de buques', 
even though arrest and embargo are not interchangeable concepts. An embargo is a 
civilian concept meaning in general terms a prohibition to sell. It is an interim 
measure of protection that by itself guarantees the result of a pending or imminent 
proceeding. It provides the embargo -holder a priority against future embargoes and 
any other future rights (in rem or in personam) constituted on the ship. Usually it 
needs to be registered in order to be enforceable. In most legal systems to grant an 
embargo, the ship must have been arrested first; nevertheless, sometimes it is 
possible to register such encumbrance without the ship's prohibition to sail.4° 
Embargo does in fact imply the security function of arrest. 
1.2.2.2. The Jurisdictional Function 
Arrest and jurisdiction are indissolubly linked but not necessarily in the 
same way in the different legal systems. In the opinion of some legal historians 
38 J J Alvarez Rubio (2000) 102. 
39 'Arrest in English law, when used, is simply an early step ensuring physical retention of 
an asset in that process. In relation to arrest as such the only relevant issue (in the context of arrest as 
security] is the extent to which an arrest may be void or stayed as an interference with the bankruptcy 
and liquidation framework' (D C Jackson (2005) 404). 
40 For example, the so- called 'ship- register arrest' in Danish law. 
39 
arrest of ships derives from the processus contra contumacem, a process of arrest of 
property to compel appearance in court of the defendant, developed in medieval 
Europe and broadly recognised in England by the sixteenth century.41 It was 
included into the Blacke Booke of the Admiralty42 as the Ordo Judiciorum43. The main 
aim of the procedure was to provide for a solution against the defendant's refusal to 
appear before the court to contest the suit brought against him. As TETLEY explains, 
in England, the person and /or the property of the defendant in the jurisdiction of the 
Admiral could be arrested for such purposes. In the Ordo Judiciorum there could be 
no question of contumacy until the defendant had received the citation. However, 
by the time of Henry VIII, the arrest of the defendant's property was done 
concurrently with the citation of the defendant. It has been stressed that the practical 
reason which justified such alteration of the 'due process' was the speed with which 
the defendant's main asset, the ship, could leave the jurisdiction,44 thus, adding the 
protective function to the arrest of ships. Furthermore, the possibility of arresting 
any goods of the defendant in the jurisdiction was a particularly useful remedy to 
secure the claim where the defendant himself was out of the jurisdiction (as 
frequently happened and still happens in maritime litigation). 
In modern times, the 'compelling' effect is related to arrest of ships as a 
measure aimed at forcing the debtor to submit to the jurisdiction and to abide by the 
judgment. This 'compelling' effect is not to be understood as to bring undue 
pressure on the defendant to settle; however the borderline is always thin.45 
The strongest link between arrest and jurisdiction is forum arresti and the 
possibility to found jurisdiction on the merits upon arrest. Forum arresti was 
41 W Tetley (1999) 1900 -1901. 
42 T Twiss (ed), Black Book of the Admiralty (2nd Reprint The Lawbook Exchange Ltd 
New Jersey 1999). 
43 W Tetley (1999) 1900 -1901. 
44 Ibid. 
45 As a practitioner one should attest that provisional and protective measures in 
general, and the arrest of ships in particular, can be sometimes a lethal tactical weapon that 
frequently induces an early settlement. 
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originally a jurisdictional basis known only to a very small number of States - 
England and Scotland were among them -. Currently, it has been sustained that 
forum arresti constitutes a general trend in international procedural maritime law 
and that it is justified in terms of convenience, derived from the essentially 
moveable nature of the ship.46 Consequently, it should be accepted together with the 
Scottish doctrine of forum conveniens/non conveniens to advance justice. There are 
legal systems that criticise severely this jurisdictional basis, such as the French, since 
French law does not provide for forum arresti as a consequence of a saisie 
conservatoire performed in a French port. Nevertheless, the jurisdictional function 
has survived and it has been adopted by the international Conventions on the field. 
1.2.2.3. The Protective Function 
The protective function of arrest of ships is its most obvious one,47 so, it is 
possible to refer to arrest as a provisional and protective measure, or as an interim 
measure of protection, even though it is provisional in character and the protective 
function is only one of its functions.48 The arrest of a ship places the res under 
judicial detention pending adjudication of the claim. This character is shared by 
46 R Herbert and C Fresnedo de Aguirre (1993) 167. 
47 D C Jackson (2005) 393. 
48 This is also influenced by European legal literature on the general subject- matter. 
See for example, L Collins, Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation (1992) 
234 Recueil des Cours, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (RdC) 
19; C Kessedjian, 'Note on Provisional and Protective Measures in Private International Law 
and Comparative Law' Hague Conference on Private International Law (HccH) Prel. Doc. 10 
(1998); G Maher and B J Rodger, 'Provisional and Protective Remedies: The British Experience 
of the Brussels Convention' (1999) 48 ICLQ 306; N Andrews, 'Provisional and Protective 
Measures: Towards a Uniform Protective Order in Civil Matters' [2001] Uniform Law 
Review 931; J Carrascosa González, 'Medidas provisionales y cautelares en el Reglamento 
44/2001' (2005) 3 DeCITA 400; A Dickinson, 'English Private International Law Aspects of 
Provisional and Protective Measures' in M Andenas, H Bukhard and P Oberhammer (eds) 
Enforcement Agency Practice in Europe (BIICL London 2005) 284. 
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most of the different institutions serving the same functions49 in the different legal 
systems. As stated by JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, 
'[Tlhe essential object of provisional measures is to ensure that the 
enforcement of a future judgment on the merits shall not be 
frustrated by the actions of one party pendente lite ...[Tlhe essential 
justification for the impatience of a tribunal granting relief before it 
has reached a final decision ... is that the action of one party 
pendente lite causes or threatens damage to the rights of the other, 
of such a nature that it would not be possible fully to restore those 
rights, or remedy the infringement thereof, simply by a judgment in 
its favour'.50 
1.2.3. Economic Analysis of Arrest of Ships 
Since ancient times ship financing transactions are negotiated on the credit of 
the ship rather than that of the owner.51 Ships are high value assets52 over which 
extensive debts can arise.53 The traditional view is that arrest of ships benefit both 
creditors and ship- owners. BROWNE explained that at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century if an Englishman was owed money by a foreign merchant, any ship of the 
latter coming into the river was liable to arrest, the creditor not being obliged to look 
for his debtor in a foreign country due to the security that the ship itself represented. 
Moreover, such a security was considered as favouring as well the foreign merchant 
whom, on such security, was better enabled to gain credit in England upon 
49 Except for arrestment to found jurisdiction in Scots law, which in fact does not 
serve all the main functions of arrest of ships but the jurisdictional function only; see 
Chapter 6 (Arrest of Ships and Jurisdiction on the Merits). 
50 Greece v. Turkey ICJ Reports (1976) 3, 15 -16. 
51 In the past by the form of hypothecation of the ship's bottom (bottomry bond 
currently obsolete); see F L Wiswall (1970) 9 referring G H Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty 
Law in the United States (West Publishing Co. St Paul, Minn. 1939) 370. 
52 At present a large ship can cost over USD 100 million to build (IMO J /9015.doc 4). 
53 J A G Lowe, 'Maritime Securities' The Laws of Scotland, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia 
SME (20) 118 [2731. 
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occasion.54 This has not changed that much in the last five centuries. Arrest and the 
referred related proceedings, particularly in the form of a provisional and protective 
measure, are of central importance in transactions involving ships.55 The 
harmonisation efforts in the field of arrest of ships were indeed aimed at protecting 
the ship -owner from abuse as well as improving his position as to the ability to gain 
credit upon the ship;56 interestingly enough, it has been argued that the arrest of 
ships is the main mechanism of protection and security of ship financing 
transactions.57 Obtaining possession upon default is naturally an essential first 
requisite in the realisation of asset value through enforcement.5s In a slightly 
different area, concerning express rights in security, based primarily on contract, the 
Unidroit Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment takes account 
of such importance. 
Economic analysis is growing in importance in maritime law39 as well as in 
PIL,60 particularly in integrated areas such as Europe. There are fields that are 
particularly fertile for the application of law and economic theories, and it is here 
suggested that the international regulation of arrest of ships is particularly so. The 
economic loss that a ship owner may suffer if his ship is prevented from commercial 
use is generally severe. Thus, if the ship -owner can provide some form of alternative 
security other than the ship for the claim, e.g. bail or other security such as a bank 
guarantee or a letter of undertaking from her insurer (I' &I Clubs), the financially 
54 A Browne, A compendious view of the civil law and of the law of the admiralty: being the 
substance of a course of lectures read in the University of Dublin (vol 2 Halsted and Voorhies New 
York 1840 reprint The Lawbook Exchange Ltd New Jersey 2000) 76. This corresponds to the 
traditional view on rights in securities which are deemed to benefit creditor and debtor. 
55 R Goode, H Kronke, E. McKendrick and J Wool, Transnational Commercial Law 
(OUP Oxford 2004) 437. 
56 J J Alvarez Rubio (2000) 91. 
57 J J Alvarez Rubio (2000) 23. 
58 Ibid. 
59 S Kumar and J Hoffmann, 'Globalization: The Maritime Nexus' in Handbook of 
Maritime Economics (LLP London 2002). 
60 See H Muir Watt, 'Law and Economics: quel apport pour le droit international 
privé ?' in Etudes offertes a Jacques Ghestin: Le contrat au début du XXIe siecle (Librairie Générale 
de Droit et de Jurisprudence Paris 2001) 685. 
43 
unsound situation of having a ship taken out of use may be avoided. On the other 
hand, a ship -owner is at risk of having a ship arrested on insufficient or even 
incorrect grounds. Therefore, the court may make it a condition for granting arrest 
that the claimant furnishes counter -security that will be used in case the ship -owner 
is awarded damages for wrongful arrest. This counter -security is designed to be an 
effective deterrent against arrest applications from less than serious claimants. 
Surprisingly, at present, in order to arrest a ship in England or in Scotland it is not 
necessary to provide any cross -undertaking in damages. 
1.3. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Different legal systems have different understanding of the aims and 
objectives of PIL. Nonetheless, there is universal consensus as to its difficulty.61 The 
most extended conception, that of English and Scots law as well as most civilian 
systems, is that the subject includes the study of conflict of laws, conflict of 
jurisdictions, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.62 In turn, 
61 Particularly in England '...the cases decided in the field have been heavily influenced by 
policy considerations, national pride, and local economic impact of the decisions that must be made. 
The case law is often inconsistent, with the reasoning underlying many decisions appearing to be an 
almost ad hoc quality. The unpredictability of the law in this area has from time to time been judicially 
noted...' (G Bowtle and K McGuinness, The Law of Ship Mortgages (LLP London 2001) 237). 
62 There are also different names for the subject which despite their appearance do 
not really reflect those differences of extent in terms of aims and objectives. There is a 
traditional difference between the common law of the United States of America on the one 
hand, and civil law systems on the other hand. 'The Conflict of Laws' is the preferred name 
used in the USA and the title seems to indicate that the subject matter is limited to applicable 
law problems and choice -of -law methodology; whereas in civilian systems 'Private 
International Law' usually serves to identify a broader area of law covering not only 
applicable law but jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments. That difference is 
more apparent than real and at present legal systems have converged into more or less the 
same contents of the subject. Both names are very well known. Private International Law 
(PIL) is the preferred one in this thesis since it indicates the broadest conception. Moreover, 
it is the label used in the EU. In English law both titles are used and, interestingly enough, 
none of them is used in Scots law where traditionally the title used for the subject has been 
'International Private Law' (IPL). For an explanation of the reasons of such denomination see 
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English and Scottish PIL systems are formed respectively by three main pillars: 
national PIL provisions; European PIL rules (mostly Regulations); and international 
Conventions that are in force in the United Kingdom. In general terms, though Scots 
domestic law differs substantially from English municipal law, yet there is no such 
difference as to their principles of PIL. As legislation in the United Kingdom 
showed an increasing awareness of PIL issues since the 1970s, English and Scots PIL 
have been transformed from systems largely regulated by common law to ones 
largely regulated by statute.63 
1.3.1. A PIL Objective: Juridical Continuity across 
National Borders 
The dilemma that gives rise to PIL as a legal discipline is created by the 
confrontation between a world divided into different legal systems (each one with a 
defined territorial application), and private legal relations that go beyond frontiers. 
In this context the juridical continuity of legal relations across national borders 
becomes the centre of concern of PIL.64 For this purpose 'legal relation' is every 
situation capable of being treated as legally relevant by any legal system. In that 
sense PIL does not differ from any other legal discipline, bearing in mind that all of 
them have legal relations at the centre of their concerns. However, the difference is 
one of perspective: the specific aim of PIL is to solve the problem that arises when 
legal relations are confronted to the discontinuity that the diversity of legal systems 
throughout the world represents. 'Continuity' and 'discontinuity' are hereby used 
as relative (as opposed to absolute) terms, to show the confrontation mentioned 
A E Anton Private International Law: A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell Edinburgh 1967). 
63 E B Crawford and J M Carruthers, International Private Law in Scotland (Green 
Edinburgh 2006) 2. 
64 See R Herbert in D Opertti Badán et al, Objeto y Metodo en el Derecho Internacional 
Privado (2nd edn Fundacion de Cultura Universitaria (FCU) Montevideo 1990) 93 -118 (tr by 
the author). 
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above. As HERBERT65 explains, the juridical continuity of legal relations is the 
dynamic objective at the centre of concern of PIL, in a world divided by national 
borders (discontinuity of legal order). 
1.3.2. PIL, Uniform Law and Comparative Law 
1.3.2.1. PIL and Methodological Pluralism 
At present PIL takes advantage of methodological pluralism66 in addressing 
one of the three main issues referred above: the conflict of laws. There are two main 
methods used: the 'uniformist' method (or unification of substantive law), and the 
'conflictualist' method (or choice -of -law methodology). The first one is used '...in the 
few departments of law where this unity is imperative and possible...'67 via international 
Conventions and Treaties. The traditional view is that whenever such unanimity is 
not attainable the conflictualist method remains the only solution. The latter creates 
rules (abstract rules) that indicate merely the legal system which is to supply the 
substantive provision in the particular case. As explained by OPERTTI, uniform rules 
and conflict rules have a different objective: the first ones create the substantive 
provisions for a certain PIL category; by contrast, conflict rules select the applicable 
law amongst the diversity of legal systems connected to the case. There are national 
conflict rules, originated from national systems of PIL; and there are international 
conflict rules, resulting from the efforts of the 'internacionalists' to unify the rules of 
PIL so as to ensure juridical continuity of legal relations across national borders. 
This second type of rules is also embodied in international Conventions and 
Treaties. 
65 Ibid 100. 
66 J R Talice in D Opertti Badán et al, Objeto y Método en el Derecho Internacional 
Privado (2nd edn FCU Montevideo 1990) 29, 53. 
67 P M North and J J Fawcett, Cheshire and North Private International Law (13th edn 
Butterworths London 1999) 10. 
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Both methods are currently used within PIT_ and they do not exclude but 
complement each other, i.e. eclecticism's is the rule, as it was already in BARTOLUS 
times.®9 Legal history shows that there is no need to resort to one method to the 
exclusion of the other, to achieve a just and satisfactory result. Moreover, this thesis 
shows, in the particular field of ranking of maritime claims, that the choice -of -law 
methodology is sometimes inefficient to provide a suitable solution. Hence, 
methodological pluralism is supreme.-A) Though, arrest of ships as a PIL category, is 
very much influenced by the use of the 'uniformist'. method, as it is private 
international maritime law more generally. This is reflected in the international 
Conventions in the field. 
13.2.2. Uniform Law and Maritime Law 
Even though uniform Conventions such as the 1952 Arrest Convention"' 
affected positively the difficulties arising from the diversity of legal systems, it has 
not suppressed all the problems that PIL aims to answer in that field. It is 
uncontested that uniform laws do not necessarily mean uniform application of such 
laws; and the 1952 Arrest Convention is indeed an example of such disparity in 
application.%2 
A Reppy Jr., `Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid or Mishmash ?' (1983) 34 
Mercer Law Review 645. 
69 Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313- 1357). In the early conflicts literature the two basic 
approaches to PIL issues, i.e. unilateralism and multilateralism, were already coexisting 
methods despite the fact that they yield different conclusions (P H von Neuhaus, Die 
Grundbegriffe des Inteniationalen Privatrechts (Mohr Tübingen 1976) 4 -8, 29). 
J R Talice (1990) 29 -61. 
71 International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea -Going Ships signed in 
Brussels on May 10pß^ 1952. 
i2 For several examples of different applications of the 1952 Arrest Convention in 
different countries see F Berlingieri (2006) and J J Alvarez Rubio (2000). 
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1.3.2.3. PIL Limits in Relation to Uniform Rules 
Uniform rules, as any other rule of law, have two elements: the category (the 
factual situations covered by the norm) and the provision (the legal consequence). 
The scope of research of PIL as a legal discipline in relation to uniform rules is 
limited to the first element of this normative structure: the factual situation, where 
the internationalism of the rule remains. In particular, the PIL concerns73 in this 
sphere relate to a) the scope of application of uniform Conventions; b) the scope 
(alcance extensivo) of arrest of ships as a legal category [the characterization 
problem]; c) the problems with interpretation of international Conventions; d) the 
necessary coordination of legal rules resulting from the coexistence of different 
(overlapping) legal systems. 
1.3.2.4. Comparative Law and PIL 
In turn, comparative law represents very important assistance to the whole 
width of juridical science; for PIL its importance is vital. The study of comparative 
law is the first step in understanding different legal cultures and indispensable if the 
aim is to achieve harmonisation, and even more, unification of the law in a 
particular field. The study of comparative law is indeed of pivotal support to PIL.74 
Both methods used in the conflict of laws, namely the 'conflictualist' method and 
73 For the selection of the issues the opinion of J R Talice insofar as the objectives of 
PIL has been followed. '...Debe corresponder a la Parte General del Derecho Internacional 
Privado... los siguientes problemas a) campo de aplicacion en el espacio b) alcance extensivo de la 
categoria regulada c) el problema integrativo e interpretativo d) coordinacion normative frente a la 
coexistencia de normas' (J R Talice (1990) 59). 
74 On this theme see De Boer, TM, 'The Missing Link: Some Thoughts on the 
Relationship between Private International Law and Comparative Law' in Boele -Woelki [et 
all (eds), Comparability and Evaluation, Essays on Comparative Law, Private International Law and 
International Commercial Arbitration in Honour of Dimitra Kokkini -Iatridou (Nijhoff The Hague 
1994) 15. 
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the 'uniformist' one depend on the permanent assistance of comparative law. A PIL 
scholar must necessarily be a comparatist.75 
1.3.3. Europeanization of PIL 
One of the most important phenomena influencing the current development 
of PIL is market integration, particularly at the regional level.76 Such influence has 
generated a process that has been called the 'Europeanization' of PIL. This process 
poses various different issues77 and involves in many cases giving up national 
conflict rules in favour of harmonization and unification. As recognised by 
JOLOWICZ integration processes between states such as the one undertaken by the 
European Union are leading to a degree of harmonization of law in a pace never 
experienced in modern legal history.78 
Before the Treaty of Amsterdam measures designed to secure the 
harmonization of conflict rules at EC level had taken the form of Conventions 
signed and ratified by the Member States on the basis of what is now article 293 of 
the EC Treaty. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1St May 
1999, much progress has been done in the 'Europeanization of PIL' via the 
harmonisation of conflict rules at European level by means of EC regulations 
adopted under Title IV (Articles 61 -69) of the EC Treaty. The Amsterdam reform of 
the EC Treaty has given specific competence to Community institutions to legislate 
75 J Dolinger, Direito InternacionaI Privado (5th edn Renovar Rio de Janeiro 1997) 44. 
76 This is a reflection of the tendency in international trade. Regional trade has been 
growing faster than inter -regional trade, i.e. intra- European or intra- MERCOSUR trade has 
been increasing at a higher rate than trade between these two regional blocks ((2004) 25 
UNCTAD Transport Newsletter 15). 
77 See C van der Plas, 'The Limits of the Judicial Function and the Conflict of Laws' 
(2006) 53 Netherlands International Law Review (3) 439 -470. 
78 J A Jolowicz (2002) 721. 
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on PIL issues (Article 65 EC). The ultimate objective is the proper functioning of the 
internal market. 
With the Treaty of Amsterdam the judicial cooperation in civil matters, more 
specifically PIL and procedural law, has been transferred from the Third Pillar to the 
First Pillar. Whereas the Second and Third Pillars may be qualified as 'inter- 
governmental', in the First Pillar, the Community Pillar, use is made, firstly, of 
primary law provisions which have direct effect, and secondly, of secondary law 
provisions enacted upon the recommendation of the Commission as an independent 
institution and concerning which the Court of Justice in Luxembourg offers legal 
protection and legal unity. The movement of PIL from the Third Pillar to the First 
Pillar shows that the Community is interested in advancing the harmonisation in 
the field to a great extent. 
Coherency and consistency are paramount in this sphere; coherency with 
basic premises of Community law and consistency with fundamental decisions 
already adopted by the ECJ. Particularly in the field of jurisdiction, European 
criteria should conform to fundamental principles of the European legal system 
such as, in the commercial sphere, the free movement of judgments. 
This harmonization would have better chances of succeeding in so far 
'decisional harmony' is concerned if the various jurisdictions involved also intend to 
harmonise their respective procedures.79 Already in 1946 GUTTERIDGE stressed that 
'...similarity of rule in two or more systems of law, in the substantive sense, may easily be 
nullified by divergence in procedure'... 80 Harmonization of PIL rules could be a pivotal 
starting point for further private law uniformity.81 
79 J A Jolowicz (2002) 725. 
80 H Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal 
Study and Research (CUP Cambridge 1949) 35. 
B1 There is a wealth of literature on the topic of private law harmonisation in Europe, 
from the most sceptical positions to the most optimistic, up to some utopia. Measures 
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'Europeanization' has represented a big change for English, and arguably 
also for Scots PIL (IPL), and one commentator has called it '...a systematic dismantling 
of the common law of conflicts of law' ...82 since in his opinion the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ)'s decisions on the field have been mainly civil law orientated. 
Regardless of whether one agrees with such assessment or not it is clear that '...one 
enters a new world once an area of private law becomes Europeanized'....R3This process 
directly affects the idiosyncratic British maritime jurisdiction and the challenge 
seems to be to fit maritime jurisdiction into Europe. 84 
1.4. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is about relationships. It is not a thesis on the arrest of ships, but a 
thesis on the relationship between arrest of ships and PIL. It is not a thesis on 
English and Scots law, but a thesis on the relationship between English law, Scots 
law and the international Conventions on arrest of ships. It is not a thesis on 
comparative law, but a thesis where comparative law is used as a device for the sake 
of a PIL examination. It involves not only the study of maritime law and PIL but 
several other 'departments of law' such as the Scots law of diligence and the law of 
rights in security, among others. This thesis is, indeed, the product of an axis of 
innumerable relationships. 
adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty apply to the UK only if it elects to participate in the 
adoption of, or to accept, the measure in question. 
82 T Hartley, 'The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common 
Law of Conflict of Laws' (2005) 54 ICLQ 813; J Mance, 'The Future of Private International 
Law' (2005) 2 Journal of Private International Law 185. 
83 T Hartley (2005) 813. 
84 See D C Jackson, 'Fitting Maritime Jurisdiction into Europe or vice versa? [20011 
LMCLQ 219. This thesis concludes that fitting the European admiralty scheme into English 
and Scottish traditions is feasible and desirable (conclusion 8.13 page 305). 
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This chapter has sought to set the context in which the topic of arrest of ships 
in PIL in English and Scots law is going to be considered, and to introduce some 
concepts that are going to be of use throughout this piece of work. In a nutshell, the 
present study has the following major objectives: First, the characterization of arrest 
of ships as a provisional and protective measure and consequently the review from 
a critical viewpoint of the indistinctive conceptualization of ship arrest in English 
law in modern times as an inherent part of the action in rem,85 conceptualization that 
seems to apply to any kind of ship arrest available in England and to prevail over its 
conceptualization as a provisional and protective measure. Secondly, the 
systematization of the state of affairs regarding the legal framework applicable to 
the security function of arrest of ships; its distinction from maritime liens;86 and the 
examination of the conflict of laws issues in this respect in English, Scots and 
international law. Thirdly, this thesis considers the convenience of the survival of 
forum arresti as a specific jurisdictional ground for maritime claims in the context of 
the Europeanization of PIL. Fourthly, the role of the lex fori is examined throughout 
this thesis; its impact on characterization issues; its subtleties when applied as the 
governing (substantive) law of the forum (qua lex causae); and its so often too far - 
reaching scope when used as the law of the forum as such (qua lex fori) (in English 
law through the widest possible extension to the meaning of the term 'procedure'). 
Finally, jurisdiction for the sole purpose of interim relief (hereinafter ancillary 
jurisdiction) is distinguished from jurisdiction on the merits of the case in the 
context of arrest of ships. The underlying rationale of the proximity principle as a 
pivotal device of judicial cooperation is examined in this context. 
85 International Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999 art 2(4) see R Goode, H Kronke, 
E McKendrick and J Wool (2004) 440. 
86 The English term 'maritime lien' strictly corresponds to a maritime hypothec in 
traditional Scots law; however due to the internationalism that the English terms has 
acquired through international Conventions on the field, Scots law has recently recognised 
by statue the usage of the English term in order to indicate a hypothec over a ship, cargo, or 
other maritime property; i.e. a non -possessory real right of security in a ship, cargo, or other 
maritime property (see Administration of Justice Act 1956, Ch 46, s 48 (2), as amended by 
Schedule 4 to the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007). 
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The whole analysis indicates that at present arrest of ships is a mixed legal 
institution in its fullest comprehension; undoubtedly an axis of common law and 
civil law but not only such. 87 
87 Note on methodology and terminology: In order to achieve consistency, The 
Oxford Standard for Citation of Legal Authorities (OSCOLA 2006) has been followed as far 
as possible. That is the reason why this thesis has departed from normal practice in the 
citation of cases and preference has been given to the specialist series of the Lloyd's Law 
Reports. Also following OSCOLA 2006 is that bibliographic references are given in full only 
in their first mention in each chapter; subsequent mentions are done in the abbreviated form. 
As far as terminology, traditionally PIL studies are characterised by the use of Latin; this 
thesis is not immune to that tendency. That is the reason to provide at least the definition of 
the two Latin expressions more frequently used throughout this study. Lex fori: the domestic 
law of the country where an action is raised. Lex causae: the legal system which governs the 
subject matter of an action (these definitions have been taken from E B Crawford and J M 
Carruthers (2006) 4). 
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Part I 
'The Admiralty law of the two countries is derived 
from the same source, namely, the ancient customs 
of the commercial nations of Europe, which have 
grown up into a system with the knowledge and 
assent of both England and Scotland as members of 
the commercial community of nations, and which, 
with certain limits and with certain exceptions, 
have all the force of an international code.' 88 
88 Boettcher y Carron Co 186123 D 322, 330. 
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'The Lex Maritima of Europe and the Mediterranean was 
more truly international than any other, earlier than any 
other, and developed a coherence and unity out of 
necessity'. 1 
CHAPTER TWO 
Arrest of Ships in the Lex Maritima 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The precise historical lineage of arrest of ships is not entirely clear. Despite 
several scholarly attempts2 to trace back this ancient process no definite source has 
appeared to be the original one. The need to provide security in the case of foreign 
defendants was already a requisite in the practice of the ancient Athenian maritime 
procedure as early as in the fourth century. However, arrest of ships is not 
mentioned there as a device used for such purposes but imprisonment of the 
defendant if necessary. 
After a very brief outline of the legal origins of arrest in general -not limited 
to the arrest of ships- in civil and commercial litigation this chapter follows a 
chronological order. First, it analyses the arrest of ships in the ancient lex maritima. 
Then, along with the rise of nationalism, it analyses the arrest of ships as practised 
in England and Scotland in the nineteenth century. The analysis of the 
contemporary lex maritima since the beginning of the 20th century up till present 
times is left to Chapter 3. 
J Mathiasen, 'Some Problems of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the 17th Century' (1958) 
2 The American Journal of Legal History (3) 215. 
2 See eg F L Wiswall, The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice since 1800 
(CUP Cambridge 1970) 183. 
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2.1.1. Arrest in Civil and Commercial Litigation 
There are different opinions as to the origins of arrest as a legal institution. 
According to GIERKE3 arrest has a Germanic foundation. Nevertheless, MUTHER 
considered that arrest already existed in Roman law4 and WACH distinguished the 
German evolution from the Italian evolution, the first one from the Carolingian 
times, and the latter from Longobardish law.5 In early times arrest was linked to 
enforcement processes and its compelling effects were against the person and not 
against the res.6 At the beginning it was voluntarily agreed between the litigating 
parties as a way to secure the accomplishment with the eventual judgment', and 
later it became compulsory in favour of the creditor, first against the person of the 
debtor, and later on against his property. Arrest preserved only what was enough to 
cover the debts 
3 0 Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht (Duncker u. Humblot Leipzig 1895) (1) 330 ,Dieses 
dem römischen Recht unbekannte Rechtsinstitut hat sich aus deutschrechtlicher Wurzel im gemeinen 
Zivilprozess entwickelt'. For a historic overview of arrest see P Miranda, História e Prática do 
Arresto ou Embargo (Saraiva Sao Paulo 1929 reprint Bookseller Campinas 1999). 
4 T Muther, Sequestration und Arrest im Römischen Recht (Hirzel Leipzig 1856) 304, 
344. It is here submitted that as far as arrest of ships is concerned it is clear that it did exist 
already in the times of the Roman Empire. 
5 H von Rudorff, Zur Rechtsstellung der Gäste im mittelalterlichen städtischen Prozess: 
vorzugsweise nach norddeutschen Quellen (Marcus Breslau 1907) (88) 41. 
6 J W von Planck, Das deutsche Gerichtsverfahren im Mittelalter: nach dem Sachsenspiegel 
und den verwandten Rechtsquellen (Braunschweig 1879 reprint Olms Hildesheim 1973) (2) 367. 
Planitz considered the arrest against the fugitive debtor as the main type of arrest in the past 
(H Planitz, Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Arrestprozesses, Der Arrest gegen den fugitivus in 
Zeitschrift der Savigny- Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (germanische Abteilung 1913 (34) 49) 
online at http: / /www.bibliothek. uni -regensburg.de /ezeit/ ?2085091. Nevertheless this thesis is 
rejected by P Miranda (1929). 
7 P Miranda (1929) 25. 
8 P Miranda (1929) 62. 
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2.2. ARREST OF SHIPS IN THE ANCIENT LEX MARITIMA 
2.2.1. The Earliest Times of Maritime Navigation 
The ancient lex maritima originated from the customs of the early Egyptians, 
Phoenicians and Greeks, who carried an extensive commerce in the Mediterranean 
Sea. These rules enjoyed authority far beyond the ports were they were 
promulgated. Basically, until the rise of modern nations, maritime law did not 
derive its force from territorial sovereigns but represented what was already 
conceived to be the customary law of the sea.9 Nonetheless, no trace of arrest of 
ships, or any institution thought to provide for similar functions, can be found in the 
substantive rules of the earliest times of maritime navigation. The very first rules 
related to the maritime adventure and its perils such as the Hammurabi's Code of 
Laws (circa 1780 B.C.), the Sumerian Laws Handbook (circa 1700 B.C.), and the Laws of 
Manu (Manusmriti) (1500 B.C. to 200 A.D.) do not provide for any such rule or 
procedure. Neither is arrest of ships accounted for as a common practice in the 
Hellenic culture. However, it should be noted that the Athenian commercial 
maritime procedure of the fourth century, the dikai emporiki, was rigorous when it 
came to pre -trial bail for defendants.10 This rigorousness was a consequence of the 
heavy participation of foreigners in those commercial cases." Special provisions 
were available for assuring a defendant's appearance at the ensuing trial and 
measures such as imprisonment could be taken to enforce the judgment of maritime 
tribunals.72 That shows that two of the three functions that eventually arrest of ships 
came to fulfil later in time, the jurisdictional and the security functions, were already 
9 s S Jados (tr), The Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents (University of Alabama 
Press Alabama 1975) (available online at LIBRO http: / /libro.uca.edu /consulate, last accessed 
on September 7, 2007). 
19 E E Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts (Princeton University Press New 
Jersey 1973) 80. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 8. 
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part of commercial and maritime proceedings involving foreigners since at least the 
fourth century. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it is in Rhodian law73 as compiled in 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis (Book XIV Title I -II of the Justinian's Digest) of the sixth 
century where the first evidences of arrest of ships ever appeared. Romans did not 
have their own maritime law. They incorporated in the Corpus Iuris Civilis the famed 
Rhodian Sea Law. According to that law in the early times of the Roman Empire the 
ship or res could be arrested until bail was given and this arrest was not justified 
under the tacita pignora (tacit hypothec) of the Romans.14 However, the origins of 
such practice are quite unsettled. No primary written specimen of the Rhodian law 
has survived, so it is impossible to tell whether this practice was already common in 
the law of Rhodes. Nonetheless, the majority seem to derive arrest as a process from 
the processus contra contumacem of Roman law. The first evidence of arrest of ships as 
a procedure would emerge then from the transposition of the law of Rhodes -i.e. the 
practices of a small- shipping- experienced island- as incorporated in the magnificent 
compilation of Roman law and associated with the Roman processus contra 
contumacem. This could be seen as the very first merger in the long chain of 
amalgamations throughout the centuries that have led to what is known today as 
arrest of ships. 
73 Some commentators consider Rhodian Laws as the most ancient maritime laws in 
Europe; see G J Bell, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland and on the Principles of Mercantile 
Jurisprudence (vol 2, 7th edn T & T Clark Edinburgh 1870 reprint Butterworths Edinburgh 
1990) 547. Bell provides a good concise enumeration and description of authorities received 
by Scottish judges, ie The Rhodian Laws, Il Consolato del Mare, Rules of Oleron, Rules of 
Wisby, The Ordonnances of the Hanseatic Towns, Le Guidon de la Mer, Ordonnance de la 
Marine of Louis XIV, Code de Commerce, the determinations of maritime and mercantile 
courts such as the ones of Genoa, Friesland and Holland, and the decisions (of greatest 
authority) of the High Court of Admiralty of England; see op cit 547 -550. 
14 A Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil Law and of the Law of Admiralty (vol 2 
Halsted and Voorhies New York 1840 reprint The Lawbook Exchange Ltd New Jersey 2000) 
35. When analysing the contents of the law Rhodia de Jactu Browne summarises its contents 
as follows '... They make the exercitor or owner answerable for the contracts of the master and it is 
said they also make the ship liable for the same. They certainly do inasmuch as the res or ship might be 
arrested by process till bail was given: but I do not find any such case among the tacita pignora (tacit 
pledge) of the Romans though repairs of a ship might like all other repairs constitute a tacit pledge...'. 
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2.2.2. Arrest of Ships in the Medieval Era 
Undoubtedly it was in medieval times where the blossoming of commerce 
within Europe led to the emergence of the lex mercatoria, a cosmopolitan mercantile 
law based upon customs and applied to cross -border disputes by the market 
tribunals15 of the various European trade centres. This law resulted from the effort 
of the medieval trade community to overcome the fragmentary and obsolete rules of 
feudal and Roman law which could not respond to the needs of the inter -local and 
international commerce.16 Merchants created a superior law, which constituted a 
solid legal basis for the great expansion of commerce. For almost eight hundred 
years uniform rules of law, those of the Iaw merchant, were applied throughout 
Western Europe among traders. The lex maritima comprising the rules applied to 
shipping were an important part of such lex mercatoria. However, arrest of ships is 
not mentioned in many medieval sea laws. The first codes of the Medieval Era such 
as the Maritime Ordinances of Trani (1063 A.D.), the Navigation Code of the Port of Arles 
(1150), the Barcelona Navigation Act of 1227 or the Maritime Code of 1258 do not 
provide for the arrest of ships as an interim measure of protection. 
Interestingly enough, the relation between the ship and its creditors as 
known in present times originated during those times. In La Tabula de Amalfa dated 
from 1095 A.D. the ship was already considered as the guarantee. There were 
provisions such as 'let the ship and the capital advanced on commission form one mass and 
one fund, and let the ship be responsible for the capital, and the capital for the ship, 
notwithstanding, any other ancient or modern obligation howsoever incurred'17 or the 
faculty of the master to 'bind the ship to whomsoever he may please, expressly in 
15 In England these were so- called pie poudre and staple courts (G Baron, 'Do the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New Lex Mecatorta ?' 
(1998) 15 Arbitration International (2) 117). 
16 A M Lopez Rodriguez, Lex Mercatoria and Harmonization of Contract Law in the EU 
(DJOF Publishing Copenhagen 2003). 
77 Art 6 see T Twiss (ed), The Black Book of the Admiralty (vol 4 Longman London 
1871 -1876 2nd Reprint The Lawbook Exchange Ltd New Jersey 1998) 9. 
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accordance with the usage of the Strand of the aforesaid city, notwithstanding, any public or 
private agreement in the nature of a contract or a quasi- contract entered into between the 
parties'.18 The relationship between the ship's equipment and the ship's creditors is 
found also in the first article of The Rules of Oleron19 (circa 1266), where interestingly 
enough, Scotland is expressly mentioned," and it is established that the master may 
pledge part of the ship's equipment for necessaries. 
It is in the Ordinances issued by King James of Spain (1213 -1276) for the 
Island of Majorca where the first provisions regarding to the arrest of ships 
appeared, but it was not until the end of the fifteenth century, when they were 
compiled in the Consolato del Mare (1494),21 that they acquired broader recognition 
and acceptance. Arrest is therein expressly authorised by provision number 4222 
under the title 'Demand of a Guarantee When Seizure of a Vessel is Ordered'. 
18 Article 7 Ibid. 
19 While travelling the eastern Mediterranean on the Crusades with her first husband 
King Louis VII of France, Eleanor of Aquitaine discovered a complicated and advanced 
system of admiralty law. She brought back this admiralty law and administered it upon her 
people on the island of Oleron. Later, while acting as regent for her son King Richard the 
Lionheart in England she founded the English system of admiralty law on such bases. 
20 'Art I. When several joint owners make a man master of a ship or vessel, and the ship or 
vessel departing from her own port, arrives at Bordeaux, Rouen, or any other such place, and is there 
freighted to sail for Scotland, or some other foreign country; the master in such case may not sell or 
dispose of that ship or vessel, without a special procuration from the owners: but in case he wants 
money for the victualling, or other necessary provisions of the said vessel, he may for that end, with 
the advice of his mariners, pawn or pledge part of the tackle or furniture of a ship'. 
21 The Consulate of the Sea is a compilation of ordinances. The first such codification 
was published in 1010 under the title of Customs of the City of Amalfitina; a second one was 
published in 1063 in the city of Trani. In 1509 an edited copy of the later was incorporated 
into the statutes of de city of Fermo. It is also said that in the Hansa Towns (Baltic, North 
Sea, Hanseatic League) some of these laws were adopted earlier and published under the 
auspicies of the Hanseatic League, under the title Waterrecht in 1407 (the Laws of Wisby). All 
these compilations contributed significantly to the later formation of the Consulate of the Sea 
of the fifteenth century (see S S Jados (tr) (1975)). 
22 'In all instances when the Consuls order seizure of a vessel and its cargo as a guarantee...'. 
Against the background of these ordinances, it looks as if this 'guarantee seizure' is the 
modern arrest of ships because 'guarantee' was only mentioned in these ordinances in such 
context. Ordinance No 30, under the title 'Posting a Bond to Assure the Execution of a Veredict' 
establishes 'If the summons demands that the defendant furnish a guarantee in thee action brought 
against him;..., and if he is a foreigner, he must furnish a guarantee bond at once...' (S S Jados (tr) 
(1975)). 
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Therefore it can be submitted without hesitation that even though arrest 
procedures were already practised in Roman law, arrest of ships had it earliest 
developments in medieval times, in the context of shipping- credit and related to 
litigation involving foreigners. That is to say, two main functions were already then 
performed by arresting a ship. The first one related to the assertion of jurisdiction 
over a defendant who without such detention would not be submitted to it; and the 
second one, the security function, related to the ship as an asset guaranteeing the 
payment of debts. The third function identifiable in present times, the protective 
function, is indeed a pre- condition for these two to be operative; hence, arguably, 
the three functions have been part of the law of arrest of ships since its early origins. 
2.2.3. Arrest of Ships in Early English Maritime 
Practice 
In England admiralty courts were already functioning in the 11th century. 
The greatest source to trace back arrest of ships as practiced in England is Twiss' 
Black Book of the Admiralty 23 which although only published in its modern form in 
1871, was compiled as the definitive English collection of Admiralty sources dating 
from the middle Ages. The Black Book shows that in the second year of the reign of 
King John (A.D. 1200) in Ipswich24 there was a 'court sitting regularly from tide to tide to 
administer the Law Marine in England'.25 This was a practice also in other regions of 
23 Through the compilation of The Black Book Twiss succeeded to show that in the 
practice of shipping law the world rest firmly on the same roots; see J Hare, 'Of Black Books, 
White Horses and Sacred Cows: The Quest for International Uniformity in Maritime Law' 
(1999) British Maritime Law Association available online at 
http: / /www.bmla.org.uk /documents /of_black_books.htm 
24 See N S B Gras, 'A List of Local Customs Due in the Port of Ipswich' in The Early 
English Customs System: A Documentary Study of the Institutional and Economic History of the 
Customs from the Thirteenth to the Sixteenth Century (vol 18 CUP Cambridge 1918) 159. 
25 Domesday of Ipswich, Black Book of the Admiralty, T Twiss (vol 2, 1998) viii 
'...When and how this practice originated does not appear. It was a legacy of the imperial Rome that 
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the country where 'courts sat in those boroughs from day to day, or from sea to sea, as the 
case might be, to administer justice between men of various nations, whom the spirit of 
commerce or the necessities of navigation happened to bring within their local jurisdiction'.26 
Later on, the courts of the Lord High Admiral dealt primarily with cases of piracy 
and naval discipline but gradually these tribunals extended their jurisdiction to 
commercial matters. 
Arrest of ships is also an ancient institution in England even though is not 
possible to determine with certainty when this practice started.27 In the very first 
reports found in the oldest English admiralty manuscripts there are several 
references to arrest for the king's service28 but it is difficult to assert when arrest 
procedures linked with commercial litigation started and what were the legal 
grounds for such a practice. In any case, at the beginning of the sixteenth century 
such a practice was common and was intrinsically linked with commercial cases 
with foreign elements. 
As no real right was necessary to found the Admiralty action in rem against 
ships in the medieval or early modern period, rather than it being derived from the 
actio realis of Roman law legal historians point to a procedural origin of arrest of 
ships in English Admiralty jurisdiction. In their opinion it derives from the processus 
contra contumacem, a process developed all over medieval Europe and firmly 
maritime causes should be heard without any delay before the competent judges in each province, and 
there is good reason for believing that medieval Europe accepted this legacy, and never allowed it to 
lapse'. The Domesday of Ipswich is the earliest extant record of any borough Court to sit 
daily to administer the law merchant. Ipswich was an important maritime borough in the 
time of Edward the Confessor. 
26 T Twiss (vol 2, 1998) vii -viii. 
27 ' When the right to press private ships for the service of the crown originated is not very 
clear. A fleet of Edward the Confessor's in the year 1049 consisted partly of "king's ships" partly of 
"people's ships "'... (T Twiss (vol 1, 1998) 65). In the old rules for the Lord Admiral (Liber Niger 
Admiralitatis) found in The Black Book of the Admiralty there are provisions regarding the 
arrest 'for the king's service or for any other reasonable cause' (T Twiss (vol 1, 1998) 65 -67). 
28 See the Documents Connected with the Admiralty of John Holland, Duke of 
Exeter, 1443 -46 in T Twiss (vol 1, 1998) 65, 250, 262. In these documents there are several 
precepts to arrest ships. One of them appears as 'precept to arrest certain aliens and their goods'. 
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established in the City of London by the fifteenth century.29 The civilian judges of 
the High Court of Admiralty practised ship detention during the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries in the framework of the processus contra contumacem. Its primary 
purpose was to neutralise the effects of the defendant's contemptuous resistance to 
appear before the court. This procedure could be exercised in two ways: against the 
person or against his property (any property, all the assets of the defendant were at 
stake, not only the ones related to the claim). The process was a summary one: first, 
the person and /or the property of the defendant were arrested at the same time that 
the defendant was cited to appear.30 Secondly, the defendant received up to four 
citations to appear and if all were defaulted the claimant would formulate his claim 
in the form of a draft sentence or article upon first decree.31 Finally, the admiralty 
court in its primum decretum could award possession32 of the property arrested to the 
claimant based on the defendant's contumacy.33 In the original Continental 
procedure, a secundum decretum was needed in an actio personalis (different from the 
actio realis, where real rights were at stake) in order to transfer ownership of the 
arrested property to the claimant after a period of time. In England, the secundum 
decretum rarely appeared in case law, paradoxically, due to the irrelevance of the 
distinction between actio realis and actio personalis34 in English law. The arrest did not 
depend for its validity on the existence of any real right on the ship or the goods 
derived from a lien or a hypothec; the only requirements were that the ship or goods 
belonged to the defendant and were within the Court's jurisdiction.35 
The development in English law later abandoned these origins completely to 
reach the opposite pole: where the availability of arrest will depend on the existence 
29 W Tetley, 'Arrest, Attachment and Related Maritime Law Procedures' (1999) 73 
Tulane Law Review 1895, 1900 -1901. 
3o W Tetley (1999) 1901. 
31 Ibid. 
32 In the Continental original processus contra contumacem possession was granted 
only in actio realis and in actio personalis only custody of the property up to the amount of the 
indebtedness was granted (W Tetley (1999) 1901 fn 19). 
33 A Browne (vol 2, 1840) 352; W Tetley (1999) 1901. 
34 W Tetley (1999) 1901 fn 19. 
35 W Tetley (1999) 1903. 
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of a maritime lien (a real right on the ship) and where the relevance of the 
distinction between action in rem and action in personam will become not only 
paramount but -in the opinion of some- the raison d'être of arrest of ships as a legal 
institution. In modern times, however, the situation of English law lies somewhere 
in the middle of this polarization, not without incongruities and inconsistencies 
difficult to overcome. 
Hence, the English mark of arrest of ships as a measure in rem lies elsewhere, 
not in the distinction between actio realis and actio personalis of Roman law. It can be 
said that the distinction in personam /in rem even though it originated undoubtedly 
from the Roman one, evolved as something completely different. It has been 
suggested that owes its genesis to the long lasting clash between the High Court of 
Admiralty jurisdiction and that of the common law courts started in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries.36 
The court of admiralty was a civil law court and during those times it was 
continuously confronted with the common law courts to determine the extent and 
limits of its jurisdiction. It took many centuries and more prohibitions37 to settle this 
issue, unfortunately with not so good results for the Admiralty court 38 One of the 
36 A Mandaraka- Sheppard, Modern Admiralty Law (Cavendish London 2001) 5. 
37 A prohibition is a writ issued by a [superior] court, directed to the judge and 
parties of a suit in an [inferior court], commanding them to cease from the prosecution of the 
same, upon a suggestion that the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, 
does not belong to that jurisdiction, but to the cognizance of some other court (W W C, 'The 
Function of Writs of Prohibition' (1919) 28 The Yale Law Journal 482). In the case of the clash 
between the court of admiralty and the common law courts the prohibitions were most of 
the times based on prejudice rather than on reason (A Browne (vol 2, 1840) 85). 
38 Already in 1632 the rules were as follows 'If suit should be commenced in the 
court of admiralty upon contracts made, or other things personal, done beyond the seas, or 
upon the sea, no prohibition to be awarded. If suit be before the admiral for freight, or 
mariners wages, or for breach of charter -parties, for voyages to be made beyond the seas; 
though the charter -party happen to be made within the realm, so as the penalty be not 
demanded, a prohibition is not to be granted: but it the suit be for the penalty; or if the 
question be, whether the plaintiff did release or otherwise discharge the same within the 
realm; this is to be tried in the King's courts at Westminster, and not in his court of 
admiralty.If suit be in the court of admiralty for building, amending, saving or necessary 
victualling of a ship, against the ship itself, and not against any party by name, but such as 
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ways used by the common law courts to limit the scope of action of the High Court 
of Admiralty was to dwell upon the idea that admiralty jurisdiction was limited to 
causes of action involving the liability of the vessel, as opposed to the personal 
liability of the owner. At those times the device used in admiralty to compel the 
defendant to appear in court was to arrest the person of the defendant39 or seize his 
assets within the jurisdiction (maritime attachment). When the High Court of 
Admiralty lost its jurisdiction in personam (therefore to arrest the person of the 
defendant was no longer competent) arrest of the ship came to be seen as the 
exclusive mode in which admiralty process was exercisable in respect of such 
claims.40 The advantage of having the ship as security was so manifest that common 
law courts were forced to yield and admiralty jurisdiction regained part of its lost 
jurisdiction in later times. Nevertheless, after those long centuries of struggle it was 
never again what it once was. From then on, an action in rem is one against the ship 
or res where an action in personam is against the owner or charterer of the ship, even 
though the border lines have never been and certainly are still not entirely clear. 
This traditional in rem /in personam distinction -upon which all the admiralty law of 
England and its ex- colonies has been developing during the last two hundred years - 
is full of inconsistencies. 
for his interest makes himself a party, no prohibition is to be granted, though this be done 
within the realm' (A Browne (vol 2, 1840) 78 -79). For more on the diminishing influence of 
the civilians in the seventeenth century see B P Levack, The civil lawyers in England, 1603- 
1641: a political study (Clarendon Oxford 1973). 
39 The last known maritime attachment exercised as arrest of a person was in 1780 
The Clara (1855) Swab 1. 
40 W Tetley (1999) 1903. 
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2.2.4. Arrestment of Ships in Early Scottish Maritime 
Practice 
The first compilation to include a section on sea laws appears to be 
BALFOUR's Practicks;41 however this collection was not published until the eighteenth 
century. As early as in 1590 WILLIAM WELWOOD published the first textbook of 
maritime law to be published in Great Britain under the title Sea Laws of Scotland.42 In 
that book he commented that the first courts to exercise what it was later known as 
admiralty jurisdiction in Scotland were the Courts of the water bailies of the 
maritime burghs.43 These were superseded by the Court of Admiralty probably in 
the early fifteenth century even though the precise date of its establishment it is 
unknown.44 
The first Admiral of Scotland appears to have been the second Earl of 
Orkney in the early fifteenth century and the jurisdiction of the court started to 
develop during the same time.45 Its earliest records are the Acta Curiae Admirallatus 
Scotioe, dated 1557 -1562. In 1567 the Court was already established in Edinburgh.46 
With a clear parallelism with what was happening in England, from 1532, 
when the Court of Session was instituted, their respective jurisdictions clashed 
throughout the centuries.47 There were various attempts to define the relation 
41 The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich (1583, published 1754, reprint Stair 
Society vol. 21 (1962) and vol. 22 (1963)) see M C Meston, 'Admiralty' Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia (SME) (1) 197 [402]. 
42 W Welwood, Sea Laws of Scotland (Robert Waldegrave Edinburgh 1590). An 
expanded version written in English, not Scots, appeared in 1613 (A D M Forte, 'Insurance' 
in K G C Reid and R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in Scotland (vol 2 OUP Oxford 
2000) 333. 
43 A R G McMillan, Scottish Maritime Practice (Hodge Edinburgh 1926) xxxiii. 
44 A R G McMillan (1926) xxxiv. 
4SIbid. 
46 The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland (APS) III 41 (1567) art 50, as cited by M C 
Meston, SME (1) [403]. 
47 See e.g. M C Meston, SME (1) [404]. 
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between the two courts: the 1609 Act expanded the jurisdiction of the Admiralty 
Court; and the 1681 Act, which was enacted 'for the advancement and encouragement of 
trade and navigation', succeeded in affirming the independency of the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Admiralty in the first instance and the priority of maritime causes on 
appeal to the Court of Session. This Act continued to regulate the relations of the 
two Courts until the abolition of the Court of Admiralty by the Court of Session Act 
1830.48 
The Court of Admiralty was essentially a civil law court where the common 
law of Scotland was not administered but the general lex mercatoria. This had led 
some authors to affirm that the maritime law of Scotland is not Scottish but British.49 
It is here submitted though that even when this could be accurate in certain aspects 
of maritime law, such as the law of maritime liens which is indeed very much 
related to the law of arrest of ships, it does not apply to the law of arrest of ships 
itself where both legal systems have developed differently. 
The arrestment of the ship played a key role in relation to the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Admiralty. Its jurisdiction was regarded as particularly applicable to 
foreigners due to the fact that it was only in admiralty cases that the court was 
capable of founding jurisdiction against a defender resident abroad through the 
arrestment of the ship (arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem50) (jurisdictional 
function) 51 In turn, arrestment of a ship was a summary procedure (and 
functionally it is possible to say that this was view of its protective function) 'found 
to be necessary owing to the opportunities which ship- owners possessed for escaping 
diligence by merely sending their vessels to sea on receipt of notice that proceedings were 
48 A R G McMillan (1926) xxxviii. 
49 A R G McMillan (1926) 4. 
50 The arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem was first reported as used by the Court 
of Admiralty than by the Court of Session; see Young y Arnold 1683 M 4833. 
51 A R G McMillan (1926) xxxiv. 
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contemplated' .S2 Due to it, it was understood that 'the admiralty jurisdiction arises 
ratione rei sitae by reason of the res being situated within the maritime territory [of 
Scotland], and it is founded by the arrestment of the res'.53 The arrestment was performed 
without calling the owners, whose names might have been unknown, and the 
precept was usually directed against the master alone. If the owners failed to enter 
appearance decree might have proceeded in their absence and the vessel be 
judicially sold in extinction pro tanto of the debt in respect of which she had been 
arrested (security function). In that case, which was frequent when the amount of 
the debt exceeded the value of the defender's interest in the ship, MCMILLAN 
affirms that the proceedings 'were in no sense deemed to be directed against the defender, 
since the Court was, in fact, ignorant of his identity, and he was not before it but against the 
ship herself .54 Not surprisingly, MCMILLAN does not give any further grounds for 
such an affirmation that disregards the personal liability of the owner beyond the 
value of the vessel. Probably in the early twentieth century the personification 
theory, meaning that the action in rem was not a pure device for obtaining personal 
jurisdiction over ship- owners, but a unique proceeding directly against the ship, as 
firmly established in England by The Bold Buccleugh in 1852, was so unchallenged 
that it was taken for granted 55 
As well as in England, the method of exercising jurisdiction by the Court of 
Admiralty in Scotland, had arrestment of the ship at its very centre; considering 
such procedure as 'the appropriate machinery for proceeding in rem against the ship 
herself which is the subject of a claim' .56 If the owners entered appearance they had to 
52 W Smith, Maritime Practice, Adapted to the Sheriff Courts of Scotland (T &T Clark 
Edinburgh 1832) 13 as cited by McMillan (1926) 57. 
53 A R G McMillan (1926) 7. 
54 A R G McMillan (1926) 19. 
55 Cf. Morrison y Massa 1866 5 M 130. 
56 A R G McMillan (1926) 17. It is apparent that this jurisdiction based on arrestment 
is of a similar nature of jurisdiction of an English Admiralty action in rem as highlighted by 
McMillan (1926) 8, 'the form of action used in the Scottish Court of Admiralty [i.e. prior to 
18301 was in substance an action in rem as now used in England'; see The Dupleix [19121 P 8 
(PDAD). 
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found caution the judicio sisti (to attend and appear during the pendency of the suit) 
and judicatum solvi (to pay the sum adjudged against them).57 The ship was 
thereupon released and the action became a personal action against the owner, who 
was deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction.58 
On the other side of things, the pursuer was required to find caution for 
damages for such liability as he might incur under the decree.59 This cross - 
undertaking in damages is another typical feature of interim measures of protection 
as conceptually encoded universally in present times. Unfortunately it has been 
abandoned in the current practice of arrest of ships in Scotland, probably in order to 
be in an equal position as a jurisdiction for the arrestment of ships as compared to 
England.h0 
The creation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707 did not affect 
itself the way that admiralty jurisdiction was at those times exercised in Scotland.61 
57 See eg C Farquhar Shand, The Practice of the Court of Session: On the basis of the late 
Mr. Darling's Work of 1833 (T &T Clark Edinburgh 1848) 'But in all maritime actions in the Court 
of Session, [the creditor] is entitled to insist, not only for caution de judicio sisti, but judicatum solvi' 
415. 
55 A R G McMillan (1926) 8, 20. 
59 A R G McMillan (1926) 20 referring W Smith (1832); R Boyd, Judicial Proceedings 
before the High Court of Admiralty and Supreme Consistorial or Commissary Court of Scotland (C 
Elliot Edinburgh 1779). 
60 In England this is a consequence of characterizing arrest of ships as an enforcing 
procedure and as such a matter of right, and represents an anomaly as a provisional and 
protective measure in the sense that a very similar measure in effect -the freezing order - 
does require such undertaking. In Scotland it is indeed regrettable that in the context of the 
law reform process that led to the adoption of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) 
Act 2007 even though the issue was discussed and the Scottish Law Commission 
recommended to empower -or retain the power (see Chapter 4) of the courts to require such 
undertaking, this recommendation has not been followed. 
61 By the nineteenth article of the union Act all admiralty jurisdictions shall be under 
the Lord Admiral or Commissioners of Admiralty in Great Britain. But the Court of 
Admiralty in Scotland shall be continued in maritime causes 'till the parliament of Great 
Britain make regulations as expedient for the whole united kingdom so as in Scotland be always a 
court of admiralty for determining all maritime causes relating to private right in Scotland' (A 
Browne (vol 2, 1840) 31). 
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2.3. ARREST OF SHIPS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY IN 
GREAT BRITAIN 
2.3.1. England 
The impression one has when analyzing the unsettled dicta of the nineteenth 
century in England is that the different theories about the essence of arrest of ships 
have all contributed to a better understanding of the institution: whether it is a way 
to compel the defendant to appear in court; security- orientated device for 
accomplishing with the judgment (procedural theory), a way to enforce the liability 
of the ship as the wrongdoer (personification theory), or the way to establish the 
jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty (hereinafter called 'jurisdictional 
theory'). The problem, however, is that even when the question addressed by the 
divergent theories is important, the answers should not be exclusive of one another. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Admiralty Court had 
lost its in personam jurisdiction and acted only in rem, the struggle generated by the 
futile search of sources to understand, justify and describe the one and only 
characteristic feature of the action in rem, made it unacceptable to conceive the 
different functions of arrest of ships as equally important. Nonetheless, the arrest of 
ships has continued to develop as an interim measure of protection that has three 
functions, the protective, the security and the jurisdictional one. And it is at the 
crossroads of these three functions derived from three different historical lineages 
where the core of arrest of ships lies. 
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2.3.1.1. The Action in rem 
MAXWELL" in giving the advantages of an Admiralty action in rem in his 
treatise of 1800, said 'the ship itself is responsible in the admiralty, and not the owners' 63 
BROWNE, in 1802, said that 'no person can be subject to that [Admiralty] jurisdiction [in 
rem] but by his consent'.64 In TETLEY'S opinion it was the need of the claimant, under 
the admiralty procedure of the Tudor /Stuart (1485 -1714) period, to identify the 
arrested res in his draft sentence on first decree, and the fact that enforcement was 
limited to its value, what contributed to the concept that the ship itself, as opposed 
to its owner, was liable for certain claims, such as seamen's wages and salvage. 
However, as mentioned earlier in this Chapter, the liability of the ship is much 
ancient a concept than that, derived from the earliest lex maritima of Medieval 
Europe. 
2.3.1.1.1. From Maritime Attachment to Arrest in rem (beginning of nineteenth 
century) 
The procedure of maritime attachment is similar in outline to that of the 
action in rem; indeed, because it involves the arrest of the ship, it is often referred to 
as a proceeding quasi in rem. WISWALL distinguishes maritime attachment - 
assimilating it to foreign attachment -, as a device designed to compel the 
appearance of a defendant in an action in personam, from arrest in rem, designed to 
enforce a maritime lien. He criticizes Sir Francis Jeune in The Dictator because he 
ignored such crucial distinction and congratulates Sir John Jervis in The Bold 
Buccleugh for his skilful acknowledgement of the difference.65 
1800). 
62 J I Maxwell, The Spirit of Marine Law (Bunney and Gold for T. Chapman London 
63 Ibid 8. 
64 A Browne (vol 2 ,1840) 100. 
6s F L Wiswall (1970) 165. 
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The truth is that the differences among them, at least in England, are not 
mainly conceptual but historical. The maritime attachment, originally adjunct to the 
writ in personam, fell into disuse in Admiralty by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century concurrently with the loss of jurisdiction in personam experienced by that 
court. The Admiralty Court's powers were only expanded by the Acts of 1840 and 
1861 but by then the maritime attachment was already considered extinct as a legal 
procedure.66 The High Court of Admiralty continued to arrest ships as part of its 
newly circumvented jurisdiction. From then on, arrest of ships has been conceived 
in England as part of the action in rem nowadays renamed as in rem claim.67 
As WISWALL recognises, the evolution of the action in rem in England is an 
example of the effect of the historical development of the Court of Admiralty upon 
the substantive law applied by such court.68 For centuries, the ability to proceed in 
the Admiralty Court directly against a ship -regardless of the different theories 
providing justification for such possibility- has been the distinguishing feature of 
Admiralty jurisdiction. 
2.3.1.1.2. The Jurisdictional Theory (1823) 
This theory is constituted by all the decisions and comments that find the 
earliest antecedent of arrest of ships in the processus contra contumacem. Already 
Lord Stowell in The Dundee expressed that arrest of ships was the ancient method of 
acquiring jurisdiction in rem.69 
66 W Tetley (1999) 1905. Tetley is of the opinion that the maritime attachment 
continued to exist after 1800 on the grounds of Fry LJ's speech in Northcote y Owners of the 
Henrich Bjorn (The Henrich Bjorn) (1885) LR 10 PD 44 (CA). 
67 Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 1999. 
68 F L Wiswall (1970) 155. 
69 The Dundee (1823) I Hag. Adm. 109, 124. 
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2.3.1.1.3. The Personification Theory (1852) 
In The Bold Buccleugh Sir John Jervis rejected the idea that the action in rem 
was a purely procedural device intended to secure the appearance of the owners 
and thus to gain personal jurisdiction over them, similar to the manner of a foreign 
attachment.70 Jervis asserted that with attachment the process was directed initially 
at the person, and was thus in the nature of an action in personam, whereas the 
Admiralty action in rem was directed in the first instance at the ship. Hence, the 
Privy Council firmly established in The Bold Buccleugh that the action in rem was not 
a pure device for obtaining personal jurisdiction over ship- owners, but a unique 
proceeding directly against the ship.71 
2.3.1.1.4. The Procedural Theory (1892) 
This theory was first advanced by Sir Francis Jeune in The Dictator.72 In his 
opinion arrest in rem was essentially intended to obtain security for any judgment 
that might be given. In evolving the procedural theory Jeune based his reasoning 
upon 'the early practice of the Admiralty Court'73 and commenced his investigation in 
the early times above -mentioned when a proceeding to seize the res was available 
7° F L Wiswall (1970) 156; The Bold Buccleugh (1852) 7 Moo. PCC 267, 282 (Sir John 
Jervis). 
71 In the opinion of Wiswall 'the origins of the personification theory may be seen in the 
early decisions that contracts for ship construction were not maritime and hence not enforceable in 
Admiralty' correlatively a 'dead' ship [permanently withdrawn from navigation] was then considered 
non -maritime property and hence not individually liable in tort or upon warranty of seaworthiness' 
(F L Wiswall (1970) 163). The personification theory has reached it utmost development in 
the USA where it received complete recognition at the beginning of the twentieth century in 
[1901] Tucker v Alexandroff 183 US 424, 438. In this dictum M J Henry Billings Brown gave the 
definitive opinion which declares the ship 'born' when she is first launched, and that 
thereafter 'she acquires a personality of her own...and is individually liable for her obligations'. 
72 F L Wiswall (1970)159. 
73 The Dictator [1892] P 304 (PDAD) 310. 
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only when the defendant in a proceeding in personam was unavailable for personal 
arrest; failing to appear in response to a citation, the defendant was held in 
contempt and his res defaulted.74 In a nutshell, for an action in rem against the ship 
to be available, the procedural theory requires that the person who was the owner at 
the time when the facts giving rise to the cause of action occurred could have been 
answerable at common law. There is a person, not an asset, who is liable. Jeune's 
procedural theory was quickly accepted.75 
Jeune was not alone. MARDSEN reached also the conclusion that the very 
early Admiralty action in rem was a security- orientated device because: 'Arrest of 
goods was quite a frequent as arrest of the ship..., [and] the fact that goods and ships that 
had no connection with the cause of action, except as belonging to the defendant, were 
subject to arrest, points to the conclusion that arrest was mere procedure, and that its only 
object was to obtain security that judgment should be satisfied'.76 
2.3.1.1.5. From the Procedural Theory back to the Jurisdictional Theory (1899) 
The procedural theory has one essential corollary, i.e., that in the original 
action in rem it is possible to arrest property of the defendant other than his ship. It 
was stated in 1885 by L. J. Fry, that 'any property of the defendant within the realm' 
might be arrested to enforce a statutory right in rem.77 This dictum was criticised as 
gratuitous and unsupported78 due to confusion between the very early actions in 
74 F Clerke, Praxis curiae admiralitatis Angli (Dublin 1666) Tit. 67 -68 (Hall (1809) 115- 
118). For a translation of Clerké s Praxis see J E Hall, The Practice and Jurisdiction of the Court of 
Admiralty (Geo. Dobbin and Murphy, Baltimore, 1809; reprint by The Lawbook Exchange NJ 
2005) Part II, 3 -118. 
75 The Gemma [1899] P 285 (CA) 292; The Dupleix [1912] P 8 (PDAD) 12. 
76 R G Marsden (ed), Select Pleas of the Court of Admiralty. The court of the Admiralty of 
the west (A.D. 1390 -1404) and The High Court of Admiralty (A.D. 1527 -1545) (vol 1 B Quaritch 
London 1894 -97) lxxi. 
77 The Henrich Bjorn (1885) LR 10 PD 44 (CA). 
78 F L Wiswall (1970) 170. 
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rem with maritime attachment in personam. However, this aspect of the procedural 
theory eventually prompted the arrest in an action in rem of collateral property of a 
ship- owner, particularly sister -ship's arrests. 
In the meantime, the Court of Appeal in The Beldis 79 in order to avoid 
sanctioning collateral arrest, found it necessary to modify the procedural theory 
which it had previously accepted without question,8° asserting that arrest of the res 
was a procedural device to obtain personal jurisdiction, but was not developed until 
such time as any attempt to assume jurisdiction in personam was prohibited by the 
common law courts. 
All in all, the three theories81 developed during the nineteenth century82 in 
England are to a certain extent correct and all of them contributed to the 
development of the action in rem (and to its core feature: the arrest of ships) by a 
process of intermingling leading to what it is today the unique institution at the 
centre of this analysis. However, after the revision of these different theories it is 
possible to argue that the confusion and complexities that still exist in the 
enforcement of maritime claims derive from the continued inaccurate reliance on 
historical admiralty practice. Particularly, in the case of arrest of ships, the lack of 
distinction between its different functions is due to the lack of acknowledgment that 
the institution has been permanently changing, arguably adapting itself to the 
change of times. This backward -looking approach has not advanced its 
understanding. 
79 The Beldis [1936] P 51(CA) 73 -74. 
80 The Gemma [1899] P 285 (CA). 
81 It is noteworthy that both the procedural theory and the personification one seem 
to have a common point of origin: the jurisdictional side, both have developed partly to 
distribute competences among national courts. The personification theory to exclude ship 
building contracts from Admiralty jurisdiction in the USA, and the procedural one to bring 
the defendant to Admiralty jurisdiction rather than common law courts in England. 
82 For a modern reassessment of these theories see Republic of India y India Steamship 
Co Ltd The Indian Grace (No.2) [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL). Ten years ago this decision left 
more than one 'at sea'; see N Teare, 'The Admiralty Action in rem and the House of Lords' 
[1997] LMCLQ 33. 
75 
2.3.2. Scotland 
2.3.2.1. Arrestment of Ships in Scotland after the Court of 
Session Act 1830 
By the Court of Session Act 1830 the Court of Admiralty was abolished and 
its civil jurisdiction transferred to the Court of Session and the Sheriff Courts. From 
then on, arrestment can be made by the Court of Session or the Sheriff Court in 
virtue of their dual civil and common law jurisdiction. Same judges, same Courts, 
but two distinct jurisdictions in their nature and in their law is the situation of 
administration of civil justice in Scotland since the Court of Session Act 1830. As the 
two jurisdictions had been cumulative and concurrently exercised since then, the 
maritime procedure in the early nineteenth century was more closely assimilated to 
that of a common law action in Scotland than was the case in England.83 
The most common form of action in Scotland was a petitory action for the 
payment of a debt directed against the ship- owner, and all his assets were liable to 
arrest in security.B4 Only if he failed to meet his personal obligations or allowed the 
action to go by default could proceedings in rem against the ship become necessary, 
by which the ship could be sold by order of the Court in a process of sale. As 
MCMILLAN explains, however, those proceedings in rem were ancillary to the main 
purpose of the action, which was one to enforce payment of a debt, and they were 
merely a form of diligence and not to be confused with the English action in rem. In 
the former the action was essentially a personal one and distinct from the latter 
where -in the opinion of most- the liability was primarily that of the ship and was 
only indirectly that of the owner.85 On this distinction The Bold Buccleugh was 
83A R G McMillan (1926) 19. 
84A R G McMillan (1926) 21. 
85 The Burns [1907] P 137 (CA) 144. 
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decided, and the two pending actions for damages out of the same collision, the one 
in Scotland and the other one in rem in England, were deemed to be essentially 
different; hence, the plea of lis alibi pendens was not upheld in England.86 This has 
remarkably changed in present times.87 
At those times the distinctive features of the Scottish maritime procedure as 
compared with the English action in rem were as follows. First of all, in the case of a 
foreign ship -owner jurisdiction could be founded against him by arrestment ad 
fundandam jurisdictionem of any property or debts belonging to him situated within 
the jurisdiction. The jurisdictional ground was as simple as that and it disregarded 
how accidental the presence of this property within the jurisdiction could be.88 In 
the case of existence of a maritime lien in favour of the pursuer, in addition to the 
warrant of arrestment obtained on the dependence against the defender (which was 
effectual only to attach his personal interest in the ship) a special warrant of 
arrestment in rem against the ship was also required in order to attach the ship itself. 
In an action in this form it was necessary to call all parties interested in the ship, and 
they were to be cited. However, this was neither assimilated to the English action in 
rem because it was still based primarily on the liability of the ship- owner.89 
86 The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 Moo. P.C.C. 267, 288. 
87 Republic of India y India Steamship Co Ltd The Indian Grace (No.2) [1998] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 1 (HL). 
88 A R G McMillan (1926) 21. 
89 A R G McMillan (1926) 22 -23. Already in the early twentieth century McMillan 
was worried about the way that this lack of proper action in rem affected the extraterritorial 
recognition of Scottish judgments. He particularly pointed out to the general principle of law 
that personal decrees in absence in foreign courts are refused recognition while if they were 
in rem is universally conceded to be a real right that will be recognised (ARG McMillan 
(1926) 44 -45). 
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2.3.2.2. Arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem 
The essential purpose of arrestment was understood to be 'as the term 
"arrest" itself implies, to fix the vessel in the place in which she is found',9° operating as 'an 
interdict against the debtor himself and paralysing him in the use of the property in his own 
possession'.91 It has always been the law of Scotland that jurisdiction exists over a 
defender not only in respect of his domicile but also in respect of his possession of 
property there; a jurisdictional ground considered exorbitant by the international 
community nowadays. 
Differently from the action in rem, which is exclusively an Admiralty action, 
arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem is not limited to admiralty arrestment but is 
extensible to all moveable property of a defender not otherwise subject to the 
Scottish jurisdiction. If such property is in Scotland and it is arrested for the express 
purpose of founding jurisdiction such arrestment is known as arrestment ad 
fundandam jurisdictionem or jurisdictionis fundandae causa.92 In his Treatise on the Law of 
Diligence 1898 STEWART offered this 'diligence'.93 
It does not provide for security in the terms that an arrestment of a ship on the 
dependence does; it has a very defined and narrow purpose: to found the 
jurisdiction of the Scottish courts. STEWART explained that this method of 
constituting jurisdiction was borrowed from Dutch law. There was always 
awareness that this jurisdictional ground was against the settled principle of Roman 
law that admit the maxim of actor sequitur forum rei94 but it was justified under the 
pressing needs of international commerce. 
90 Carlberg v Borjesson 1877 5 R 188, 195. 
91 Wolthekker y Northern Agricultural Society 1862 1 M 211, 213. 
92 G Stewart, A Treatise on the Law of Diligence (Green Edinburgh 1898) 246. 
93 However it has been alleged that this distinctive kind of arrestment is not proper 
diligence (G L Gretton, 'Diligence' Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (SME) (8) 75 [249]); for a 
detailed analysis of this peculiar institution of Scots law see Chapter 6 (Arrest of Ships and 
Jurisdiction on the Merits). 
94 G Stewart (1898) 246. 
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It is from the amalgamation of the Scottish jurisdictional base and the Dutch 
method of 'fixing movable assets' that arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem 
emerged. By arresting movable property of the defender the property was rendered 
fixed in Scotland therefore it was possible through that mechanism to found 
jurisdiction over the owner of such property in Scotland.9S As early as in 168396 the 
practice was an established one in the Admiralty Court and beyond it and it was 
accepted that where a foreigner had moveable property in Scotland the creditor 
could lay a nexus on the goods preventing the possessor from handling them over 
until the owner gave security to submit to the jurisdiction.97 Ultimately the effect 
was that arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem itself created jurisdiction.98 In it 
earliest times it was considered that the security which could be demanded for 
releasing the goods was not only judicio sisti but judicatum solvi, hence, originally 
arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem served both functions, grounding jurisdiction 
and providing security for satisfaction of the eventual decree. However, already in 
the seventeenth century99 this original view was departed from and only the 
jurisdictional function continued to be the effect of arrestment ad fundandam 
jurisdictionem up to the present time. Nowadays if it is necessary to obtain security 
95 Ibid 247. 
96 Young y Arnold (1683) M 4833 is generally referred to as the leading case. 
Nevertheless McMillan argues that the case showed that the practice was already common 
in the Admiralty Court. The importance of Young o Arnold in his opinion lies in the fact that 
it was the first application of the theory not in re mercatoria in the Admiralty Court but in 
the Court of Session in an ordinary case involving patrimonial rights. In that dictum the 
Court admits that the acceptance of the theory is foreign in principle to the strict law 
(McMillan (1922) 89). 
97 G Stewart (1898) 247. Interestingly enough the effects at those times seemed to be 
similar to the current effects of the English- crafted freezing injunction; but the purpose of the 
'freezing effect' in the early arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem was to found jurisdiction 
and to make the goods available as security for the claim (jurisdictional and security 
function) the later being actually the only purpose of the freezing effect of the English 
referred injunctions.. Nowadays in Scots law both functions are displayed together in the 
frequent case of arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem and arrestment on the dependence 
being used concurrently. 
96 Further analysis of its current jurisdictional function is provided for in Chapter 6 
(Arrest of Ships and Jurisdiction on the Merits). 
99 Lindsay o L & N -W Ry Co 1860 22 D 571, 585 (Lord Press). 
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in the terms of an interim measure of protection (judicatum solvi) an arrestment on 
the dependence must be served in addition. 
This lack of nexus with the property meant also in practice -as it was 
established in 18961° ° - that the ship was entitled to sail away without committing 
any breach of arrestment. Surprisingly, even though this consequence expressed at 
the end of the nineteenth century run counter to former opinion on the issue, it was 
rapidly accepted, regarded as sound, and considered not to weaken the efficacy of 
the 'diligence'.101 How possible is that arrestment of a ship ad fundandam 
jurisdictionem does not prevent the ship from sailing when the original idea when 
borrowing the method from Dutch law was to 'fix' the property to the jurisdictional 
territory of Scotland so jurisdiction could be founded on such ground in the case of 
defenders not domiciled in the country? As it is the case of many legal creations, 
particularly in the sphere of diligence, due to the fact that is a field crafted by 
custom and judicial decisions rather than statues, sometimes the remaining figure is 
inconsistent with its own roots. Undoubtedly, allowing the ship to sail was an 
unforeseeable feature of arrestment of ships to found jurisdiction when it was first 
adopted. 
The general rule for arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem was that for 
jurisdiction to be found the defender needed to be the owner of the property 
arrested. The exception to that rule applied in the case of arrestment of ships. 
Differently from English law the justification from such departure from that general 
principle of law was not based on the personification theory but on the role of the 
Master as capable of representing and binding the owners and the ship. The 
dissenting opinion of Lord Curriehill in Morrison v Masa in 1866702 shows that at 
those times the personification theory as developed earlier in England was not so 
loo Craig y Brunsgaard, Kjosterud & Co (1896) 3 SLT 265 (IH (1Div)). 
101 G Stewart (1898) 272. 
102 Morrison v Massa 1866 5 M 130. 
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well known in Scotland and that the possibility of raising an action against the ship 
as the 'wrongdoer' was far from clear.103 
2.4. FINAL REMARKS 
Arrest of ships never adjusted perfectly to the general framework of arrest in 
general civil and commercial litigation. Its functions were and still are beyond the 
effects of arrest as form of diligence, to put it in Scots law terms. 
Most of the inconsistencies of the law of arrest of ships as today in England 
and in Scotland are owing to the lack of attempt to recognise that the institution has 
been permanently changing since its very origins.104 The changes have been in the 
way of transposition and cross -fertilisation. Consequently, lack of historical 
accuracy was a common drawback found in many dicta in the nineteenth century in 
England and in Scotland, which created perplexity and inconsistency. And from 
then on up to the present time Admiralty jurisprudence has been trying to reshape, 
to describe and to understand arrest of ships. That is why it is so important to 
determine its scope as a legal category. Due to the achievements in the international 
sphere this task is easier today. This thesis aims to show that arrest of ships is first 
103 '...the argument ...comes very much to this: that the debt was...the debt of the ship... 
Now I do not know what is meant by a debt being called debt of the ship. It is not a real burden on the 
ship and the ship itself cannot personally be a debtor. And even if the ship were in the position of being 
the debtor I do not see how an arrestment of the ship could render her master personally subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that property belonging to him has been arrested...' Morrison 
v Massa 1866 5 M 130 (Lord Curriehill). 
104 For instance Wiswall highlighted that '...Marsden made no attempt to show or to 
intimate that the early jurisprudence of Admiralty endured without change until the 1890s and his 
remarks are entirely concerned with the Court's very early practice though they were subsequently 
cited in support of the historical accuracy of Jeune's scrutiny...' (F L Wiswall (1970) 162). A 
constant reference back seems to be the rule when approaching maritime litigation in 
England and such an attitude has been criticised (see D C Jackson (2005) 7 -8). See The River 
Rima (1988) 2 Lloyd's Rep 193 (HL) where the House of Lords construed the 1952 Arrest 
Convention in the light of English law prior to the Convention (the 1925 Supreme Court of 
Judicature (Consolidation) Act) (Lord Brandon of Oakbrook). 
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and foremost a provisional measure that has throughout the centuries developed 
three main functions: a protective function, a security function, and a jurisdictional 
function. The following Chapter looks at these different functions in order to 
examine the scope of the legal category as provided for in the international 
Conventions dealing with arrest of ships. 
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'The sea with its winds, its storms and its dangers never changes 
and this demands a necessary uniformity of juridical regime'.1 
CHAPTER THREE 
Arrest of Ships in the International 
Conventions 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
As international trade and commerce is more likely to flourish when it is 
conducted under a system of law which is certain and uniform, one of the dominant 
legal leitmotifs of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has been the desire 
to achieve international uniformity. This ideal has always been particularly 
important to maritime law; an area that is ruled by its international character. The 
ancient lex maritima provided a sound starting point for modern harmonisation; it 
also fostered the expectation that uniformity in modern maritime law is desirable 
and achievable. 
The arrest of ships is not immune to that ideal.' One of its characteristic 
features in modern law is the availability of international uniform law within its 
mores. Indeed, it has led the way in the use of the ' uniformist' method in PIL. 
P S Mancini, 'Prelezione al corso di diritto pubbllico marittimo insegnato nella R. 
Università di Torino nell'anno 1852 -1853' (speech given on 29 November 1852) in P S 
Mancini, Diritto internazionale - Prelezioni, con un saggio sul Machiavelli (Marghieri Naples 
1873) 93, 105 -106 (tr) P J S Griggs 'Obstacles to Uniformity of Maritime Law, The Nicholas J. 
Healy Lecture' in (2003) 34 J Mar L & Corn 191, 192. 
2 Even though the rationale underlying the first attempts to harmonise the law in 
this sphere was not to achieve uniformity for the sake of commercial prosperity generally 
but to protect ship- owners from the indiscriminate use of arrest of ships as an interim 
measure of protection; arguably, as an indirect way to protect international trade. 
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Conflict rules' are still necessary whenever uniform solutions have not been 
achieved (either because agreement was not obtained or because preference has 
been afforded to the lex fori to rule on such issues); nonetheless, it is fair to say that 
this is a sphere shaped by international uniform law. 
Uniformity has adopted different paths in this field: the 'transnational' level 
via the lex mercatoria since ancient times; the 'international' level via the traditional 
mechanism of international Conventions in the twentieth century; and more 
recently, allegedly, the 'supranational' level with regard to its jurisdictional effects, 
within Europe, through the special position of the 1952 Arrest Convention in 
relation to EC Council Regulation 44/2001. 
This Chapter studies the international level. It is a matter of fact that 
uniformity in this sphere is still partial, even after more than fifty years of 
application of the 1952 Arrest Convention. The analysis conducted allows 
identifying certain drawbacks to uniformity. In a nutshell, these drawbacks could be 
overcome if the mixed nature of arrest of ships as an institution, as described in the 
previous chapter, was borne in mind whenever the Conventions are to be applied. 
The dogmatic result is the necessity to avoid the use of traditional methods of 
national law in interpreting Conventional provisions. From a PIL viewpoint and for 
the sake of an appropriate autonomous interpretation, characterization4 imposes 
itself to clarify the scope 5 of arrest of ships as a PIL category' in the 1952 and 1999 
Arrest Conventions (hereinafter 'the Conventions'). 
3 To see the relation between the two main methods of PIL in international maritime 
law C Fresnedo de Aguirre and V Ruiz, 'El Derecho Marítimo y El Derecho Internacional 
Privado' [2005] 22 Anuario de Derecho Maritimo 189. 
4 The discoverer of the problem Bartin named it as of 'qualification' nonetheless the 
term 'characterization' proposed by Falconbridge has been widely adopted as its English 
equivalent (A E Anton Private International Law (Green Edinburgh 1967) 44). 
5 In Spanish the PIL term for the scope of a PIL category is 'alcance extensivo de la 
categoria'. 
6 J J Alvarez Rubio identify certain characterization problems in this sphere; see J J 
Alvarez Rubio, 'El embargo preventivo de buques: Regulación Convencional y Problemas de 
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3.1.1. The International Level 
The chase for uniformity at the international level constituted a further link 
in the long chain of amalgamations that have formed arrest of ships as the modern 
mixed legal institution that it is today. The interest in international harmonisation in 
the field arose in the 1930s in the CMI' mores. As it was outlined in Chapter 1 arrest 
of ships as an institution used in civil and commercial matters did not have an exact 
equivalent in every legal system at the national level. One main difference between 
civilian and common law systems needed to be aligned: in civil countries a ship 
could be arrested as a security for any claim, even for claims that were of a non - 
maritime nature, and in common law countries, especially in England, ships could 
only be arrested in the limited cases where the claimant was entitled to a right in 
rem. 
The first product of the harmonisation efforts' was the Convention Relating to 
Arrest of Sea Going Ships adopted in Brussels the 10th of May 1952 entered into 
force on the 24th of February 1956, where certain degree of harmonization was 
achieved via the definition of 'maritime claim'; the ex facie conceptualization of 
arrest of ships as an interim measure of protection; and the recognition of forum 
Calificación' in Derecho Maritimo y Derecho Internacional Privado: Algunos Problemas Básicos 
((Servico Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco Vitoria -Gasteiz 2000) 91. 
7 Historically the Comité Maritime International (hereinafter CMI) was the first private 
international organization concerned with unification of private international maritime law. 
In the middle of the twentieth century however the United Nations created the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and then the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). Nowadays the IMO has become the primary source of harmonising 
instruments in the field of private international maritime law. The CMI continues to work on 
its own initiatives and acts as a consultant to IMO UNCTAD and UNCITRAL. 
8 The International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea -Going Ships was signed 
in Brussels on May 10th 1952 and was preceded by several conferences: Paris (1937), Antwerp 
(1947) Amsterdam (1948) and Naples (1951). 
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arresti as an acceptable jurisdictional ground subject to certain conditions. The 1952 
Arrest Convention has at present more than 80 ratifications and accessions.9 
Discussions as to the possible review of the 1952 Arrest Convention were 
initiated at the CMI Annual Conference in Lisbon in 1985.10 The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) established a 'Joint Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
on Maritime Liens and Mortgages and Related Subjects' (JIGE) in December 1986 to 
work on a new convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages and to review the 1952 
Arrest Convention. After prolonged considerations, on 12th March 1999 in Geneva 
the UN /IMO Diplomatic Conference updated the 1952 Arrest Convention by the 
adoption of the International Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999. The 1999 Arrest 
Convention aims at achieving further unification in the field by providing a widely 
acceptable legal instrument promoting international trade and transport. It strives to 
strike a balance between the interests of cargo- owners and of ship- owners in 
securing the free movement of ships, and the right of the claimant to obtain security 
for his claim. The 1999 Arrest Convention represents advancement in various ways 
analysed in this chapter and throughout this thesis. However, this new Convention 
has not yet entered into force.11 
9 The status of ratification of the 1952 Arrest Convention is published in the CMI 
Yearbook (2005 -2006) 432 -436 accessible through the CMI website www.comitemaritime.org 
(last accessed on August 9th 2007). 
10 33rd International Conference of the CMI, 19 -25 May 1985. 
11 According to art 14 (1) the 1999 Arrest Convention should be ratified by ten 
countries for it to entry into force. Up to August 91h 2007 this has not happened yet; only 7 
countries have ratified or acceded to it: Algeria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Liberia, Spain and 
the Syrian Arab Republic (www.unctad.org last accessed on August 91h 2007). 
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3.1.2. The PIL Perspective 
Every PIL rule has, as any other rule of law, two elements: the category (the 
situations covered by the norm) and the provision (the legal consequence). This 
bipolar structure is common to all PIL rules: conflict rules, uniform rules and 
mandatory rules ('loi de police').12 However, the scope of research of PIL as a legal 
discipline in relation to uniform rules is limited to the first element of this normative 
structure: the category, where the internationalism of the rule remains. Hence, the 
central concern of this Chapter is the characterization of arrest of ships; its legal 
consequences, i.e. the material solutions, are only analysed in so far as helping to 
clarify the scope of the category. Other PIL concerns in this sphere relate to a) the 
scope of application of the Conventions; b) problems of interpretation; and c) the 
necessary coordination of legal rules resulting from the coexistence of different 
(overlapping) systems (particularly the specialised arrest Conventions and the more 
general jurisdictional frame within the EC). The last issue is just touched on in this 
chapter and further analysis is provided in Chapter 6 (with regard to the 1952 Arrest 
Convention, de lege data) and in Chapter 7 (with regard to the 1999 Arrest 
Convention, de lege ferenda). 
3.2. ARREST OF SHIPS AND DRAWBACKS TO 
UNIFORMITY FROM A PIL PERSPECTIVE 
The aim of uniform law is achieved not only through consensus on certain 
provisions included in international Conventions but uniformity of application in 
the different State parties to the Conventions is also necessary. In order to achieve 
such uniformity of application there must be certain criteria to be used by courts 
and judges for the interpretation of Conventional provisions in accordance with the 
12 J R Talice in D Opertti Badán et al, Objeto y Método en el Derecho Internacional 
Privado (2nd edn FCU Montevideo 1990) 29, 59. 
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purposes of the respective Convention. In that sense the results of the application of 
the 1952 Arrest Convention have been, and still are, unsuccessful. 
The reasons for such lack of uniformity are manifold." From a PIL 
perspective the drawbacks to uniformity in the case of arrest of ships relate to the 
following issues: the scope of application of the Convention; the interpretation of 
the Convention; and last but not least the 'disruptive' recourse to the lex fori. These 
factors undermine the uniform application of the Convention. It is here suggested 
that what happens is the consequence of brushing aside the process of 
characterization. In practical terms that would mean that when, under the 1952 
Arrest Convention, an Italian judge is ordering a sequestro preventivo of a ship, or a 
Spanish court is ordering an embargo preventivo of a ship, or a Swedish court is 
ordering a kvarstad, or a French court is ordering a saisie conservatoire of a ship, or a 
Scottish court is ordering a ship arrestment, or an English court is ordering a ship 
arrest, they generally do not take into consideration that they are not ordering any 
of these measures but they are ordering a 'detention or restriction on removal of a ship 
to secure a maritime claim'; and that they should do so according to the provisions 
and the purposes of the 1952 Arrest Convention. In other words, the scope of the 
legal category 'arrest of ships' should be examined in ordinem against the provisions 
of the Convention itself; extra ordinem characterization is best avoided. 
Going through the different authorities in the jurisprudence of the State 
parties to the 1952 Arrest Convention it appears clearly that in many cases the 
13 Amongst others, there is no consensus as to the main objective the Convention 
itself. Most continental Europeans understand the Convention's main aim as to limit the 
right to arrest since in continental Europe claimants- rights to arrest ships were limited by the 
Convention. Scots law enters into this category. Under English law, on the other hand, the 
Convention gives broader rights to arrest than was previously allowed in England. In turn 
this could lead to a more consistent interpretation with the characterization of arrest of ships; 
if as such it is a provisional and protective measure the main aim of the Convention should 
be to assist claimants in the pursue of their claims. The latter interpretation is no more than a 
wishful thinking. 
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Convention is seen just as a limitation imposed in terms of the kind of claims that 
entail the right to arrest the ship; that is the Convention is seen purposively as its 
article 2. Therefore, dicta in the different countries show that in accordance with the 
limitations and extensions established by the Convention States usually continue to 
apply their own 'arrest of ships' in terms of scope of the legal category disregarding 
the fact that the Convention is a uniform scheme by itself.14 The following factors 
contribute to that misapplication. 
3.2.1. Scope of Application 
The first drawback relates to the scope of application of the Conventions. 
The 1952 Arrest Convention applies to ships flying the flag of State parties and such 
application excludes national law in so far as the claims for which a ship may be 
arrested (article 2). From a civil law perspective this is a protective rule -protecting 
ship- owners- as it limits the right of arrest to certain types of claims included in a 
closed list in article 1 of the Convention. There are two exceptions to this general 
rule provided for in article 8 paragraphs 3 and 4. The former provides that State 
parties may exclude from the benefits of the Convention any person who does not at 
the time of the arrest have his habitual residence or principal place of business in a 
State party. This provision is actually entitling the States to make an exclusion that 
would have the nature of a reservation to the Convention. This has been so 
amended in the 1999 Arrest Convention. 
The second exclusion, that of paragraph 4, is directed towards cases where 
there are no foreign elements. The provision provides that the Convention does not 
14 An illustration of that is to be found in the Scottish Law Commission 'Report on 
Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty Arrestment' (Scot Law Corn Report No. 164 
(1998)) where it was expressed that the harmonisation introduced through the enactment of 
the Administration of Justice Act 1956 did not change the nature of arrestment of ships in 
Scots law; it merely limited its scope or field of competence to a list of particular claims (116). 
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apply when arrest is performed in the State of registration of the ship by a person 
who has his habitual residence or principal place of business in that State. That 
would be a purely domestic case. Article 8 (4) has been subject to criticism. 
BERLINGIERI is of the opinion that the exclusion from the scope of application of 
purely national cases is sensible in PIL Conventions adopting the methodology of 
choice -of -law, i.e. in a 'conflictualist' approach. However, in his opinion, if the 
'uniformist' method is adopted and therefore the final aim of the Convention is to 
achieve uniformity of application of the substantive rules in the State parties, it 
advances such a goal better by applying the substantive rules of the Convention in 
relation to everyone.15 This opinion deserves further consideration. The first 
argument of BERLINGIERI in so far the difference between conflict -of -laws rules and 
uniform rules is quite obvious: regarding domestic cases there is no need for a 
conflicts rule at all. The second argument is not so straightforward. On the one hand 
international Conventions, such as the Arrest Conventions, provide an alternative to 
the choice -of -law methodology by providing a uniform solution for PIL cases, that 
is, for cases where there is at least one relevant foreign element, and in that sense it 
is the solution of PIL cases that matters -and not the domestic ones. The arrest of 
ships in the international sphere is a truly PIL institution crafted so as to provide a 
device for international commerce and to compensate for the difficulty of enforcing 
judgments abroad. This rationale does not exist in domestic cases. On the other 
hand, however, it is realistic to ascertain that for the sake of uniformity, keeping 
double standards, that is, keeping two different schemes of arrest of ships 
depending on whether the case is domestic or international, places further 
difficulties for judges and those in charge of applying the law; in a certain way it 
enhances the possibility of disruptive lex fori interference. Moreover, this is not a 
field where double standards would be justifiable in terms of the need to protect 
15 He explains that this provision may give rise to problems for example where a 
ship is arrested by two claimants one to whom the Convention applies and one to whom it 
does not [or it does not completely] because the uniform rules and the national rules may be 
in conflict with one another (F Berlingieri, Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships (41h edn LLP London 
2006) 316). 
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forum policies. Contrarily, a field such as arrest of ships should be a prosperous 
sphere to advance harmonisation in the procedural mores» All in all, the technique 
used in article 8 (4) of the 1952 Arrest Convention is regrettable since it encourages 
State parties to keep double standards." Unfortunately this provision has been 
reproduced in article 9 (6) of the 1999 Arrest Convention. In the opinion of 
BERLINGIERI it limits the global character of the new Arrest Convention.18 
A stronger controversy arises, however, in relation to another unfortunate 
provision of the 1952 Arrest Convention, that of article 8 (2). This provision 
establishes the application of the Convention to ships flying the flag of a non -State 
party except for the 'protective' rule of article 2. The ratio legis of this provision 
seems to have been to extend the burdens of the Convention to every sea -going ship 
but to avail the benefits of it only to ships and claimants closely connected to any of 
the State parties. The provision is the result of a British proposal in order not to 
leave ships of non -State parties in a better position in English ports than the ships of 
State parties. As for English law before the adoption of the Convention the right of 
arrest was limited to claims enforcing a maritime lien, if the Convention could not 
16 J A Jolowicz, 'On the Comparison of Procedures' in J A R Nafziger and S C 
Symeonides (eds), Law and Justice in a Multistate World, Essays in Honor of Arthur T von 
Mehren (Transnational Publishers New York 2002) 721, 740. 
17 Sweden for example has a dual system when it comes to arrest of ships. It has 
ratified the 1952 Arrest Convention and it keeps its domestic legislation regarding the 
kvarstad institute. Kvarstad is a Swedish term and may be defined as an ordinary attachment. 
Under rule 8 (4) above -mentioned the rules relating to the kvarstad procedure found in ch 
15th of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure may still be used to arrest ships (see O 
Egerström, 'Securing Maritime Claims: The ship arrest regimes in Sweden and England' 
(2004/2005) Master thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Lund, 
www.juridicum.su.se / transport / Forskning / Uppsatser /oscaregerstrom %20uppsats %20050901 
.pdf last accessed on August 10th 2007). Other examples are Germany and France. In the 
German Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code) the national provisions on arrest still apply on 
the ground that they are not in conflict with those of the Convention because they require 
conditions for an arrest that are stricter than those set out in the Convention. This 
interpretation is criticized by Berlingieri (F Berlingieri (2006) 16). In France the national 
regime applicable to French ships in the cases set out in art 8 (4) and to ships flying the flag 
of a non -State party to the Convention where the arrester elects to apply it, is Decree No 67- 
967 of 27 October 1967. 
18 F Berlingieri (2006) 319. 
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be applied to ships of non -State parties that would imply that those ships in English 
ports would be 'safer' than the rest. The application of the 1952 Arrest Convention 
to ships flying the flag of non -State parties is noteworthy.19 This dichotomy has been 
amended in the 1999 Arrest Convention where paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 8 have 
been replaced by a provision according to which the Convention shall apply to any 
ship, whether or not flying a flag of a State party; and this is without any limitations 
insofar as the availability of 'protective rules' whatsoever. States may, however, 
reserve the right to exclude the application of the Convention to ships not flying the 
flag of a state party to the Convention via a formal reservation. This modification is 
to be welcomed. The wider the scope of application of the Convention the more 
uniformity that is going to be achieved in the field, and the less chances of double 
standards interfering with a proper in ordinem characterization of the legal category. 
3.2.2. Interpretation 
The second disadvantage20 is that the Arrest Convention 1952 has been 
implemented differently in the States parties to the Convention.27 In some countries 
it has been given force of law directly as a consequence of its ratification.22 However, 
in most of the countries some sort of implementing legislation was necessary.23 
19 Belgium, Denmark, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Haiti, Norway, Poland, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Nigeria and the United Kingdom (F Berlingieri (2006) 310 -311). 
20 It is obvious that this is not a downside particular to the 1952 Arrest Convention 
but to international Conventions more generally; however it is material to this thesis in the 
sense that it does affect directly the characterization problem. 
21 It is worth mentioning in this context that the International Maritime Law Institute 
(IMLI) in Malta provides an excellent source for governments in the understanding and 
implementing international Conventions in this field. 
22 That is the case of Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Ireland and Spain (F Berlingieri (2006) 15 -23). 
23 Other states where the provisions of the Convention have been incorporated into 
national law include Denmark, Finland, Nigeria, Norway and Sweden (F Berlingieri (2006) 
24). This was the case in the United Kingdom. The Administration of Justice Act 1956 was 
enacted with the purpose of giving effect to the 1952 Arrest Convention in English and Scots 
law. In England it has been superseded by the Supreme Court Act 1981. In Scotland, even 
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These different methods of implementation have affected the uniform interpretation 
of the Convention. As recognised by BERLINGIERI, 'when the provisions of a Convention 
are enacted into national law the danger arises that they are interpreted on the basis of 
national rules rather than on the basis of the Convention from which they originate, no 
account being taken of the need for their uniform interpretation'.24 In PIL terms the risk is 
that when countries fulfil their international obligations by enacting a piece of 
national legislation to comply with the Convention, the extra ordinem 
characterization imposes itself against the best interest of unification. The text of the 
Conventions consists of concepts formed out of negotiations between states 
delegates based on several systems of law; not only the saisie conservatoire of French 
law or the ship arrest of English law but many more. It is paramount then to avoid 
the use of traditional methods of national law in interpreting international uniform 
Conventions; the restrictive bases that they use make them unsuitable for 
interpreting international uniform law. 
These different interpretations are apparent in the case of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention25, even after more than fifty years since its entry into force. From the 
different titles that the 1952 Arrest Convention does have in the different languages 
that it has been drafted or translated into these differences showed. Arrest has been 
defined by the Convention as 'any detention or restriction on removal of a ship by order 
of a Court to secure a maritime claim'26. However, the English term 'arrest' and the 
French term 'saisie conservatoire', both official languages of the Convention, have 
been translated, for example, in Spanish, as 'embargo preventivo' 27 which has 
though the 1956 Act remains in force, it has had several amendments and further 
modifications are being introduced by the Bankruptcy and Diligence, etc (Scotland) Act 
2007. 
24 F Berlingieri (2006) 14. 
25 Berlingierí s work is the clearest evidence of the many inconsistencies that still 
exist in the law of arrest of ships when applied in the States parties to the Convention. See F 
Berlingieri (2006). 
26 International Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999 art 1 (2). 
27 In Spain jurists have to distinguish between the nature of 'embargo preventivo' in 
the general frame of protective measures from the particular nature of 'embargo preventivo' in 
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particular implications in terms of the requirements and functions of ship arrest that 
not necessarily coincide with the autonomous concept of the Convention.28 
A contrary argument to the one just submitted could be that there is in fact 
no autonomous concept of arrest of ships in the Convention despite its definition in 
article 1 (2) since the aim of the Convention was just to limit the scope of arrest as 
practised by national courts before the Convention entered into force. On that line it 
could be argued that art 1 (2) is a mere delimitation of the scope of the Convention 
and not a definition of arrest. This line of argument is not followed in this thesis; it is 
here submitted that art 1 (2) is indeed a substantive definition. The issue is 
discussed later in this chapter.29 
3.2.3. Recourse to the lex fori 
The lex fori has been regarded as universal and exclusive in its application in 
the sense that ab initio every question has to be decided by reference to the lex fori 
and this dogma applies to every national court. 30 In that sense the lex fori always 
interferes with the lex causae, unavoidably. This happens whether the lex causae is 
international uniform law or national law selected by a choice -of -law rule. This is 
the maritime law mores; see J J Alvarez Rubio (2000) 102 'Debe tenerse presente la singularidad 
que representa la adopcion de tal medida de embargo preventivo en el campo del Derecho maritimo, 
frente al Derecho común: conforme a éste último, el régimen del embargo preventivo es concebido 
como el anticipo ordinario previo a una medida de ejecución, mientras que el embargo preventivo de 
buques sólo despempeña tal papel de manera excepcional'. 
28 The embargo preventivo in Spanish general law restrains the defendant from selling 
the ship and sets up a privilege in the eventual posterior sale of the ship ranking after 
mortgages but before posterior embargoes and unsecured creditors. 
29 See numeral 4, The Autonomous Concept of Arrest of Ships in the Conventions. 
30 A court should as a matter of course look to the law of the forum as the source of 
the rules of decision; see B Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke University 
Press Durham, NC 1963) 183; 0 Kahn -Freund, 'General Problems of Private International 
Law' 143 RdC 139 (1974) 167; G C Petrochilos, Procedural Law in International Arbitration 
(OUP Oxford 2004) 6. 
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something to be assumed rather than discussed.31 Moreover, methodological 
pluralism has been used in PIL since its beginnings.32 What is unfortunate is not 
recourse to the lex foci within an international uniform Convention. In that sense it 
could be argued that total uniformity is a utopia and that the 'uniformist' and the 
'conflictualist' methods do complement each other in PIL. This is apparent in 
maritime law where, even though there is a considerable degree of unification, 
conflict rules still have a very important role to play.33 However, this back -up role of 
conflict rules should not be used in a way that undermines the harmonisation 
purpose of the Convention. It is obvious that recourse to the lex fori makes it even 
more difficult to free the concepts advanced by the Convention from their meanings 
in the respective internal laws of the State parties; if the courts have to take recourse 
to their own laws to solve the issues that are left to it by the Convention, necessarily, 
the process of interpretation is affected and the goal of an autonomous 
interpretation is undermined. 
This is the case with the general recourse to the lex fori in article 6 (2) of the 
1952 Arrest Convention for all matters of procedure which the arrest may entail.34 In 
31 The author does not want to fall in the trap that many PIL scholars do, devoting 
enormous energy to square the circle. See F K Juenger The Problem with Private International 
Law (Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero Roma 1999). 
32 J R Talice (1990) 57. 
33 On the particular theme see C Fresnedo de Aguirre and V Ruiz Abou -Nigm (2005). 
34 The principle that procedural aspects of interim measures of protection are to be 
governed by the lex fori is widely accepted in PIL. Opertti has advanced the idea that in the 
case of provisional and protective measures the lex fori is indeed the most appropriate 
conflict -of -law rule (D Opertti Badán Exhortos y Embargo de Bienes Extranjeros. Medios de 
Cooperacion Judicial Internacional (Amalio Fernández Montevideo 1976). Aguirre Ramirez, 
however, has a different [arguably not so slightly] opinion in the sense that in his opinion it 
should be the lex fori of the court that has jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits (F 
Aguirre Ramirez 'Embargo y Arresto de Buques en Uruguay' (2005) Revista de Transporte y 
Seguros 275, 286). Regardless of the convenience of the choice -of -law rule and the good 
example that this is of the 'back -up role' of PIL in harmonisation processes what is here 
submitted is that for the sake of harmonisation processes recourse to the lex fori should be 
left as a last resort for issues where forum policies are germane or where the lack of 
consensus in terms of legal principles jeopardises the possibility of achieving a substantive 
solution. Following that, what is to be avoided is recourse to the lex fori in areas where 
consensus was achievable but was not achieved. 
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this sphere two relatively recent Swedish cases are illustrative. The first one is The 
Nestor35. The tug Nestor was towing a barge which was subsequently anchored in 
such manner that it damaged a fibre optic cable owned by a telecom company. The 
telecom company applied for the ship to be arrested as it was moored in Sweden. 
The Court found that the claim for damages for the damaged cable was a maritime 
claim under the 1952 Arrest Convention as implemented in chapter 4 of the Swedish 
Maritime Code. However, the Court also referred to the domestic rules of kvarstad as 
provided for in chapter 15 of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure (CJP). In 
applying the requirements criteria used for kvarstad the Court found that periculum 
in mora was to be proved by the claimant and the fact that the ship was ready to 
leave the jurisdiction could not be taken as a presumption of such risk. Due to the 
fact that there was not another peril showing that the defendants might not abide by 
the judgment, the arrest of the ship was refused. The second case is The Mindaugas36. 
It involved a claim for collision damages. The ship had struck a moored ship in the 
harbour of Tallinn. While she was in Gävle, Sweden, arrest was applied for at the 
Stockholm District Court. The Court concluded that fiimus boni iuris has been shown 
for the claim and that the claim attracted a maritime lien. However, as in the prior 
case, the Court applied chapter 15 CJP very strictly and not finding periculum in mora 
to be proven this arrest was also refused. This sort of reasoning is widely held to be 
wrong even in Sweden.37 Doubtless, it is in plain contravention of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention. Unfortunately there are several examples of this kind of 
misapplications in all of the State parties to the Convention. 
35 T 1863 -02 unreported (Swedish Maritime Court). 
36 T 11513 -02 unreported (Stockholm DC). 
37 In The Mindaugas the court has ignored the regulation in ch 3 s 40 of the Swedish 
Maritime Code providing that when a claim is secured by a maritime lien the Court may 
grant arrest even though periculum in mora has not been shown. Legislation to the same effect 
is found in all Scandinavian countries, Denmark: Retplejeloven §627, Finland: SjöL 4:3, 
Norway: Tvangsfullbyrdelseloven §14 -2. See O Egerström (2004/2005) 31. 
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3.3. CHARACTERIZATION AND AUTONOMOUS 
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM 
LAW: THE DEVICES 
Characterization is one of the fundamental pillars of PIL38 and yet the most 
difficult and unsettled issue.39 It is often discussed in the sphere of choice -of -law 
rules; however, theoretically, the process is common to all methods in PIL.40 The 
process of characterization seeks to allocate a certain legal issue into a PIL 
category.41 This process goes unnoticed if the legal relation is easily 'classifiable' and 
the PIL category has a scope of application clearly established. Whenever these two 
circumstances do not coincide the problem of characterization arises. In the field of 
arrest of ships as provided for in the international uniform Conventions analysed in 
this chapter, the problem arises due to the lack of clear delimitation of the scope of 
'arrest of ships'. 
In turn, 'autonomous interpretation' stands for a synthesis of methods; the 
traditional grammatical, systematic and historical method of interpretation must be 
38 Q Alfonsin, Teoria del Derecho Privado Internacional (Editorial Martin Bianchi Altuna 
Montevideo 1955) 386 fn 1. 
39 T de B Maekelt, Teoría General del Derecho Internacional Privado (Academia de 
Ciencias Políticas y Sociales Caracas 2005) 285. As revealed by Lipstein there seems to be at 
least certain consensus on two basic problems: what is to be characterised is a legal relation 
confronted with a certain system or systems of law and the aim of the process of 
characterization is to reveal the function and purpose of those norms as far as that legal 
relation is concerned (K Lipstein, 'Characterization' (1999) 3 International Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law (ch 5) 8). 
40 For a discussion on the importance of characterization in relation to uniform law 
see Q Alfonsin (1955) 385 -407. 
41 As for the importance of characterization and the need to undertake such process 
in a broad internationalist spirit in accordance with the principles of PIL and its overall aim 
to identify the most appropriate law to govern a particular issue see Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Osterreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC (The Mount I) [2001] EWCA Civ 68, [2001] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 597 (CA) (Mance LJ) [26 -27]. 
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supplemented by a comparative approach 42 For the purposes of international 
uniform law the process of characterization goes sometimes unnoticed within the 
process of autonomous interpretation ;43 theoretically, though, in the construal 
process, this autonomous interpretation is preceded by characterization.44 
In the case of arrest of ships the conflict arises due to the fact that different 
legal systems attach different meanings to the term 'arrest of ships'. This is the 
problem identified by FREUND as the 'hidden homonym' or 'latent conflict'45. Taking 
the Conventions as the system of law against which characterization is to be 
performed, and bearing in mind that there is an autonomous definition of arrest of 
ships in the Conventions, this conflict should be easily resolved. But it is not. It is a 
42 F Diedrich, 'Mantaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law Via 
Autonomous Interpretation' (1996) 8 Pace International Law Rev 303, 311. An excellent 
source of information for the comparative approach that is necessary to achieve an 
'autonomous interpretation' in this regard is F Berlingieri (2006). 
43 The standard principles of interpretation of international uniform Conventions are 
nowadays clearly established. A leading example is Article 7 (1) of the 1980 United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. More recently the Cape Town 
Convention on International Interest in Mobile Equipment art 5 expressly recognises those 
standards by stating that in the interpretation of the Convention regard is to be had to its 
purposes as set forth in the preamble, to its international character and to the need to 
promote predictability in its application. Furthermore, questions concerning matters 
governed by the Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in 
conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such 
principles, in conformity with the applicable law. Finally references to the applicable law are 
to the national rules of the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law 
of the forum State (rejection of renvoi). As explained by Goode in the Official Commentary 
[1] is an instruction to national courts to avoid national concepts in interpreting the texts (R 
Goode 'Official Commentary to the Cape Town Convention on International Interest in 
Mobile Equipment and Protocol thereto on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment' (Unidroit 
Rome 2002) 63. 
44 This opinion is not unanimous. Alfonsin understood that characterization and 
interpretation were the two phases of a one and only process. In his opinion the difference is 
one of perspective: from the point of view of the rule of law it is interpretation; from the 
point of view of the legal relation is characterization (Q Alfonsin, Teoria del Derecho 
Internacional Privado (2nd edn Idea Montevideo 1982) 389. 
45 E B Crawford and J M Carruthers, International Private Law in Scotland (Green 
Edinburgh 2006) 52. 
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misconception46 to assume that because there is an autonomous definition within an 
international uniform law Convention, the characterization problem is totally 
avoided47. Nonetheless, it is feasible that a greater degree of harmonisation could 
arise from the consensus that States parties achieved at the law- making stage. 
However, it is still necessary to characterize at the moment of application of such 
uniform rules. 
In a nutshell, an 'autonomous definition' does not guarantee avoidance of 
'lex fori' (extra ordinem) characterization at the stage of application of the 
Conventions. In turn this enhances the difficulty of freeing the concepts advanced 
by the Conventions from its interpretation according to the different national laws 
of the States parties. Therefore, uniformity of application would be advanced if 
courts bear in mind that in a PIL case characterization is always part of the decision - 
making process.48 
46 For example Goldschmidt believed that the problem of characterisation did not 
arise in the case of uniform law (W Goldschmidt, Derecho Internacional Privado (Depalma 
Buenos Aires 1992) 86). 
47 Characterisation has been recognised as relevant in the sphere of an international 
uniform Convention in the recent Cape Town Convention on International Interests in 
Mobile Equipment concluded in 2001 and in force since the first of April 2004 
www.unidroit.org /english /Conventions /mobile- equipment R Goode (2002) 60. 
48 For an argument to the contrary, aiming at minimizing the effect of 
characterization in modem English PIL see A Briggs, 'Conflict of Laws and Commercial 
Remedies' in A Burrows and E Peel (eds), Commercial Remedies: Current Issues and Problems 
(OUP Oxford 2003) 274 '...And the elimination of the line which separates right from remedy would 
have the advantage of negating the exercise in characterization which the existence of such a line 
requires to be undertaken...' 277 -278; D C Jackson (2005) '...classification is a first step away from 
reality...' 717. 
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3.4. CHARACTERIZATION IN ORDINEM OF ARREST OF 
SHIPS: THE RESULTS 
Arrest of ships under the Conventions is the detention of a ship under the 
authority of a court as a provisional and protective measure. Hence, the extent of the 
PIL category includes arrest as a protective measure to secure payment of a 
maritime claim; arrest as a preventive measure to enforce maritime liens; and arrest 
as a provisional measure 'to secure the res'. Bearing in mind that these three 
different types of measure have different functions it is indeed its provisional 
character and not its functions that provides the scope of arrest of ships as a PIL 
category insofar as characterization of the rule of law against the international 
Arrest Conventions. 
3.4.1. Arrest of Ships as a Provisional and Protective 
Measure 
In international commercial litigation the provisional character and the 
protective function49 of these kinds of measures more generally -not limited to ship 
49 In international commercial litigation the distinctive features of provisional and 
protective measures are to be supportive of the case on the merits and consequentially 
reasonable and proportional. Bearing in mind that measures are to be granted '...without 
however adversely affecting the other guarantees of a fair trial' (Resolution No 1 adopted by the 
20th Conference of European Ministers of Justice Budapest 11 -12 June 1996) proportionality is 
vital. The same criterion is applied in English law considering proportionality a part of the 
overriding objective that interim remedies purport to obtain (H Brooke (ed) Civil Procedure 
(Sweet and Maxwell London 2004) 547). At present there are certain global standards of what 
constitutes a provisional and protective measure and there is as well enough basis for 
consensus in what is necessary for the claimant in terms of requirements for the court to 
order any such measures. The most authoritative achievements in this regard internationally 
are the 'Resolution on Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation' 
prepared by the International Law Association (ILA) at its Helsinski Conference in 1996 and 
the 'Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure ALI/Unidroit' as adopted in 2004 ((2004) 4 
Unif L Rev 758 -809). For a comprehensive study of provisional and protective measures see 
L Collins, Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation (1992) 234 RdC 19; see 
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arrest- are usually examined together. In the long chain of amalgamations that led to 
arrest of ships as the modern mixed legal institution that it is today law- makers 
have departed, with or without reason, from the universally recognised criteria for 
granting provisional and protective measures. These measures are generally 
discretionary, and to assess the convenience of granting them there is usually the 
need to prove the fumus boni iuris, the periculum in mora and to provide for an 
undertaking in damages. 
Just for the sake of a better analysis the provisional character is cast aside 
from the protective side of it in order to clarify some conceptual misunderstandings. 
3.4.1.1. Provisional Measure 
The particularities of the 'provisional' feature of arrest of ships are as 
follows. 
3.4.1.1.1. No need to prove periculum in mora 
There are important differences of perspective in common law systems as 
opposed to civil law ones in this regard. Under many civilian legal systems arrest as 
any other interim measure of protection against any asset of the debtor is 
conditional on the danger of the claimant being unable to enforce his claim after he 
has obtained an enforceable judgment because the debtor is financially insolvent 
(periculum in mora). The periculum in mora literally means 'risk in waiting' and 
therefore, urgency is an element to be proved by the claimant. 
However this is not a requirement for the arrest of ships under the 
Conventions. It has been argued that this is because the risk in waiting is in fact 
also C Kessedjian, 'Note on Provisional and Protective Measures in Private International 
Law and Comparative Law' Prel. Doc. No.10 HccH October 1998. 
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inherent to the moveable character of the ship.10 The issue has been discussed 
thoroughly in Italy and in Spain. In the latter the need to prove the periculum in mora 
has been provided for in relation to protective measures in general in the new 
Spanish Code of Civil Procedure5l in force since January 2001. Despite that, the law 
that established (following the ratification by Spain of the 1952 Arrest Convention) 
that the right of arrest exists as respects maritime claims on the basis of a mere 
allegation of a claim52 has remained in force as a lex specialis.53 In the eight session of 
the Joint UNCTAD /IMO Intergovernmental Group of Experts (hereinafter JIGE) 
held the 9 -10 October 1995 one delegation suggested that new language should be 
added to the definition of arrest to ensure that arrest can be ordered in cases where 
there was a risk for the alleged claim not to be satisfied.54 But it was then decided to 
revert to the definition of arrest contained in article 1 (2) of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention where such a risk is not a requirement. 
3.4.1.1.2. No need to prove fumus boni iuris 
On the same token the allegation of a claim suffices to justify an arrest, 
consequently, proof of the fumus boni iuris is not required under the Conventions.55 
This is a consequence of characterising arrest as a procedure to enforce 
maritime liens; but inconsistent with arrest as an interim measure of protection. In 
Italy, for example, the general rule is that pursuant to obtain an order of arrest it is 
sufficient to provide a prima facie evidence of the claim which is described as fumus 
boni juris. Italian courts have applied this rule also in respect of arrest of ships 
5° F Aguirre Ramirez (2005) 280. 
51 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil 1/2000 art 728. 
52 Ley 2/1967. 
53 F Berlingieri (2006) 22. 
54 The travaux préparatoires of the 1999 Arrest Convention (F Berlingieri (2006) 526). 
ss F Berlingieri, 'The 1952 Arrest Convention Revisited' [2005] LMCLQ 327, 330 -331. 
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governed by the 1952 Arrest Convention.56 The 'fume of a good right' relates both to 
the likelihood of success of the claim and to the amount of the claim.57 In similar 
terms the claim is assessed in Poland and in Portugal for the purposes of ordering 
an arrest under the 1952 Arrest Convention.58 In France and in Spain the burden of 
proof resting on the claimant is less onerous in the cases of arrest of ships under the 
1952 Arrest Convention than under internal procedural rules.59 This feature, even 
though a departure from the general principles of interim measures of protection 
has been regarded as commercially sound.60 
3.4.1.1.3. Cross -undertaking in damages? 
As above -mentioned article 6 (1) of the 1952 Arrest Convention establishes 
that '...all questions whether in any case the claimant is liable in damages for the arrest of a 
ship or for the cost of the bail or other security furnished to release or prevent the arrest of a 
ship, shall be determined by the law of the State party in whose jurisdiction the arrest was 
made or applied for...'. In this regard the differences were not solved but 
circumvented by '...abandoning any attempt to provide uniform rules in that respect and 
merely inserting a private international law rule...'61 Indeed, advancement in this matter 
has been achieved in the 1999 Arrest Convention, where arrest may be subject to 
provision of security by the claimant for wrongful arrest or excessive security 
(article 6). This shows that the remission to the lex fori in the 1952 Arrest Convention 
was not justified by 'forum connections' but was indeed a point where further 
consensus was necessary. In the 1999 Arrest Convention this discretion is made 
available to courts and judges by the uniform Convention and does not depend on 
the lex fori as it is the case under the previous Convention. 
56 Martingale Trading Group v. Azovske Morske Paroplaysto (The Mekhanik Yuzvocich) 
[2005] Dir Mar 200 (Court of Appeal of Rome). 
57 F Berlingieri (2006) 99. 
58 Ibid 100. 
59 Ibid 101. 
bo F Aguirre Ramirez (2005) 278. 
61 F Berlingieri (2000) 9. 
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3.4.1.1.4. Proportionality 
The 1952 Arrest Convention prohibits more than one arrest or bail or other 
security in respect of the same maritime claim by the same claimant in any one or 
more of the contracting States unless the claimant shows 'good cause'.fi2 It does not 
appear however that an absolute prohibition of multiple arrests is established by the 
Convention, following the reference to 'good cause for maintaining the arrest' at the 
end of article 3 (1).63 In the 1999 Arrest Convention article 5 (2) clarifies that another 
ship may be arrested for the same claim only if the security provided by the first 
arrest is inadequate or defective. 
The particularities of arrest of ships as a provisional measure comparing it to 
provisional measures as provided for in national legal systems, particularly civil law 
systems, and to the latest international trends in this regard, derive from the 
characterization of arrest of ships in English law as the procedure to enforce 
maritime liens; and in that sense, available as a matter of right. Hence, there is no 
discretion to assess periculum in mora, fumus boni iuris and to order a cross - 
undertaking in damages under the 1952 Arrest Convention. The 1999 Arrest 
Convention allows that latter possibility to courts and judges, bringing arrest of 
ships in line with the latest trends of international commercial litigation. 
Particularly in relation to the lack of proof of the periculum in morn, an 
autonomous interpretation should take into account the historical method of 
interpretation and in that sense it is the endemic absence of safety that particularly 
62 The Arrest Convention 1999 provides for re- arrest or multiple arrests if the 
amount of security provided is inadequate (up to the value of the ship originally arrested) 
the defendant is unlikely to be able to fulfil obligations or the ship arrested or security 
provided was released with the consent of the claimant on reasonable grounds or the 
claimant could not by reasonable steps prevent the release art 5 (1) (2). 
63 Scot Law Corn Report No. 164, 135. 
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affect the shipping endeavour that explains such peculiarity. In Lord Jeffrey's words 
'in maritime causes the parties are always supposed to be in meditatione fugae; they have 
their sails spread, and are, as it were, on the wing, and ever ready to depart'.b4 For that 
reason, it is here submitted that in the case of arrest of ships it is not necessary to 
prove periculum in mora because it is always presumed.6s 
3.4.1.2. Protective Measure 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the protective function of arrest of ships is its most 
obvious one, so, it is possible to refer to arrest as a provisional and protective 
measure, even though it is provisional in character and the protective function is 
only one of its functions. 
The particularities of the protective function of arrest of ships are as follows. 
3.4.1.2.1. The ship -claim connection 
For the right of arrest to arise it does not suffice that the ship is the property 
of the defendant to the action; it must also be identifiable as the ship in connection 
with the claim arose.66 Only that ship or a sister ship of that ship are liable to arrest 
under the Conventions in respect of that claim. Consequently, claims that are not 
against a particular ship cannot be protected by arrest.67 
64 Gray v Sutherland 184710 D 154,156. 
65 In German law there is a statutory provision that provides for such presumption 
when the defendant does not have any other assets see S Nieschulz, Der Arrest in Seeschiffe: 
Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung des deutschen, niederländischen and englischen Rechts (Lit 
Hamburg 1997) 18 (Arrestgrund des § 917 I ZPO bei one ship companies). 
66 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the MV Erkowit v Owners of the Eschersheim 
(The Eschersheim, the Jade and the Erkowit) [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL) (Lord Diplock). 
67 'claims against a ship -owner that relate to the maintenance and operation of his ships but 
which are not related to a particular ship cannot be secured by means of the arrest of one of the ships 
owned by him If for example the owner purchases stores or spare parts for his fleet and uses them for 
his ships when the need arises' F Berlingieri (2006) 127. The same would happen if he leases 
containers for use by an entire fleet since the claim of the supplier for the payment of such 
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3.4.1.2.2. Arrest of a ship in respect of a person other than the owner 
Arrest of ships would not present any particularities in this regard if it was 
available when the owner of the ship is liable at the moment of arrest; this would be 
in line with general principles of law in respect of personal obligations. However, 
even though this is the general rule also in the case of arrest of shipsó8, there are 
some exceptions. Article 3 (4) of the 1952 Arrest Convention grants the claimant 
who has a maritime claim against the demise charterer the right to arrest the ship in 
respect of which the claim arose. Such right is unrestricted and exists irrespective of 
the claim being secured by a maritime lien or not. The last sentence of paragraph 4 
extends the right of arrest to any case in which a person other than the registered 
owner is liable in respect of a maritime claim relating to the ship (including, for 
instance, the time charterer or the voyage charterer).69 Provision 3 (4) appears to 
derive from the fact that in certain legal systems,70 particularly the Netherlands [as it 
stood then],71 maritime claims must in certain cases be brought against the armateur 
gerant (manager) or the demise charterer. Article 3(4), however, does not cover the 
contracts has not arisen in respect of a particular ship therefore does not give right of arrest 
in terms of the Convention. 
68 The limits have been clarified in the same article of the 1999 Arrest Convention. 
The latter provides that arrest is permissible of any ship in respect of which a maritime claim 
is asserted if the person who owned the ship at the time when the maritime claim arose is 
liable for the claim and is owner of the ship when the arrest is effected. 
69 This could be the case in relation to the maritime claims listed in art 1(1)(b)(loss of 
life or personal injury) art 1(1)(e)(agreements relating to the carriage of goods) art 1(1)(f)(loss 
of or damage to goods) ie in most of the cases it will be related to a maritime claim against 
'the carrier' when such carrier is neither the owner nor the demise charterer. It has been 
revealed by Berlingieri that this provision was added on request of Norway and the 
Netherlands but he argues that the provision goes beyond what was required to bring it in 
line with Dutch and Norwegian law (F Berlingieri (2006) 139). Indeed in those legal systems 
arrest is permissible if the owner is not personally liable only in the cases where a maritime 
lien exists. 
70 For instance in Uruguay certain maritime claims are to be brought against the 
armador a concept that is probably equivalent to the armateur gerant of Dutch law. In 
Uruguay most of maritime claims are indeed enforceable against armadores y propietarios 
(manager and owner) of a certain ship This is certainly the case of cargo claims. 
71 At present under the new Transport Law included in Book 8 of the Civil Code art 
360 in force since 1 April 1991 the owner of a ship is personally liable in respect of claims 
against the demise charterer (F Berlingieri (2006) 140). 
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case where arrest is permissible in respect of claims secured by a maritime lien. The 
concept seems to unravel if article 3 (4) is read together with article 9.72 Probably the 
intention was to provide for arrest to follow the ship in the case of maritime liens; 
but article 3(4) goes far beyond those cases. This provision has given rise to 
interpretation problems.73 Arrest of a ship in respect of a person other than the 
owner is permitted under the 1952 Arrest Convention, regardless of the existence of 
a maritime lien, in France (demise charterer); Germany (Ausruster);74 Greece (any 
kind of charterer); Italy (demise charterer and time charterer); and the Netherlands 
(demise charterer).75 
The situation has been clarified in the 1999 Arrest Convention. Article 3 (1) 
(b) establishes that 'arrest is permissible of any ship in respect of which a maritime 
claim is asserted if the demise charterer of the ship at the time when the maritime 
claim arose is liable for the claim and is demise charterer or owner of the ship when 
the arrest is effected. Article 3 (3) adds: 'Nonetheless, the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 
2 of this article, the arrest of a ship which is not owned by the person liable for the claim shall 
be permissible only if, under the law of the State where the arrest is applied for, a judgment 
in respect of that claim can be enforced against that ship by judicial or forced sale of that 
ship'. Paragraph 3 refers generally to the arrest of a ship which is not owned by the 
person liable for the claim and is formulated as an exception to the provisions of 
paragraphs 1 and 2; the exception, therefore, applies not only in respect of claims 
against the demise charterer but also in respect of claims secured by a maritime lien, 
72 Even though art 3 says art 10 but this is a recognised mistake (F Berlingieri (2006) 
131). 
73 F Berlingieri (2006) 144. 
74 The Ausruster pursuant to para 510 of the HGB is the operator. This concept would 
include the demise charterer but not the time charterer (F Berlingieri (2006) 145). 
75 At present art 8 (360) of the Dutch Civil Code of 1991 provides that if a ship is 
demise chartered the owner is jointly liable with the demise charterer in respect of all 
contractual obligations of the demise charterer relating to the operation of the ship (F 
Berlingieri (2006) 147). 
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a mortgage, hypothec or other charge, and claims relating to the ownership or 
possession of the ship.76 
This provision is intended to reinforce the 'protective' character of arrest. 
And it has been welcomed by expert commentators? As such arrest can only be 
effective as a 'security' measure if it can ensure the availability of judicial sale; i.e. if 
after a decision on the merits is taken, it could be used as an asset to obtain payment 
from. However, from a PIL perspective this provision is at least difficult and needs 
further analysis. BERLINGIERI points out to possible conflict of laws in this regard. 
He explains that in the case of mortgages and hypothèques the consequence of article 
3 (3) is not to change the generally recognised rule that those charges are to be 
governed by the law of the place where the ship is registered. He assumes that every 
court will have the same conflict -of -law rule in this regard, and if that is the case, 
courts will permit the enforcement of the claim if the security is valid under the law 
of the State where the ship is registered.78 
Doubtless this provision was intended to suppress the vexatious (and 
allegedly oppressive) effect of arrest in the cases where the eventual judgment 
would not be enforceable against the ship. Again here the different functions of 
arrest as described in Chapter 1 are inextricably intermingled. And jurisdiction on 
the merits is not distinguished from jurisdiction for the purposes of interim relief. 
This lack of distinction could have been excusable in 1952 when that distinction was 
not so widely acknowledged.79 This was not the case in 1999.80 If a choice -of -law rule 
was to be included to determine whether arrest of a third -party ship was 
permissible, the remission should have been to the law of the court competent to 
76 F Berlingieri (2006) 150. 
77 See especially D C Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime Claims (4th edn LLP London 
2005) 396 -397. 'So a gap of the 1952 Arrest Convention is filled' ... 'The uncertainty of substantive 
rights in an arrested ship is removed' [in the 1999 Arrest Convention]. 
78 F Berlingieri (2006) 151. 
79 However, even then art 7 shows that the distinction was taken into consideration. 
Following it article 7(1) refers to jurisdiction on the merits whereas article 7(2) and (3) clearly 
refers to ancillary jurisdiction. 
80 C Kessedjian (1998). 
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hear the merits; even though forum arresti is recognised as the rule in the 1999 Arrest 
Conventions this does not mean that in every case the court of the place where the 
arrest was applied for is going to be the one effectively hearing the merits. The 
competence of the forum arresti is not exclusive and several circumstances can lead 
to a different court being the one to decide on the merits. In those cases, that is, 
when arrest is granted by a court exercising ancillary jurisdiction, just for the 
purpose of granting interim relief, it should not be left to the law of that court (the 
one where arrest is applied for) to decide whether a certain ship is liable to arrest in 
relation to that claim or not; this would go against a good overall management of 
the case.81 
At the time of the adoption of such rule it was suggested that such issue was 
a question of national law which is not expected to have a significant impact in 
common law countries.82 However, Scots law, where the property of a third party is 
not generally affected to satisfy the debts of another, has been modified in respect of 
arrestment of ships against demise charterers to allow judicial sale of the ship in the 
cases provided for in the 1999 Arrest Convention.83 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Arrest of ships anticipated the emergence of the lex mercatoria in the past and 
the chase for uniformity in the field at the international level also anticipated the 
81 In the case of ships the PIL rule that allows for the lex situs to establish which 
assets can be affected by a certain encumbrance (embargabilidad o inembargabilidad de los bienes 
(D Opertti Badán (1976) 324) does not apply. In the case of arrest of ships the territoriality 
principle only serves the function of permitting to found jurisdiction on the merits 
regardless of further connections with the claim, but it does not 'connect' the forum with the 
claim in any other sense, therefore, it is here submitted that taking it as a connecting factor 
for the purposes of applicable law is at least dubious. 
82 N Gaskell and R Shaw, 'Arrest Convention 1999' [1999] LMCLQ 1,10. 
83 See Administration of Justice Act 1956, Ch 46, s 47 E, as introduced by Sch 4 to the 
Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007. 
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revival of the new law merchant in present times.84 As a mixture of ancient doctrines 
and new developments, national, international, supranational and a- national it 
belongs to the lex maritima of all times. 
Under the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions, the arrest of ships is the 
detention of a ship under the authority of a court as a provisional and protective 
measure. This characterization provides a broad framework for the development of 
arrest of ships as a legal institution in the international sphere. The protective and 
security function of arrest are most of the times intermingled up to such a point 
where it is very difficult to distinguish one from the other. It is possible to cast them 
aside just for the purposes of its analysis. From the definition of arrest in the 
Conventions as the detention of a ship 'to secure a maritime claim' it follows that 
the security function is the core of the protective measure as such. Hence, the extent 
of the PIL category includes arrest as a protective measure 'to secure payment of a 
maritime claim'; arrest as a preventive measure to enforce maritime liens; and arrest 
as a provisional measure 'to secure the res'. 
In turn, the distinctive features of arrest of ships as a provisional and 
protective measure are what make it so special, so, helping to identify arrest of ships 
as a PIL category. Theoretically, these features have the potential to reduce the risk 
of extra ordinem characterization; on that line it could be argued that because of the 
peculiarities of arrest of ships in the international sphere its distinctiveness is 
noteworthy as meeting the needs of maritime commerce. Courts would, therefore, 
find it easy to distinguish between the international category and the measure as 
provided for in the national law of the forum. However, this has not happened; on 
the contrary, these features have lessened the aim of uniform application. The ex 
84 The new lex mercatoria re- emerged in the early sixties by then the first International 
Convention on Arrest of Ships was already in force after seek for uniformity in the field 
started in the 1930s (V Ruiz Abou -Nigm 'The Lex Mercatoria and Its Current Relevance in 
International Commercial Arbitration' 2 DeCITA (2004) 101). 
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facie conceptualization of arrest of ships as an interim measure of protection has not 
been as effective as it could have since it was not provided for with consistency in 
the Conventions and the lack of a conceptual framework in which to develop (due 
to the fact that neither as provisional nor as protective it followed the international 
trends) has represented a drawback to uniformity and has left arrest of ships far 
behind the most accepted international standards with regard to provisional and 
protective measures. 
These drawbacks could be overcome if the transnational origin of arrest of 
ships as an institution and the fact that in this field States have attempted to find 
compromises that resulted in the creation of a 'mixed legal institution' were borne in 
mind whenever the Convention is to be applied. The general ratio Conventionis of 
international uniform law, i.e. the creation of international uniform statutory rules 
between State parties that support stability and predictability in international legal 
relations, is not fostered by 'homewards' methods of interpretation.85 Therefore, an 
'autonomous interpretation' is necessary; and achievable, because it has to be 
acknowledged, as JUENGER did, that civilian as well as common law judges are able 
to suppress their homing instincts to adopt desirable solutions found abroad.88 The 
problems with autonomous interpretation are lessened when there is an 
international tribunal to seek uniformity in interpretation. In the international 
sphere there is no such tribunal. In the regional area there is the European Court of 
Justice. Its powers in so far as to the interpretation of the 1952 Arrest Convention as 
a specialised Convention given force in the European Communities by the lex 
specialis provision of EC Regulation 44 /2001 (article 71) is limited to those provisions 
related to jurisdiction and do not go further beyond that. 
85 F Diedrich (1996) 310. 
86 F K Juenger (1999) 202. 
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The Scottish Court of Admiralty is so far different 
frOM that of Enizland"...' 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Arrest of Ships in England 
and in Scotland 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
England and Scotland have always had different legal systems, even when 
they shared a common Parliament.2 As it is well-known nowadays Scots law 3 is a 
mixed legal system with strong civilian routes and influence from the common law 
of England.'. In turn, English law is common law based even though it is not free 
from the influence of the civilian traditions of Scotland and the rest of the European 
G J Bell Commentaries on the Law of Scotland ;and on the Principles of Mercantile 
Jurisprudence (vol 2, 7t edn T. & T. Clark Edinbur 1870 reprint Butterworths Edinburgh 
1990) 546. 
z By the Act of Union 1707 when the United Kingdom of Great Britain was formed 
express provision was made for the preservation of Scots law and Sc ttish c urts. 
Nonetheless Britain as a unit shares the House of Lords, the highest court of appeal for 
private law matters for both England and Scotland. 
3 See K G C Reid, 'While One Hundred Remain: T B Smith and the Progress of Scots 
Law' in E Reid and D L Carey Miller (eds) A Mixed Legal System in Transition: T. Smith and 
the Progress of Scots Law (EUP Edinburgh 2005); R Evan-Jones, 'Mixed Legal Systems. 
Scotland and the Unification of Private Law in Europe' in1 M Smits (ed) The Contribution of 
Mixed Legal Systems to European Private Law thitersentia Antwe 211111). 
4 See P B H Birks, °More Logic and Less Experience: The Difference between Scots 
and English Law' in D L Carey Miller and R Zimmermann (eds) The Civilian Tradition and 
Scots Law (Dunker und Humblot Berlin 1997) 167. 




countries.6 This is particularly true in the field of PIL;7 and it is material in the case 
of arrest of ships. 
In the past, the earliest admiralty courts in England and in Scotland 
recognised and applied the law merchant, particularly the lex maritima -a general 
maritime law common to all maritime nations -;8 the same in England and in 
Scotland. Nonetheless, even then, uniformity of principle did not necessarily imply 
uniformity of practice ;9 it is undeniable though that there has been direct and 
indirect cross -fertilization. 
The deeper differences in the field were harmonised in the United Kingdom 
by the 1952 Arrest Convention as enacted by the Administration of Justice Act 195610 
(now in England consolidated in the Supreme Court Act 1981). This enactment 
introduced the compromise achieved in the international sphere into English and 
Scots law. On the one hand, it narrowed the wide powers of arrestment of a ship on 
6 In the opinion of R Evan -Jones, England has benefited extraordinarily from its 
openness to the Civilian tradition with which it has had to operate so closely in the context 
of Britain (R Evan -Jones (2001) 48. Furthermore, in his opinion 'Although it is true that English 
law is essentially a product of indigenous development, Roman law was certainly though for example 
at the University of Oxford from the earliest of times' 42. See also R Evan -Jones, 'Roman Law in 
Scotland and England and the Development of one Law for Britain' (1999) 115 Law 
Quarterly Review 605. See also R Zimmermann, 'Roman Law and European Legal Unity' in 
AS Hartkamp et al (eds) Towards a European Civil Code (2nd edn Kluwer Law International 
Nijmegen 1998) 21; W M Gordon, 'A Comparison of the Influence of Roman Law in England 
and Scotland' in D Carey Miller and R Zimmermann (eds) The Civilian Tradition and Scots 
Law op cit 135. 
7 T Hartley, 'The European Union and the Sytematic Dismantling of the Common 
Law of Conflict of Laws' (2005) 54 ICLQ 813. 
8 Currie v McKnight [1897] AC 97 (HL). 
9 Sheaf Steamship Co Ltd v Compania Trasmediterranea (1930) 36 Lloyd's Law Rep 197 
(IH (2 Div)). Although the Scottish and English Admiralty Courts administered the same 
maritime law the procedure which each Court adopted as a condition of exercising its 
jurisdiction was not necessarily the same (A R G McMillan, Scottish Maritime Practice (Hodge 
Edinburgh 1926)). 
10 See Gatoil International Inc v Arkwright- Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co 
(The Sandrina) [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 181 (HL). There it was held that it was desirable that the 
Administration of Justice Act 1956, as passed to enable the United Kingdom to ratify and 
comply with the 1952 Arrest Convention, was interpreted consistently as such provisions for 
both jurisdictions can be identified as having a common derivation from the Convention. 
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the dependence previously available in Scotland where arrestment was competent 
even for non -maritime claims; on the other hand, it widened the powers of arrest 
previously available in England under which the power of arrest arose only in 
respect of admiralty claims based upon a maritime lien, or a statutory right to arrest 
in rem, by allowing the arrest of 'sister ships' in certain circumstances. The degree of 
harmonisation was affected by the very different approach to the arrestment of 
ships in Scotland as compared with England prior to the Convention. In view of 
such divergences the amendments made to Scots law were introduced in a separate 
self- contained section of the Act." 
This Chapter aims to signal the current remaining differences between 
English and Scots law 12 in the law of arrest of ships and to asses their consistency, 
respectively, with the international Conventions. Ultimately, the question that arises 
is whether it is more convenient to approach the arrest of ships as pertaining to a 
broader category (interim relief /diligence /provisional and protective measures) -as 
it is done in Scotland -; or if it is preferable, for the sake of adjustment to the 
particular needs of maritime commerce, to treat it as a category of its own -as it is 
done in English law -.13 
71 Administration of Justice Act 1956, Chapter 46, Part V (Admiralty Jurisdiction and 
Arrestment of Ships in Scotland) (47- 51/57). 
12 Due to the fact that the power to ratify international Conventions rest with the 
Crown, most of the international literature on the subject matter tends to erroneously 
assume that the United Kingdom has at present a single system of arrest of ships. 
13 It has to be borne in mind that this is a thesis on the arrest of ships from a PII, 
standpoint. Hence, the issues looked at in this chapter are not wholly comprehensive of the 
topic 'arrest of ships' in English and Scots law, but, only in as much as relevant for the 
discussion on its characterization. The specific PIL problems, i.e. applicable law, jurisdiction, 
and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, are going to be analysed in the 
following three chapters. 
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4.2. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND AND 
SCOTLAND 
As essential background to this discussion, it is necessary to present an 
overview of the admiralty jurisdiction in each legal system to set the scene. In this 
context, the particular features of the action in rem are material, as the framework 
where the arrest of ships has developed in England; and so are the main features of 
diligence on the dependence, as the framework where the arrestment of ships as a 
provisional measure has developed in Scots law. 
First of all, arrest and arrestment correspond to the same legal institution;14 
therefore, they share the same origins. However, in Scotland, arrestment is a 
particular kind of diligence. That means that the institution can be easily referred to 
the general framework wherein it developed. On the contrary, arrest of ships in 
England developed as an institution of its own kind used in Admiralty, and it does 
not pertain to a more general category. 
4.2.1. Overview 
4.2.1.1. England 
The Admiralty Court in England is part of the Queen's Bench Division of the 
High Court. Admiralty actions can be either in rem or in personam. It is possible for 
an action to be both in rem and in personam. Since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, arrest of ships is available in English law in the frame of in rem claims only. 
Admiralty actions in English law (in fact, Admiralty actions in rem) are subject to the 
Civil Procedure Rules (hereinafter CPR) Part 61 (Admiralty Claims) and the 
14 'The effect of an Admiralty arrestment, as the term 'arrest' itself implies, is to fix the vessel 
in the place in which she is found...' Carlberg v Borjesson 1877 5 R 188, 195. 
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associated Practice Direction.15 In turn, in personam Admiralty claims are dealt with 
in accordance with CPR Part 58 (Commercial Claims).16 The subject matters over 
which the Admiralty Court has jurisdiction are established in section 20 of the 
Supreme Court Act (SCA) 1981 and all claims therein included are closely connected 
to the maritime activity.17 The right to proceed against a ship in rem is governed by 
sections 20 -24 of the SCA 1981. According to its section 20 (7), Admiralty 
Jurisdiction is exercisable in relation to all ships for all claims enumerated in section 
20 (2). To be able to issue an in rem claim form in the Admiralty Jurisdiction and to 
effect service thereof in the prescribed ways, the ship must be within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the High Court. 
4.2.1.2. Scotland 
Most Admiralty actions in Scotland can be initiated either in the sheriff court 
or in the Court of Session in Edinburgh.78 As well as in England, admiralty actions 
can be either in rem or in personam. It is possible for an action to be both in rem and in 
personam. However, differently from English law, arrestment of a ship is available in 
15 The Civil Procedure (Amendment No 5) Rules 2001 (SI 2001 No. 4015) entered into 
force on 25 March 2002. 
16 Practice Direction 61 12(2). 
17 a) Under s 20(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 claims are largely coincident 
with the list of maritime claims as provided for in the 1952 Arrest Convention; b) under 
s20(1)(b) of the same Act any application to the High Court under the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1995; any action to enforce a claim for damage, loss of life or personal injury arising out 
of several circumstances enunciated therein; and any action by ship- owners or other persons 
under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 for the limitation of the amount of their liability in 
connection with a ship or other property; c) under s 20(1)(c) of the Act any other Admiralty 
jurisdiction which it had immediately before the entry into force of the Act d) under s 
20(1)(d) of the Act any jurisdiction connected with ships or aircraft which is vested in the 
High Court apart from that section and is for the time being by rules of court made or 
coming into force after the commencement of the Act assigned to the Queen's Bench 
Division and directed by the rules to be exercised by the Admiralty Court. 
18 The sheriff courts have exclusive jurisdiction in Admiralty causes below certain 
amount of money in value, and otherwise, concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Session 
except in relation to salvage, where there are very particular provisions, the discussion of it 
is out with the scope of this analysis; see M C Meston, 'Admiralty' SME (1) [407]. 
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the two types of Admiralty actions, that is, actions in rem, where the claim is 
pursued against the res as such as constituting a fund out of which the eventual 
judgment could be enforced against through the eventual sale of the ship; and 
actions in personam against the owner (or demise charterer19) of the ship, where a 
ship is arrested to secure the claim. Arrestment of ships in Scots law is subject to the 
Rules of the Court of Session 1994, as amended, Chapter 16 (Service, intimation and 
diligence) paragraph 16.13 (Arrestment of ships and arrestment in rem of cargo on 
board ship). Nowadays, in Scotland, as well as in England, the arrestment of ships is 
only available in maritime claims. In Scots law those claims are the ones listed in 
section 47 of the Administration of Justice Act 1956. For arrestment to be competent 
the ship must be within Scotland, in port or in a recognised anchorage; section 47 (6) 
of the Act provides that arrestment of a ship on passage is forbidden. 
4.2.2. The Action in Rem 
An in rem claim is a claim against the res.20 In Admiralty, the distinctive 
feature of the action in rem has always been the ability of the maritime claimant to 
proceed directly against the ship; if the person interested in defending the claim 
19 See Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907, Ch 51, s 6 (c) (Competence of Arresting a 
Ship to Found Jurisdiction in Sheriff Court) as amended by the Schedule 4 to the Bankruptcy 
and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007. The amendment allows this kind of arrestment 
against the demise charterer of the ship as well as the owner; see also Administration of 
Justice Act 1956, Ch 46, s 47 H as introduced by Schedule 4 to the Bankruptcy and Diligence 
etc. (Scotland) Act 2007. 
20 The in rem /in personam distinction derives ultimately from Roman law; see B 
Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1975) 99 -104. Nonetheless, 
the strict Roman dichotomy becomes difficult to maintain in modern legal systems where 
the law is construed in terms of rights and duties. An action in personam may operate to 
protect a right in rem (as it is in fact the case in Scots law in some admiralty actions) hence 
the Roman dichotomy is blurred. It is also blurred in English law in the sister -ship 
'allowance' which is only permitted for those claims under paragraphs (e) to (r) that also 
include those claims which give rise to maritime liens but do not include claims related to 
mortgages or ownership of a particular ship. Thus, as examined in Chapter 2, in admiralty 
actions, the modern dichotomy of in rem /in personam claims finds its modern routes 
elsewhere but in the Roman distinction. 
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appears in the proceedings, or acknowledges service of the in rem claim form, an 
action in personam materializes on top against the defendants.21 Therefore, the 
practical importance of the distinction between actions in rem and actions in 
personam is their effect on third parties.22 
The procedural advantages of the action in rem have arrest as its very core; 
by commencing the in rem claim and arresting the ship three distinct functions are 
merged: namely, it has the consequence of preventing the ship from leaving the 
jurisdiction; of establishing jurisdiction on the merits, even if there is no substantive 
link between the claim and the jurisdiction other than the presence of the arrested 
ship in the jurisdiction; and of securing the position of maritime claimants as 
preferred creditors over unsecured ones in the eventual sale of the ship. These 
features of the action in rem apply equally in English and Scots law. 
In English law it is necessary to distinguish actions which are inherently in 
rem from actions that are procedurally in rem but substantially in personam, and, 
which sometimes are referred as quasi in rem claims.23 In the Scottish Admiralty 
scheme this fallacy of the law does not exist, therefore, an action in rem is 'truly in 
rem'24 and is only competent to enforce a maritime lien;25 all other forms of admiralty 
actions are in personam. 
21 The Gemma [1899] P 285 (CA); The August 8 [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep 351((PC) 
Singapore). 
22 B Nicholas (1975) 102. In Chapter 2 a brief account of the development of the 
action in rem in England and in Scotland in the nineteenth century was given. Since the 
decision of Sir Francis Jeuene in The Dictator [1892] P 304 (PDAD) 310 it has kept 'evolving'. 
For an account of the relevant English dicta in the twentieth century see N Teare, 'The 
Admiralty Action in rem and the House of Lords' [1997] LMCLQ 34. 
23 N Meeson, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice (3rd edn LLP London 2003) 17. 
24 The Indian Grace (No2) [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep (HL) 1. In the opinion of Jackson the 
decision helped significantly to replace fiction by reality. An action in rem is an action against 
a defendant with particular benefits for the claimant rather than an action against the ship as 
the 'wrongdoer' (D C Jackson (2005) 2 -3). 
25 Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 s 17(iii) consolidated in the Court of 
Session Act 1988 s 6(iii). This requires the Court of Session to provide by act of sederunt 'for 
enabling the enforcement of a maritime lien over a ship by an action in rem directed against 
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4.2.3. Provisional Measures, Diligence on the 
Dependence, Interim Relief 
Most legal systems provide for measures granted before a court has reached 
a decision on the merits to secure compliance with the eventual decision, primarily 
in relation to pecuniary claims. In Scots law, admiralty arrestment26 as a provisional 
measure is part of the law of such kind of measures more generally,27 that of 
diligence on the dependence. Diligence28 is the Scots law term used to indicate the 
legal measures to secure or enforce compliance with court decrees, primarily 
decrees for payment.29 Diligence can be used on the dependence of an action, i.e. 
when the court has not yet reached a decision on the merits, to provisionally secure 
the pursuer's claim. In the past, these measures used on the dependence used to be 
the ship and all persons interested therein without naming then and concluding for the sale 
of the ship and the application of the proceeds in extinction pro tanto of the lien and for 
enabling arrestment of the ship on the dependence of such an action, and for the regulation 
of the procedure in any such action' (Scot Law Corn Report No. 164 (1998) 125). 
26 Due to the many specialities of arrest of ships as compared with ordinary arrestment 
in Scots law, Professor Gretton considers that it should be perhaps considered as a separate 
diligence though he recognises that most texts deal with it as a special kind of arrestment (G 
L Gretton, 'Diligence' The Laws of Scotland, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia SME (8) 113 [322]). 
27 For a general discussion on diligence in Scots law see J G Stewart, Treatise on the Law 
of Diligence (Green Edinburgh 1898); G Maher and D J Cusine, The Law and Practice of 
Diligence (Butterworths Edinburgh 1990); G L Gretton, 'Diligence' SME (8) [101 -399]. 
28 As Gretton mentions in the SME (8) [102], how a word meaning carefulness or 
assiduity came to mean execution for debt is unclear. He mentions W Ross, Lectures on the 
History and Practice of the Law of Scotland relative to Conveyacing and Legal Diligence (2ndedn Bell 
& Bradfute Edinburgh 1822)), and his derivation from the French usage diligentia, and 
ascertains that modern French law does not use the word in this sense any more. In 
Uruguayan law where French influence has been notorious, provisional and protective 
measures are dealt with under the name of, respectively (in Spanish), diligencias preparatorias 
and medidas cautelares (art 306 -310 and 311 -317 of the General Code of Civil Procedure). 
However, diligence in the sense of Scots law is covered by the second (medidas cautelares) 
rather than by the former (diligencias preparatorias) that are preparatory measures such as the 
taking of evidence. 
29 The exception to that general rule is arrestment of ships in rem to secure non - 
pecuniary claims under s 47(3) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956. 
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called 'diligence for intermediate security'30, particularly, 'arrestment in security'31, 
and operated 'in a way that seems to be unknown in England'.32 As it is easily observed 
from the concept of diligence, the line between 'to secure' and 'to enforce' seems to 
be drawn at the moment when the court reaches a decision on the merits; before 
that, the action is depending and therefore, measures are provisional, i.e. subject to 
recall on security being given for the debt. Once there is a decree, diligence is taken 
in execution to enforce it, and the object arrested cannot be relieved but by 
payment.33 Arrestment of ships to enforce maritime liens lies somewhere in the 
middle of the two, its function is to enforce rather than to secure, but it is granted 
before a decision on the merits by the courts. 
The law of diligence more generally, and admiralty arrestment in particular, 
have been the object of recent law reform in Scotland. The Bankruptcy and Diligence 
(Scotland) Act 2007 draws from the 1998 Scottish Law Commission Report on 
Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty Arrestments (Scot Law Com No 164). 
The objective of the reform is to modernise the law of diligence and to bring it into 
line with international commitments already undertaken. The new Act is in general 
consistent with the latest international development in the sphere of diligence.34 As 
far as diligence on the dependece is concerned, the underlying policy is to prevent 
an unscrupulous creditor from using provisional and protective measures to put 
undue pressure on the debtor when the creditor does not in fact need any security 
for the claim.35 In so far as the arrestment of ships, Schedule 4 to the Act, introduced 
30 G J Bell (vol 1, 1870) 7. 
31 G J Bell (vol 2, 1870) 64 -68. However, Gretton criticises that usage as confusing, 
since arrestment in security is strictly in respect of a debt which is contingent or future (G L 
Gretton, SME (8) [2571). 
32G J Bell (vol 1, 1870) 7. 
33 Ibid. 
34 For instance, proportionality as the main criterion for granting permission to use 
interim measures of protection, recognised in the recently adopted ALI /Unidroit Principles 
of Transnational Civil Procedure, is reflected in the Scottish reform. 
35 Policy Memorandum 104. 
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by section 213, modifies various enactments relating to admiralty actions and the 
arrestment of ships. 
The functions of diligence more generally, and the functions of the 
arrestment of ships as a peculiar kind of diligence, coincide up to a certain extent. 
As STEWART35 explained, diligence has three main functions: i) forcing the debtor to 
appear in court to answer an action at the creditor's instance (the 'compelling' 
effect), ii) finding security to satisfy the eventual judgment (the security function), 
iii) enforcing a judgment already pronounced (diligence in execution). 
The benefit of being part of a more general framework is that there are 
certain legal effects that belong to the general category, for example, the nexus 
(attachment) that arrestment lays over the property arrested, thus, the real right in 
security that arrestment implies 37 which in turn gives a preference to the creditor 
over acts of the debtor and of the competing creditor.38 On the contrary, it is 
arguable that arrest of ships as developed in England, as part of its Admiralty 
scheme, has developed so as to meet the particular needs of maritime commerce. In 
English law arrest of ships and interim relief are treated distinctly. The judicial 
discretion to grant interim relief is provided for in Part 25 of the Civil Procedure 
Rules. These provisions apply, for instance, to the granting of freezing orders;i9 
whereas arrest of maritime property is excluded from that framework. And indeed 
it does not have any other framework but the action in rem itself. 
36 J G Stewart (1898)1. As Gretton explains in the SME (8) [101], the first of these three 
functions refers to arrestment to found jurisdiction, and also to the now obsolete fugae 
warrant; (meditatio fugae warrant, a device of ancient Scots law to stop the debtor to escape 
from the country; under this warrant the debtor could be imprisoned unless he relieved 
himself by finding bail to remain in the country; see G J Bell (vol 1, 1870) 7. 
37 SME (8) [286]. 
38 Scot Law Corn No. 164 (1998) 186. 
39 The relation between arrest of ships and freezing orders involving a ship is 
somehow unsettled in English law. In the preliminary work pursuant to the 1999 Arrest 
Convention, the United Kingdom delegation expressed that a discussion was under way in 
England on whether it would be desirable for the Mareva injunction (as it was then called) to 
be covered by the definition of 'arrest'. See the travaux préparatoires of the 1999 Arrest 
Convention, Ninth Session 2 -6 December 1996, as included in F Berlingieri (2006) 527, 
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4.3. DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARREST OF SHIPS 
There are three types of arrest of ships as a provisional40 measure in Britain: 
arrest/ arrestment in rem to enforce a maritime lien, arrest/ arrestment (quasi) in rem 
under a statutory right to proceed in rem, and arrestment on the dependence of 
admiralty actions in personam (only in Scots law). The third one is granted within the 
general law of diligence in Scotland therefore, nowadays, at judicial discretion. The 
first one, both in England and in Scotland, is part of the specific admiralty scheme 
above -mentioned, the action in rem. The second type, arrest/ arrestment (quasi) in 
rem, is differently treated in English and Scots law. In English law, statutory rights 
entitle the claimant to issue an in rem claim form regardless of whether the result is 
pecuniary or not. In Scots law, the entitlement depends on whether the conclusion 
of the purported action on the merits is pecuniary or not; if it is pecuniary, 
arrestment on the dependence of an action in personam is competent, if it is non - 
pecuniary, the pursuer is entitled to arrest in rem, even though the action would still 
be in personam. 
4.3.1. England 
4.3.1.1. Generalities 
Arrests of ships in England take place only in the framework of an action in 
rem, available in a limited list of admiralty causes and maritime claims. There are 
two main types of arrest. The one executed to enforce a maritime lien, and the other 
type (arrest available under statutory rights). Technically, the difference between 
arrest when it enforces a maritime lien and when it does not lies in its effects with 
40 Arrest /arrestment in execution is out with the scope of this thesis since it has been 
expressly excluded from the international framework (art 1(2) 1952 and 1999 Arrest 
Conventions). Noteworthy, arrestment of a ship in execution is competent in Scots law and 
nowadays also in English law; for the latter see M Tsimplis and N Gaskell, 'Admiralty claims 
and the new CPR Part 61' [20021 LMCLQ 520, 527. 
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regard to third parties. Nonetheless, in this sense, the difference is not connected to 
the effect of the arrest as such, but, with the nature of the right that the arrest is 
purporting to enforce; i.e. the difference is between rights in rem (or 'truly in rem') 
and rights to proceed in rem (just a procedural device). In terms of functions, the 
jurisdictional function operates the same way in both types, since it is not arrest that 
displays this function but the action in rem when initiated. The interaction of the 
other two functions varies and is going to be analysed in turn. 
For the arrest of the ship in connection with which the claim arose, and 
provided the claim does not attract a maritime lien, and is not one of a proprietary 
character, such as those under sub -paragraphs a, b and c of section 20 (2), the person 
who would be liable for such claim in personam when the cause of action arose 
(either the owner, the charterer, or the person in possession or in control of that 
ship) should be either the beneficial owner of that ship in all shares, or the demise 
charterer at the time of the issue of the in rem claim form. 
For the arrest of a sister ship, the person who would be liable for such claim 
in personam when the cause of action arose should be the beneficial owner of that 
ship in all shares of that other ship at the time of the issue of the in rem claim form. 
A sister ship is only permitted for those claims under paragraphs (e) to (r), which 
also include those claims which give rise to maritime liens, but not for claims related 
to mortgages or ownership of a particular ship. When a sister ship is arrested for a 
claim attracting a maritime lien, the lien is lost and therefore its priority in 
satisfaction of the claim will rank in the same category as that of the other statutory 
rights in rem.41 
41 The Leoborg (No 4) [1964] 1 Lloyd's Rep 380 (PDAD). 
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4.3.1.2. Arrest in rem to enforce a maritime lien 
A maritime lien is a security which gives the security -holder a right in rein on 
the ship, and takes priority over mortgages. This right arises by operation of law, 
without registration or other formalities. It is indeed a right in security. This kind of 
security must be enforced by an in rem claim, in which arrest is an essential 
component. In this context, arrest is an early step ensuring physical retention of the 
res; it is a pre -emptive measure linked with a real right in security on the object. It 
displays the protective function of arrest as referred in Chapter 1, i.e. counteracts the 
speed with which the res could leave the jurisdiction; but, it does not have a security 
function as such; the priority afforded lies in the nature of the cause of action. In 
English law maritime liens arise out of collision, salvage, crew's wages, master's 
disbursements and bonds of bottomry and respondentia. 
4.3.1.3. Arrest in rem to enforce statutory rights in rem 
Apart from the claims that attract a maritime lien under English law, there 
are statutory rights in rem, the function of which is to confer on a claimant having a 
certain type of maritime claim,42 the right to arrest the ship as security for that claim. 
With regard to those claims it is the arrest as such that constitutes the 'security'. As 
explained by TETLEY, the statutory right of action in rem differs from a maritime lien 
in a least three major ways, all of them related to the security function. First, the 
right arises only from the time of the issue of the in rem claim form, where the 
maritime lien arises when the services are provided to, or the damage is done by the 
42 In order to comply with the obligations deriving from the ratification of the 1952 
Arrest Convention, the United Kingdom amended the jurisdictional rules of the Admiralty 
Court in the Administration of Justice Act 1956. This statue has been superseded in England 
by the Supreme Court Act 1981. The list of maritime claims appearing therein largely 
coincides with those maritime claims listed in art 1 of the 1952 Arrest Convention. 
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ship concerned. Secondly, for a statutory right in rem to follow the ship into 
whomever's hands it passes, an in rem claim form needs to be issued before the ship 
is sold.43 Once the in rem claim form is issued, the claimant acquires a status of a 
preferred creditor and the claim will follow the ship even in the hands of an 
innocent purchaser. The potential purchaser though, could protect himself against 
such encumbrance by looking at the court's register of in rem proceedings. This is a 
further difference from ships 'affected' by maritime liens, because liens are invisible 
(non- registrable). Thirdly, the holder of a statutory right in rem has a much lower 
priority than the maritime lien -holder in the distribution of the proceeds of the 
judicial sale, ranking after, rather than before, the ship's mortgagee." 
4.3.1.4. No arrest as a protective measure in an action in 
personam 
Differently from civil law jurisdictions, and from Scots law, there are no 
possibilities in England to arrest a ship as an interim measure of protection in an 
action in personam.45 As explained in Chapter 2, this was not always the case. In the 
early days of the Admiralty Jurisdiction in England it used to be possible to arrest a 
ship in the framework of an action in personam. The measure was known as a 
maritime attachment, and allegedly it fell into disuse in Admiralty by the beginning 
of the nineteenth century concurrently with the loss of jurisdiction in personam 
experienced by that court.46 
43 s 21(4)(b)(i) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
44 W Tetley, 'Arrest, Attachment and Related Maritime Law Procedures' (1999) 73 
Tulane Law Review 1895. 
45 Since the creation of the Mareva injunctions, those freezing orders are the ones 
available in personam in the maritime sphere, as well as in civil and commercial cases in 
genera 1. 
46 W Tetley (1999) 1905. Tetley is of the opinion that the maritime attachment 
continued to exist after 1800 on the grounds of Fry's speech in The Northcote v Owners of the 
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4.3.2.2.1. Arrestment in rem enforcing maritime liens 
As well as in English law, in Scots law a maritime lien gives the creditor a 
security without possession from the moment when the circumstances occur out of 
which the lien arises. The effect of an arrestment in rem to enforce a maritime lien is 
therefore, not to create a nexus or security over the res (which already exists) but, to 
fix the res in the place where it is when the arrestment in rem is executed 48 That is to 
say that the protective function of arrest of ships is the central one in this case. In 
addition, in an action in rem an arrestment in rem founds jurisdiction;49 i.e. it displays 
also the jurisdictional function. 
With regard to the protective function, already in the late nineteenth century 
Lord Shand in Carlberg y Borjesson50 used the expression 'real diligence' in this sense; 
arrest of ships has the effect of fixing the object in a particular place, preventing the 
defender from disposing of it 51 
As in English law, an arrestment in rem to enforce a maritime lien is not only 
competent, but also an essential incident of an admiralty action in rem.52 Warrant of 
arrestment in rem should be executed before service of the summons.53 
48 Scot Law Com Report No. 164 (1998) 124. 
49 A E Anton, Private International Law A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law 
(Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh 1967) 115. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 Sch 5 
[7] Sch 9[6]. 
501877 5 R 188, 195. 
51 In Lord Shand words 'Its effects, as the term 'arrest' itself implies, is to fix the vessel in 
the place in which she is found, and, if there is any danger of her being removed from that place, the 
power to dismantle may be exercised'. As Gretton explains, 'real diligence' is an open -ended 
concept since it has been used in different senses in English and Scots law, and even within 
the latter, with more than one meaning; hence is not helpful to distinguish one type of 
arrestment from the others (G L Gretton SME (8) [118] /[322]). 
52 Consequentially, the expenses of an arresment in rem are recoverable as part of the 
expenses of process because they are essential to the obtaining of decree in rem; see Hatton v 
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4.3.2.2.2. Arrestment in rem 54 to secure non -pecuniary claims 
By virtue of section 47(3) (b) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956, the 
claims listed in section 47(2) (p) to (s) when the result is non -pecuniary, (when the 
result is pecuniary the arrestment is on the dependence), encumber a right to arrest 
in rem in an action in personam. These claims are (p) any dispute as to the ownership 
or right to possession of any ship or as to the ownership of any share in a ship; (q) 
any dispute between co- owners of any ship as to the ownership, possession, 
employment or earnings of that ship; (r) the mortgage or hypothecation of any ship 
or any share in a ship; (s) any forteiture or condemnation of any ship, or of goods 
which are being, or have been, carried, or have been attempted to be carried, in any 
ship, or for the restoration of a ship or any such goods after seizure. 
As it was highlighted by the Scottish Law Commission in the Report on 
Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty Arrestments,55 this kind of arrestment 
is distinctive in terms of nature and functions. It is a unique example in Scots law of 
an arrestment which secures non -pecuniary claims, and in that sense sits uneasily 
with settled principles of the Scots law of diligence.56 It is the only example in Scots 
law of an arrestment which is neither an arrestment on the dependence of an action 
nor an arrestment in rem enforcing a maritime lien. Although it is an arrestment in 
rem, it is competent only in admiralty actions in personam or combined actions, but 
not in actions which are purely in rem. 
A/S Durban Hansen 1919 S C 154 (IH (1 Div)) as cited by the Scot Law Corn Discussion 
Discussion Paper No. 84 (1989) 212. 
53 Implementing a proposal (Proposition 30 (2) [3.48] of the SLC Discussion Paper No 
84 the current Rules of Court make it possible to convert an admiralty action in personam into 
an action in rem after signeting RCS r. 13.8 and note 46.3.1 Mill y Fides 1982 SLT 147 (OH) 
under RCS 1965. 
54 Under s 47 (39)(b) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956. 
55 Scot Law Corn No. 164 (1998). 
56 In his Commentaries Bell established that arrestment 'is an incompetent diligence for 
enforcing obligations which are not of a pecuniary nature' G J Bell, Commentaries on the law of 
Scotland and on the principles of mercantile jurisprudence (vol 2, 7th edn T. & T. Clark Edinburgh 
1870 reprint Butterworths Edinburgh 1990) 68. 
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Furthermore, it functions differently. It does not display the functions of 
arrest of ships as described in Chapter 1. It does not have a jurisdictional function, 
therefore, arrestment of a ship to found jurisdiction is competent in addition to that 
ship being arrested in rem to secure a non -pecuniary claim.57 Moreover, this kind of 
arrestment is not followed by a process of sale, that is, the protective function does 
not operate to safeguard the defendant's assets to eventually create a fund against 
which to enforce the judgment, but to safeguard the res itself. Following that, and 
contrary to the situation of arrestment on the dependence and arrestment in rem to 
enforce a maritime lien, this kind of arrestment does not appear to have any effect 
on the ranking of creditors, or in competition with bona fide purchasers or 
mortgagees, or generally on the substantive rights of parties, other than right to 
interim possession; i.e. it does not display neither a security function at all. 
In terms of juridical nature, however, it is a provisional and protective 
measure in the terms described in Chapter 1. As was discussed therein, a distinction 
must be made between measures such as preliminary attachment, arrest /arrestment 
or freezing injunction, on the one side, where the protective function operates to 
ensure that the final award or judgment can be enforced by safeguarding the 
defendant's assets or property;58 and, on the other side, provisional measures 
relating directly to the subject- matter of the case. This second kind of measure has as 
its main function the preservation of the res, i.e. the preservation of the status quo until 
the merits of the case are settled (pendente lite nihil innovandum). In that sense, 
arrestment in rem to enforce non -pecuniary claims is an order regulating interim 
possession pending decree in a petitory action determining the right of parties. It is 
for this reason that it may be used whether or not the ship belongs to the defender, 
57 PTKF Kontinent y VMPTO Progress 1994 SLT 235 (OH). 
58 CA McLachlan, 'Second Interim Report on Provisional and Protective Measures in 
International Litigation', Report of the Sixty- Seventh Conference, Helsinski (ILA London 
1996) 185, 202. 
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and even if it belongs already to the pursuer 59 Furthermore, it has been argued that 
being an ancillary interim remedy in an action the court granting it should have 
jurisdiction in the principal action.ó0 For this reason, the possibility of arresting a 
ship in these circumstances while excercising ancillary jurisdiction supporting 
foreign proceedings or arbitration seems to be excluded. 
4.3.2.3. Arrestment on the dependence 
Arrestment on the dependence in general law. The arrestment on the dependence 
as it stands today in Scots law was already a very familiar and well -known form of 
diligence at the beginning of the twentieth century.61 Its object is to arrest, i.e., to 
keep fixed, some asset of the debtor, the defender in the action, so it may be made 
good to satisfy the decree which the pursuer is seeking (protective function). Except 
from ships, arrestment could never be in the hands of the debtor himself but must 
be in the hands of a third party. 
Arrestment of a ship on the dependence. Arrestment of a ship is rather different. 
It is a diligence against the ship itself and is eventually made good by a process of 
sale. There may be arrestment of a ship on the dependence of an Admiralty action in 
personam involving (i) claims included in section 47 (2) (p) to (s) of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1956 when the result is pecuniary; (ii) claims included 
in section 47 (2) (b) loss of life or personal injury, (d) use or hire of a ship, (e) 
carriage of goods (agreement), (f) carriage of goods (loss or damage), (g) general 
59 Inglis explains, for instance, that 'under s 47(2) (p) an owner may whish to obtain 
possession of a ship which he has chartered to the defender He would be entitled to arrest his own ship 
in security for the claim to obtain possession because for example of a breach of the defender of a 
material obligation in the charter' I G Inglis, 'Arrest of Ships in Scotland' in C Hill (ed) The 
Arrest of Ships Series (vol 4 LLP London 1987) 87. 
G0 Scot Law Corn No. 164 (1998) 131. 
61 The Clan Line Steamers Limited y The Earl of Douglas Steamship Company 1913 SC 967 
(IH (1 Div)). It is probably the diligence most practitioners turn to in the first place (E Baijal, 
'The Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007: The New Jewel in the Creditor's 
Crown' (2007) 9 Scots Law Times (Legislative Comment) 55, 57. 
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average, (i) towage, (j) pilotage, (k) supplies, (I) construction, repair or equipment of 
a ship, (m) liability for dock charges or dues. 
Only one ship (the ship concerned or a sister ship) per action may be 
arrested on the dependence under section 47 (1) of the 1956 Act.A2 Contrary to the 
admiralty arrestment in rem, arrestment on the dependence is competent but not an 
essential incident of an admiralty action in personam. And unlike arrestment in rem 
and arrest of ships in English law, arrestment of ships on the dependence in Scots 
law does not found jurisdiction; it does not have a jurisdictional function_ If 
jurisdiction is to be found upon arrestment an arrestment to found jurisdiction 
needs to be served in addition to the arrestment n the dependence. 
4.3.2.4. Ar'restment to found jurisdiction 
In addition to the three kinds of an-estment of ships mentioned above, a ship 
can be arrested under Scots traditional law t > found jurisdiction (the so- called 
arrestment ad ,fundnndam jurisdictionem). This --culiar means of establishing 
jurisdiction is not technically a provisional and protective measure. Arrestment to 
found jurisdiction does not prevent the ship from sailing (no protective function) 
and does not establish a nexus63 with property arrested (no security function); 
the effects of this kind of arrestment in the case of ships as well as in the case of any 
other kind of moveable property of the defender, are solely _fund r nelae causa 
(jurisdictional function) and are examined in Chapter 6. 
Interatlantic fNamibia) tPtrÿ Olreasnki Ri 9;rny Ltd aFae gala) [1 : 3] 2 Li 
(OH). 
d"s Rep. 2 :. 
G Stewart (1$98) 269; North ir Steztvirt (18 17 R mtl ( L); Maxwell The Practice of the 
Court of Session (Scottish Courts Administration Edinburgh 19:4) 387; Fraser-Johnston 
Engineering Co y Jeffs ((1920) 2 Lloyd's Re;;. 33 (11H (1 Div)); A R G McMillan (1926) 10; D 
Maxwell, The Practice of the Court of Session (Scottish Courts Administration Edinbur 19"1i) 
387; Mill v Fides 1982 SLT 147 (OH). 
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4.4. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARREST OF SHIPS IN 
ENGLISH AND IN SCOTS LAW IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
AUTONOMOUS CHARACTERIZATION OF ARREST OF 
SHIPS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Article 1(2) of the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions contain an autonomous 
definition of arrest of ships as formed by various parts: (i) what is arrest (the 
detention of a ship; the detention or restriction on removal of a ship); (ii) how is it 
effected (judicial process; order of a court); (iii) what is it purpose (to secure a 
maritime claim); (iv) what is not arrest (the seizure of a ship in execution or 
satisfaction of a judgment or other enforceable instrument). In the following 
paragraphs the consistency of English and Scots law with such autonomous 
definition is scrutinised. 
í. Arrest Means Physical Detention ofa Ship 
Except for arrestment to found jurisdiction in Scots law all the other types of 
arrestment mentioned above prevent the ship from sailing; and in that sense fit 
within the Convention's category. The same happens with arrest of ships in English 
law. The phrase 'restriction on removal'64 added in the 1999 Arrest Convention does 
not present any difference as far as English or Scots law.65 
64 The selection of the term 'removal' in the English version has been criticised. In the 
French version the more appropriate term 'depart' was used. In the Diplomatic Conference 
the CMI suggested that the term 'removal' should be replaced by 'departure' but that 
suggestion was not taken into consideration. In the Spanish text is 'restricción a la salida de un 
buque' (F Berlingieri (2006) 93). 
65 It was inserted to clarify the situation of any encumbrance over a ship that does 
not imply physical detention. For instance, the so- called 'ship- register arrest' in Danish law, 
whereby the warrant of arrest is not executed on the ship but is only endorsed in the ship's 
register. Functionally it operates like an embargo preventing the owner from selling or 
mortgaging the ship and thus securing the future enforcement on the ship of the claim of the 
arrester (security function only). 
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ii. Arrest is a Judicial Remedy 
In this sphere alignment with the Convention's provisions is not so 
straightforward. Article 1(2) of both international Conventions refers to the 
detention of a ship by judicial process and articles 4 and 2, respectively, provide that 
a ship 'may only be arrested [or released from arrest] under the authority of a court 
[or of the appropriate judicial authority] of the State party in which the arrest is 
made [effected]'. Under Scots law not so long agoó6 warrant for diligence on the 
dependence was granted as a matter of right without judicial consideration; the 
'judicial authority' intervention was limited to an order of the clerk of courts. In any 
case doubts in this regard in Scots law are now dissipated because currently judicial 
intervention is mandatory.67 In English law, though, it remains an order of the 
Admiralty Marshall without much of a 'judicial process' in between. 
Arrest is a Provisional Measure; it is Not Seizure in Execution 
As examined above arrest /arrestment of ships can be used both in English 
and in Scots law before a court has reached a decision on the merits of a maritime 
claim; arrestment in execution is also available, arguably in both systems, but it has 
been cast aside from the characterization of arrest of ships in the International 
Conventions. This point is made clearly in Article 1 (2) of the Conventions. 
Seemingly, the notional concept is centred on two premises. Arrest is a provisional 
measure requested before the claim is subject to a decision on its merits by a court. 
To be provisional in nature means that it can be recalled at the instance of the 
defendant and alternative security may replace that of the ship herself. Contrarily, 
seizure in execution is permanent, and a manner of enforcing a judgment and 
66 Before the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into Scots 
law. See Karl Construction Ltd y Palisade Properties Plc 2002 SC 270 (OH). 
67 See Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, Pt 6 (Diligence on the 
Dependence). 
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satisfying the claim out of the proceeds of sale. In this event a ship is not different 
from the other assets of the debtor, and due to its exclusion from the definition of 
arrest of ships under the Convention, is liable to seizure irrespective of the nature of 
the claim, whether maritime or not.68 
iv. Arrest is a Measure intended to 'Secure a Maritime Claim' 
Characterization in this respect is difficult. The problem lies in the extent of 
the security function of arrest of ships. In the international Arrest Conventions the 
security function is part of the autonomous definition of arrest of ships; whereas in 
English law, several dicta have disregarded such function.69 
In accordance with an in ordinem characterization of arrest of ships any 
detention of a ship effected without the purpose of securing a maritime claim would 
be beyond the scope of the Conventions. This purposive interpretation could entail 
a problem of consistency if understood too narrowly, for example in the case of 
claims secured by a maritime lien. In this regard the common law and civil law have 
not managed to amalgamate so easily. The result is that some of the provisions of 
the Conventions reflect the one and some the other. In other words, under the 
Conventions the following questions produce inconsistent answers: Does the scope 
of arrest of ships as a legal category in the Conventions covers only measures 
intended to secure a maritime claim or arrests performed to provide functionally 
any other of the effects stated in the Conventions fit within the category regardless 
of its lack of security function? Is the protective function of arrest of ships separable 
from its security function? That is, 'to secure a maritime claim' is necessarily to 
safeguard a certain asset against which the final award or judgment can be enforced 
68 F Berlingieri (2006) 88. 
69 The Prinsengracht [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 41; The Anna H [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 11. In 
fact, in the later it became clear as to English case law, the multiplicity of functions that the 
arrest of a ship entails as a single procedural act. 
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(the ship), or is it possible to understand the protective function more broadly in 
terms of the compelling effect of arrest of ships regardless of its security aspect? 
According to the Conventions in this context it is possible to arrest 'to secure a 
maritime claim' even when the claim (according to its lex causae) is already secured 
by a maritime lien, hypothec, mortgage or charge of the same nature. How should 
this be interpreted in terms of the extent of the legal category? Is it possible to arrest 
a ship even when alternative security has already been given? Apparently due to 
the inclusion of the security function in the very definition of arrest of ships, all the 
substantive rules (the legal consequences) of arrest of ships under the Conventions 
should be interpreted in accordance with this central function. To do it otherwise 
would be against the Conventions. However, an interpretation of the Conventions 
as whole points to a broad interpretation of the protective function of arrest of ships. 
In The Prinsengracht70 it was held that the claimant is entitled to arrest a ship 
even after bail has been provided when the owner has declined to agree expressly to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the court. On the same line in The Anna H71 the Court of 
Appeal in England argued that the purpose of the arrest of ships indicated in its 
definition in the 1952 Arrest Convention does not mean that where there is 
alternative security, an arrest to establish jurisdiction is not within that Convention. 
It was argued that despite the definition of arrest as a measure 'to secure a maritime 
claim' the commercial motive of the arrester was irrelevant. This argument is in 
plain contradiction to an in ordinem characterization of arrest of ships as a PIL 
category in the Convention. The only explanation for that departure from the 
autonomous interpretation of arrest of ships as in the Convention could be that, 
because in English law the protective function of arrest of ships is as important as its 
jurisdictional one, the lex fori characterization distorted the application of the 
Convention in such a way. 
70 [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 41 (QBD (Admlty)) (Sheen J). 
71 [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 11 (CA). 
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4.4.1. Arrest of Ships as a Provisional and Protective 
Measure 
4.4.1.1. The Provisional Character of Arrest of Ships 
The 'provisional' character of arrest of ships is related to its temporary 
condition and to its accessory nature to the case on the merits. Due to these features 
provisional measures are generally discretionary, and can always be recalled under 
the provision of alternative security. The universally recognised criteria to assess the 
convenience of granting such interim remedies are the need to prove the fumus boni 
iuris, the periculum in mora and to provide for an undertaking in damages. However, 
as explained in Chapter 3, in the long chain of amalgamations that led to arrest of 
ships as the modern mixed legal institution that it is today, law- makers have 
departed from the universally recognised criteria above -mentioned. Doubtless, the 
influence of English law is responsible for such departure. 
4.4.1.1.1. Arrest /arrestment in rem to enforce a maritime lien 
This 'departure' is currently inmaterial in the case of arrest /arrestment in rein 
to enforce a maritime lien. Both in English and Scots law such arrest is currently a 
legal right rather than a discretionary remedy.72 Paradoxically, in English law it has 
been argued that due to the strength in nature and effect of arrest of ships it might 
better be discretionary rather than a legal entitlement.73 On the contrary, in Scotland 
it has been held that judicial discretion is inappropriate where the purpose of the 
72 In English law it used to be conditional upon the claimant making full and frank 
disclosure of material facts at the time it applies for the arrest Owners of the Vasso y Owners 
of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Vasso (The Andria, The Vasso) [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 235 (CA). 
73 M Tsimplis and N Gaskell (2002) 525. Furthermore, these authors argue that this 
may be particularly true if the 1999 Arrest Convention is enacted, as it increases the scope of 
arrest. 
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measure is to enforce a security.74 On the one hand, the foregoing paradox illustrates 
the difference between English and Scots law in this regard, since the comment of 
English law referred to arrest of ships in general and indistinctively as in England 
actions in rem do not necessarily imply a substantive right in rem but a right to 
proceed in rem; whereas in Scots law actions in rem are 'truly in rem'. In that sense, if 
the court were to refuse the arrestment in rem, it would deprive the claimant of the 
benefit of his maritime lien.75 On the other hand, this view does not take into 
consideration that even though the court is enforcing a real right it is so doing 'in 
advance'; that is probably what was meant when referring to its strengh in nature 
and effect. And the court is doing so before even considering the case on its merits, 
hence, there should be an 'essential justification for the impatience of a tribunal granting 
relief before it has reached a final decision'.76 None of the benefits of a maritime lien as a 
real right justifies the 'anticipation' of the remedy; the only justification is that it is 
an essential part of the action in rem, a special admiralty scheme the development of 
which does not have other but historical explanation as showed in Chapter 2. 
Following that, the suggestion made in English law referred to above deserves 
further consideration. In this sphere the revision undertaken with regard to 
admiralty arrestments pursuant to the law reform in Scots law has raised several 
questions (and answers) that have not been answered as far as English law is 
concerned. It has been suggested that eventuallyn similar questions will have to be 
answered and that there is little support for any change away from arrest as an 
entitlement.78 In the light of the latest trends in international litigation in the field of 
interim measures of protection this opinion is challengeable at least in the cases 
where the cause of action is not secured by a maritime lien. The theme should be 
74 Scot Law Com No. 164 (1998) 127. 
75 Ibid. 
76 E Jimenez de Arechaga in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turkey) ICJ 
Reports (1976) 315 -16. 
77 'Should it ever be decided to reform the English law of arrest, e.g. by enacting the Arrest 
Convention 1999 similar questions will have to be answered' M Tsimplis and N Gaskell (2002) 
526. 
78 M Tsimplis and N Gaskell (2002) 526. 
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looked at from the perspective of the European Convention on Human Rights and it 
should be linked with the issue of cross -undertaking in damages and liability for 
wrongful arrest.79 
4.4.1.1.2. Arrest/ arrestment in rem or in the dependence when there is no 
maritime lien at stake 
4.4.1.1.2.1. Legal Right or Discretionary Remedy? 
4.4.1.1.2.1.1. England 
In English law this feature of being a legal right rather than a discretionary 
remedy applies not only to arrest to enforce a maritime lien but to arrest of ships in 
general. Arrest is described as an inherent part of the action in rem,80 a 
characterization that seems to prevail over its provisional and protective nature. At 
present, the general understanding is that as there is an entitlement to arrest in 
compliance with procedure requirements there is no room for any discretion to 
impose any condition.B1 
This was not always so. Before the 1986 Rules of the Supreme Court arrest 
was considered to be a discretionary remedy and the court had the power to refuse 
the application to arrest.R2 Furthermore, in the case of ex parte proceedings there was 
79 See infra. 
80 1999 Arrest Convention art 2(4) R Goode, H Kronke, E McKendrick and J Wool 
Transnational Commercial Law (OUP Oxford 2004) 440. 
81 D C Jackson (2005) 405. However, when Part 61 of the CPR and its associated PD 
entered into force in 2002, there was some scope for doubt as to whether there was any 
intention to return to the position prior to 1986 (M Tsimplis and N Gaskell (2002) 525). The 
widely held position is that there was no such intention and arrest remains a legal 
entitlement rather than a discretionary remedy under current English law. Surprisingly, the 
issue has not been examined in the light of the ECHR in English law, as it has been Scots 
law. 
82 M Tsimplis and N Gaskell (2002) 523; [1984] The Vasso 1 Lloyd's Rep. 235; The 
Vanessa Ann [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 549 (QBD (Admlty)). 
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the requirement of full and frank disclosure by the claimant.83 Arrest shifted from a 
discretionary remedy to a legal right due the changes introduced in the Rules of the 
Supreme Court in 1986.54 This change of character enhanced the power of arrest as a 
'weapon' in the hands of a claimant; doubtless due not only to the protective and 
the security function of arrest but to its jurisdictional one. From then on the 
entitlement to arrest has been further reaffirmed by subsequent legislation. 85 The 
only sphere where discretion still exists is with regard to ancillary jurisdiction in 
support of foreign proceedings or arbitration. In such circumstances the Court has 
discretion as provided for in Section 26 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 
1982.86 
There are many differences between a court exercising jurisdiction on the 
merits from a court exercising ancillary jurisdiction; some of them will be examined 
in Chapter 7. Nonetheless, the different treatment of arrest as an interim measure of 
protection in both situations could be suggesting that indeed this claimant - 
orientated policy of treating arrest of ships as a legal entitlement is aimed to protect 
England as one of the world leaders of maritime litigation. 
4.4.1.1.2.1.2. Scotland 
In Scotland, except for the arrestment in rem to enforce a maritime lien, 
admiralty arrestment is part of the general framework of diligences in security 
(protective measures), and may be used on the dependence of an action (as a 
provisional measure). Until recently authority to use diligence on the dependence 
83 Ibid. 
84 The Varna [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 253 (CA). 
85 In 1999 Practice Direction 49F [6.1] as enacted by CPR 1998 (SI 1998 No. 3132). 
86 Greenmar Navigation v Owners of Ships Bazias 3 and Bazias 4 and Sally Line (The Bazias 
3 and The Bazias 4) [1993] QB 673 (CA); The Havhelt (1993) 1 Lloyd's Rep 523 where the 
defendant argued that the claimant's claim would be time barred under the Hague Rules as 
construed by Norwegian Law (S Baughen Shipping Law (3rd edn Cavendish London 2004) 
399). 
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was given more or less automatically.87 This state of affairs was considered by the 
Scottish Law Commission discussion paper Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty 
Arrestments 1989 (SLC DP 84) and the Report mentioned above, where judicial 
discretion was recommended for the grant of warrant for arrestment of a ship on the 
dependence of an action in personam, or warrant for arrestment in rem securing 
decree of specific implement in an admiralty action in personam in relation to a non - 
pecuniary claim. It was also recommended there a different treatment for an 
arrestment in rem in an admiralty action in rein to enforce a maritime lien since in 
those cases the arrest is the only method of making good the lien; it was considered 
that judicial discretion would be out of place in those cases and accordingly warrant 
for arrestment in rem should continue to be available to the maritime lien- holder as 
of right.88 
Furthermore, the Scottish Law Commission analysed the situation in the 
light of the Protocol 1 (right to property, education and free elections) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).89 Two decisions of the Scottish 
courts, cases of Ltd v Palisade Properties P1c90 and Advocate 
General for Scotland v Taylor91 affirmed that the way in which diligence on the 
dependence was then available in Scots law infringed Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR 
because of a disproportionate interference with the debtor's property rights. 
According to Karl four conditions needed to be satisfied before diligence on 
the dependence could be compatible with Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR: the creditor 
87 G Maher, 'Diligence on the dependence: principles for reform' [1998] Juridical 
Review 188. Nonetheless, well before the statutory law reform in this sphere, to permit the 
arrestment of a ship on the dependence the summons needed to show a 'colourable case' i.e. 
'some intelligible and discernible cause of action' (G Maher and D J Cusine, The Law and Practice 
of Diligence (Butterworths Edinburgh 1990) 96; West Cumberland Farmers Ltd y Ellon Hinengo 
Ltd 1988 SLT 294 (OH); Clipper Shipping Co Ltd y San Vicente Partners 1989 SLT 204 (OH)). 
88 Scot Law Com Report No. 164 (1998) [1.10]. 
89 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed 
in Rome on the 4th of November 1950. 
9° 2002 Session Cases 270. 
91 2003 Scots Law Times 1340. 
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needed to show a prima facie case (fumus boni iuris) and a specific need for diligence 
on the dependence (periculum in mora); there should be a hearing before a judge (due 
process); and the creditor must be liable to pay damages for losses of the debtor 
should the action fail. 
Taylor is the latest and authoritative case but has a more limited analysis of 
the issues. In contradiction to Karl, the court held in Taylor that a hearing was not 
necessary, and all that was needed was for the decision on the application for 
permission to use diligence to be made by a judge. The creditor needed to show 
only a prima facie case and there was no need to show periculum in mora. However it 
raised the issue of proportionality; the use of such diligence would require being 
proportionate to the claim being made. Taylor clearly establishes just as low a 
minimum as required for ECHR compatibility. As such it was subject to academic 
criticism.92 
Since the decisions in Karl and Taylor and because of the differences between 
them practice in the courts did not developed a consistent way. led to 
uncertainty and unfairness. The Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007 
enacted to modernize the law of diligence more generally in Scots law, tackles the 
issue by applying a specific test in order to get permission to use diligence on the 
dependence.93 According to it the creditor must have a prima facie case (fumus boni 
iuris) and satisfy the court that there is a specific need to use diligence (periculum in 
mora). The court will need to be satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances 
that permission is given and in making the decision consider whether the debtor is 
insolvent or verging on insolvency, or likely by removal or disposal of his assets to 
defeat or prejudice enforcement of any decree (periculum in mora). It is intended that 
there will be a hearing in every case, except where the court is satisfied that there is 
92 G Maher, 'Diligence on the dependence: reform needed' (2004) 27 Scots Law 
Times (news) 167. 
93 For an account of the milestones of the reform process see G Maher (2004). 
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an urgent need to act before intimation of the claim document94 (the need for the so- 
called surprise effect of ex parte warrants). In order to strike the balance between the 
rights of the debtor and the creditor the court may limit the sum secured, the limit 
being set by reference to a formula." 
This judicial discretion applies to arrestment of ships with the only exception 
of the enforcement of maritime liens; that is, even arrestment in rem to secure non - 
pecuniary claims should be affected by the new legislation on diligence on the 
dependence.96 
Accordingly, Scots law has put itself in line with the recognised international 
standards in the field, except for one thing: if proportionality is to be achieved the 
court should have discretion to ask for a cross -undertaking in damages since the 
creditor must be liable to pay damages for losses of the debtor should the action fail. 
Further discussion of this issue is offered infra when dealing with cross - 
undertakings. 
4.4.1.1.2.2. Fumus boni iuris 
The fumus boni juris is the requirement to show the appearance of a good 
right, that is the applicant should be able to show a large probability that he has a 
good right which deserves protection. As explained in Chapter 3 proof of fumus boni 
iuris is not required under the Arrest Conventions. 
94 See Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, s 15, Pt 1 A (Diligence on the Dependence) ss 15 E 
(Grant of Warrant without a Hearing) as introduced by Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2007, Pt 6, s 169. 
95 See Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, s 15, Pt 1 A (Diligence on the Dependence) ss 15 
H (Sum Attached by Arrestment on Dependence) as introduced by Bankruptcy and 
Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, Pt 6, s 169. 
96 Scot Law Corn No. 164 (1998) 131. 
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4.4.1.1.2.2.1. England 
Consequently with the right to arrest as aforementioned judicial discretion to 
assess fumus boni iuris is beyond the powers of English courts when it comes to 
arrest of ships, except for the case when exercising ancillary jurisdiction in support 
of foreign proceedings or arbitration. However and even though showing fumus boni 
iuris is not a condition at the moment of arrest, the lack of foundation to ask for such 
a measure may amount to gross negligence in the eventuality of the defendant 
claiming damages for wrongful arrest. 
4.4.1.1.2.2.2. Scotland 
In Scots law the competency of arrestment of a ship on the dependence 
depends upon there being a colourable case set out in the pleadings.97 The recent 
law reform makes the situation far clearer by establishing that to arrest on the 
dependence the creditor has the onus of proving that he has a prima facie case on 
the merits of the action 98 The reform applies to an arrestment on the dependence of 
an admiralty action99 in so far as not inconsistent with the provisions of Part V of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1956. It follows that even though fumus boni iuris is not 
a requirement under the 1952 Arrest Convention it will be clearly so under Scots law 
once the reform is fully in force. Arguably, this collides with the Convention since 
despite article 6 (2) leaves procedural issues to the ¡ex fori arresti the extension of 
'procedure' should not go that far. It is broadly understood that the mere allegation 
of a claim should be sufficient to arrest the ship in terms of the Conventions. 
97 G Maher/ D J Cusine (1990) 88. 
98 See Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, s 15, Pt 1 A (Diligence on the Dependence) ss 15 E 
(Grant of Warrant without a Hearing) and F (Hearing on Application) as introduced by 
Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, Pt 6, s 169. 
99 See Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, s 15, Pt 1 A (Diligence on the Dependence) ss 15 
N (Application of this Part to Admiralty Actions) as introduced by Bankruptcy and 
Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, Pt 6, s 169. 
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4.4.1.1.2.3. Periculum in mora 
The periculum in mora is literally the 'risk in waiting' and therefore, the 
claimant need to prove urgency or at least allege that the enforcement of the 
eventual judgment may be frustrated or prejudiced by the defendant's insolvency or 
by him removing or concealing his assets.100 As it was explained in Chapter 3 arrest 
of ships is not conditional on showing periculum in mora under the 1952 Arrest 
Convention; however, many civilian legal systems do require such proof anyway.101 
4.4.1.1.2.3.1. England 
In English law, consistently with the characterization of arrest of ships as an 
inherent part of the action in rem, there is no need to show the danger of the 
claimant being unable to enforce his claim after he has obtained an enforceable 
judgment because the debtor is financially insolvent, or in the process of so 
becoming. 
4.4.1.1.2.3.2. Scotland 
In the opinion of MAHER this is the primary principle for consideration in 
granting diligence on the dependence more generally.102 It explains the 'impatience of 
the tribunal' in JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA words, and it will generally involve 
demostrating either that there is a significant risk of the defender's insolvency, or 
the defender is taking steps to conceal or dissipate his assets, or that there is a 
significant risk that the defender will remove his assets from the jurisdiction.103 
Young). 
100 G Maher (2004) 168. 
101 See Chapter 3. 
102 G Maher (2004) 172. 
103 Karl Construction y Palisade Properties plc 2002 SLT 312 [54] (OH) (Lord Drummond 
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Contrarily to the common fear that this requirement poses a pursuer facing 
diligence on the dependence too much of a burden in practical sense, in the case of 
arrestment of ships on the dependence periculum in mora is easy to show. It could 
arguably be even presumed104 since more often than not the ship is going to be in 
port for a few hours, so the risk of the defender removing his assets from the 
jurisdiction is actual and real; indeed the speed with which the ship could leave the 
jurisdiction is what arrest of ships has been always trying to counteract. Such 
presumption exists in some legal systems and it is regretable that it was not 
introduced in the international Conventions on arrest of ships. Not surrprisingly 
this could be probably explained also looking backwards; the endemic absence of 
safety that particularly affects the shipping endeavour since shipping was the 
preserve of adventurers has made the proof of the risk redundant; arguably though 
it would not be redundant in many cases in present times. 
The Scottish reform goes in that line; the new 2007 Act pays account to the 
need to prove periculum in mora (or the specific need to use diligence)105 and the 
relevant provisions apply to an arrestment on the dependence of an admiralty 
action;106 again, consequently, it seems that even though periculum in mora is not a 
requirement under the 1952 Arrest Convention it will be so under Scots law once the 
new Act enters into force. The same comment done with regard to fumus boni iuris in 
terms of consistency with an in ordinem characterization of arrest of ships under the 
international Conventions as a provisional and protective measure applies here. 
Oddly enough, whilst these features bring Scots law into line with the latest 
trends in the sphere of diligence it may be argued that it drives it apart from the 
104 A legal presumption in this sphere exists in some legal systems, for example, 
German law; see S Nieschulz, Der Arrest in Seeschiffe: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung des 
deutschen, niederländischen und englischen Rechts (Lit Hamburg 1997) 18 (Arrestgrund des § 
917 I ZPO bei one ship companies). 
105 Pt 6 s 15 (E) and (F). 
1°6 2007 Act pt VI (Diligence on the Dependence) s 15 (N). 
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1952 Arrest Convention. Possibly it is the 1952 Arrest Convention, which, in turn, 
has a very strong English taste, that is inconsistent with general principles of 
provisional and protective measures. The justification for that departure is found in 
the pressing needs of the maritime adventure. 
4.4.1.1.2.4. Cross -undertaking in Damages 
Of the civil law countries of continental Europe the law and practice of 
provision by the claimant of counter -security is not uniform.107 In general, liability 
arises when it is proved that the arrest was not justified.10$ In the 1952 Arrest 
Convention the issue is left to the lex fori arresti, whereas the 1999 Arrest Convention 
expressly empowers courts with discretionary powers in this regard.109 There are 
strong policy considerations in this matter that outweigh the technical (legal) ones. 
4.4.1.1.2.4.1. England 
Why is it necessary to provide a cross -undertaking in damages for obtaining 
security through a freezing order110 (formerly known as Mareva injunction) but there 
is no such requirement in the case of arrest of ships in English law? As well as in all 
the other elements relevant to characterise arrest of ships as a provisional and 
protective measure, the reason is the intrinsic and troublesome connection between 
arrest and action in rem in English law; and in turn, the lack of distinction between 
arrest in rem to enforce a maritime lien and arrest in the framework of interim 
measures of protection as a means of obtaining security. 
1 °7 Scot Law Corn Report No. 164 (1998) 137-138. 
108 Report on 1952 Arrest Convention CMI Bulletin 105, 3 quoted in Scot Law Corn 
Report No. 164 (1998) 137. 
1°9 Art 6. 
11° See s 25 of the CPR. 
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The absence of a cross -undertaking in damages in the case of arrest of ships 
may leave without remedy a defendant ship -owner who has suffered loss by an 
unjustifiable arrest but who is unable to establish malice or crassa negligentia (the 
only grounds for awarding damages for wrongful arrest under English law). 
4.4.1.1.2.4.2. Scotland 
Scottish courts have power to order counter security (caution or 
consignation in Scots law terms) though it is rarely invoked and virtually unknown 
in modern practice. The current rule in Scots law, which applies with regard to 
diligence more generally and not limited to admiralty arrestment, is that a litigant 
using diligence on the dependence is generally not liable for loss which has been 
caused if his claim should eventually prove to be unfounded; unless malice or want 
of probable cause could be proven, which is extremely difficult."' In that sense there 
are not profound differences between English and Scots law. 
As explained in the SLC Report on Diligence on the Dependence and 
Admiralty Arrestments, a requirement for a pursuer to provide a cross -undertaking 
in damages is difficult to reconcile with the pursuer's entitlement to obtain a 
warrant for diligence on the dependence as of right (which was the position of Scots 
law until recently, but this has already changed); and with the rule that he is not 
liable for damages merely because the action in question turns out to be 
unsuccessful. In that sense, the caution could be required only to secure against 
damages for diligence which is wrongful and not against diligence that even when it 
is oppressive is not formally unlawful.112 
111 G Maher (2004) 167. 
112 Scot Law Corn Report No. 164 (1998) 42 [3.65]. 
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The first circumstance (entitlement as of right) has already changed in Scots 
law; with respect to the second one the SLC in its Report recommended that the 
pursuer should be liable in damages to the defender not only in the case of the 
warrant being wrongful (wrongfully obtained or executed) but also when it was 
unreasonable for the pursuer to apply for that warrant.113 The Scottish Executive in 
its consultation paper called The Enforcement of Civil Obligations in Scotland 114 
expressed its intention to apply the Commission's recommendation115 in relation to 
liability of the pursuer equally to admiralty arrestment on the dependence as to 
diligence on the dependence generally. However, in the following paragraph of the 
same document it was affirmed: 'In line with the Executive's intentions for diligence on 
the dependence generally, it is not intended to provide for the provision of security by the 
pursuer, as a condition of the grant of a warrant to arrest, or the maintaining of an 
arrestment of a vessel once executed'.116 No reasons are given to justify such dogmatic 
position which is indeed inconsistent with the SLC finding that if their 
recommendation on liability of the pursuer was to be adopted there would be much 
greater scope for caution or consignation117 (cross- undertaking in damages). 
Particularly in the case of arrestment of ships the SLC suggested that 'there may be 
even cases where the competency of the diligence is in doubt, e.g. where a ship sought to be 
arrested on the dependence belongs to the defender, and warrant (if granted at all) has to be 
granted forthwith because speed is essential in the circumstances. In such a case, it may be 
useful for the court to require the arrester to find caution'.118 Moreover, in this respect 
there is no issue of consistency with the 1952 Arrest Convention since the issue is 
expressly left to the lex fori arresti under article 6 (1). 
113 Scot Law Corn Report No. 164 (1998) 42 Recommendation 6 [3.63]. 
114 April 2002 available at www.scotland.gov.uk /consultations . 
115 Recommendation 6 [5.51 -5.56]. 
116 Scottish Executive Enforcement of Civil Obligations in Scotland [5.78] 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/justice/Civ0b-00.asp. 
117 [ 3.67]. 
118 Ibid. 
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The justification might be that there is no need for reform, since the Scottish 
courts already have such power.19 In modern Scottish practice, however, a cross - 
undertaking in damages offered by the arresting pursuer is unknown in the field of 
diligence on the dependence more generally as well as in the field of admiralty 
arrestment; even when in theory may be competent.120 Nonetheless, 
Recommendation 62 of the SLC Report advocated for liability for wrongful or 
unjustified diligence and the empowerment of courts, as a condition for granting 
warrant for an admiralty arrestment in rem or in the dependence, to request caution 
or consignation to the pursuer, i.e. to require the pursuer to provide security for any 
loss which may be incurred by another party to the action or any other interested 
party, as a direct result of the arrestment having been wrongful or unjustified. In the 
case of admiralty arrestment on the dependence and in rem to secure non -pecuniary 
claims the test should be higher than in the case of arrestment in rem to enforce a 
maritime lien since in the later case the pursuer has no choice but to arrest to make 
good his right in security. In such cases reasonableness is the SLC preferred 
criterion.121 
It is indeed regrettable that these recommendations were not adopted in the 
new Act.'22Nothing was mentioned in the relevant provisions123about the power of 
the court to request a cross -undertaking in damages. This is inconsistent with the 
reforms introduced by the Act which makes arrestment on the dependence a 
discretionary diligence; and collides with the 'balance of convenience' between 
pursuer and defender that is paramount for provisional and protective measures. 
119 Scot Law Corn Report No. 164 (1998) 43 Recommendation 7 [3.71].This position 
was further corroborated in Observations of the Scottish Law Commission on the International 
Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999, 13 -14. 
120 Scot Law Corn Report No. 164 (1998) 136. 
121 Scot Law Corn Report No. 164 (1998) 139. 
122 The issue was raised in the context of diligence on the dependence in general, and 
in the context of arrestment of ships particularly (Scot Law Com Report No. 164 (1998) [3.64] 
to [3.71] and [7.111] to [7.124] respectively). 
123 See Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, s 15, Pt 1 A (Diligence on the Dependence) ss 15 
E (Grant of Warrant without a Hearing) and F (Hearing on Application) as introduced by 
Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, Pt 6, s 169. 
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In the field of arrest of ships the issue certainly raises difficult questions in 
terms of policy; and the disagreements (in fact the inability to reach an agreement) 
in respect of liability for wrongful arrest in the preparation of the two international 
Arrest Conventions so notes.124 The main argument against reform seems to have 
been that Scots law should not be different from English law in this regard because 
the difference would, through 'forum shopping', affect negatively admiralty 
litigation in Scotland.125 In the 2002 consultation paper referred above the Scottish 
Executive made it clear that Scotland should not be a less favourable jurisdiction 
within which to arrest than others.126 This is a strong policy argument; and indeed 
the kind of argument that English law- makers would have been very ready to 
consider if the case was the opposite. Theoretically though the problem here lies in 
the fact that English law is arguably erroneous in this matter127 and by following 
such pattern Scots law misses the opportunity to get in line with internationally 
accepted standards. 
124 The 1952 Arrest Convention leaves the whole issue to the lex fori arresti. The 1999 
Arrest Convention confers on the court where arrest has been effected the power to impose a 
cross -undertaking in damages. 
125 In that sense, the risk is that litigants might prefer to litigate in England in order 
to take advantage of the absence of any judicial power to order counter -security there. On 
the same line, claimants in Scottish admiralty actions should not be under a significant 
disadvantage compared with claimants in England, (SLC Report 64, 138). This kind of 
consideration also led civilian countries to widen the scope of forum arresti in the 1999 Arrest 
Convention; in that sense showing that even at present when England is not the maritime 
empire it used to be, it is still very influential, arguably as a 'maritime legal practice empire', 
thus, all the other jurisdictions would like to share the pie! 
126 Enforcement of Civil Obligations in Scotland [5.70]. 
127 Centro Latino Americano de Commercio Exterior SA v Owners of the Kommunar (The 
Kommunar) (No.3)) [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 22, 33 (QBD (Admlty)) (Colman J). 
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4.4.1.1.2.5. Proportionality 
Bearing in mind that measures are to be granted '... without however 
adversely affecting the other guarantees of a fair trial', 128 proportionality is vita1.129 
4.4.1.1.2.5,1. England 
The principles of the 1952 Arrest Convention in so far as the prohibition of 
multiple arrests are reflected in English judicial doctrine.130 When there is a foreign 
arrest, no further English arrest will be allowed unless there is a reason affecting the 
security.131 So far as arrests in England are concerned, the Supreme Court Act 1981, 
section 21 (8) enacts a mandatory prohibition. Where a ship has been served with a 
claim form or arrested to enforce that claim no other ship may be served with such a 
form or arrested in that or any other action in rem.132 
4.4.1.1.2.5.2. Scotland 
The issue of proportionality in terms of the availability of repeated 
arrestment of the same ship, and on the arrestment of two or more ships, on the 
128 Resolution No. 1 adopted by the 20th Conference of European Ministers of Justice, 
Budapest, 11 -12 June 1996. 
129 English law considers proportionality a part of the overriding objective that interim 
remedies purport to obtain. See H Brooke (ed), Civil Procedure (Sweet and Maxwell London 
2004) 547. 
13° However, in Centro Latino Americano de Commercio Exterior SA v Owners of the 
Kommunar (The Kommunar) (No.2) [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 8 (QBD (Admlty)) it was held that s 
21(8) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 is not to be seen as implementing the more flexible but 
wide prohibition on re- arrest provided for in the 1952 Arrest Convention art 3 (3). 
131 The Christianborg (1885) 10 PD 141; The Golaa [1926] P 103 (PDAD); Owners of the 
Cressington Court v Owners of the Marinero (The Marinero) [1955] P 68; [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
230 (PDAD); The Arctic Star (The Times 5 February 1985 (CA)); Tjaskemolen (Now Named 
Visvliet), The (No.2) Tjaskemolen, The (No.2) Visvliet [1997] 2 Lloyds Rep 476 (QBD (Admlty)); 
Owners of the Carbonnade v Owners of the Ruta (The Ruta) [2000] 1 Lloyds Rep 359 (QBD 
(Admlty)). 
132 Centro Latino Americano de Commercio Exterior SA v Owners of the Kommunar (The 
Kommunar) (No.2) [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 8 (QBD (Admlty)). 
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dependence of the same action (or to secure the same claim) has raised difficulties 
within Scotland. Before the entry into force of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 
there were no formal limits in Scots law on the number of ships owned by the 
defender which could be competently arrested on the dependence of an action for 
payment.133 The leading case on how such right has been limited by the 1956 Act is 
Interatlantic (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd y Okeanski Ribolov Ltd134. There it was held, following 
the English dictum in The Banco,135 that the purpose of the 1956 Act was to 
incorporate into Scots law the provisions of the 1952 Arrest Convention and its 
general policy against multiple or repeated arrestment for the same claim. The 2007 
Act, taking into consideration the SLC recommendation,136 clarifies the issue and 
provides that a creditor in admiralty action may, on cause shown, obtain warrant to 
re- arrest a ship, or arrest a sister ship, on the dependence of that action.137 This is 
consistent with article 3 (1) of the 1952 Arrest Convention. 
4.4.1.2. The Protective Function of Arrest of Ships 
The arrest of a ship places the res under judicial detention pending 
adjudication of the claim to ensure that the final award or judgment can be 
enforced. The 'asset- safeguarding' peculiarities in the case of arrest of ships in 
English and Scots law are as follows. 
133 Scot Law Corn No. 164 (1998) 134. In Sheaf Steamship Company y Compania 
Transmediterranea (1930) SC 660, the Court of Session held that, while Scots Admiralty law 
may be the same as English Admiralty law, the law on remedies and procedure was not the 
same, and that an arrestment to found jurisdiction could be laid against a sister -ship of a 
wrong -doing ship though such arrest would have been incompetent under English law. The 
same reasoning could be applied to arrestment on the dependence; however, it is here 
submitted that the same reasoning cannot apply to arrestment in rem. 
134 1996 SLT 819 (OH). 
133 Owners of the Monte Ulia y Owners of the Banco (The Banco) [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep 49 
(CA); see alsoGatoil International Inc y Arkwright- Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co 
(The Sandrina) [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 181 (HL) (Lord Keith of Kinkel). 
136 Recommendation 61, 135 -136. 
137 Sch 4 introduced by s 197 (7) (3) (1) (B). 
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4.4.1.2.1. England 
In traditional English law the only claimant who had the right to arrest the 
ship in the hands of a bona fide purchaser was the holder of a maritime lien. This 
position has been adopted in the 1952 Arrest Convention and there is no doubt, both 
in the Convention and in English law, that unless the claim is secured by a maritime 
lien, the right to arrest a ship in respect of a maritime claim exists only if that ship, at 
the time of the issue of the in rein claim form (in English law), or at the time of the 
arrest (in the Convention), is still owned by the person who owned her when the 
maritime claim arose. 
Under section 21 (4) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, if a person who would 
be liable in an action in personam is, when the cause of action arises, the owner or 
charterer of, or is in possession or control of, the ship, an action in rem may be 
brought against: (a) the offending ship, if at the time when the action is brought, 
that person is either the owner or demise charterer; (b) a sister ship, if that person is 
the owner at the time when the action is brought. In that sense article 3 (4) of the 
1952 Arrest Convention has been given effect in English law except for its last 
sentence.138 The cause of action 'arises' when the incident occurs. The action is 
'brought' when the in rem claim form is issued. The effect of this section is that if, 
when the claim form is issued, the person liable for the claim was either the owner 
or demise charterer of the ship, she may be arrested whoever owns the ship at the 
date the arrest is actually effected as clearly established in The Monica 5.139 To fully 
understand the impact of such a rule it is important to bear in mind that arrest can 
happen in England several months, and exceptionally years, after the issue of an in 
rem claim form. To be consistent with the international framework English law 
138 F Berlingieri (2006) 145. 
139 Owners of Cargo Laden on Board the Monica Smith y Owners of the Monica Smith 
[1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep 113 (QBD (Admin)). 
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should change the time of the link from the issue of the claim form to the arrest,140 
somehow in that respect coming back to the state of affairs of English law prior to 
the Judicature Acts 1873 to 1875. In that sense JACKSON is of the opinion that this 
link is a substantive aspect of the regulation of arrest of ships, and therefore, it 
cannot be left to English national rules. 
4.4.1.2.2. Scotland 
In the 1999 Arrest Convention article 3 (3) provided that the arrest of a ship 
which is not owned by the person liable for the claim shall be permissible only if, 
under the law of the State where the arrest is applied for, a judgment in respect of 
that claim can be enforced against that ship by judicial or forced sale of that ship. It 
was presumed that 'this is a question of national law which is not expected to have a 
significant impact in common law countries'.141 On the contrary, Scots law, where the 
property of a third party is not generally affected to satisfy the debts of another, has 
been modified in respect of arrestment of ships against demise charterers to allow 
judicial sale of the ship in those cases. In line with the 1999 Arrest Convention the 
reform allows the pursuer in an admiralty action against a demise charterer to be 
entitled to complete diligence by judicial sale of a ship which has been arrested on 
the dependence of the action. The sale is competent even thought the ship is owned 
by a third party. This is a fundamental departure from traditional Scots law.142 
140 D C Jackson (2005) 404; The Po [1991] 2 Lloyds Rep 206. 
141 R Shaw and N Gaskell 'Arrest Convention 1999' [1999] LMCLQ 1, 10. 
142 See Administration of Justice Act 1956, Ch 46, s 47 E (Sale of a ship arrested on the 
dependence of an action against demise charterer) as introduced by Sch 4 to the Bankruptcy 
and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007. 
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4.5. FINAL REMARKS 
While it is often assumed that Scots law will always follow English law in 
admiralty matters,743 this Chapter has aimed to show that this statement is not 
entirely correct.144 And in the sphere of arrest of ships is particularly inaccurate. The 
differences are historical and conceptual. Most of the historical ones have already 
been shown in Chapter 2. As far as the conceptual ones, the main difference is that 
admiralty arrestment in Scots law forms part of the general law of diligence that has 
no English counterpart. This has, in turn, advantages and disadvantages on both 
sides of the borders. Having a conceptual framework helps to understand the 
different functions and effects of the measure; however, these general concepts - 
with a clear Romanist mark- were not crafted to meet the needs of maritime 
commerce; whereas that can be said about arrest of ships as developed in English 
law. 
In present times, however, the differences are not so much between English 
law and Scots law, but between arrest of ships to enforce a maritime lien or a 
mortgage, hypothecation or other charge of the same nature; arrest of ships to 
protect the status quo in the case of claims related to possession, title or forfeiture of 
the ship herself; and arrest of ships as a true protective measure, i.e. a measure to 
secure a maritime claim. And such differences are undisclosed within the 
international Conventions and within English law; arguably in the former due to the 
influence of the latter. It is the action in rem (and its intrinsic connection with 
maritime liens) that gives arrest of ships to enforce maritime liens distinctive 
features which should not be extended to cases where such 'real' linkage between 
743 Boettcher v Carron Co 1861 23 D 322; Currie v McKnight [1897] AC 97 (HL); SS 
Blaimore Co Ltd v Macredie (1898) 25 R (HL) 57, 59; Clydesdale Bank Ltd v Walker & Bain 1926 SC 
72, 82; The Goring [1988] 1 AC 831 (HL) 853. 
'44 As recognised by the Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 84 (1989) 
'There is no comprehensive systematic and authoritative comparison of the two systems of Admiralty 
law on which alone a sound generalisation could be based' 206, statement affirmed by G L Gretton 
in the SME (8) [322]. 
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the res and the claim does not exist. Indeed, the main functions of arrest of ships as 
identified in this thesis are attributed tò the in rem claim rather than to arrest in 
English law.'45 
The linkage between arrest and the in rem claim has fewer advantages than 
disadvantages. The latter have been highlighted by JACKSON: it creates confusion 
between the different functions of ship arrest: the protective function, on the one 
side, and the jurisdictional function, on the other side, by making arrest dependant 
on merits jurisdiction. This linkage has undermined the correct application of the 
1952 Arrest Convention in English law.146The intricacies of English law in this 
respect show the 'schizophrenic approach of English law to maritime claims' in JACKSON's 
words.147 Interestingly enough, he mentions Ireland as a good example of a different 
experience. The 1952 Arrest Convention and the 1952 Collision (Civil Jurisdiction) 
Convention were implemented there by the Jurisdiction of Courts (Maritime 
Conventions) Act 1989 which recognised arrest as distinct from the substantive 
action in rem.748 Maybe it was not necessary to look at another island. Scots law has 
always recognised the difference between arrestment and action in rem, and the 
enactment of the 1952 Arrest Convention in a self -contained section of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1956 for Scotland has not blurred that distinction. 
Scots law has all the possibilities, and makes a clearer distinction between the 
different categories. It could be said that it is not just a coincidence that a mixed 
legal system understands better the complexities of a mixed legal institution, but 
maybe this would be too presumptuous. 
145 A Mandaraka- Sheppard, Modern Admiralty Law (Cavendish London 2001) 11. He 
explains that commencing the in rem claim and arresting the ship merge all three functions 
of arrest of ships, namely, the 'protective function', the 'jurisdictional one', and the 'security 
function', securing the position of maritime claimants as preferred creditors. 
146 In Jackson' words '(Arrest of ships] necessary connection with the action in rem seems 
to have lead to a failure to put national law into a form which complies fully with the international 
obligations undertaken through ratification of the Arrest Convention' D C Jackson (2005) 402. 
147 D C Jackson (2005) 240. 
148 D C Jackson (2005) 402. 
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Part II 
'Maritime law is particularly suited as the 
basic subject on where a theory of conflict of 
laws may be developed, 
Because maritime law embraces both civil law 
(in its origins) and common law (in its more 
modern evolution), and is found as well in 
national statues and international 
Conventions; in conflict Conventions, and in 
uniform rules.' 149 
149 W Tetley, 'Charterparties and Choice of Law' [1992] Il Diritto Marittimo 1146. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Arrest of Ships, Security 
and Applicable Law 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
As examined in the previous chapters, arrest of ships as a provisional and 
protective measure serves several functions. The `security's function of arrest of 
ships as analysed in this thesis refers to arrest as a method of ensuring the 
availability of judicial sale.2 It can be defined as the availability of the res for 
satisfaction of a judgment; i.e. the judicatum solvi function. It has been argued that 
I It is necessary to distinguish from the outset of this Chapter the concept of security 
in this sphere from the radically different and unconnected concept of 'maritime security' in 
the public international law sense. The latter relates to safety at sea. The most far -reaching 
international instrument is the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS 
Code), which contains detailed security- related requirements for Governments, port 
authorities and shipping companies. 
In Scots law terms, to examine the security function of arrest of ships, actually means 
to study the nexus created by the arrestment as an effect of diligence; i.e. the judicial right in 
security that the arrestment confers on the creditor over the ship. 
2 Judicial sale is the final stage, ensuring that the security function of arrest is 
reflected in funds available to the claimant to satisfy his claim (D C Jackson Enforcement of 
Maritime Claims (4th edn LLP London 2005) 427). In English law a court may not order a 
judicial sale unless the ship is under arrest; see The Wexford (1883) 13 P D 10; Continental 
Grain Co v Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Government Trading Corp of Iran (The Iran 
Bohanar) [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 620 (CA); Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrolera 
Ecuatoriana (The Scap trade) [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 253 (HL). Judicial sale may be made prior to 
judgment on the merits where the security of the arrester is reducing in value through the 
continuation of arrest; see The Conet [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep 195 (PDAD); The Myrto [1977] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 243 (QBD (Admlty)) 259 -260; The Emre II [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep (QBD (Admlty)) 
182. In that sense, reflecting what Alvarez Rubio (infra) said about the effectiveness of arrest 
as a measure: putting pressure on the debtor in order to comply with the eventual judgment 
(J J Alvarez Rubio, Derecho Maritimo y Derecho Internacional Privado, Problemas básicos (Servico 
Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco Vitoria -Gasteiz 2000) 102). 
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the security function of arrest of ships is indeed its most relevant one. On this token 
the argument is that the ultimate ratio of arrest of ships is to give the creditor the 
chance to create a right in security over the ship, and in turn, that possibility puts 
pressure on the debtor in order to comply with the eventual judgment; that is 
actually what makes it so effective.3 
This function of arrest is differently understood in different legal systems. 
The nature and extent of the rights which arrest confers on the arrester vary 
significantly. Variations in this regard do not only happen between different legal 
systems, but, within one legal system between the different kinds of arrest of ships 
available therein. The main question in this regard is whether the arrest itself creates 
a right in security different from the preference originated by the cause of action. 
As analysed in Chapter 4 at present in English and in Scots law, in line with 
the international Conventions on the topic, the right to arrest does not depend on 
the existence of a maritime lien,4 but is available for a broader but closed list of 
maritime claims. However, in English law, the link between arrest and liens still 
explains the most salient features of the law of arrest of ships, particularly in 
relation to its security function. There is not in this field great difference between 
English and Scots law, arguably due to the 'reception's of English jurisprudence in 
this area of Scots law. 
3 J J Alvarez Rubio (2000) 102. 
4 Nonetheless, in the opinion of Jackson, in English law the availability of arrest does 
depend on the existence of a lien, if not maritime, statutory, but always a lien (D C Jackson 
(2005) 395 [15.111). 
5 Currie v McKnight [1897] AC 97 (Lord Watson) 'From the earliest times the Courts of 
Scotland exercising jurisdiction in Admiralty causes have disregarded the municipal rules of Scottish 
law and have invariably professed to administer the law and customs of the sea generally prevailing 
among maritime states. In later times with the growth of British shipping the Admiralty law of 
England has gradually acquired predominance and resort has seldom been had to the laws of other 
States for the guidance of the Courts'. 
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In domestic English and Scots law, traditional maritime liens attach only to a 
restrictive group of maritime claims, namely, seamen's wages, master's wages and 
disbursements, salvage, damaged caused by a ship and the bonds of bottomry and 
respondentia.6 These 'traditional maritime liens' enjoy priority when confronted 
with other causes of action, notably mortgages, therefore, a maritime lienee is 
generally among the first to be satisfied when various competing actions exist 
against the ship. On the contrary, it is established in English and Scots law that, for 
example, claims for necessaries do not attract a maritime lien. 
By contrast, in the United States and in some civil law jurisdictions, certain 
maritime claims which are not within the 'traditional maritime claims' of English 
and Scots law, such as claims for necessaries, cargo damage, and general average, 
give rise to maritime liens or rights of preference. In Europe, France, Belgium, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain are party to the 1926 International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages in force since 
June 2nd 1931 that provides for those kinds of 'non- traditional' maritime liens. 
Against this background, the conflict of laws arises after the ship has been 
arrested and sold by judicial sale in a certain jurisdiction; at the stage when that 
court has to determine how the distribution of the proceeds is to be made; in the 
cases where the maritime claim of the arrester (or any other party with a proprietary 
interest on the ship that has taken part in the proceedings) attracts a privilege of a 
certain status under the lex causae but it does not so in the same way under the lex 
fori arresti. In this context PIL has a primary role to play; and in present times a 
sound conflict -of -laws rule is paramount to achieve a good case management on the 
merits. 
6 Bonds of bottomry and respondentia were considered obsolete already at the end 
of the first quarter of the twentieth century, yet, the Administration of Justice Act 1956 
provides that a claim arising out of bottomry is within Admiralty Jurisdiction, and the 
Supreme Court Act 1981 which has taken the place of the former Act as far as England 
repeats the provision. See The Conet [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep 195 (PDAD). 
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Therefore, the present Chapter, after looking at the security function of arrest 
of ships from a PIL perspective, addresses the applicable law issues connected with 
it, namely, the applicable law to the existence and qualification of the security right, 
and the applicable law to the question of priorities, examining the role of the 
security function of arrest of ships in the latter question in English and in Scots law.7 
5.2. THE SECURITY FUNCTION OF ARREST OF SHIPS 
A right in security8 is a 
'[R]ight which a creditor may hold for ensuring payment or 
satisfaction of his debt, distinct from and in addition to his right of 
action and execution against the debtor under the latter's personal 
obligation'.9 
Rights in security can be divided into express rights (agreement), tacit rights 
(implied by law) and judicial rights (diligence /protective measures). This threefold 
division can be exemplified in the case of ships as i) ship mortgage (express); ii) 
maritime lien /maritime hypothec (tacit); ship arrest /arrestment (judicial). 
In comparative law, largely, the claimant who has arrested a ship will be 
treated as a secured creditor in the distribution of the sale proceeds. The question is 
whether such preference is previous, concurrent or consequential upon arrest; in 
other words whether the security derives from the cause of action (a preferential 
7 It may be argued that the conflict -of -laws issues studied in this chapter do not 
really relate to arrest as a provisional and protective measure, since the matter arises at a 
later stage, at a moment in time where the provisional arrest has resulted in more permanent 
effects (as opposed to temporary ones) through judicial sale. Notwithstanding, the conflict of 
laws in this sphere affects the security function of arrest of ships as a provisional and 
protective measure in the first place, therefore, its revision is germane in the context of this 
thesis. 
B 'Pignus utriusque gratia datur, et debitoris, quo magis ei pecunia crederetur, et creditoris, 
quo magius ei in tuto sit creditum' (Institutiones Justiniani iii.xiv 4). 
9 W M Gloag & JW Irvine, Law of Rights in Security, Heritable and Moveable: including 
Cautionary Obligations (Green Edinburgh 1897) 2. 
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debt, or a claim to which a maritime lien attaches) or is created by the arrest 
(maritime claims attracting a right to proceed in rem, sometimes named statutory 
liens in English law); does the effectual arrest constitute or crystallise the right in 
security? The answer is 'it depends' on the applicable law.10 
In civil law systems there are three different institutions that could come 
eventually under a broad conception of arrest of ships; the differences between the 
three lie upon the security function of arrest as displayed by each of them. These 
three types of measure, namely, arrest, embargo and seizure of ships have been 
studied by HERBERT", FRESNEDO12 and AGUIRRE13. In their opinion, arrest is a 
protective measure whose only effect is to situate the ship in a particular 
jurisdiction, and prevent it from sailing, in order to make possible the adoption of a 
subsequent interim measure of protection, the latter being the one that provides 
security for the result of the pending or imminent proceedings.74 Hence, in this 
conception, arrest by itself is not a means of security but the mechanism to obtain 
such security. Security would then be set previously (maritime lien), concurrently or 
subsequently (seizure and /or embargo). Consequently, from this point of view, the 
priorities that constitute part of such security do not crystallise upon the arrest but 
10 In this sense, a certain consideration of the lex causae (German law) was given to 
this issue by Langton J. in Smith y Owners of the SS Zigurds (The Zigurds) (1932) 43 Lloyd's 
Rep 156 (PDAD). Yet, after such consideration, German law was disregarded, on the 
grounds that it was a matter of German procedural law (and not substantive law); and it was 
for English procedural law to determine priorities. It is here submitted that the decision was 
correct in relation to the submission that issues related to the enforcement of a right are 
necessarily governed by the lex foci; nonetheless, as argued later on in this chapter, the issue 
of priorities in the sphere of maritime liens should be initially a matter for the lex causae. 
11 R Herbert and C Fresnedo de Aguirre, 'El Arresto de Buques y el Principio de 
Jurisdicción mas Próxima' [1993] Revista de Transporte y Seguros (RTSS) 158. 
12 Ibid; C Fresnedo de Aguirre, 'Embargo de Buques como Medida Cautelar en el 
Derecho Internacional Privado Uruguayo' (1997) 14 Anuario de Derecho Marítimo 385. 
13 F Aguirre Ramirez, 'Embargo y Arresto de Buques en Uruguay' [2005] RISS 275. 
Uruguay has not ratified the international Conventions on the field but nevertheless Herbert, 
Fresnedo and Aguirre do consider the doctrine emerging from the Arrest Conventions in 
order to formulate such distinctions. Even though this examination has been done according 
to Uruguayan law, it is indeed enlightening, and it is possible to apply it more generally to 
other legal systems where arrest of ships displays the same functions. 
14 R Herbert and C Fresnedo de Aguirre (1993). 
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by a previous, concurrent or subsequent right enforced by the arrest. Differently, an 
embargot5 (civilian concept meaning in general terms a prohibition to sell) is an 
interim measure of protection that by itself guarantees the result of a pending or 
imminent proceeding. It provides the embargo- holder a priority against future 
encumbrances and any other future rights (in rem or in personam) constituted on the 
ship. It is usually an encumbrance that needs to be registered in order to be 
enforceable. In most legal systems to grant an embargo, the ship must have been 
arrested first; nevertheless, sometimes it is possible to register such encumbrance 
without the ship's prohibition to sail.16 In turn, seizure (secuestro) is usually either an 
interim measure of protection, or a measure in execution of a judgment, that implies 
the loss of possession of the ship by the owner. Generally, it is the way of making 
the embargo effective. 
There are differences also in the availability of such measures depending on 
against who the proceedings have been or are to be brought. Embargo and seizure 
are available to the claimant only in the case of the owner being the defendant. By 
contrast, arrest is also available against the charterer. This evidences that the 
security function of arrest of ships goes beyond the relationship between claimant 
and defendant and strikes heavily in the effects of arrest with regard to third parties. 
In common law systems, these differences present themselves between arrest 
of ships to enforce maritime liens and arrest of ships based upon statutory rights to 
initiate an in rem claim (statutory liens). 
In Scots law, the effects of the security function of arrest differ depending on 
the type of arrestment, namely, arrestment of ships in rem in an action in rem 
(maritime liens); arrestment of ships in rem in an action in personam (non -pecuniary 
15 It has to be borne in mind that the 1952 Arrest Convention has been translated into 
Spanish as 'Convenio sobre unificación de ciertas reglas relativas al embargo preventivo de 
buques' (emphasis added). 
16 For example the so- called 'ship- register arrest' in Danish law. 
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obligations); and arrestment of ships on the dependence of an action in person= (all 
the other admiralty claims). 
5.3. THE APPLICABLE LAW PROBLEMS 
As already mentioned, the problem arises when a court is confronted with a 
maritime claim that under its lex causae attracts a certain privilege but it does not 
under the lex foci arresti. That court has two fundamental decisions to take. The court 
must, first, decide whether or not to recognise that foreign privilege (right of 
preference) regardless of the fact that a corresponding claim arising within the 
court's own territorial jurisdiction may not attract a similar preference. Secondly, if 
the court decides to recognise the foreign right, it must then decide how to rank the 
recognised preference in the distribution of the sale proceeds. It may be argued that 
these two issues are so intermingled that the decision process of the Court should 
not be split in the two steps mentioned above; that the distinction matters only as a 
methodological approach to the study of the problem. The discussion that follows 
examines this argument. 
Traditionally in PIL studies these two applicable law issues, the applicable 
law governing the existence of the right of the creditor and the applicable law 
governing the ranking of maritime claims, have merited separate examination. Yet, 
in the case of maritime liens, since they are the two faces of the same coin, it is here 
submitted, in opposition to traditional authority, that they should not be governed 
by different laws. However, it has been argued that it remains critical to identify the 
two categories for characterization purposes." Nevertheless, from a dogmatic point 
17 D C Jackson (2005) 682. See the decision of the Court of Appeal of England in The 
Colorado (1923) 14 Lloyd's Rep 251, a decision where it was recognised that the right (as 
opposed to the remedy) should be governed by the lex causae. Even though the distinction 
was drawn therein for the case at hand, the submission of priorities to the lex fori was 
supported upon previous cases where such distinction had failed to be drawn, and where 
the right (and not only the remedy) were examined under the loop of the lex fori (See 
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of view it is here submitted that a fragmented approach to the characterization of 
maritime liens jeopardizes its juridical continuity across national borders, the 
ultimate aim of PIL.18 
Despite these theoretical considerations, most legal systems split the 
characterization of maritime liens into two categories, substance and procedure, or 
right and remedy, and provide for two different conflict rules, invariably deciding 
all questions of ranking according to the lex fori.19 It is submitted that in the current 
process of Europeanization of PIL the line between right and remedy, which is a 
derivative of the differences between substance and procedure, as understood in 
English and Scots law, should be re- aligned.20 
On the practical level, the analysis has to take as a starting point that, even 
though the issue arises sometimes out of different European systems, and confront 
common law with civil law concepts, the main problems arise in extra -community 
cases, and confront different common law jurisdictions.21 
Scrutton LJ referring to The Milford, Swabey 362 and The Tagus [1903] P.44 at 255). Yet, Briggs 
seems to be of the opinion that it is possible to eliminate the demarcation in totum '...where 
lines of demarcation, or of characterization, can be eliminated without substantial cost, it is good that 
they should be. The line which separates right from final remedy is one which could usefully be 
eliminated, with the result that the lex causae would prevail generally...' (A Briggs, 'Conflict of 
Laws and Commercial Remedies' in A Burrows and E Peel (eds), Commercial Remedies: 
Current Issues and Problems (OUP Oxford 2003) 286). 
18 See D Opertti Badán, Exhorto y Embargo de Bienes Extranjeros (Amalio M. Fernández 
Montevideo 1976) 327. In different words, Briggs acknowledges that in the sphere of 
commercial remedies '...the coherence of results is conducive to the doing of practical justice...' 
(Briggs (2003) 286). 
19 See J Asser, Maritime Liens and Mortgages in the Conflicts of Laws (Gothenburg 
School of Economics and Business Administration Publications Gothenburg 1963). He gave 
examples of this fragmented approach in German law (p.19), in France (p.21), in Belgium 
(p.22) in England (p. 25 -26), in the United States (p. 28) and in Argentina (p. 28). 
20 A successful example of a change of characterization is the case of 'limitation of 
actions'. It is submitted that a similar approach to proprietary remedies, including their 
prioritization, should follow that lead. 
21 The contest arises usually between United States law and English or Scots law. 
Policy issues are entrenched particularly in respect to cargo liens on the ship. English law is 
very restrictive reflecting its tradition as a ship -owing nation, with the underlying policy to 
protect ship- owners, whilst the United States, as historically a shipper nation (up to World 
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5.3.1. Applicable Law Governing Rights of Preference=s 
First and foremost, it has to be taken as the starting assumption that the topic 
is indeed a very difficult and complex one. It is primarily a matter of 
characterization, and particularly, the main decision to be taken is whether a 
maritime lien or similar right of preference is a procedural remedy governed by the 
lex fori or, on the contrary, should be regarded as a substantive right and therefore 
governed by the lex causae. The distinction has a very practical consequence: taking 
into consideration that the lists of claims which give rise to rights of preference do 
vary quite radically from country to country, the question of which legal system is 
to determine the existence of such rights is indeed very important in practice.23 
Arguably, the conflict of laws in this sphere is the reflection of a real conflict of 
interests between the ship financing sector24 and ship operators. This explains the 
War I the US mercantile fleet played only a very minor part in world shipping), has had the 
opposite traditions and interests (W Tetley Maritime Liens and Claims (2 ̂ d edn Blais Montreal 
1998) 727). Nevertheless, as the world can no longer be divided into maritime and non - 
maritime nations, policy makers should review the convenience of the law provisions 
crafted upon such premises. 
22 It was not easy to decide upon the right sub -heading for this part of the discussion. 
'Preferential debts', 'privileges', 'maritime lien', 'maritime hypothec' are not necessarily 
identical or interchangeable concepts; but the selection is done bearing in mind the 
importance of characterization in PIL and the need to undertake such process in as broad 
internationalist spirit as possible, as acknowledged by Mance LJ in Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Osterreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC (The Mount I) [2001] EWCA Civ 68, [2001] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 597 (CA) [26 -27]. 
23 D R Thomas (1980) 320 -321. From Louis Castrique v William Imrie and W.J. Tomlinson 
[1869 -70] L.R. 4 H.L. 414 to Andromeda Marine SA v O W Bunker & Trading A/S [2006] WL 
1078890 (QBD (Comm Ct)) there is a large number of cases decided in England and in 
Scotland on the topic. 
24 Mortgagees are the natural competitors of maritime lienees and this is reflected in 
the case law referred in this part of the discussion; however, it should be remarked that the 
study emphasises the examination of maritime liens, since it is in this field where, from an 
international point of view, the situation is rather confusing, if not chaotic. By contrast, 
registered mortgages are recognised practically world -wide and governed by the law of the 
country of registration. 
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limited success of the international Conventions25 as well as the opposed views as to 
the characterization (and its consequences) of maritime liens. 
In this context, the lex fori as a forum -centred methodology, is construed 
upon a positivistic approach that considers a Judge as an instrument of the 
legislative will and as such a way to apply forum policies. 26 The lex fori approach 
represents the most extreme and possibly the simplest solution to the applicable law 
issues hereby examined.27 In the field of maritime liens its application has been 
justified in various ways, some of which are outlined as follows. 
One way of applying the lex fori in this sphere is to adopt as a connecting 
factor the place where the ship is situated, and consider it as governed by the lex rei 
sitae; in this methodology, the ship is fixed by arrest to the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court and therefore the lex fori is applied qua lex causae.28 Another way of 
enhancing the role of the law of the forum, as traditionally done in English PIL, is 
through the application of the 'substance and procedure rule'. It is with this 'escape 
device' that the examination in this Chapter is more concerned. 
A radically different methodological approach with similar results, is the 
exclusion of foreign law via the 'international public policy' (ordre public) of the 
forum.29 Nonetheless, none of these theories are applied by the Courts in a pure 
methodological form; practically, Courts strive to find a formula which in their 
opinion, and according to its own PIL rules, leads to the fairest solution in each case. 
25 The main criticism levelled at the principles of the 1926 MLM Convention is 
directed at art 2 (5) according to which the liens referred to in that paragraph, namely liens 
for claims resulting, inter alía, from contracts entered into by the master for the purpose of 
preserving the ship or continuing the voyage, take precedence over mortgages (J Asser 
(1963) 29). 
26 O von Wächter, Über die Collision der Privatrechtgesetze verschiedener Staaten (pt 1), 
24 ACP 230 (1841). 
27 J Asser (1963) 14. 
28 The Tagus [19031 P.44 (PDAD). 
29 As done, for instance, traditionally, in France and Belgium (J Asser (1963) 14). 
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5.3.1.1. Generalities 
A lien is a form of security interest in property which arises by operation of 
law. As such is accessory to a situation which has a legal character of its own 
(contract, tort /delict).30 The concept of lien is applied widely in English and Scots 
law and responds mainly to two different concepts: the common law lien 
(possessory lien or 'right of retention') and the equitable lien. One of the main 
differences between these two is that the first depends on possession and arises 
usually out of a contract of services, whereas the latter disregards possession; arises 
by implication of law, and is lost when a sale of the res to a bona fide purchaser is 
performed. However, a 'maritime lien' is a distinctive legal institution:31 it does not 
depend on possession and it 'travels' with the res regardless of the hands of whose 
possession rests on; it is not registered anywhere; and is independent of notice. In 
the words of THOMAS 'maritime liens are secret and invisible'.32 
In English law there is a further distinction between traditional maritime 
liens, and 'statutory liens' (or right to proceed in rem); the concept of lien is so 
intermingled with the arrest of the ship (as the only way to enforce maritime and 
'statutory' liens), and the action in rem (the framework in which such enforcement 
takes place) that they get often confused with one another.33 In the words of Sir John 
Jervis, the maritime lien 'it is inchoate from the moment the claim or privilege attaches, 
30 The illustration of Jackson is clarifying 'A seaman to whom wages are due has a lien -to 
enforce his contractual right' (D C Jackson (2005) 460). 
31 Two monographic works have enlightened the theme of 'maritime liens'; see G 
Price, The Law of Maritime Liens (Sweet & Maxwell London 1940), and D R Thomas, Maritime 
liens (Stevens London 1980). For recent developments see J Brown, 'The extinction of 
maritime liens' (2003) 3 LMCLQ 361; N Hutton, 'The origin, development, and future of 
maritime liens and the action in rem' (2003) 28 Tulane maritime law journal (1) 81; P K 
Mukherjee, 'The Law of Maritime Liens and Conflict of Laws' (2003) 9 JIML (6) 545; R P 
Hayden and K C Leland, 'The Uniquenes of Admiralty and Maritime law: the Unique 
Nature of Maritime Liens' in (2005) 79 Tulane L. Rev. (5 -6) 1227. 
32 D R Thomas (1980) 4. 
33 For instance in G Bowtle and K McGuinness, The Law of Ship Mortgages (LLP 
London 2001) 119 a maritime lien is defined as 'the right of a person who has a claim against the 
ship to arrest the ship and, if the claim is not paid, to have the ship sold by the court and the claim 
paid from the sale proceeds'. 
168 
and when carried into effect by legal process by a proceeding in rem, relates back to the 
period when it first attached'34 
STORY was the first to use the term 'maritime lien' in the North American 
case The Nestor.35 In a few words, a maritime lien can be defined as a maritime 
privilege36 which gives the privilege- holder a right on the ship and freight of a 
property kind. As it has been stated in The Tolten,37 the lien travels with the ship 
into whoever's possession it may come and has a certain ranking with other 
maritime liens, all of which take priority over mortgages. This right arises with the 
claim without registration or other formalities.38 In English law its first 
comprehensive definition appeared in The Bold Buccleugh.39 However, there is no 
statutory definition of a maritime lien in either English or Scots law. In the words 
of JACKSON 'they are interests of prime importance and of no inconsiderable uncertaintÿ ao 
'Maritime lien' is an Anglo- American term. In Scots law the institution is named as 
a 'maritime hypothec'. However, due to the use of the expression 'maritime lien' in 
English law and in international Conventions, this expression has been historically 
used in Scots law, even when it was not strictly accurate; hence, giving rise to 
confusion. For the sake of harmonization the issue has been recently clarified in a 
very straight- forward way: in Scots law a 'maritime lien' means a hypothec over a 
ship, cargo or other maritime property.41 
34 [1851] 7 Moo. P.C. 267, 284. The definition has been cited in various cases since 
then, for example, The Halley [1867] L.R. 2 P.C. 193, The Feronia [1868] L.R. 2 A. & E. 65, The 
Charles Amelia [1868]L.R. 2 A. & E. 330; The Beldis [1936] P. 51; The Tolten [1946] P. 135. 
35 (1831) 18 Fed Cas 9 (Case No. 10, 126) 11 (C.C. D. Me 1831) cited by W Tetley, 
'Maritime Liens in the Conflict of Laws' in J A R Nafziger and SC Symeonides (eds), Law and 
Justice in a Multistate World: Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren (Transnational Publishers 
Ardsley, NY 2002) 439. 
36 Even though the 'maritime lien' is a common law institution there are similar ways 
of granting a preference in civil law systems, generally as 'preferential debts' or 'privilèges'. 
37 [1946] P 226 242. 
38 W Tetley (2002) 442. 
39 [1851] 7 Moo PC 267 (Sir John Jervis). 
ao D C Jackson (2005) 459. 
41 See Administration of Justice Act 1956, Ch 46, s 48 (2), as amended by Sch 4 to the 
Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007), 'In this Act and in any other enactment 
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5.3.1.2. English Law 
5.3.1.2.1. The Lex Fori Approach 
The lex fori has been regarded as universal and exclusive in its application in 
the sense that ab initio every question has to be decided by reference to the lex fori 
and this dogma applies to every legal system.42 However, as a conflict -of -laws 
approach, the lex fori can be regarded as the main territorial predilection common to 
all times,43 that can be traced back to the unilateralists of the sixteenth century. 
D'ARGENTRE assumed that courts should normally apply their own law, whereas 
foreign rules of decision were relevant only in exceptional cases» WÄCHTER45 
adopted a similar position. Modern scholars such as CURRIE46 and EHRENZWEIG47 
have also acknowledged the 'lex fori approach'. 
One of the arguments advanced for the remission of maritime liens to the lex 
fori on the 1960s was that it should not be possible '... to enlarge the jurisdiction to 
benefit the foreign claimants when English claimants have no similar benefits conferred upon 
them'.48 This line of argument is very old in PIL. It was already advanced by JITTA 
who acknowledged that a judge cannot give to a juridical relation a character 
(including an Act of the Scottish Parliament and any enactment comprised in subordinate 
legislation under such an Act) 'maritime lien' means a hypothec over a ship cargo or other 
maritime property'. 
42 As mentioned in Chapter 3 a court should as a matter of course look to the law of 
the forum as the source of the rules of decision; see B Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of 
Laws (Duke University Press Durham, NC 1963) 183; O Kahn -Freund, 'General Problems of 
Private International Law' 143 RdC 139 (1974) 167; G C Petrochilos, Procedural Law in 
International Arbitration (OUP Oxford 2004) 6. 
43 Juenger referred to it as 'the twentieth century unilateralism' (F K Juenger Choice of 
Law and Multistate Justice (Martinus Nijhoff Dordrecht 1993) 34). 
44 B Currie (1963) 183. 
45 0 von Wächter (1841). 
46 B Currie (1963). 
47 A A Ehrenzweig, Private International Law: A Comparative Treatise on American 
International Conflicts of Law, Including the Law of Admiralty (Oceana Leyden 1967). 
48 The Acrux (No. 3) [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep 565 (PDAD) 573 (Hewson J). 
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different to that given to it by his national law.49 Yet, this argument is at loggerheads 
with a modern conception of PIL. 
More recently, FENTIMANS° asked himself whether the difficulty and expense 
of proving foreign law could imply in practice the convenience of the lex fori over 
the multilateral method of law- selection as conceived by SAVIGNY. 51 FENTIMAN also 
questioned whether the whole system of law- selection based on objective 
connecting factors could be counted only as an 'experiment which has failed', ruined 
by an inadequate procedural infrastructure 52 Without the need to go that far, it is 
possible to ascertain that, doubtless, the decision as to where to draw the line 
between substance and procedure, and right and remedy in a certain legal system is 
to decide on how far to take the lex fori approach within it. In doing so it should be 
borne in mind that from a teleological perspective, the lex fori approach is one -sided: 
it benefits only those litigants who are in the position to take the best out of 'forum 
shopping' opportunities.53 
5.3.1.2.1.1. A Thing of the Past? 
In times gone by the principal authorities54 in English case law were The 
Milford,55 The Tagus,56 The Colorado,57 The Zigurds,58 and The Acr ux.59 Except for The 
49 DJ Jitta, La méthode du droit international privé (Belinfante The Hague 1890) 198. 
50 R Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts: Pleading, Proof and Choice of Law (OUP 
Oxford 1998) 2. 
51 F C von Savigny, Private International Law and the Retrospective Operation of Statutes. 
A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws and the Limits of their Operation in Respect of Place and Time (tr 
W Guthrie 2nd edn Clark Edinburgh 1880). 
52 As explained by Juenger there are various reasons why a non -choice rule such as 
the lex fori is simpler to most conflict approaches. He recognised that what courts apply as 
foreign law is often a bad replica of the foreign law itself (F K Juenger (1993) 157,162,158). 
For the complex issue of the application of foreign law see also R Fentiman (1998); S 
Geeroms, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: a Comparative and Functional Analysis (OUP Oxford 
2004). 
162. 
53 F K Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice (Martinus Nijhoff Dordrecht 1993) 
54 D R Thomas (1980) 322 -329. 
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Colorado, where the right was recognised by reference to the lex loci contractus 
(French law) but the ranking (priorities) was governed by the lex fori arresti; the 
common feature of all the other decisions is the submission of the 'assimilated-to - 
maritime -lien- right' to the lex fori arresti: in The Milford via characterizing it as a 
question of remedy and not of contract at all; in The Tagus, applying the lex fori qua 
lex causae, using as the connecting factor the territorial location of the res (lex rei 
sitae); in The Zigurds via posing the question as one of priorities (remedial) rather 
than connected to the existence of the right;60 and finally in The Acrux,61 even though 
under Italian law the claim would have been considered as a maritime lien, it was 
remarked that no maritime lien existed under English law and therefore, (obiter) that 
the Italian maritime lien would have not been recognised under English law. Such 
observation was grounded on a strict 'lex fori characterization' considering only the 
narrow scope of the domestic law category and adding that without legislative 
intervention there could be no extension of those categories. 
The latest authority remains the Halcyon Isle.b2 In this case, the Privy Council, 
in a three -to -two decision reversing the Singapore Court of Appeal, refused to 
recognise the status of maritime liens to any claims which differed from the six 
'traditional' maritime liens recognised in English law. The majority decision was 
based on the notion that maritime liens, in the conflict of laws, are procedural 
remedies rather than substantive rights.63 In consequence, the ship repairer's claim 
ranked below that of the mortgagee, because the repairman's claim, which 
according to its lex causae (lex loci contractus) (United States law) attracted a maritime 
55 [1858] Swab. 362. 
56 [1903] P.44 (PDAD). 
57 [1923] P.102 (CA). 
58 Smith v Owners of the SS Zigurds (The Zigurds) (1932) 43 Lloyd's Rep 156 (PDAD). 
59 The Acrux (No. 3) [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep 565 (PDAD). 
60 The Zigurds (1932) Langton J. 
61 Hewson J. 
62 [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 325 (PC (Sing)). 
63 Speaking for the majority Lord Diplock held that maritime liens involve '... rights 
that are procedural or remedial only and accordingly the question whether a particular class of claim 
gives rise to a maritime lien or not [is] one to be determined by English law as the lex fori' Ibid, 331. 
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lien, did not so attract according to English law. In English law the claim was 
secured merely by a statutory right in rem which did not 'travel' with the ship and 
which ranked after the mortgage. The dissenting position,64 on the contrary, citing 
various precedents, and in particular the English decision in The Colorado65 observed 
that: 
'A maritime lien is a right of property given by way of security for a 
maritime claim. If the Admiralty court has, as in the present case, 
jurisdiction to entertain the claim, it will not disregard the lien. A 
maritime lien validly conferred by the lex loci is as much part of the 
claim as is a mortgage similarly valid by the lex loci. ...It would be a 
denial of history and principle, in the present chaos of the law of the 
sea governing the recognition and priority of maritime liens and 
mortgages, to refuse the aid of private international law'.66 
Thus, they argued that the lex causae of the foreign maritime lien merited 
recognition, even if English law denied maritime lien status to the equivalent claim 
arising in England. Commentators prefer the examination of the minority position.67 
In the opinion of TETLEY the approach taken to maritime liens in England is a 
consequence of the lack of codification of the matter.68 It is submitted, though, that 
such approach may be a result of the fact that maritime liens are necessarily given 
effect through an action in rem and in turn this has generated such an amalgamation 
of the two concepts that the fusion is indeed a source of confusion. However, most 
probably, the characterization of maritime liens as procedural is just an 'escape 
device' used to disregard the application of the lex causae and apply the lex fori 
instead. In any case, despite the reasons or excuses to regard maritime liens as 
procedural rather than substantive, it seems that the arbitrary line is being moved 
and currently leading commentators affirm that 'the existence and quantification of each 
64 Lord Salmon and Lord Scarman. 
65 Hills Dry Docks & Engineering Company, ltd. v. Colorado [1923] P. 102 (CA). 
66 [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 325 (PC (Sing)) 339 (Lord Salmon and Lord Scarman). 
67 P M North and J J Fawcett, Cheshire and North Private International Law (13th edn 
Butterworths London 1999) 82; L Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws 
(14th edn Sweet & Maxwell London 2006) 191. 
68 W Tetley (2002) 448. 
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creditor's claim is of course a matter for the lex causae of the claim' (emphasis added).69 
Probably, even when dicta have been very inconsistent in this matter, the decision in 
The Colorado and the dissenting opinion in the Halcyon Isle, have led the doctrine, in 
present times, to recognise the substantive nature of maritime liens, thus, the need 
to give due consideration to the lex causae as the applicable law. It is to be hoped that 
the judicature will follow that lead. 
5.3.1.2.2. The Lex Causae 
Some sources suggest that before 183570 certain kind of maritime liens, 
particularly liens for necessaries, were recognised in English and Scots law 
according to the lex causae, applicable to the substance of the case at hand.71 Yet, as 
mentioned above, decisions since then have not consistently followed this line?' 
Doubtless, the decision of the Court of Appeal in The Colorado73 has 
represented a break through in the treatment of the issue. Scott L.J. in The Tolten74 
supported also the opinion that a maritime lien represents a substantive right. In his 
words the consequences of a lien are 'indubitably a rule of substantive law in 
admiralty'.75 At present leading commentators, despite the opinion of the majority in 
the Privy Council decision of The Halcyon Isle,76 agree on that. In Cheshire and North's 
69 L Collins (ed) (2006) 191. 
70 The Neptune [1835] 3 Kn. P.C. 94. 
71 'By the law of some foreign countries a person who supplies necessaries has a lien 
upon the ship, and at one time he could maintain such a suit in England; but in 1835 it was 
decided in the case of The Neptune (1835 3 Kn. P.C. 94) that the Admiralty Court had no 
jurisdiction to try such a case, and that the material or necessaries man could only bring an 
action against the owner and not against the ship' Lord Dewar (OH) in Constant y Klompus 
[1912] 2 S.L.T. 62. 
72 P M North and J J Fawcett (1999) 82. 
73 [1923] P.102 (CA). 
74 [1946] P. 135, p. 159. 
75 [1946] P. 135, 145. 
76 The outcome in the Halcycon Isle has been strongly criticised by commentators. 
Nonetheless, it has also its supporters; see MM Cohen, 'In Defense of the Halcyon Isle' [1987] 
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Private International Law77 it is affirmed that '...in the case of a right in rem such as a 
lien.. , the substantive right of the creditor depends on the governing law...'. On the same 
token, in Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws78 it is ascertained that '... the 
existence and qualification of each creditor's claim is of course a matter for the lex causae of 
the claim...'. 
In TETLEY'S opinion the lex fori could not displace the law of the legal system 
most closely connected with the parties and their transaction 79 He argues that as a 
result of the Rome Convention 1980 the Halcyon Isle is probably a thing of the past. 
He is of the view that article 10 (1) (c) of the Convention submits to the lex contractus 
the 'consequences of breach' of the contract, and he understands that foreign 
maritime liens (generally, contractual liens) and related maritime rights surely fall 
within this term.80 
There are several options available for a court which is faced with a case 
involving foreign maritime liens, in terms of the determination of the lex causae, in 
the absence of a choice -of -law agreement between the parties to the claim: 
apply the law of the place of creation of such right (lex loci contractus or lex loci delicti, 
depending on whether it arises out of a contract or tort /delict); (ii) to apply the law 
of the place of enforcement of such right (lex of the forum arresti - as the arrest of the 
ship is the only way to enforce maritime liens) that is another way to apply the lex 
fori qua lex causae; or, as maritime liens are rights in rem (real rights) on the ship, (iii) 
applying the law of the flag, which has been traditionally the 'personal' law of the 
ship. These options have all been adopted by comparative law in modern legal 
systems. A further option would be to apply the lex situs (lex reí sitae) since the situs 
LMCLQ 152 and the reply by W Tetley, 'In Defence of the bannis Daskalelis' [1989] LMCLQ 
11. 
77 P M North and J J Fawcett (1999) 82. 
78 L Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (14th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell London 2006) 191. 
79 W Tetley (2002) 448. 
80 W Tetley (2002) 457. 
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is a well -known connecting factor in issues related to real rights and moveable 
property. However, bearing in mind the special kind of res the ship constitutes this 
connecting factor is probably not appropriate since a ship is 'too moveable' in this 
regard; and practically, as it is 'fixed' by the arrest, it would result in the same as 
applying the lex fori arresti. 
A different approach is the one taken in the United States, where the lex 
causae is selected taking into consideration all the connecting factors mentioned 
above, but rejecting any mechanical process based only on legal categories and 
selection rules.81 Following that, foreign maritime liens will be recognised even 
where the rights they confer differ in character from those which would arise from 
the equivalent maritime claim under the lex fori;82 and maritime claims that would 
attract a maritime lien under the lex fori would not be given such status unless the 
lex causae so provides. Notwithstanding, United States courts have repeatedly 
applied the lex fori qua lex causae to foreign maritime liens, using PIL theories such as 
the 'most significant relationship'83 as well as 'governmental interest analysis'.84 In 
Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines /85 for example, a ship was arrested in the U.S. on a 
claim relating to bunkering performed in Saudi Arabia, under a contract entered 
into in the U.S. The ship- owner, the charterer and the ship were American, as was 
the supplier. Applying governmental interest analysis, the Federal District Court for 
the Southern District of New York held that the 'proper law' to govern the existence 
of maritime liens in that case was U.S. law. 
81 Seemingly, Jackson is of the opinion that such an approach is preferable to the one 
of English law dependent on the characterization of issues into choice of law 'categories'. He 
highlights that characterization [in his words, classification] is a first step away from reality 
(D C Jackson (2005) 717). 
82 W Tetley (2002) 450. 
83 As introduced by the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws; under this well 
known theory the applicable substantive law is that law of the State which has the most 
significant relationship with the dispute and with the parties. It is an eclectic approach as 
compared to the traditional choice -of -law methodology of PIL, and considers various 
connecting factors equally ab initio in the law selection process. 
84 For the qualitative evaluation that contemplates a weighing of the governmental 
interests see generally B Currie (1963). 
85 707 F. Supp. 155, 1989 AMC 2467 (S.D. N.Y. 1989). 
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5.3.1.2.2.1. The Law of the Flag 
In English legal literature JACKSON supports the convenience of the law of 
the flag to determine the existence of a maritime lien. Traditionally the law of the 
flag has enjoyed a particular status in PIL issues of a maritime nature. Due to the 
particular kind of res that a ship constitutes it can be assimilated to the law of the 
domicile of a person or to the law of the incorporation in the case of a company. 
There are various examples in comparative law of the application of the law of the 
flag as the conflict -of -laws rule to maritime liens conflicts in modern national legal 
systems.S6 This rule received consideration in English jurisprudence in The Rama87 
where an action in rem against the owners of Rama in the Maritime Court of Panama 
was at stake. In the latest international Convention on Maritime Liens and 
86 Amongst them is the Netherlands 1993 Conflict of Maritime Laws Act art 3 (2); see 
W Tetley, International Conflict of Laws: Common, Civil and Maritime (Biais Montreal 1994) 
1069. According to it the law of the ship's registry (flag) governs the question of whether a 
maritime claim is protected by a lien, as well as the scope and consequences of such a lien, 
except for the ranking which is subjected to The Netherlands law. Another example is art 9 
of the 1958 Greek Code of Private Maritime Law that requires that the law of the ship's flag 
determine everything related to proprietary rights over ships. Interestingly enough, and 
differently from the case of The Netherlands, this provision has been interpreted by 
commentators as governing not only the recognition of the existence of the foreign lien but 
also the ranking of foreign maritime claims. Article 9 'The Law of the state under whose flag 
the ship is registered regulates property rights on it' (translation by the author) 'To bíxaiov 
TIN 7TOALTEiaç, rlç Trly orgµaíav 4:1)0EL To rcAoLov, pvOµLCEL Ta Ere avtOV EµrcpáyµaTa 
b1KaLC3µaTa'; see A M Antapassis, Les Codes maritimes Grecs (Librairie Générale Paris 1983) 
114. See the text in English by T B Karatzas and N P Ready, The Greek Code of Private Maritime 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1982) 6. A third example is the Swedish Maritime Code 
1994 (similar codes were adopted the same year by Denmark, Finland and Norway) 
according to which Swedish law governs maritime liens on Swedish- registered ships when 
the lien or right is invoked in Sweden (Swedish Maritime Code ch 3 s 51) (see the Swedish 
and English text (Juristförlaget Stockholm 1995)); in the case of foreign ships the effect of a 
maritime lien is determined by the law of the ship's registry. As far as priorities, foreign 
maritime liens rank after any maritime lien or right of retention provided for in ch 3 of the 
Code, and after any hypothec (ship mortgage). The order of priorities in such chapter 
complies generally with the Maritime Liens and Mortgages (MLM) Convention 1967 (that 
never entered into force). Furthermore, the Maritime Procedure Code of Panama provides 
for a conflict -of -law rule that establishes that in the case of maritime liens the applicable 
substantive law is that of the flag of the ship's registry (W Tetley, International Conflict of 
Laws: Common, Civil and Maritime (Biais Montreal 1994) 175 -224). 
87 Berliner Bank A.G. v C. Czarnikow Sugar Ltd (The Rama) [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 281. 
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Mortgages88 the law of the ship's place of registration governs the ranking of 
registered mortgages, 'hypothecques' or charges as between themselves and, 
without prejudice to the provisions of the Convention, their effect with regard to 
third parties. Being such securities effective only if they comply with the law of the 
place of registration of the ship, the conflict -of -laws rule in order to assert the law 
applicable to their recognition and to the ranking between themselves is perfectly 
coherent. However, this strong connection with the law of the flag existing in the 
case of registered securities is missing in the case of maritime liens that are per se 
non- registrable.89 
Following that, why should the law of the flag be more decisive than the lex 
loci contractus if the maritime lien attaches to a contractual claim; or the lex loci delicti 
if the maritime lien originated in tort /delict? The answer is not connected only to the 
law applicable to the existence of maritime liens but needs as a corollary to 
approach the two, in principle separable, issues of existence and priorities of 
maritime liens as one problem not to be split in two for PIL purposes via the process 
of characterization. Therefore, this solution is further analysed infra after the 
examination of applicable law issues with regard to priorities. 
88 1993 MLM Convention. 
89 As far as the registrable character of arrest as such the MLM Conventions are 
silent; the issue is left to national law. For example, in French law, art 93 of the decree of 27 
October 1967 provides that the arrest (saisie) is not effective vis -à -vis third parties prior to its 
registration in a special register (See Ste Transunt v Baudoin Lefevre and Others (The Patrick 
Victor) [1982] DMF 420). However R Rodière in Le Navire (Dalloz Paris 1980) 255 states that 
the arrest of ships when granted as a provisional measure (saisie conservatoire) is not 
registrable; Berlingieri disapproves that interpretation (2006) 133. In Spain and in Italy the 
arrest of ships (embargo preventivo /secuestro conservativo) is also registrable. 
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5.3.1.3. Scots Law 
In The Baltic,90 Lord Dewar understood the question for decision before 
him as whether the pursuer, a mortgagee, had a preferable claim to the proceeds of 
the judicial sale of the ship in virtue of his mortgage, or whether the competing 
defender was to be preferred in virtue of an alleged maritime lien (based upon coals 
supplied and cash advanced to the master of The Baltic when she was lying at the 
port of Copenhagen). In present times it could be argued that the issue for decision 
was a question of priorities; indeed it was -as it always is- a question of existence 
and priority of the foreign privilege; even though this decision, as so many other 
decisions of that time, earlier, and later ones, have not drawn a distinction between 
the substance of the right and the question of priorities.91 According to the law of 
Denmark (the lex causae) the coal supplier had a preferential claim. Nevertheless, 
Lord Dewar disregarded the application of the law of Denmark and after 
consideration of Scottish and English authorities,92 applied what he understood was 
the law of Scotland at that moment in time, submitting the issue to the lex fori. He 
explained his reasoning in the following terms: '... the only question is whether, 
according to the law of Scotland, the compearing defender has a maritime lien for the 
necessaries he supplied and the cash he advanced to the master of the "Baltic "'. Based on 
the settled principle of Admiralty law as administered in England where the 
'material man' has no maritime lien for necessaries, he concluded that the defender 
did not have a maritime lien. He did not find anything in the Scottish authorities or 
doctrine to suggest that there was any peculiarity in the law of Scotland which 
distinguished it from the Admiralty law of England. On the contrary, he found 
authorities to point to the assimilation of both legal systems in this branch of 
jurisprudence.93 
9° Constant y Klompus 1912 2 SLT 62 (OH) (Lord Dewar). 
91 Because in fact there is none; the distinction itself is just a fallacious way of dealing 
with the issue with a view to applying the lex fori. 
92 Mecca [1895] P.95, Clark y Bowring & Co 1908 SC 1168 and The Tagus [1903] P.44. 
93 Hay y Le Neve (1824) 2 Sh App 395; Boettcher y Carron Co (1861) 23 D 322. 
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The similarities between both legal systems in terms of the substantive law 
applicable to maritime liens are incontestable. Nonetheless, the conflict rule in Scots 
PIL should reflect the easier distinction in Scots law between arrestment of ships 
and maritime hypothec /liens. In this sense, it is submitted that there are no 
justifications in Scots PIL (IPL) to examine foreign preferential claims under the loop 
of the lex fori. Arguably, there are not justifications in English law either; but in Scots 
law, where a maritime hypothec /lien is clearly a substantive right, there is no 
explanation for treating foreign ones as procedural; therefore, there is no reason to 
follow the lex fori approach of English PIL in this regard. 
In Scots law the arrestment of ships, on the one hand, and the maritime 
hypothec on the other, have always kept, conceptually, independent form each 
other; i.e. the substantive right and the way to enforce it, are distinct clear -cut 
categories. This represents a difference in the functionality of arrestment of ships as 
compared to English law; i.e. a warrant of arrestment to found jurisdiction and a 
warrant to arrest on the dependence are not necessarily connected to a maritime 
lien, and are not by themselves sufficient to effect a lien on a ship which has been 
arrested under either of these warrants; a warrant for arrestment in rem is necessary 
if it is desired to effect a maritime lien over a ship.94 It is regrettable, then, that this 
difference has not had an impact on the understanding of applicable law issues to 
maritime hypothec /liens and its ranking, probably because English case law has 
been followed. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the nineteenth fifties DONALDSON95 
affirmed that in Scots conflict rules, as regards proprietary rights over ships situated 
in Scotland, Scots law as the lex situs should give way to the lex causae in special 
circumstances. Arguably, in Scots law submission to the lex fori in this sphere has 
94 Mill y Fildes [1982] S.L.T. 147. 
95 A Donaldson, 'Some Conflict Rules of Scots Law' (1953) 39 Problems of Public and 
Private International Law Transactions of the Grotius Society 145, 175. 
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not been justified on a fallacious distinction between substance and procedure but, 
on application of the lex fori qua lex causae. Scots law has for long disliked fallacious 
applications of the law, thus, the 'substance and procedure rule' in the English 
fashion would fit uneasily in the Scottish legal tradition. In the words of Lord Reid 
'...During early stages of the development of a legal system legal fictions have been 
invaluable...But in this day and age I dislike them intensely. Why should we tell lies when 
the truth will serve our purpose equally well if only we give a little care to the formulation of 
our principles...'96 
Even though the issue is strikingly complex, it is suggested that the 
decision in The Baltic could be regarded as a way of 'reception',97 a form of legal 
development regarded as a fundamentally disruptive force in all legal systems98; 
'when one body of law is overwhelmed by another because of the intervention of powerful 
cultural and political forces the mixture that often results can be very much worse, not 
better, than the law drawn from a single tradition that was replaced'.99 In general terms, it 
has been argued that it is time that reception of English law at the expense of the 
civil law came to an end in Scotland. It is here submitted that the issue at hand 
offers a great opportunity for such a change. 
96 (1968) 54 Proceedings of the British Academy 189, 200 as quoted by Scot Law Corn 
No 164 (1998) 186. 
97 'Reception as a form of legal development requires that lawyers replace their own law, or a 
part of it, with a foreign body of law' (R Evan -Jones, 'Mixed Legal Systems, Scotland and the 
Unification of Private Law in Europe' in JM Smits (ed), The Contribution of Mixed Legal 
Systems to European Private Law (Intersentia Antwerp 2001) 44). Lord Deward in The Baltic 
concluded his judgment quoting the words of Lord Watson in Currie v McKnight [1897] AC 
97: '...In later times, with the growth of British shipping, the Admiralty law of England has 
gradually acquired predominance, and resort has seldom been had to the laws of other States for the 
guidance of the Courts'. 
98 R Evan -Jones (2001) 45. 
99 R Evan -Jones (2001) 44. 
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5.3.2. Applicable Law Governing the Ranking of 
Maritime Claims 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, conflicts of ranking between 
maritime claims usually arise between maritime lienees inter se and between them 
and holders of other kind of security interests on the ship, such as maritime charges 
or mortgages. The order in which maritime claims rank varies from country to 
country and public policy considerations are usually at stake. Furthermore, the 
effect of the security function of arrest as such deserves consideration in this context. 
An illustration will probably show the extent of the problem better. 
5.3.2.1. An Illustration of the Conflict of Laws: England y United 
States 
The traditional ranking of maritime claims in English case law is as 
follows:100 1) special legislative rights; 2) court costs e.g. costs of arrest, custodia legis 
and judicial sale; 3) 'traditional' maritime liens (arising out of salvage, collision, 
masters's and seamen's wages and master's disbursements); 4) ship registered 
mortgages; 5) statutory rights in rem (necessaries: bunkers, repairs, supplies, 
towage, etc). However, questions of priority are not capable of being 
compartmentalized in the form of strict rules of ranking.101 Liens arising out of 
tort /delict will normally have precedence over contractual liens, but apparently rank 
pari passu among themselves.m2 Salvage is usually treated as a contractual lien, but is 
given a priority not only amongst contractual liens but also against damage liens if 
the salvage has preserved the res.103It is within the discretionary powers of a Court 
100 W Tetley (2002) 445. 
101 D Steel, J. (Adm. Ct.) in The Ruta [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 359. 
102 M C Meston, 'Admiralty' SME (1) [413]. 
103 Ibid. 
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to organise priorities purporting to do justice to all in the case at hand, having 
regard to considerations of equity and public policy. Such discretion is very broad, 
and judges face the difficult task of analyzing the relevant authorities in the light of 
the particular features of each case. Bearing in mind that priority issues were 
already discussed in early nineteenth century cases,104 that discretion has resulted in 
the advancement of multiple criteria, and as a consequence, in the 'chaos of the law of 
the sea governing the recognition and priority of maritime liens' that Lord Salmon and 
Lord Scarman mentioned in The Halcyon Isle.1°s 
By comparison, the United States has its own original ranking system which 
is different from the rest of the world. Under the United States system the priorities 
in maritime claims are as follows:106 1) special legislative rights; 2) custodia legis and 
court costs; 3) preferred maritime liens: a) wages of master and crew (including 
maintenance and cure), b) salvage (including contract salvage) and general average 
(cargo against the ship) c) maritime torts (e.g. collision), including personal injury 
and death, property damage and cargo tort liens; d) longshoremen (individuals, not 
company), e) contract maritime liens (necessaries) entered into before 
the filing of a U.S. preferred mortgage. This includes repairs, supply of bunkers, 
1°4 For instance, touching on the comparative priority of wages and damage claims 
see The Aline [1839] 1 W. Rob 111 
1 °5 [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 325 (PC (Sing)) 339.Nevertheless, there are several hints. 
First, judges have had regard to considerations such as the voluntary or involuntary nature 
of a lien. In that sense a damage lienee's interest should be protected first if considered 
against a voluntary right holder because the latter may consider all the possible risks and 
decide what is most advisable for his own interest where the person suffering the damage 
has no option The Aline [1839] 1 W. Rob 111 In the words of Mr. Justice Gorell Barnes 'it is 
clear that liens arising ex delicto take precedence over prior liens arising ex contractu' The Veritas 
[1901] P. 304. Secondly, the availability of alternative security has been taken into account in 
several cases, to prioritise those lienees who have no other means of making good their 
rights The Aline [1839] 1 W. Rob 111; The Chimera [1852] 11 L.T. 113 (Dr. Lushington); The 
Linda Flor [1857] Swab. 309 (Dr. Lushington); The Duna [1861] 5 L.T. 217; The Ruta [2000] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 359 (Mr. J D Steel) Thirdly, the preservation of the fund (the res) has also been 
considered, i.e. a salvage lienee should have priority as the salvage services had preserved 
the ship The Lyrma [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 30 (Mr. J Brandon) Finally, considerations of public 
policy as well as commercial expediency have always mattered. 
1°6 The U.S. order of priorities has been taken from W Tetley (2002) 445 -446. 
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supplies, stevedores, towage, contract cargo damage liens and charterer's liens, etc. 
(and also including statutory maritime liens, e.g. for civil penalties); 4) preferred 
U.S. ship mortgage liens, as of the date of filing, as well as preferred ship mortgages 
on foreign ships whose mortgages have been guaranteed under Title XI of the 
Merchant Marine Act 1936;1 °7 5) U.S. contract liens (necessaries) arising after the 
filing of the U.S. preferred ship mortgage; 6) foreign ship mortgages; 7) U.S. contract 
liens (other than necessaries) (e.g. contract cargo damage liens and charterers liens); 
8) unregistered mortgages and perfected non -maritime liens (including tax liens and 
other Government claims which are subordinate to maritime liens), state chattel 
mortgages and liens and liens for maritime attachment, and foreign contract liens 
e.g. U.K. statutory rights in rem. 
The problem arises if a maritime claim attracting a lien according to its lex 
causae, being the latter U.S. law, is to be ranked in English or Scottish courts 
according to the lex fori; the legal relation would certainly loose juridical continuity, 
exactly what PIL is trying to avoid. Ever since financing by means of credits granted 
by banks and other financial institutions became an increasingly important feature 
of maritime commerce, learned authors and national courts of all maritime nations 
have been trying to find a solution to this conflict of laws, a solution which would 
be reasonable, practical and theoretically sound.108 
5.3.2.2. Uniform Solutions: International Conventions 
To solve this problem international Conventions have attempted to create a 
uniform framework in this field. There are three international Conventions on the 
topic: the 1926,109 1967110 and 1993111 Conventions on Maritime Liens and 
10746 U.S. Code Appx. sect. 1101 et seq. at sect. 1271 et seq. 
108 J Asser (1963) 13. 
109 The 1926 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
Maritime Liens and Mortgages (Brussels, April 10, 1926) in force since June 2, 1931. It has 24 
States party as at 2005; see the status of ratifications of Maritime Conventions published in 
184 
Mortgages.112 The 1967 Convention never entered into force. None of them has been 
ratified by the United Kingdom, despite the fact that the United Kingdom is a 
signatory of the 1926 Convention. 
5.3.2.2.1. 1926 Convention 
The order of priorities of maritime claims is established in Article 2 of the 
Convention. According to it, the ranking is the following: 1) cost of preserving ship 
in custodia legis and judicial sale costs; 2) immediately arising salvage and general 
average claims; 3) master and crew wages; 4) salvage and general average claims; 5) 
damage and personal injury claims; 6) master's disbursements or necessaries 
provided, inter alía, the ship is away from her home port and the contracts were 
necessary for the preservation of the ship or the continuation of the voyage; 7) 
registered mortgages; 8) other claims. 
This Convention is the only one to recognise a lien for necessaries. In turn, 
articles 5 and 6 establish that, apart from claims for salvage and general average, 
claims arising immediately out of the last voyage have priority over claims of the 
same kind arising out of earlier voyages. That is the well -known rule113 about liens 
that rank inter se in inverse order of effectual attachment; the theory being that the 
CMI Yearbook 2005 -2006 at page 420 -421 available at 
www.comitemaritime.org /2005_6 /pdffiles/YBK05_06.pdf last accessed September 3, 2007. 
710 The 1967 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
Maritime Liens and Mortgages (Brussels, May 27, 1967). 
111 The International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages 1993 (Geneva, 
May 6, 1993) in force since September 5, 2004. States party as at 1 April 2007: Ecuador, 
Estonia, Monaco, Nigeria, Peru, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Ukraine, Vanuatu (UN Treaty website, 
http: / /untreaty.un.org, last accessed September 3, 2007). 
112 For a detailed exposition on the three international Conventions see D C Jackson 
(2005) 509-516. 
113 G Price, 'The Priority of Maritime Liens' (1942) 24 Journal of Comparative 
Legislation and International Law 1, 38 -40; M C Meston, 'Admiralty' SME (1) 197, [413]. 
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latest services rendered tend to preserve the ship. "" Many civilian countries 
(including, in the European Union, Belgium, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain15) are party to that Convention. 
5.3.2.2.2. 1967 Convention 
This Convention never entered into force. Its order of priorities is established 
in Article 4 of the Convention. The principal changes with respect to the previous 
Convention in so far as to the creation of maritime liens are: the abolition of master's 
disbursement claims; the broadening of 'collision claims'; and the exclusion of 
claims involving nuclear activities. Maritime liens are given priority over mortgages 
and any other liens created by a state, and the order of priorities between maritime 
liens themselves is specified by article 5 of the Convention. 
5.3.2.2.3. 1993 Convention 
The latest international Convention on the issue entered into force on the 5" 
of September 2004. Basically, it maintains the structure of the previous Conventions 
providing for the order of ranking in its articles 5, 6 and 7. It alters the order in the 
case of port dues and salvage claims, which are taken down in the first case and up 
in the second, and it suppresses the ship repairer's lien (in its place article 7 of the 
1993 MLM Convention provides that a shiprepairer may be entitled to a right of 
retention (possessory lien) according to the law of the State where the ship was 
reconstructed or repaired). The numbers of claims which rank above mortgages 
have been reduced compared to the previous Conventions in order to stimulate 
ship financing operations. States are allowed to create privileges for other claims in 
their national law, but those claims rank after claims which have been secured by a 
14 J Asser (1963) 25. This theory has been also reflected in the 1993 MLM Convention 
art 5 (4) in relation to maritime liens securing claims for reward for the salvage of the ship. 
15 Spain is also a party to the 1993 MLM Convention. 
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mortgage. Amongst the European Union only Estonia and Spain are States party to 
this Convention. 
5.3.2.3. The Conflicts Solution in English and Scots PIL 
Whenever an international Convention exists and is in force between the 
legal systems concerned, that Convention should apply as the uniform law to 
govern the issue of priorities. This is the situation amongst the States parties to the 
1926 and 1993 MLM Conventions. Yet, it is somehow puzzling that these 
Conventions appear to have so limited success. Thus, whenever there is no uniform 
order agreed between the relevant legal systems, a conflict -of -laws rule is necessary 
to determine which is the law governing the order of priorities of maritime claims. 
The settled principle under English PIL is grounded on the assumption that 
priorities form no part of the transaction under which a creditor has acquired his 
right; it is remedial -extrinsic- and therefore subject to the lex fori.116 It is here 
suggested that this is an axiom that, applying COOK'S thesis,117 'shows that some 
imaginary line has been arbitrarily taken as a boundary'.118As expressed already in 1935 
by MENDELSSOHN119 the English conception of characterization of certain issues as 
remedial is closely knit with the whole of English PIL as a system. In the opinion of 
English leading commentators, the distinction between right and remedy, parallel to 
the distinction between substance and procedure, is an eternal truth of every system 
116 Pardo v Bingham [1868] LR 6 Eq 485 (Ct Ch); Re Melbourn (No. 1) [1870] 6 Ch App 
64 (CA Ch); Hills Dry Docks & Engineering Company, ltd. v. Colorado (The Colorado) [1923] P. 
102 (CA) '...But the right of priority forms no part of the contract. It is extrinsic, and is rather a 
personal privilege dependent on the law of the place where the property lies, and where the Court sits 
which is to decide the cause' (L.J. Bankes) at 107. 
117 W W Cook, "'Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws' (1933) 42 Yale 
Law Journal 333. 
118 G N Lewis, The Anatomy of Science (1926) referred by W W Cook (1933) as the 
initial quotation. 
119 A Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 'Delimitation of Right and Remedy in the Cases of 
Conflict of Laws' (1935) The British Yearbook of International Law 20, 23. 
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of PIL.120 Following that, preferences depend on the law of the country where the 
remedy is sought.121 
Scottish courts will normally follow English sources in this respect, which, 
however, differ among themselves.122 In the case of Clark y Bowring & Co.'" it was 
held that the law of Scotland only could be applied in determining the ranking of 
claims on a British ship locally situated in Scotland. The same opinion was held in 
Clark and Another y Hine and Others.124 The latter case involved a maritime lien 
obtained under the law of New York which the lienees tried to make good in 
Scotland. The judgment stated that 'as I can only apply our own law in determining the 
ranking of claims on a British ship locally situated in Scotland, they must be treated as 
unsecured creditors of the bankrupt owner'.125 
The most obvious argument in favour of this traditional position is that the 
lex fori approach provides a clear solution for the cases where different competing 
rights in security, created under different legal systems, seek to be enforced against 
the sale proceeds of the same res. The reasoning being that in this kind of situation, 
where there are different governing laws, there is no other option but to be guided 
by the order of priorities of the lex fori. As already mentioned, the lex fori approach is 
surely the simplest solution. It is here submitted, however, that this solution hardly 
advances juridical continuity and enhances the undesirable consequences of 'forum 
shopping'.126 On the one hand, when the lex causae of the competing rights is the 
120 P M North and J J Fawcett (1999) 82. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Scot Law Corn No. 164 (1998) 176. 
1231908 S C 1168. 
124 (1908) 15 SLT 914 (OH). 
125 Lord Salvesen at 915. 
126 Already in the early 1900s pursuers /claimants and also defenders /ants considered 
where to litigate in terms of the impact of the applicable law to the possible outcome. In 
Clark and Another v Hine and Others (1908) it was considered that '...the defenders have an 
obvious interest in resisting a judicial sale, for if the vessel was to go to an American port they would 
be able to enforce their alleged lien against her there...'(L Salvesen, 915). Later on in the 1920s, 
when still 'forum shopping' was far from being named as such, claimants considered their 
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same or where even if they are different they lead to the same result, there is no 
justification for applying the order of priorities of the lex fori. On the other hand, 
even in the cases where there is a real conflict because of differences in the ranking 
of the relevant governing laws, the priorities should be organised trying to 
accommodate the ranking of the different legal systems connected to the case 
according to their respective underlying policies. The suggestion of JACKSON127, that 
the lex fori has a claim to govern only as an arbiter, applies to this kind of situation. 
53.2.4. The Law of the Flag Revisited 
The traditional fragmented approach to the characterization of maritime 
liens, and its division into right and remedy for the sake of applicable law issues 
connected to them, favoured by the majority,128 has various downsides. It can lead to 
bizarre results, for example, in an American maritime lien claimant obtaining a 
higher priority in Canada than it would in the United States. This is exactly what 
happened in The Atlantis Two.129 In that case the court of Vancouver recognised a 
United States maritime lien in favour of a sub -charterer for breach of the charter - 
party. The court further recognised that if the priorities were to be determined 
possibilities in such terms, as a result of the application of the lex fori to the order of 
priorities, instead of the lex causae. See The Colorado (1923) 'The repairers evidently thought now 
that they would have been better off if instead of bringing their action in England they had allowed the 
ship to proceed to her home port in France and had instituted an action there' (1923) 14 Lloyd's Law 
Rep 251 (CA) 252. 
127 D C Jackson (2005) 683; he had previously stated that '... the role of the forum as such 
in any matter of priority can be questioned particularly when the governing law of all relevant 
transactions is the same or where there are differing laws each leading to the same result. It is only 
where there is a conflict because of differences in the laws governing the competing transactions that 
the forum may be said to have an umpire's role simply because it is the forum.' Ibid, 682. See also E B 
Crawford and J M Carruthers, International Private Law in Scotland (Green Edinburgh 2006) 
'...[ t]here is room for a little unease here. If all claims arise under the same law, perhaps the forum 
should defer to that law...' 201. 
128 It has to be recognised that most legal systems, even those recognising the 
substantive nature of a maritime lien -such as United States and Canadian law- distinguish 
between the lien (the substantive right, therefore governed by the lex causae) and the priority 
it entails (a procedural remedy, thus established according to the lex fori). 
129 [1999] 170 FTR 1. 
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according to the lex causae the sub -charterer's lien would rank behind the prior 
registered mortgage. However, the court held that priorities were to be determined 
according to the lex fori, and under Canadian law the maritime lien of the sub - 
charterer ranked ahead of the mortgagee. Hence, the sub -charterer received a higher 
priority in Canada, according to its lex fori, than it would have received before a 
court in the United States. 
A similar situation (with a similar outcome) was faced by Hill J. in The 
Colorado13D in the 1920s, affirmed by the Court of Appea1.13' In that case, applying the 
lex fori to the order of priorities led to the foreign claimant being benefited in a way 
that he would have not if the issue was submitted to the lex causae, since according 
to English law (lex fori), the mortgagee had priority over the necessaries men. Hill J. 
decided, via lex fori characterization of the French mortgage that the French 
mortgagee was to rank with priority over the ship- repairers of Cardiff. Yet, by 
French law the rights of the mortgagee were of quite a different character as 
compared to the ones of an English mortgagee, (the Court of Appeal assimilated 
them to the rights of maritime lien holder); yet, the French mortgagee under French 
law had no right to take possession or to sell the ship, and his rights were postponed 
to those of the necessaries men. 
Against this background, the law of the flag as suggested by JACKSON 
provides one foreseeable answer. It also provides an answer for the frequent cases 
where there is a question of priority between two contractual liens, and these 
proprietary interests according to the lex loci contractus are governed by different 
laws, which in turn, produce different results in terms of the final outcome. JACKSON 
is supported by a large tradition of commentators, that despite different theoretical 
justifications, sees in the selection of the law of the flag a conflicts rule that tends 
towards the greatest uniformity, and finally that is the most equitable to creditors 
13° (1922) 13 Lloyd's Law Rep 474. 
131 (1923) 14 Lloyd's Law Rep 251 (CA). 
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who can foresee the applicable law to which their lien will be subject.132 It is indeed 
difficult to find a counter -argument for such a proposition; since this conflict rule is 
the only one in this sphere that could provide uniformity of decision. That is why, 
following the internationally accepted link between a ship and the country of her 
flag for registered securities, it has been strongly argued that all issues of property 
in a ship should be referred to the law of the flag -unless, of course, an international 
Convention such as the 1993 MLM Convention applies to the case -.133 
Nevertheless, looking at the reality of ship registration systems, and bearing 
in mind that most ships nowadays fly flags of convenience,134 adopting such a 
connecting factor could be regarded as anachronistic and the fear is that, even when 
providing uniformity and foresee -ability, applicable law issues connected to 
maritime liens could end up being governed by the law of a legal system totally 
unconnected to the case: there is frequently no close link between the country of 
registry and the owners, operators and insurers of ships.135Yet, since the priority 
issue needs one order as to the definitive solution, unless there is an international 
Convention, the only conflict rule to provide for one and only law to govern 
maritime liens as a whole, regardless of where the claim is to be raised, is the law of 
the flag. It has to be assumed rather than circumvented that the 'conflictualist' 
approach to this issue is unable to provide for a better solution hence an 
international uniform solution imposes itself. 
132 Nonetheless, this theory has been hardly followed in judicial practice U Asser 
(1963) 16). 
133 D C Jackson (2005) 718. 
134 A ship is said to be flying a flag of convenience (FOC) when it flies the flag of a 
country other than the country of ownership. There are various factors that could motivate a 
shipowner's decision to 'flag out'. However, it is generally understood that there should be a 
genuine link between the real owner of a ship and the flag that she flies. On flags of 
convenience see H E Anderson, 'The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: 
Economics, Politics, and Alternatives' (1996) 21 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 139. 
135 On the law of the flag generally in conflicts of maritime law see W Tetley (1994) 
175 -224. 
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5.3.3. The Role of the Security Function of Arrest of 
Ships in the Ranking of Maritime Claims 
Differently from the issue of priorities, the effect of the security function of 
arrest of ships in the ranking of maritime claims is a matter inherently procedural, 
therefore, to be governed by the lex fori, unless there was international unification of 
procedural rules in this regard. 
5.3.3.1. International Conventions 
The 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions deal with the right to arrest but, apart 
from the declaration that nothing in the Conventions creates a right of action, do not 
provide for the consequences of the arrest on the property rights of persons 
interested in the ship. In turn, the Conventions on the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages (MLM Conventions of 1926, 1967 and 
1993) deal with maritime liens and rights of retention; they refer to arrest only in the 
context of maritime liens and mortgages, and assume that such causes of action 
carry with it the right to arrest; they do not deal with the right in security created by 
the arrest as such. 
During the preparation of the 1952 Arrest Convention the French and the 
British delegates at the Diplomatic Conference expressly objected to create a link 
between the Arrest Convention and the 1926 MLM Convention, and attempts to 
move forward in the discussion of this issue were unsuccessful.)36 A new 
opportunity arose in the preparatory work undertaken pursuant to the 1999 Arrest 
Convention where, even though account was taken of the fact that in some countries 
136 The travaux préparatoires of the International Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of Sea -Going Ships 10 May 1952 (CMI 1997). 
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an arrest not only prevents the physical removal of the ship but also results in a 
prohibition against disposal of the ship by sale or otherwise, the Conference still did 
not find it reasonable to include such a requirement in the definition of arrest."' 
It is indeed regrettable that currently the Arrest Conventions and the 
Maritime Liens and Mortgages Conventions did not enhance one another in this 
sphere.138 The present state of affairs of 'chaotic inconsequence' in this are of the 
law139 would certainly improve if it was possible to rely on coherent and consistent 
international standards for the different aspects of the international enforcement of 
maritime claims. Possibly the problems go far beyond technicalities, as these issues 
are very sensitive to public policy. Doubtless, this has represented an obstacle when 
it comes to international harmonisation of the law in this field. 
5.3.3.2. English Law 
In English domestic law the priority afforded by the in rem claim, or the right 
to proceed140 in rem, depends on the nature of the cause of action, e.g. whether it 
encumbers a maritime lien, or a mere statutory right in rem, or derives from a 
mortgage or other charge of the same nature, it depends on the nature of the right, 
substantively, as outlined below. 
Arrest in rem to enforce a maritime lien 
137 The travaux préparatoires of the 1999 Arrest Convention (F Berlingieri (2006) 526- 
28) (Report of the CMI on article 1(2) [29]). 
138 In fact, when the 1952 Arrest Convention entered into force more than fifty years 
ago, it did enhance the 1926 MLM Convention by filling the gap the latter left in so far the 
enforcement of liens and mortgages; see J M Kriz 'Ship Mortgages, Maritime Liens, and 
Their Enforcement: The Brussels Conventions of 1926 and 1952. Part Two' (1964) 1 Duke 
Law Journal 70. 
139 In The Halcyon Isle [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 325 the dissenting opinion held that PIL 
had an important role to play in 'the present chaos of the law of the sea governing the recognition 
and priority of maritime liens and mortgages' (Lord Salmon and Lord Scarman 339). 
140 Very often this right to proceed in rem, ie this procedural right, is mentioned as 
'this right in rem', confusing the procedural nature of quasi in rem actions with the 
substantive feature of rights in rem. 
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When arrest of ships is granted to enforce a maritime lien the priority 
derives from the maritime lien and not from the arrest; this means that once the ship 
is arrested, the security function goes back in time to the moment where the lien 
attached, namely the moment the cause of action originated. 
Arrest in rem to enforce statutory rights in rem 
In so far as statutory rights in rem are concerned the security effect 
crystallises on the property from the time of the issue of the in rem claim form. This 
was established in The Monica 5141 where Brandon J. pointed that 'It seems to me that 
it would be strange if a statutory right of action in rem only become effective, as against a 
subsequent change of ownership of the res, upon arrest of the res, and yet, by the same 
statute, as conferred the right of action, arrest was in many cases prohibited'. 142 It has been 
argued that policy considerations must have been determinant in this decision, 
which has remained unchallenged since 1967.143 Consequently, it seems that in 
English law the position of a secured creditor in relation to maritime claims not 
secured by a maritime lien, arise from the issuance of an in rem claim form and not 
from arrest. However, this was not always the case. In The Henrich Bjorn,'44 the 
charge created upon the ship based on 'statutory liens' (right to proceed in rem) in 
favour of the claimant, was held to accrue from the time of the arrest of the ship. 
Nonetheless, in present times it is the issuance of an in rem claim form (and not the 
effectual arrest) that creates a security which cannot be defeated by insolvency and 
is available only for maritime claims.145 It will only be defeated by a maritime claim 
141 [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep 113 (PDAD). 
142 Ibid at 131. 
143 A Mandaraka- Sheppard, Modern Admiralty Law (Cavendish London 2001) 81. 
144 The Northcote y Owners of the Henrich Bjorn (The Henrich Bjorn) (1885) LR 10 PD 44 
(CA). 
145 This is to be contrasted to the obtaining of security by means of a freezing order 
(formerly Mareva injunction) in English law. A freezing order does not create nexus (in Scots 
law terms), merely preserves a fund against which execution may be taken which in fact is 
liable to be defeated by insolvency process or by a prior execution creditor. 
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having greater priority.146 In that sense, arrest does not create a right in security as 
defined earlier in this chapter, at least not a right that is distinct from, and in 
addition to, the right of action. 
5.3.3.3. Scots Law 
In Scots law some insight may be thrown into the particular effects of 
arrestment of ships from the general law of diligence. 
Litigiosity`y' and Nexus in Scots Law 
There have been two approaches to the effect of arrestment in general in 
Scots law: the prohibition theory and the attachment theory.148 These theories can be 
easily applied to the arrestment of ships in Scots law and, to the arrest of ships as an 
institution more broadly. The prohibition theory considers arrestment as a mere 
prohibition upon the arrestee from parting with the arrested subject (and in that 
sense coinciding with the nature of arrest as understood by HERBERT, FRESNEDO and 
AGUIRRE). In turn, the attachment theory regards arrestment as being not only a 
prohibition but also laying a nexus (right in security) on the subject arrested (thus 
constituting an embargo in the opinion of the authors mentioned above). In the case 
of arrestment of ships this nexus is a nexus realis,149 i.e. a jus in re aliena (a right 
146 N Meeson, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice (3rd edn LLP London 2003) 17. 
147 It has to be borne in mind that the principle of litigiosity in this sphere of Scots 
law may be undergoing reconsideration; notably, the 'fictional litigiosity theory' as 
understood by Erskine (Institute 111,6,19) has been severly rejected by the Scottish Law 
Commission in the 'Report on Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty Arrestments' 
(Scot Law Corn No 164 (1998) [9.23] 187). There the SLC argued that '... the fictional litigiosity 
theory of the arrester's preference should be abandoned and replaced by properly formulated 
principles. In our view however it would be preferable if this result were to be achieved by judicial 
development of the law rather than by legislation ...' Litigiosity was then considered as an out -of- 
date doctrine in the sense that it represents a 'mere personal prohibition against the arrestee 
parting with the arrested property having no effect in competitions with third parties'... [9.14] 184. 
148 G L Gretton,'Diligence' Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (SME) (8) [285]. 
149 Dicta have not been consistent to answer the question whether arrestment gives 
rise to a nexus realis. For an affirmative answer see [1898] Inglis v Robertson and Baxter 25 R 
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acquired by one over a thing belonging to another).15° As GRETTON explains, from 
the times of STAIR these theories have been in the field of diligence in Scots law 
producing inconsistent dicta; some decisions reflect one theory, some the other.151 As 
a consequence, there is no settled rational framework in which the law can be 
developed.152 Seemingly, the attachment theory has gained more acceptance; the 
particular rules which depend on the prohibition theory are currently regarded as 
inconsistent.153 In terms of specific effects both theories agree that arrestment results 
in litigiosity; but the prohibition theory holds that arrestment does not lay a nexus in 
addition to litigiosity.ls4 BELL, when considering the effects of arrestment in security 
more generally, called it an 'embargo upon a man's floating capital, his goods and his 
moneÿ ;155 that could be interpreted as arrestment creating not only litigiosity but also 
nexus.156 To put the point another way, it seems that in modern Scots law arrestment 
as a form of diligence, excluding thus arrestment to found jurisdiction, creates a 
nexus (attachment157) which gives a preference to the creditor over acts of the debtor 
and of the competing creditor.158 
(HL) 70 at 73 per Lord Watson. On the contrary view, Stewart's statement that arrestment of 
itself gives no real right (p 125) sits uneasily with his advocacy of the attachment theory; 
following Stewart, arrestment has been held to give no real right in several Scottish dicta; see 
G L Gretton SME (8) [285] fn 8. 
150 [1897] The Ripon City P 226 per Gore11 Barnes J (242). 
151 G L Gretton SME (8) [285]. 
152 Gretton argues that 'In the whole law of diligence, this failure to develop a coherent 
doctrine as to the effect of arrestment is probably the most remarkable and most inexcusable. The fault 
is perhaps lightened by being spread over many centuries' (G L Gretton SME (8) [285]). 
153 G L Gretton SME (8) [285]. 
154 Ibid. 
155 G J Bell (vol 2, 1870) 66. 
156 G L Gretton SME (8) [116]. 
157 A J Sim, 'The Receiver and Effectually Executed Diligence' 1984 SLT (News) 25 
' ...in modern Scots law...the orthodox view has been that an arrestment effects a true attachment - 
and so can be regarded as a diligence executed on property - with certain important and defined 
effects which cannot be explained on the principle of litigiosity...' 28, as cited by Scot Law Corn No 
164 (1998) 184. Notwithstanding, the principle of litigiosity is still being used by Scottish 
courts; see Iona Hotels Ltd v Craig 1990 SC 330 (IH (1 Div)) 334 -336, arguably, in the opinion 
of the SLC in the Report mentioned above, failing to take account of the way in which the 
law on the effect of arrestments has developed since the eighteenth century (Scot Law Corn 
No 164 (1998) [9.17] 184). 
158 Scot Law Corn No 164 (1998) 186. Note however, the position of Gretton who 
considers that viewing arrestment as an attachment rather than a mere prohibition is not 
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Arrestment on the dependence in an admiralty action in personam 
According to the foregoing discussion on the effects of arrestment in the 
general law of diligence, an arrestment of a ship on the dependence creates a 
preference for the arrester which will be recognised and enforced in subsequent 
rankings of creditors. Seemingly ranking after 'traditional' maritime hypothecs and 
ship mortgages even though there are no modern authorities.159 As stated above, it is 
likely that Scots law will follow English lead in this area of law. 
Arrestment in rem in an admiralty action in rem to enforce a maritime lien 
As well as in English law, when a warrant of arrestment is obtained in order 
to enforce a maritime lien, it is the maritime lien (in Scots law terms, hypothec) that 
constitutes the security and not the arrestment as such. 
Arrestment in rem in an admiralty action in personam to enforce a statutory right in 
rem 
An arrestment in rem16° under a cause of action listed in section 47(2) 
paragraphs (p) to (s) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (non -pecuniary 
claims) does not have any effect on the ranking of creditors, or in competition with 
bona fide purchasers or mortgagees, or generally on the substantive rights of 
parties, other than rights to interim possession.167 
Arrestment to found jurisdiction 
Arrestment to found jurisdiction creates no nexus with the ship arrested. 
Thus, no security function is ever displayed by this kind of arrestment alone. That is 
always true (G L Gretton, SME (8) [286]). Arrestment to found jurisdiction is indeed an 
example of an arrestment that it is not an attachment. 
169 J A G Lowe, 'Maritime Securities' SME (20) 118 [273 -315]. 
160 According to s 47 (3) (b) the arrestment is in rem if the result of the cause of action 
in (p) to (s) of s 47(2) is non -pecuniary. 
161 Scot Law Com No 164 (1998) 131. 
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the reason why it is usually applied for together with a warrant for arrestment on 
the dependence. 
5.4. AT THE CROSSROADS: SUBSTANCE AND 
PROCEDURE AND RIGHT AND REMEDY IN PIL 
In most systems of PIL there is an axiomatic rule: procedural issues are 
governed by the lex fori whereas substantive matters are governed by the lex causae. 
It has been proclaimed as 'the most inveterate doctrine of the conflict of laws'.162 But 
when it comes to the point where it is necessary to decide what is procedure or 
remedy, as opposed to substance or right, things become doubtful and subject to 
acrimonious controversy.163 
The distinction became established in medieval times. In the thirteen century 
a case before Parisian courts, the defendant alleged excuse -appearance 
purporting that the 'custom of Normandy' allowed it. However, the defence was 
rejected on the ground that the matter was 'de processu causae' and was therefore 
governed by the lex fori.164 The following century the post -glossators BARTOLUS and 
BALDUS laid down the same distinction clearly.165 Following them the forthcoming 
centuries took the rule as a settled axiom. 
162 E H Ailes, 'Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws' (1940 -1) 39 Michigan 
Law Review 392'...It is perhaps the most inveterate doctrine of the conflict of laws that all questions 
of procedure in a given instance are governed by the lex fori, or the law of the court invoked, 
regardless of the law under which the substantive rights of the parties accrued. For seven centuries, at 
least, courts and lawyers have broadly stated or assumed to be axiomatic the rule that substantive 
rights are fixed and immutable whilst the procedural devices by which such rights may be vindicated 
and enforced depend solely upon the law of the forum.' 
163 A Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1935) 33. 
164 [1265] Les Olim, I., Ed. Beugnot, 1839 630 as cited by E H Ailes (fn 185) 397. 
165 Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313- 1357), Commentarius in Codicem lustinianum: "de 
summa trinitate" glossa "quod si Bononiensis" (Lyon 1521). His writings have been translated 
into English by J H Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws of PIL (vol 1 Harvard University 
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The rule has been of particular influence in common law systems, notably in 
English PIL. In 1896 DICEY expressed that '...English lawyers give the widest possible 
extension to the meaning of the term "procedure ". The expression as interpreted by our 
judges includes all legal remedies, and everything connected with the enforcement of a 
right'.166 Arguably, the rationale behind such an expansive notion of procedure is 
that in English law this rule operates as an 'escape device'167 in terms of the 
functioning of PIL, thus, helping courts to achieve a fair judgment.168 Yet, the line 
between substance and procedure has been consistently drawn to evade the impact 
of foreign law.169 COOK explained the issue in the following terms, 
'if we admit that the "substantive" shades off by imperceptible 
degrees into the "procedural ", and that the "line" between them 
does not "exist ", to be discovered merely by logic and analysis, but 
is rather to be drawn as best to carry out our purpose, we see that 
our problem resolves itself substantially into this: How far can the 
court of the forum go in applying the rules taken from the foreign 
system of law without unduly hindering or inconveniencing 
itself ?'.17° 
In this respect Arden LJ has recently confirmed that '...when in the conflict of 
laws, the court says that a particular issue is one of procedure rather than substance, the 
court is really saying that it cannot, for whatever reason, apply the relevant foreign law to 
that issue'.171 
Press Cambridge 1916). For Baldus de Ubaldis (1327- 1400), disciple of Bartolus, see A Lainé, 
Introduction au Droit International Privé (vol 1 F Pichon Paris 1888/1892) 121. 
166 A V Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws 
(Stevens London 1896) (1896) 712. 
167 By 'escape device' is meant to point out to PIL 'tools' such as the use of renvoi or 
the application of the exception of ordre public, amongst others. 
168 In Chaplin v Boys [1969] 2 Lloyd's Rep 487 (HL) the 'substance and procedure rule' 
was described as a tool which '...in skilful hands...can be powerful and effective' (Lord 
Wilberforce). 
169 As for the most recent example see Harding v Wealands [2006] UKHL 32. 
170 W W Cook (1933) 343 -344. 
171 Harding v Wealands [2005] 1 All ER 415, 437. 
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This approach has been repeatedly criticised. LORENZEN,172 in a letter written 
to AILES in 1929, concluded that the terms 'substance' and 'procedure' have no 
inherent meaning and that, for the purposes of conflict of laws, the only issue that 
matters is that the created rights are enforced in every court. He admitted only two 
exceptions to this main rule: when the local judicial machinery would be obstructed 
thereby (for inherently procedural matters), or if the enforcement or recognition of 
such rights 'would be shocking to the local community'173 (ordre public exception). On the 
same line, CHAMBERLAYNE went forward expressing that '...the distinction between 
substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory. In essence, there is none. The 
remedy and the predetermined machinery, so far as the litigant has a recognised claim to use 
it, are legally speaking, part of the right itself... ':174 
Scottish courts have been more restrictive with the 'substance and 
procedure' device;175 arguably, showing the internationalist spirit that has 
characterised Scots PIL. In present times CARRUTHERS176 puts the issue under 
discussion in terms of self -restraint and self -promotion of the forum, arguing in 
favour of the former '...for the whole foundation of the conflict of laws requires that a 
court should restrict the field of its own procedure and be prepared to follow as far as possible 
the foreign substantive law.. .'.177 
172 E G Lorenzen (ed), Cases on Conflict of Laws (West Publishing St Paul 1937). 
173 E H Ailes (1940 -1). 
174 C F Chamberlayne, A W Blakemore and D C Moore Handbook on the Law of 
Evidence (M.Bender Albany, NY 1919) 171, 1911as cited by E H Ailes (1940 -1) 394. 
175 A E Anton, Private International Law (Green Edinburgh 1967) 542; A E Anton and P 
Beaumont, Private International Law (2nd edn Green Edinburgh 1990) 743. In the later (1990) it 
was '...not as yet clear how far this approach will be developed...' 743. 
176 J M Carruthers, 'Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws: A Continuing 
Debate in relation to Damages' (2004) 53 ICLQ 691 '...Self -promotion on the part of any forum 
foments reluctance to concede that foreign rules are substantive, and encourage litigants to indulge in 
the vice of forum shopping. Self -restraint, on the other hand, fosters willingness to characterize 
foreign rules as substantive and, in turn, to apply those rules unless to do so would be impractical or 
impossible or offensive to the forum's public policy...' 710. 
177 A H Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (Harvard Press Cambridge 
MA 1950) 247 as cited by J M Carruthers (2004) 695. 
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The modern doctrinal approach (as opposed to the jurisprudential one),178 
thus, is to ascribe a natural meaning to the terms substance and procedure,19 
limiting the scope of 'procedural' to those issues strictly necessary to conduct court 
proceedings.180 In PANAGOPOULOS words 'matters of procedure are concerned with 
manners, whereas matters of substance are concerned with matters'.181 Doubtless, the 
original rationale behind the distinction, and its consequential rule that procedural 
matters are governed by the lex fori, is to 'avoid imposing upon a court foreign legal 
machinery with which it is unfamiliar'. 182 Since under this modern approach the scope 
of 'procedural' is therefore reduced to a considerable extent, specific areas have 
been the object of recent development (for example, in the sphere of limitation of 
actions, considered as a 'prelude of things to come'183) and some other areas, such as 
the field of remedies, is being tested in present times.184 
Surprisingly, the distinction between right and remedy in PIL has not 
deserved the same scholarly attention as its corollary, substance and procedure,185 
despite its relevancy as far as characterization is concerned. After MENDELSSOHN 
BARTHOLDY186 analysis in 1935, which is actually more concerned with 
characterization [qualification], there is hardly any other well -know study of the 
topic. However, some studies devoted to the analysis of the distinction between 
substance and procedure in PIL give consideration to this issue.187 Notably, the 
178 Harding v Wealands [2006] UKHL 32. 
179 G Panagopoulos, 'Substance and Procedure in PIL' (2005) 1 Journal of Private 
International Law 69, 70. 
180 [1991] McKain v Miller 174 CLR 1, 27 (HCA) by Mason CJ. 
181 Ibid 71. 
182 D R Thomas (1980) 322. 
183 G Panagopoulos (2005) 70. 
184 See G Panagopoulos (2005) 77. 
185 The distinction between substance and procedure within PIL has been the object 
of numerous studies since the early twentieth century until present times. See, for example, 
W W Cook (1933) 333; E H Ailes 'Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws' (1940 -1) 
39 Michigan Law Review 392; J M Carruthers (2004); G Panagopoulos (2005). 
186 A Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1935). 
187 See W W Cook (1933) 341 '...if...we examine into the distinction between "substantive 
law" and "remedial and procedural law" as that distinction is involved in legal problems, we find that 
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question appears repeatedly in case law.188 In 1949 LJ C Thomson in McElroy v 
McAllister189 expressed, 
'...matters of "remedy ", being truly matters of procedure and not 
of substantive right, fall to be dealt with according to the law of the 
forum. There are sound reasons for this attitude. So far as remedy 
is concerned the reasons are practical, though the line between 
what is a matter of remedy, and what is substantive right may be 
difficult to draw...'190 
Traditionally, there have been two main approaches: the 'traditionalist' and 
the 'realist'. For the traditionalist the difference is axiomatic, and is seen as a useful 
device for the administration of justice; by contrast, for the realist the distinction is 
not well grounded, and in some cases is even inconvenient for it 'involves a denial of 
right which is the more reprehensible in that it purports to rest upon a "mere" denial of 
"remedy "'.191 
The traditional approach has received considerable support since the 
distinction became established in medieval times.192 Yet, it is here submitted that in 
the case of maritime liens the realist approach is to be preferred since it is actually a 
field where to deny the remedy means to deny the right. 
This approach has been recently supported by PANAGOPOULOS.193 He argues 
that, on the one hand, remedies are certainly not norms ruling on the manner in 
which court's proceedings should be conducted and therefore, should not be seen as 
inherently procedural. On the other hand, the remedy is an integral part of the right 
this distinction is drawn for a number of different purposes, each involving its own social, economic or 
political problems.' 
188 See e.g. Kendrick v Burnett (1897) 25 R 82 (Lord Kinnear) 90 '...The rule that 
whatever belongs to the remedy is to be determined by the lex fori... depends upon the distinction 
between questions as to the constitution of obligations and questions as to the mode in which they are 
to be enforced'; Naftalin v LMS Railway 1933 SLT 193 (Lord Murray) 200; see also D M Walker, 
The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland (Green Edinburgh 1974) 19. 
1949 SC 110 (IH (Ct of 7 Judges)). 
190 Ibid at 117. 
191 E H Ailes (1940 -1) 394. 
192 E H Ailes (1940 -1) 396. 
193 See G Panagopolus (2005)77. 
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being enforced, actually affecting its existence and scope, therefore, it should be 
characterised as substantive.194 JACKSON is also of the opinion that issue of priorities 
in the case of maritime liens should be submitted to the same law governing the 
existence of the security right.195 
In this modern (realist) conception, therefore, there is no place to consider 
maritime liens as procedural; moreover, there is no place either to consider the 
priorities they imply as remedial. Consequently, neither the right nor the priorities 
intrinsically adjudged to the right should be considered procedural under the 
modern loop of PIL. Both right and priority are inherently substantive and should 
coherently be governed by the Iex causae. 
The inconvenience of the fragmentation into right and remedy for PIL 
purposes has been recently examined by BRIGGS.196 In his opinion ...there should be 
no line which separates right from remedy in the conflict of laws, or, to put it another way, 
the remedial rules of the Iex causae should apply in an English court unless it would be 
contrary to public policy to do so, at which point the nearest English equivalent should apply 
Outwith PIL, in modern times Goudling J has observed that `...right and 
remedy are indissolubly connected and correlated...it is as idle to ask whether the court 
vindicates the suitor's substantive right or gives a suitor a procedural remedy as to ask 
whether thought is a mental or a cerebral process'.19$ Leading commentators, however, 
194 G Panagopoulos (2005) 78. 
'95 D C Jackson (2005) 681 -682. In his opinion 'Any reference of priority to the law of the 
forum assumes that questions of the substance or nature of a right (which should be a matter for the 
law governing its creation) and priority of the right as against other rights are distinct issues. But, on 
the contrary, priority may be dictated by the nature._. To distinguish nature and priority is to draw a 
distinction inherently inconsistent with the whole framework of which the two aspects are part' 
[26.36]; 'Following that argument, the role of the forum as such in any matter of priority can be 
questioned particularly when the governing law of all relevant transactions is the same or where there 
are differing laws each leading to the same result. It is only where there is a conflict because of 
differences in the laws governing the competing transactions that the forum may be said to have an 
umpire's role simply because it is the forum. Otherwise, it is artificial to refer the connected issues of 
priority and substance to different laws' [26.37]. 
196 A Briggs (2003) 274. 
197 A Briggs (2003) 277 -278. 
198 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel- British Bank (London) [1981 ] Ch 105, 124. 
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along with traditional authority, still affirm that in general terms the question of 
priorities is a remedial matter for the lex fori.199 Nonetheless, the latest edition of 
Dicey, Morris and Collins recognise that '...the principle that priorities are governed by 
the lex fori is not, however, a universal one.'200 It looks as if the door is being left open to 
future developments of the law in this regard. 
5.5. CONCLUSIONS 
As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis arrest of ships benefits both 
creditors and ship- owners.20' Yet, when it comes to applicable law issues connected 
to it, the conflict of interests in the adjacent field of international interests in ships 
makes it very difficult to strike a balance acceptable to the shipping community as a 
whole. Therefore, unification of the law in this field remains paramount. 
Nonetheless, even though a first step towards uniformity has been achieved with 
the entry into force of the 1993 MLM Convention in 2004, in present times, conflict - 
of -laws rules in the matter studied in this chapter are far from being redundant.202 
199 P M North and J J Fawcett (eds) (1999) 83. 
200 L Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (14th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell London 2006) 191. 
201 It may be argued that also in this sense arrest of ships has, functionally, the 
characteristics of a right in security. Already in the Corpus Juris Civilis it was established that 
'Pignus utriusque gratia datur, et debitoris, quo magis ei pecunia crederetur, et creditoris, quo magius 
ei in tuto sit creditum' (A security is given for the benefit of both parties: of the debtor in that 
he can borrow more readily, and of the creditor in that his loan is safer). Institutiones Book III, 
Tit. XIV translated in T L Mears, Analysis of M. Ortolan's Institutes of Justinian: including the 
history and generalization of Roman Law (Stevens London 1876). Even though this definition 
describes express security rights given by agreement, in the case of ships the rationale 
behind the common benefit encompasses all three kinds of security rights mentioned above. 
202 Arguably, even if the 1993 MLM Convention achieves greater success, a good 
conflict -of -laws rule will always be needed to supplement the Conventional system. For the 
supplementary role of PIL in substantive unification see C Fresnedo de Aguirre and V Ruiz, 
'El Derecho Marítimo y El Derecho Internacional Privado' [2005] 22 Anuario de Derecho 
Maritimo 189. 
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The main argument submitted in this chapter is that a fragmented approach 
to the characterization of maritime liens in PIL, either through the distinction 
between substance and procedure or right and remedy, should be resisted.2 °3 When 
a given 'procedural' question is treated differently in the different legal systems 
connected to a certain PIL case (i.e. as 'procedural' for the lex fori and as 
'substantive' for the lex causae) the outcome of the case in terms of applicable law 
will probably differ depending on the chosen forum. This, undoubtedly, enhances 
the undesirable consequences of 'forum shopping'. To put it another way, the Iex fori 
approach, qua lex fori or qua lex causae should be avoided; in the 21st century a lienee 
should not be in a position of having his claim substantially satisfied or entirely shut 
out, depending upon the legal system of the jurisdiction in which the ship is 
arrested and sold.2 °4 Moreover, an appropriate conflict rule cannot be based on the 
fallacy that the maritime lien /hypothec is a procedural aspect of the maritime claim 
and therefore governed by the lex fori. 205 As THOMAS remarked in 1980 the lex fori 
approach in the English fashion was a minority position considering other maritime 
courts around the world, where the trend was to define a maritime lien as a 
substantive right and consequently, subject to the lex causae.206 
Against this background, the far -reaching concept of 'procedure' in English 
law as to cover the existence of maritime liens should be seen as a thing of the past. 
The modern doctrinal approach is consistent in asserting that the characterization of 
certain aspect of a claim as 'procedural' should be restricted to manners directly 
related to the conduction of court proceedings. Matters that affect the existence, 
203 See P B H Birks, 'Rights, Wrongs and Remedies' (2000) 20 OILS 1 arguing that 'the 
habit of thinking of the law in terms of wrongs and remedies encourages a malignant, criminal model 
of the civil law', what he calls 'discretionary remedialism'; a 'model where "rights" dissolve'. 
Indeed, if the distinction is applied for the purposes of characterization (and consequently 
the determination of the applicable law) to maritime liens, 'the right does dissolve'. 
204 J M Kriz, 'Comment' (1955) 64 Yale Law Journal 878, 893. 
205 For the same opinion see W Tetley (1998) 7. 
206 D R Thomas (1980) 23. 
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scope and enforceability of the rights themselves, are inherently substantive, 
therefore, should be left to the lex causae.207 
Furthermore, it is here submitted that it is inconvenient to refer the 
connected issues of existence and ranking of maritime liens to different laws; it 
could lead to incoherencies that would not advance the policies underlying neither 
the lex causae nor the lex foci. Using the same illustration as throughout this chapter, 
if for example,208 a United States lien is ranked following the English priority system 
it will probably not advance the rationale underlying either United States law or 
English law, therefore jeopardizing the juridical continuity of the legal relation and 
disregarding the rationale of the foreign system of priorities. JACKSON suggests that 
'a priority issue necessarily poses a proprietary issue and the whole should be considered as a 
matter of substance' .209 Time is ripe for the re- examination of PIL rules in this sphere. 
It is here submitted that the ranking of the lex causae should be used unless there are 
such circumstances amounting to an application of the ordre public exception, 
grounded on international public policy issues, which is the only possible 
justification in modern PIL for disregarding the application of the lex causae. 
The change of characterization on 'limitation of actions'21° within English 
and Scots211 PIL shows how feasible is to change from one category to the other, and 
207 D C Jackson (2005) 681 -682 
208 In the United States there are a considerable number of maritime liens which are 
organised according to priorities; in English law there are a restricted range of maritime liens 
with no clear -cut system of priorities. The priority order is determined in a case -by -case 
basis and it is related to the relation between the different types of lien (D C Jackson (2005) 
682). 
209 D C Jackson (2005) 683. 
210 Nowadays the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 provides that time -bar 
provisions are governed by the lex causae and not by English law unless the latter is the lex 
causae. This welcomed modification attuned with the general modification in English PIL of 
contracts after the Rome Convention helps to harmonise characterisation of statutes of 
limitation within Europe as substantive (P M North J J Fawcett 121). Nevertheless English 
law on limitation will still apply to determine the time at which the limitation period stops 
running against the plaintiff and may apply if the application of the lex causae is contrary to 
public policy; see A Briggs The Conflict of Laws (OUP Oxford 2002) 38. 
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how arbitrary the boundaries in reality are. Hopefully, this change could gradually 
lead to a better general understanding of maritime liens as the preferential rights 
they are, and consequently, to re -align the distinction between right and remedy in 
the future, as to allow for the intrinsic issue of priorities to be governed also by the 
lex causae. 
In a nutshell, the common law of England and Scotland, as prepared to 
refine its categories and conflict -of -law rules, conscious of the interplay between the 
two,212 should consider maritime liens and the priorities they entail as a matter of 
substance submitted to a conflict -of -law rule that points out to an appropriate 
applicable law. In the words of BRIGGS, ' ...if there is to be an elimination of the doctrinal 
choice of law which separates right from remedy, there will need to be a clearer certainty that 
the choice of law rules for substantive rights are themselves in good shape...'.213 As 
mentioned above, JACKSON is of the opinion that the appropriate conflict rule in this 
sphere should indicate that all issues of property in a ship are referred to the law of 
the flag. 
Finally, as far as the role of the security function of arrest of ships in the 
distribution of the sale's proceeds there is no uniform framework for the law to 
develop in; neither in national, international or regional law. This carries the 
uncertainty of the effect of arrest on third party proprietary interests.214 This is 
211 A similar process occurred in Scots law; see the SLC Report on Prescription and 
the Limitation of Actions -Report on Personal Injuries Actions and Private International Law 
Questions (Scot Law Corn No 74 (1983)); D M Walker, The Law of Prescription and Limitation of 
Actions in Scotland (6th edn Green Edinburgh 2002). 
212 A Scott (2007) 47; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Five Star General Trading 
LLC (The Mount I) [2001] EWCA Civ 68, [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep 597 (CA) (Mance LJ) [26]. 
213 A Briggs (2003) 279. 
214 Jackson recognises that 'Arrest is a mode of establishing security for a claim and its role 
in the context of a bankruptcy or liquidation clearly raises potential conflicts with the rules relating to 
secured and unsecured claimants in that context' (D C Jackson ibid). 'Arrest in English law when 
used is simply an early step ensuring physical retention of an asset in that process. In relation to 
arrest as such the only relevant issue ]in the context of arrest as security] is the extent to which an 
arrest may be void or stayed as an interference with the bankruptcy and liquidation framework' (D C 
Jackson (2005) 404). 
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certainly an area that needs further clarification and uniformity for the sake of 
predictability and legal certainty in the sphere of ship- financing transactions. It is 
here submitted that, in present times, this is a fertile field for unification of 
procedural law. At the CMI Conference held in Amsterdam in 1949 pursuant to the 
adoption to the 1952 Arrest Convention, the British representative, Mr. Cyril Miller 
affirmed that it was quite '...impossible to attempt, and indeed undesirable, to unify the 
law of procedure... 
the same way.216 
' 215 Fifty years later the international community does not think 
215 See Berlingieri (2006) 6. 
216 See, for example, the ALI/Unidroit Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure 
adopted in 2004 (2004) 4 Unif. L. Rev. 758 -809. In the particular field of international security 
interests see the UNIDROIT Convention on Mobile Equipment (Cape Town Convention) in 
force since the 30th of March 2006. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Arrest of Ships and 
Jurisdiction on the Merits 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Ship -related businessmen have always been particularly affected by 
jurisdictional issues since shipping by its very nature involves contacts with 
various countries, their laws and their adjudicatory powers. Some of the most 
fiercely contested conflicts of jurisdiction take place in shipping disputes and much 
effort and resources are devoted to solve the jurisdictional issue -which in many 
cases becomes much more important than the subject matter itself.' Hence, this is 
an area of law where certainty and foresee -ability are more necessary than in most 
others. 
The arrest of ships plays a paramount role in that conflict of jurisdictions. 
As jurisdiction on the merits based on the arrest of the ship is an established 
jurisdictional basis under some national systems of law and under international 
Conventions, it provides almost always for concurrent jurisdictions in the field, 
therefore, the threat of parallel litigation is always latent. 
I In The Spiliada it was made clear by Staughton J at first instance that the decision as 
to the appropriate forum will put one party or the other into a stronger negotiating position; 
see The Spiliada Maritime Corporation y Cansulex Ltd ) [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL).The same 
reasoning was followed in Golden Ocean Assurance and World Mariner Shipping SA y Martin 
(The Goldean Mariner) [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 390 (QBD (Comm)). 
209 
In general terms, it can be said that at the present time a court is entitled to 
exercise jurisdiction on the merits if it is a forum with which the dispute has a 
substantial connection. And the main duty of PIL is to identify what constitutes a 
substantial connection across the whole range of PIL categories. Furthermore, a 
court is entitled to exercise jurisdiction even if it does not have a substantial 
connection with the dispute for the sole purpose of interim relief. Therefore, two 
main themes arise in connection with jurisdiction and the arrests of ships. On the 
one hand, the jurisdictional function of arrest, that is, arrest as a substantial 
connection with the forum for the purpose of grounding jurisdiction on the merits. 
In this sphere the assessment is done through the position of the forum arresti in the 
international Conventions and, as in the 1952 Arrest Convention the issue is left, to 
a certain extent, to the law of the forum arresti, to its position in English and Scots 
law. Both legal systems provide, albeit differently, for arrest as a jurisdictional 
ground for the merits of admiralty claims. On the other hand, the distinction 
between jurisdiction on the merits based upon arrest from jurisdiction to arrest for 
the sole purpose of interim relief (hereinafter called 'ancillary jurisdiction'). In 
English law, this distinction whilst clear in principle is jeopardised by the intrinsic 
connection between arrest of ships and the action in rem. The second issue is only 
outlined in this chapter. Ancillary jurisdiction is indeed more related to judicial 
cooperation than to direct jurisdiction that is why its analysis is left to Chapter 7. 
Thus, the main task of this Chapter is to examine the jurisdictional function 
of arrest of ships to unravel the foundations of the forum arresti principle. 
Essentially the aim is to identify the type of connecting factor that justifies the 
exercise of jurisdiction on the merits as a consequence of the arrest of ships, with a 
view towards enhancing its theoretical legitimacy. 
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6.2. THE JURISDICTIONAL FUNCTION OF ARREST OF 
SHIPS 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the jurisdictional function of arrest of ships has 
historical foundations. The impact of English law on this history is remarkable. In 
turn, the English rule is a consequence of the inherent link between arrest and 
action in rem. It can be said without hesitation that if English law would have not 
recognised such basis of jurisdiction, it would certainly not be nowadays an 
internationally accepted jurisdictional ground.2 
This jurisdictional ground, despite the fact it has been for long part of the 
law of the 'great maritime nations',3 it has not been free from criticism. Already in 
1902, during the Comité Maritime International (CMI) Conference held in Hamburg, 
where preliminary work pursuant to the 1910 Collision Convention4 was 
undertaken, several opinions were submitted against the forum arresti as a 
jurisdictional basis for the merits of the dispute. The two main arguments against it 
those days were: first, that this jurisdictional basis could result in the infinite 
multiplication of courts that may have jurisdiction to address a particular disputes 
[nowadays it could be added that this represents a higher risk of 'forum shopping', 
lis pendens and irreconcilable judgments]; secondly, it was argued that this 
2 Because English law recognised such jurisdictional ground the international 
community thought that it was wiser for the other countries -in the absence of any hope of 
the English abandonment of such basis- to opt for allowing themselves as well to be 
competent on such a basis but with limitations (Franck, The travaux préparatoires of the 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of Sea - 
Going Ships 10 May 1952 (CMI 1997) 399 '... voulez -vous donc que nos amis Anglais puissent 
saisir nos navires et faire juger nos affaires a Londres et qu' il n' y ait pas de réciprocité ?...' ). 
3 Ibid 398. 
4 The International Convention on Certain Rules Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in 
Matters of Collision signed at Brussels on 10 May 1952. 
5 M Autran, The travaux préparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of Sea -Going Ships 10 May 1952 (CMI 
1997) 398. 
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excessive extension of jurisdiction came from the lack of a distinction between 
jurisdiction on the merits and jurisdiction for the sole purpose of interim relief.6 
This lack of distinction, reflecting the lack of distinction between the 
different functions of arrest of ships, which was not surprisingly quite extensive 
among the national representatives during the preparatory sessions previous to the 
1952 Arrest Convention,7 was, and still is, the core of the problem. Admittedly, the 
extended practice is to allow for arrest of a ship as a provisional and protective 
measure as broadly as possible. However, to establish jurisdiction on the merits 
upon arrest is a completely different question.8 
Another distinction was also missing in those days. Those who were against 
arrest of ships as a jurisdictional basis for the merits of the dispute argued that the 
only jurisdictional basis for such purpose should be the domicile or habitual 
residence of the defendant,9 doubtless, they did not consider the distinction 
between general and specific jurisdictional bases.10 
6 M Autran ibid '...Cette extension abusive de compétence provient a mon sens de l'absence 
de distinction entre les mesures provisoires et le jugement du fond...'.. 
7 See E Alten (Oslo) The travaux préparatoires of the 1952 Arrest Convention (CMI 
1997) 410 '... the object of an arrest shall not be to press the ship -owner to furnish a guarantee for a 
claim which cannot be satisfied by execution in the ship. The object of the arrest must be to secure 
execution of a judgment pronounced in the State where the arrest is made or, in exceptional cases, 
execution of a foreign judgment which is recognised as binding and enforceable in that State...our 
proposal only states the principle that there shall be no arrest lying in the ship unless the judgment of 
the local court or a foreign court can be executed in the ship...'. 
8 The distinction between ancillary jurisdiction and jurisdiction on the merits is 
examined in Chapter 7. 
9 M Autran (1997) 398. 
lo Interestingly enough, for example, as early as in 1930 a plea of forum non 
conveniens was sustained in a Scottish court against jurisdiction based on the arrestment of a 
ship to found jurisdiction (Scottish jurisdiction, Dumbarton) in favour of the court of the 
domicile of the defendant (Spain) in Sheaf Steamship Co Ltd v Compania Trasmediterranea 
(1930) 36 Lloyd's Rep 197 (IH (2 Div)). 
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6.2.1. Bases of Jurisdiction 
A jurisdictional basis is the link between a certain forum and a certain 
international dispute. Bases for assuming adjudicatory jurisdiction rest on different 
kind of relationships between the forum and the dispute, or the forum and the 
parties. The strength of these links vary from minimal, i.e. defendant's transitory 
presence, to a strong concern of the forum, based either in its relationship with the 
parties or the dispute. HILL distinguishes three categories of jurisdictional bases in 
the PIL arena: 'consensual' jurisdiction; 'connected' jurisdiction; and 'universal' 
jurisdiction. In turn, he recognises four different strands of the 'connected' basis, i.e. 
exclusive, general, special and protective." Without entering into detail as to the 
different categories it is clear that forum arresti in the case of ships is a case of 
'connected' jurisdiction, that in turn it is neither exclusive nor protective.72 Thus, 
the general and special categories call for examination. 
6.2.1.1. General and Specific Jurisdiction 
This classification was first coined by VON MEHREN and TRAUTMAN in a 
very influential article73 more than forty years ago.74 These American scholars 
11 J D Hill, 'The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Private International Law' in P Capps, M 
Evans Sr S Konstadinidis (eds) Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal 
Perspectives (Hart Oxford 2003) 39, 49. 
12 Protective jurisdictional bases are those adopted to achieve a better balance 
between the parties favouring the weak party linked with the forum. Examples of protective 
fora are jurisdictional bases related to consumer contracts, employment contracts, and to 
incapable and maintenance creditors; see D P Fernández Arroyo, 'Exorbitant and Exclusive 
Grounds of Jurisdiction in European Private International Law: Will They Ever Survive' in 
Festschrift für Erik Jayme (Sellier Munich 2004) 169, 171. 
13 A T von Mehren and D T Trautman, 'Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis' (1966) 79 Harvard Law Review 1121. 
14 This distinction has been recently adopted by Hill who defines the two categories 
in the following terms 'A court with general jurisdiction may adjudicate any type of dispute as 
long as there is a particular connection between the defendant and the forum By contrast a court with 
special jurisdiction may adjudicate only disputes which are related to the particular connecting factor 
on which jurisdiction is based' (J D Hill (2003) 52). 
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distinguished, on the one hand, jurisdictional bases based on the relationship 
between the forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected 
(general jurisdiction) and, on the other hand, jurisdictional bases based on the 
relationship between the forum and the dispute (specific jurisdiction).15 
The universal assertion actor sequitur forum rei (being the connecting factor 
the habitual residence of the defendant) would be according to their opinion the 
only internationally acceptable one in terms of general jurisdiction.16 However, 
many legal systems do consider other jurisdictional bases that are also general - 
even if not all of them have such extended international acceptance- such as the 
defendant's nationality, and personal connections such as domicile, habitual 
residence or nationality of the claimant. None of them, not even the wide accepted 
defendant's domicile, is free from criticism.17 Party autonomy can also be 
considered a source of general jurisdiction in the sense that it is related to the will 
of the parties and not necessarily to a certain connection between the forum and the 
dispute, even though some legal systems only authorise the choice by the parties of 
a forum connected with the case. 
The other category -specific basis of jurisdiction- includes the connecting 
factors based on an objective link between the forum and the dispute, such as the 
place of the specific performance in contractual matters, the place where the 
damage occurred for tort /delict claims, or the place where the res is situated for 
jurisdiction regarding proceedings in relation to immovable/heritable property. It is 
clear that modern trends tend to elaborate more and more specific jurisdictional 
bases. 
15 L I de Winter, 'Excessive Jurisdiction in Private International Law' (1968) 17 ICLQ 
717, 718. 
16 Ibid. 
17 D P Fernández Arroyo (ed) Derecho Internacional Privado de los Estados de Mercosur 
(Zavalia Buenos Aires 2003) 157. 
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A clash between general (party autonomy) and specific (forum arresti) 
jurisdiction arose in The Bergen.18 The case involved a jurisdiction and choice -of- 
law clause in a bill of lading providing for disputes to be decided where the carrier 
had his principal place of business (Germany) under the law of such country; the 
bill of lading provided (as usual) for the parallelism between law and forum. The 
relevant ship was served and arrested in England. Under English domestic law 
(which in turn, arguably,79 was applicable through article 7 of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention, due to the lex specialis provision of the Brussels Convention) the 
English Courts had jurisdiction to determine the claim on the merits. The core of 
the problem was whether the forum clause of the bill of lading invalidated the 
jurisdiction of the forum arresti. Clarke J, after acknowledging the conflict existing 
between Article 7 of the Arrest Convention which enables jurisdiction to be 
founded on the arrest of a ship, and Article 17 of the Brussels Convention [article 23 
of Regulation 44/2001], by which an agreement on jurisdiction excludes the 
jurisdiction of courts of other Member States than that of the chosen court, upheld 
the jurisdiction of the English Court. 
Yet, modern trends in international jurisdictional theory seem to be pointing 
otherwise. Party autonomy is the undisputed 'star' in terms of jurisdictional 
78 [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 380 (QBD (Admlty)). It is interesting to compare the decision 
in The Bergen with the decision of the Court of Appeal in OT Africa Line Ltd y Magic 
Sportwwear Corporation and Others [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep 170 (CA). In the latter the Court of 
Appeal affirmed that where the parties to a contract of carriage had entered into an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the English court, but, a provision in Canadian 
law allowed proceedings to be brought there, the English court had jurisdiction to grant an 
injunction preventing the Canadian proceedings from continuing. The question is whether 
the difference in terms of precedence between the 'consensual' and the 'connected' 
jurisdiction is due to the fact that the former is an intra- Community case and the latter is an 
extra -Community one, or whether the difference lies in the fact that the supremacy of party 
autonomy in the former led to a foreign court having jurisdiction, and in the latter pointed 
to the English courts. 
t9 See the more restrictive interpretation mentioned infra supported by A Philip 
(1977) note 87; J P Verheul (1983) note 87 and F Berlingieri (2006) note 88. 
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grounds (and also in terms of applicable law).2° It is clear that when in a contractual 
claim there is a valid choice of forum or arbitration clause the parties to the contract 
have promised to do something ;21 if the forum /arbitration clause is an exclusive one 
(which is usually the case) the parties have also promised not to do something else; 
in the latter case, the arguments for upholding the parties to their bargain is even 
stronger. Doubtless, Clarke J would have totally agreed with that;22 nevertheless, 
his point was centred on the priority of article 7 of the Arrest Convention over the 
rules of the Brussels jurisdictional system; i.e. in terms of general and specific 
jurisdiction, he favoured the latter over the former. 
20 As O Kahn -Freund recognised 'The rule of 'autonomy' in the conflicts of law is like 
nature: you cannot drive it out even with a pitchfork'. Cited by T M C Asser, 'Choice of Law in 
Bills of Lading' (1974) 5 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce (3) 355. On party 
autonomy see H Kronke, 'The Scope of Party Autonomy in Recent UNIDROIT Instruments 
and the Conflict of Laws in the MERCOSUR and the European Union' in Liber Amicorum 
Opertti Badán (FCU Montevideo 2005) 301. In Re party autonomy and jurisdiction see the 
new Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements concluded on the 30th of June 2005 
that is indeed the result of the much broader aim of an international Convention on 
Jurisdiction, which proved too ambitious a goal. On the 2005 Convention see T C Hartley, 
'The Hague Choice -of -Court Convention' (2006) 31 Edinburgh Law Review 414; A Bucher, 
'La Convention de La Haye sur les accords d'élection de for' (2006) 1 Revue suisse de droit 
international et européen (RSDIE) 33; M M Celis Aguilar 'Convención sobre los acuerdos de 
elección de foro' (2006) 5 -6 Derecho del Comercio Internacional Temas y Actualidades 
(DeCITA) 613. 
21 See Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Another [2003] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 571 (CA). 
22 Indeed he argued that '...the conclusions of principle which I have reached are unlikely 
to have far- reaching consequences because the practical result of applying art. 17 on the one hand and 
the principles of English domestic law on the other is likely to be the same in the vast majority of 
cases' The Bergen (No 1) [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 380 (QBD (Admlty)). However, principles do 
matter a great deal when trying to construe a jurisdictional framework in the EU. It is here 
suggested that principles in this regard are to be analysed in the light of the Community 
aims that they are trying to achieve, and not in the light of the practical effects that is likely 
to produce in so far as English domestic law. In that sense the arguendo of The Bergen is not 
advancing harmonization in the EU. 
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6.2.1.2. Excessive or Exorbitant Jurisdiction 
It is difficult to give a clear definition of what constitutes an excessive or 
exorbitant jurisdictional basis.23 FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO provides a negative definition 
and describes exorbitance as lack of reasonableness.24 In general terms it can be said 
that when the balance between the interests of the claimant and the defendant is 
not even, and one or the other is put in such a position close to a practical denial of 
justice, the situation is unacceptable from an international point of view. Hence, if a 
judgement is rendered in such conditions in a certain forum it should not be 
recognised and enforced abroad. Certainly, this kind of explanation is related to the 
fact that international jurisdiction is not a goal in itself but it is a way of ensuring 
juridical continuity to international legal relations. This link has been already 
signalled by MANN who appreciated that the issue of adjudicatory jurisdiction in 
international litigation could not be studied separately from the problem of the 
recognition of foreign judgments.25 
Historically, there have been clear cases of exorbitant jurisdictional bases in 
many legal systems. The most well known examples were article 14 of the French 
Civil Code, establishing that a Frenchman could always sue an alien in France even 
if the obligations have been contracted in a foreign country; article 213 of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure and paragraph 99 of Austrian Code of Civil 
Procedure, both provisions conferring adjudicatory jurisdiction on their courts 
against non -resident defendants if assets belonging to the defendant could be 
found within the country; seizure of assets belonging to debtors residing abroad, as 
23 See among others K H Nadelmann, 'Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on 
Recognition of Judgements: The Common Market Draft' (1967) Columbia Law Review 995; 
L I de Winter, (1968) 712; F A P Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law (1964) 
111 RdC 1; K A Russell, 'Exorbitant Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements: the 
Brussels System as an Impetus for the United States Action' (1993) Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 2; C Kessedjian, 'International jurisdiction and foreign 
judgements in civil and commercial matters' HccH PIL Prel Doc 7 (1997). 
24 D P Fernández Arroyo (2004) 170. 
25 L I de Winter (1968) 712. 
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in The Netherlands and Belgium law; and arrestment of movables belonging to 
non -residents as in Scottish rules of jurisdiction. All of these jurisdictional grounds 
were bases of general jurisdiction and, not surprisingly, met with disapproval as 
considered excessive.26 In the European Communities these excessive jurisdictions 
have been all re- examined, and excluded from the European jurisdictional scheme. 
The arrest of ships -even though included in the broadest 'general' category 
of 'seizure of the defendant's asset within the territory' -, has survived as a basis of 
'specific' jurisdiction via the lex specialis rule included in article 57 of the Brussels 
and Lugano Conventions, now article 71 of EC Regulation 44/2001. 
6.3. FORUM ARREST": THE PROBLEMS 
6.3.1. The Different Perspective in International 
Litigation 
The reasonableness of a certain jurisdictional basis in international litigation 
needs to be judged not only from the point of view of the defendant but also the 
claimant. In the law of procedure all over the world and throughout the ages the 
traditional rule actor sequitur forum rei, i.e. the defendant must be sued at the court 
of his domicile is the leading principle of general jurisdiction, both domestic and 
international. However, it has been argued that its acceptance in the international 
sphere, particularly its adoption as the main jurisdictional rule in the European 
scheme, has to do with the lack of acknowledgment of the difference in the 
underlying principles of venue (domestic jurisdictional rules) and jurisdiction in 
the international sphere.27 The trouble and expense involved in instituting 
proceedings or in defending an action in a foreign court are always considerable: 
26 L I de Winter (1968) 708. 
27 R Michaels, 'Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction' (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1003. 
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therefore there are certain issues to examine in international litigation that are not 
present when selecting an objective jurisdictional ground for the purpose of 
domestic litigation. As WINTER expressed already forty years ago, 'the position of a 
claimant in international cases is already far from enviable owing to the fact that even if he 
gets judgment against the defendant in his own country, it will usually be difficult to make 
this judgment effective. So at least his interest in being provided with an accessible 
jurisdiction should not be entirely neglected .28 
As in most issues in law [and in life], it is a matter of balance of 
convenience. One thing is not to neglect the burden of the claimant and other very 
different is to argue, as it has been done,29 under the umbrella of the claimant's 
convenience, the supremacy of certain fora when it comes to admiralty disputes. 
This is not acceptable in present times. Even when it is possible to agree that for 
assessing the balance of convenience between the claimant and the defendant 
practical considerations should be taken into account, these considerations should 
not go as far as to consider one forum better equipped than others because of its 
own 'greatness'. 
28 L I de Winter (1968) 717. 
29 'the practical convenience of treating a ship as domiciled where it can be found, is to 
prevent a man from possibly starting from a not very civilised State or sending his ship into civilised 
waters navigating recklessly and doing mischief and then retiring into some country -may I say 
some South American State? where possibly justice is not of the purest- the advantage of seizing his 
ship is so great and the advantages in practice of the English and American Courts of Admiralty are 
so great that we are quite prepared to submit our ships to arrest in other countries and we strongly 
maintain the power of proceeding against a ship where it can be seized' W Phillimore, The travaux 
préparatoires of the 1952 Arrest Convention (CMI 1997) 400. Fortunately this mentalité has 
been changing. A quarter of a century after Sir Philimore's opinion, Lord Reid recognised 
that 'There was a time when it could reasonably be said that our system of administration of justice 
though expensive and elaborate was superior to that in most other countries. But today we must 
admit that as a general rule there is no injustice in telling a plaintiff that he should go back to his 
own courts' in Owners of the Atlantic Star v Owners of the Bona Spes (The Altantic Star and The 
Bona Spes) [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep 197 (HL) 200. Note, however, that in the same case Lord 
Denning M.R. said, ([1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep 446, 451) '... if the forum is England, it is a good place 
to shop in, both for the quality of the goods and the speed of service'. As Lord Reid recognised, 
there was times 'when inhabitants of this island felt an innate superiority over those unfortunate 
enough to belong to other races' ([1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep 197 (HL) 200). 
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6.3.2. The Lack of a Proper Balance between 
Principles and Practicality 
However, this kind of considerations have given rise to opinions like HILL'S, 
who considers that jurisdictional issues in PIL have become too dominated by 
practicalities related to cost and convenience, and that the proper division of 
competence between States is being left aside. He stresses that as a matter of 
principle 'unless the parties have expressly or impliedly chosen the forum in question, the 
exercise of jurisdiction is not legitimate if the dispute does not have some territorial 
connection with that forum'.30 Furthermore, he criticises 'conexity' (jurisdiction being 
extended to co- defendants and third parties), surprised by the fact that this 
jurisdictional basis has been rarely criticised [and indeed, it has been recognised in 
international Conventions]. He believes that this lack of opposition derives from 
the referred emphasis on practical issues rather than theoretical ones. 
It should be stressed that even though his arguments have solid foundations 
the issue of principles should not be taken that far. International adjudication of 
jurisdiction is in any case not an aim on its own but a way of assuring juridical 
continuity to international legal relations. Therefore, practical consequences are 
important ones; and a proper balance between principle and practicality is 
needed.31As described in Chapter 1, the specific aim of PIL has been since its origins 
to solve the problem that arises when legal relations are confronted with the 
diversity of legal systems throughout the world. Therefore, at the centre of PIL 
there is a dynamic objective, i.e. the juridical continuity of legal relations across 
national borders. This is the ultimate target, and principles do serve its function if 
they contribute to that goal. But principles are not values per se; their value depends 
on the solutions that they contribute to achieve. In the opinion of MACCORMICK, 
3° J D Hill (2003) 45 -48. 
31 As an example of rules where this balance is looked for see the Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure of ALI/UNIDROIT as adopted in 2004 (2004) 4 Unif. L. Rev. 
758 -809. 
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there are two desiderata: that the law should be readily comprehensible to and 
sensibly organised for those who work with it [and for that purpose principles are 
paramount], and that it should also make as much sense as possible to the non- 
professionals whose lives are regulated by it.32 Hence, practicalities do matter a 
great deal. 
6.3.3. Concurrent Jurisdictions 
It is often the case that the courts of more than one country will be able to 
exercise jurisdiction over a particular dispute. It is intrinsic to an international legal 
relation to have substantial connections with more than one forum. And in these 
cases most legal systems allow the claimant a choice of forum. The problem arising 
out of this permission is that two parties to a dispute may bring similar 
proceedings in different jurisdictions; or even more troublesome, that the same 
party could present the same claim in more than one forum. Therefore, many 
efforts have been done relatively recently, particularly in integrated areas, to find a 
solution to the problem of parallel and related proceedings. There is no definite 
consensus yet as to the best way of addressing these problems. 
This is a matter of special concern in shipping cases where there will be 
invariably a number of potential fora whose jurisdictional rules would permit the 
dispute to be entertained. Ship -related businessmen have always been vulnerable 
to the existence of concurrent jurisdictions because of the nature of their business 
which takes them from forum to forum, making maritime claims 'particularly 
vulnerable to "forum shopping "'33 and rendering every port an 'admiralty 
32 N MacCormick, 'Law as Institutional Fact' in N MacCormick and O Weinberger, 
An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism (Kluwer Dordrecht 
1986) 63. 
33 DSV Silo und Verwaltungsgessellschaft mbH y Owners of the Sennar (The Sennar) (No 
2) [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 521 (HL) (Lord Diplock). 
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emporium'.34 Hence, maritime law is a particular area where jurisdiction of the 
court of a given country is prescribed by international Conventions to which that 
country is a signatory. 
What are the principles underlying the solutions coined by such 
Conventions? 
6.3.4. Principle of Territorial Proximity 
In the field of jurisdiction for the purposes of interim relief, forum arresti as a 
forum selection criterion has been made objective through the proximity principle 
(jurisdiction is based on the proximity between the forum and the case35), 
particularly by the principle of territorial proximity (principio de jurisdicción mas 
próxima).38 However, it seems at least debatable whether this theoretical foundation 
could be applied to sustain direct jurisdiction on the merits. Nevertheless, it is 
worth an attempt. 
The international jurisdiction to adjudicate is a direct consequence of the 
international jurisdiction to legislate which in turn is derived from State 
sovereignty.37 Consequently, since sovereignty is territorial in character, the public 
international law impact on civil jurisdiction has remained firmly rooted in 
territoriality.38 As a rule jurisdiction extends and is limited to everybody and 
everything within the sovereign's territory. Already STORY39 taught that every 
34 The Atlantic Star (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 
35 P Lagarde, Le principe de proximité dans le droit international privé contemporain 
(1986) 196 RdC 9, 131 -132. 
36 For an analysis of this principle in relation to the arrest of ships in Uruguayan law 
see C Fresnedo de Aguirre and R Herbert, 'El Arresto de Buques y el Principio de 
Jurisdicción mas Próxima' [1993] Revista de Transporte y Seguros 158. 
37 F A P Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After 20 Years (1984) 
186 RdC 9,51. 
38 Ibid. 
39 J Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Hilliard, Gray & Co Boston 1834). 
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nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own 
territory.40 As a result, a defendant was not subject to the jurisdiction unless he had 
been served with process within the jurisdiction or had voluntarily submitted to it. 
In turn, jurisdiction in rem could not be exercised over a res unless it was situated 
within the forum. 
A century later CooK4' purported to free the common law from what he 
considered the misleading notion of territoriality and associated theories. He 
demonstrated that STORY'S theory was defective in that STORY accepted that 
jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in personam could be exercised independently. 
COOK, on the contrary, understood that to exercise jurisdiction over a res within the 
forum necessarily involved the exercise of some jurisdiction over persons claiming 
an interest in it.42 
More recently, the strictly territorial character of the doctrine of 
international jurisdiction has been loosening up particularly in the commercial 
sphere; as HILL remarks, the application of the territorial principle is likely to lead 
to jurisdiction being exercised on insubstantial connections, leading therefore to a 
high incidence of parallel and related proceedings:* Reasonableness," fairness, and 
substantial contacts with the forum, have dominated the supplementary 
connections. Nevertheless, in admiralty the subsistence of the forum arresti in the 
40 In his view it would be 'wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of the 
sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation should be at liberty to regulate either persons or things 
not within its own territory' M M Bigelow, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (8th edn 
Little, Brown Boston 1883) 20. 
41 W W Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws (Harvard University 
Press Cambridge, Mass. 1942). 
42 W W Cook (1942) 'Legal rights cannot exist independently of legal persons and when a 
court exercised jurisdiction over a thing it necessarily affected the rights of persons interested in that 
thing. Thus if a court exercised in rem jurisdiction over a res and persons claiming some interest in 
the res were outside the jurisdiction, the court was doing what Stony said it could not be done - 
binding persons not resident in the forum' (62). 
43 J Hill (2003) 61. 
44 Reasonableness has been evaluated as a strong principle in the elaboration and 
interpretation of jurisdictional rules in Europe; see D P Fernández Arroyo (2004) 173. 
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case of arrest of ships as a specific jurisdictional ground shows that the traditional 
territorial character of jurisdiction remains firmly rooted in territoriality, despite it 
is indeed likely to lead to a high incidence of parallel and related proceedings. 
This is possibly so, not because of any principles but because -as these 
paragraphs have attempted to show- in this traditional and distinctive area of law, 
that of maritime law, there is a difference in perspective due to its inherent 
internationality, and furthermore, it may be argued, there is a 'justifiable' 
imbalance of practicalities over principles. 
These peculiarities fit easier into certain kind of jurisdictional paradigms 
than in others. The following paragraphs aim to asses that fitness in the European 
regime, and in turn, in England and in Scotland. 
6.4. DIFFERENT PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
JURISDICTION 
As MICHAELS45 explains, a paradigmatic account 'must be painted with a 
broad brush'; details within each system are neglected; the aim is to draw a picture 
that is not necessarily complete but comprehensive enough to discuss the central 
concern of this thesis. Hence, a general outline of the main features of each 
paradigm is offered and some material peculiarities are highlighted. 
Paradigmatic differences are very important in practice. These differences in 
mentalité46 (mentality) define the inner structure of a legal system and by comparing 
different ones unrecognised similarities and differences come to the surface and 
may help to unravel big knots. 
45 R Michaels (2006) 1026. 
46 See H P Glenn, 'Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions' in M van Hoecke (ed) 
Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart Oxford 2004) 7. 
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6.4.1. The European Paradigm of Jurisdiction47 
6.4.1.1. Generalities 
The Brussels regime48 is modelled on a civilian system as far as jurisdiction 
is concerned. The central principle is that where a defendant is domiciled in a 
Member State, proceedings against him should be brought there 49 that is, general 
jurisdiction in the European scheme is based on the defendant's domicile. In 
addition, the European regime recognises choice of court agreements (party 
autonomy) and specific jurisdictional grounds based on a close link between the 
court and the action. In that sphere the European paradigm searches for one and 
only one connecting factor as a jurisdictional ground for each legal category5° 
(parallel to the Savigny-like51 style of choice -of -law methodology). Following that, 
the European regime has battled against exorbitant fora and has banished entirely 
47 There is an enormous wealth of legal literature on this theme and it would be 
impossible to even try to refer to them without running the risk of not mentioning the most 
relevant ones. 
48 When reference is made to the 'Brussels regime' or the 'European regime' or 
similar, the author is referring to all texts dealing with judgments and jurisdiction in civil 
and commercial matters, adopted in the frame of the European integration. Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 entered into force in the United Kingdom on 1 March 2002 and 
replaced the Brussels Convention, except in relation to Denmark and to the EFTA countries. 
The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters 1998 (The Lugano Convention) came into force in the UK on 1 May 1992. The 
Lugano Convention adopts the principles of the Brussels Convention so that the two 
Conventions produced a largely uniform regime for civil jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in EU and EFTA states. 
49 Council (EC) Regulation 44/2001 art 2, OJL /12/3. 
59 R Michaels (2006) 1043. 
51 Surprisingly enough, the term 'seat' in the field of jurisdiction, was used by Lord 
Reid in the English decision of the House of Lords in Owners of the Atlantic Star v Owners of 
the Bona Spes (The Altantic Star and The Bona Spes) [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep 197 in a radically 
different (or maybe not so much radically as of late ?) paradigm of jurisdiction. Indeed it 
was not only the term that coincided with the European paradigm but the whole idea; he 
expressed 'the plaintiff should not be "driven from the judgment seat" without very good reason' 
(The Atlantic Star, Lord Reid, 200). However, it is important to be very careful when it comes 
to the parallelism between conflict -of -laws and jurisdictional issues in PIL, since practically 
and theoretically those are separable problems which, for the most part, implicate quite 
distinct policy considerations. 
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from the application among the States parties the use of certain controversial 
jurisdictional bases.52 
To put it in terms of rule and exceptions, the general rule is domicile and 
the exceptions are (i) statutory exclusive jurisdiction,53 (ii) choice -of -court 
agreements,54 (iii) special jurisdictional bases either recognised in the regime55 or 
recognised in particular specialized Conventions56 and (iv) protective fora.57 
In terms of legal technique the civilian approach seeks to resolve 
jurisdictional problems through an integrated framework of hard- and -fast rules. 
The role of judicial discretion is very limited58 Oversimplifying it, civilian systems 
have restrictive jurisdictional grounds but jurisdiction on that grounds needs to be 
exercised by the courts and there is hardly no room to stay proceedings when the 
court is internationally competent to hear them as far as the defendant is domiciled 
in a member State 59 The system is based on narrowly defined bases of jurisdiction, 
which a claimant is entitled to invoke as of right. 
52 As far as the United Kingdom, three jurisdictional bases are expressly excluded 
from the European regime. Rules which enable jurisdiction to be founded on (a) the 
document instituting the proceedings having been served on the defendant during his 
temporary presence in the United Kingdom, or (b) the presence within the United Kingdom 
of property belonging to the defendant, or (c) the seizure by the claimant of property 
situated in the United Kingdom. Noteworthy, these include arrestment to found jurisdiction 
in Scots law under (b) and (c). 
53 Council (EC) Regulation 44/2001 art 22 OJL /12/7. 
54 Council (EC) Regulation 44/2001 art 17vOJL /12/7 see The Bergen( No 1) [1997] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 380 (QBD (Admlty)), cf Ladgroup Ltd v Euroeast Lines SA 1997 SLT 916 (OH) and 
Erich Gasser v MISAT [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 222 (ECJ). 
55 Council (EC) Regulation 44/2001 art 5 OJL /12/4. 
56 Council (EC) Regulation 44 /2001 art 71 OJL /12 /16. 
57 Council (EC) Regulation 44 /2001 arts 8- 14;15;18 OJL /12/5 -7. 
58 Contrarily the common law perception of jurisdiction is based on wide 
jurisdictional bases contained by judicial discretion. 
59 If the defendant is domiciled outside a contracting state and the domestic law of 
the lex fori of the court first sized on the mater recognises the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens it is possible to so apply it through article 4 of the EC Regulation (former article 4 
of the Brussels Convention); see Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. (No.2) [1992] Ch. 72 (CA); 
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co of Europe Ltd v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (UK) Ltd [2004] 
Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 846 (QBD (Comm)). 
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In terms of priorities, in the case of parallel proceedings, automatic 
precedence is given to the court first seized.ó0 A clear ranking of principles is 
established where the aim to avoid parallel proceedings is above all other 
considerations. No explicit precedence inter se amongst the different categories of 
jurisdictional groundsó1 is established except for the case of protective fora and 
exclusive jurisdiction. This regime has the advantage of simplicity but the 
disadvantage of inflexibility. The Community mutual trust principle is paramount 
as it has legal certainty as an aim. The interest of the parties are sought to be 
protected via the predictability achieved by the regime.ó2 The recent trilogy of PIL 
cases heard by the European Court of Justice, Erich Gasser v Misató3, Turner v Grovit64 
and Owusu v Jackson65 do not leave room for doubt in this regard. Following that it 
has been held that European jurisdictional thinking is 'international'; what matters 
is the relation between nations." 
60 Articles 27 and 28 of the EC Regulation 44/2001 (formerly articles 21 and 22 of the 
Brussels Convention). In this context it was discussed whether the parties of an in rem claim 
could be the same with the parties of an in personam claim commenced in another European 
state, and this issue was sorted out affirmatively by the ECJ in Maciej Rataj (The Tatry) [1995] 
1 Lloyd's Rep 302 (ECJ). 
61 The Regulation does not prioritise general over special jurisdictional grounds or 
vice versa. Arts 2 (general jurisdictional ground -domicile of the defendant) and 3 
(possibility to sue elsewhere under special rules) are linked with a 'may'. The claimant 
'may' opt at his best interest. It could be argued that this parity in treatment is what 
concurrent jurisdiction is about; a prioritization would amount to subsidiary rather than 
concurrent jurisdictional grounds. However, certain precedence in case of parallel litigation 
does not necessarily means subsidiarity as a corollary. The claimant would still be able to 
opt, and, in principle, all the concurrent jurisdictional grounds would be available to him. 
De lege ferenda, in the case of parallel proceedings, a certain order of precedence amongst 
jurisdictional grounds could provide an alternative solution to that of the court first seized, 
certainly unfair in so many ways and causing so many disruptions in the system (for 
example the 'Italian torpedo'). 
62 The main aim of the Regulation was to facilitate the sound administration of 
justice by making rules on jurisdiction highly predictable (Recitals 11 and 12 of Regulation 
44/2001). 
63 [2005] 1 QB 1 (Case C- 116/02) (ECJ). 
64 [2005] 1 AC 101 (Case C- 159/02) (ECJ). 
65 [2005] QB 801 (Case C- 281/02) (ECJ). 
66R Michaels (2006) 1049. 
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6.4.1.2. The lex specialis provision 
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the European regime gives way to 
other international Conventions where further specific bases of jurisdiction have 
been recognised. The purpose of the lex specialis provision is to 'ensure compliance 
with the rules on jurisdiction laid down by specialised Conventions, since in 
enacting those rules account was taken of the specific features of the matters to 
which they relate' [specificity]. 67 
This is particularly the situation in respect of jurisdiction based on the arrest 
of ships in the terms of article 7 of the 1952 Arrest Convention, and article 1 of the 
1952 Collision Convention68 where the forum arresti acquires jurisdiction on the 
merits in certain specific circumstances. This is an example of a jurisdictional basis 
that, even though excluded from the European regime in general, has been 
preserved for the case of ships, according to the lex specialis provision (article 71 of 
Regulation 44/2001) (formerly article 57 of the Brussels Convention) of the 
European regime. 
The particular case of jurisdiction based on the arrest of ships was 
considered during the preparatory work pursuant to the accession of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark to the Brussels Convention 1968 (Accession 
67 Maciej Rataj (The Tatry) [1995] (Case C 406/92) 1 Lloyd's Rep 302 (ECJ). This decision 
was criticised by P Beaumont on the grounds that art 57 was then construed too narrowly. 
In his opinion, it had the 'the effect of distorting the Arrest Convention by adding a rigid lis 
pendens rule that was not provided for by the drafters of that Convention' (P Beaumont, 'European 
Court of Justice and Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters' (1997) 46 ICLQ (1) 205, 211). Nonetheless, the ECJ did look at the case from the 
uniformity of application of the then Brussels Convention application, and not from the 
Arrest Convention point of view. Furthermore, the most important consequence of the lex 
specialis rule is that provisions on jurisdiction contained in special Conventions are to be 
regarded as if they were provisions of the European regime themselves; but it means to 
subsume this special jurisdictional grounds under the much broader scheme provided for 
by the European Regulation as it currently is. 
68 In relation to the Collision Convention the Court of Appeal in The Po [1991] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 206 (CA) was content to uphold substantive jurisdiction under the latter on the 
basis that the claimant had complied with the Convention and English law. 
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Convention 1978). The possibility of introducing a special part in the Convention in 
order to 'protect' admiralty jurisdiction as exercised particularly in the U.K. and 
Ireland was considered.69 SCHLOSSER remarked that 
'it would have been inappropriate to limit the exercise of admiralty 
jurisdiction to the basis of jurisdiction included in the 1968 
Convention in its original form. If a ship is arrested in a State 
because of an internationally recognised maritime claim, it would be 
unreasonable to expect the creditor to seek a decision on his claim 
before the courts of the ship -owner's domicilé .70 
Again here, practicalities prevail over questions of principle. The common 
understanding was that the United Kingdom would have suffered an unacceptable 
loss of jurisdiction if a special provision71 had not been introduced. The same was 
said in relation to the Irish in rem jurisdiction.72 No wonder the story of forum arresti 
would have been very different if the United Kingdom had not won this battle at 
that point in time. 
69 P Schlosser, 'Official Report on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark 
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters' (1979) 
OJ C/59/140. In relation to Ireland see P Terry, 'Convention of Accession of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom to the Convention of Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters' (1980) 4 Journal of the Irish Society for 
European Law 31. He acknowledges that 'The application of the general jurisdiction rule based 
on domicile would have seriously eroded the Irish in rem jurisdiction in maritime claims'. 
70 Ibid. The issue went far enough to consider a special section dealing with 
admiralty jurisdiction; see H Gaudemet -Tallon, Les Conventions de Bruxelles et de Lugano 
Competence Internationale, reconnaissance et execution des jugements en Europe (Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence Paris 1993) 155. Finally this proposal was dropped and 
instead a Joint Declaration urging the Community States to accede to the 'most important of 
all the Conventions on maritime law, namely the Brussels Convention of 10 May 1952' was 
signed in Luxemburg on the 9th of October 1978. Furthermore, in the transitional provisions 
art 36 was introduced reproducing (with some interesting differences) arts 1, 3 and 7 of the 
1952 Arrest Convention. The interesting difference compared to the relevant provisions of 
the 1952 Arrest Convention is that according to [1] effectual arrest was not necessary to 
found jurisdiction; alternative security in lieu of arrest sufficed. It goes without saying that 
all this has only background importance since at the moment the 1968 Convention has been 
superseded by the Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001. 
71 Art 57 (2) of the Brussels Convention was amended by art 25 (2) of the 1978 
Accession Convention in a way which clarified the priority of specialised Conventions (P 
Beaumont (1997) 211). 
72 P Terry (1980) 31 acknowledges that 'The application of the general jurisdiction rule 
based on domicile would have seriously eroded the Irish in rem jurisdiction in maritime claims'. 
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The 'special laws'73 providing for specific heads of jurisdiction in particular 
matters are to be read together74 with the Regulation in relation to jurisdictional 
grounds. That means that even States which are not parties to the special 
Convention must recognise and enforce decisions given by courts which have 
jurisdiction only under the special Convention.75 For jurisdiction to be based on 
arrest of ships within Europe, i.e. for the forum arresti to be operative within the 
European regime through the priority provision, actual arrest must have been 
made under the circumstances provided for in article 7 of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention. Security for the claim provided in lieu of arrest is not sufficient to 
found jurisdiction in the case of the 1952 Arrest Convention 76 Nonetheless it is so in 
collision cases if the priority provision gives place to article 1 of the 1952 Collision 
Convention.77 Hence forum arresti has taken on an enhanced importance in Europe. 
The operational issues in relation to the lex specialis provision are various 
and complex enough to have been left open to judicial and doctrinal development.? 
73 D C Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime CIaims (4th edn LLP London 2005) 155. 
74 This methodology was advanced by the opinion of the Advocate -General, Mr 
Tesauro in the ECJ case Maciej Rataj (The Tatry) (Case C 406/92) [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 302 
(ECJ). 
75 P Schlosser (1979). Even though it seems apparently clear that they are to be read 
together, if conflict was to arise between the provisions of the special Iaw and the 
Regulation there are no clear indications of the criterion; seemingly, the Regulation should 
prevail. In the Schlosser Report it was explained that a number of questions in this regard 
were to be left opened 'to leave the solution of the outstanding problems to the Iegal Iiterature and 
case law' [240]. A clash between article 7 of the 1952 Arrest Convention and article 17 of the 
Brussels Convention (currently article 23 of Regulation 44 /2001) arose in The Bergen ( No 1) 
[1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 380 (QBD (Admlty)). Some interesting contributions of legal literature 
in this regard are J J Alvarez Rubio, 'Los Foros de Competencia Judicial Internacional en 
Materia Maritima en los Convenios de Bruselas y Lugano' (1997) 14 Anuario de Derecho 
Marítimo 143; G A L Droz, 'Entrée en vigueur de la Convention de Bruxelles revisee sur la 
competence judiciaire et l'execution des jugements' (1987) 2 Revue critique de droit 
international privé 269. 
76 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Deichland v Owners and/or Demise 
Charterers of the Deichland (The Deichland) [1990] 1 QB 361 (CA) 370; The Tatry [1995] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 302 (ECJ); cf The Anna H [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 11 (CA). 
77 Owners of the Bowditch v Owners of the Po (The Po) [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 206 (CA). 
7e P Schlosser (1979). 
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As far as the stage of development these have reached to date it seems that whether 
the rules of the specialised Convention override, are additional to, or are alternative 
to the Regulation depends on the specialised Convention :q In this context, it is 
regrettable that the decision in The Bergen 's° referred above did not follow the 
argument that the specialised Convention overrides the Brussels regime to its 
ultimate consequences. Doing that would have meant to read article 7 of the 1952 
Arrest Convention as a whole, where in fact choice of forum agreements are 
expressly recognised (article 7 (3)), and where it is stated that if the forum has been 
agreed by the parties, the arresting court is fully competent to exercise ancillary 
jurisdiction (for the purpose of the arrest as security), but, for the merits of the case 
the arresting court would limit itself to establish a time limit to bring the claim to 
the agreed forum. It is somehow puzzling that the core of the dispute has been 
centred in the alleged conflict between the 1952 Arrest Convention and the Brussels 
Convention, when such conflict does not exist in such terms. s4 Both Conventions 
are fully consistent as to the keep the parties to their bargain. The issue should 
rather have been centred in the scope of application of article 7 (3) of the Arrest 
Convention, according to which the arrest can still be effected but solely displaying 
the protective and security functions, as the forum would be exercising merely 
ancillary jurisdiction based in the proximity principle. The problem with the 
outcome of The Bergen is that it takes back with one hand what the system is bound 
to give the parties with the other 
79 D C Jackson (2005) 156; P Schlosser (1979) 12401. The Jenard Report on the 
Brussels Convention (P Jenard (1979) OJC,59,/ 4^:) highlighted that the rules of jurisdiction 
laid down in the special Conventions have been dictated by particular considerations 
relating to the matters of which they treat; and he remarks the case of the place of 
registration of a ship as a special connecting factor in maritime Conventions where domicile 
is not often used as a jurisdictional basis. 
90 The Bergen [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 380 (QBD (Admltv)). 
B1 This argument is supported by K M Siig, 'Maritime Jurisdiction Agreements in 
the EU' [1997] LMCLQ 362, 367 'it is highly arguable that no conflict between the two 
Conventions exists'. 
82 Clarke J. argued that in fact it did not, because even though English courts -in his 
opinion- had jurisdiction to hear the merits, (obiter) they also had discretion as to whether 
the case should be stayed; but as the latter was not an issue before the court, the court 
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In the opinion of JACKSON83 the dictum in The Bergen seems to follow from 
deriving Community jurisdiction from the specialised Convention and in that sense 
reference is made to another decision of the ECJ in Nurnberger Allgemeine 
Versicherungs AG y Portbridge Transport International BV.S4 In this case the ECJ held 
that Article 57 (2) (a) of the Brussels Convention should be interpreted as meaning 
that the court of a Contracting State in which a defendant domiciled in another 
Contracting State is sued, may derive its jurisdiction from a specialised Convention 
to which the first State is also a party, and which contains specific rules on 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the ECJ has held in a different case that unless the 
particular Convention contains its own provisions for the prevention of parallel 
litigation, the provisions of the European regime will apply to elucidate the 
conflict.85 Therefore, the court seized second will have to dismiss its action. 
It seems clear that the purpose of the lex specialis provision of the Brussels 
regime is to ensure compliance with the rules of jurisdiction laid down by 
specialised Conventions ;86 and in the case of arrest of ships that means with the 
rules of jurisdiction of the 1952 Arrest Convention as a whole, not only with the 
rule laid down in Article 7 (1). Moreover, it has been expressed that 
'since the purpose of Article 57 [71 in the EC Regulation] of the Jurisdiction 
Convention is not to affect unification realised through Conventions on 
particular matters, only the special links listed in [the 1952 Arrest 
Convention] Article 7 (1) under (a) to (f) prevail over the provisions of the 
Jurisdiction Convention, while when jurisdiction is based on the domestic 
rules of the country in which the arrest is made the provisions of the 
Jurisdiction Convention remain wholly operative'.87 
retained jurisdiction according to the Arrest Convention, The Bergen [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
380 (QBD (Admlty)). 
83 D C Jackson (2005) 135. 
84 Case C- 148/03 Judgment of 28 October 2004. 
85 Art 27 -30; The Maciej Rataj (Case C- 406/92) (ECJ). 
86 A Briggs, 'The Brussels Convention Tames the Arrest Convention' [1995] LMCLQ 
161. 
87 A Philip, 'Maritime Jurisdiction in the EEC' [1977] Nordisk Tidss -Krift for 
internationale ret 121; see also J P Verheul, 'The Convention Relating to the Arrest of 
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This restrictive interpretation has been favoured by BERLINGIERI who is of 
the opinion that the first sentence of article 7 (1) of the 1952 Arrest Convention - 
recourse to the lex fori- as a PIL conflicts rule is indeed a reference to the 
Convention [now Regulation] provisions themselves as the 'lex fori' (a special kind 
of renvoi).ß8 In other words, the aim of the lex specialis provision of the European 
regime was not to interfere with harmonisation achieved amongst the State parties 
in jurisdictional issues in specific matters. And arrest of ships as a provisional and 
protective measure, according to the 1952 Arrest Convention, found jurisdiction in 
certain circumstances. Therefore, even recognising article 7 of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention as in force through article 71 of the EC Regulation, it is at least 
debatable that the remission to the lex fori of article 7 operates in such broadness as 
a remission to traditional jurisdictional rules before the European regime was 
established. 
This is certainly not the position in Scotland where the reference to the lex 
fori is still interpreted as a reference to the traditional jurisdictional rules before the 
European regime was established. In Ladgroup Ltd y Euroeast Lines SAft9 it was held 
that the Brussels Convention and Schedule 8 to the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 left unaffected the pre- existing law of Scotland in admiralty 
causes where arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem provided a basis for 
jurisdiction.90 
Seagoing Ships of 1952: Some Questions' [1983] Netherlands International Law Review 383, 
386. 
88 'The first sentence of art 7 (1) pursuant to which the courts of the country in which the 
arrest is made have jurisdiction on the merits if such jurisdiction is granted by the lex fori has the 
nature of a rule of PIL The consequence is that if the country where the arrest is made is a party to 
the Jurisdiction Convention [now the EC Regulation] its provisions shall apply except for the 
special links set out in art 7 (1)' (F Berlingieri (2006) 279). 
891997 SLT 916 (OH). 
90 In the opinion of Lord Prosser 'art 57 of that Convention may have the effect of giving 
the 1952 Arrest Convention primacy insofar as it deals with jurisdiction in a case of this type. The 
1952 Arrest Convention can in turn colourably be argued to give primacy to the domestic law of 
Scotland and while for many purposes that law will be found in sch 8 to the 1982 Act it can at least 
colourably be argued that sch 8 has nothing to do with the matter since this is one of the types of 
action excluded from sch 8 by the express terms of sch 9. While I appreciate that broadly speaking one 
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6.4.2. The English Paradigm of Jurisdiction 
English thinking about jurisdiction is dramatically different. English law is a 
system in which the judge rather than the academic is the major force and in which 
precedent rather than principle is the major source of law.91 Long -established rules 
include a wide range of jurisdictional bases, some of which do not require there to 
be a substantial connection with England.92 They are shaped by judicial discretion.93 
Value -based judgments; tailor -made solutions crafted to meet individual 
circumstances; judicial discretion is idiosyncratic since Henry II.94All these concepts 
do not form part of the European vogue. 
may regard the provisions of the Brussels Convention as providing the domestic law of Scotland on 
jurisdiction in cases where sch 8 does not do so more specifically there is something mildly odd or 
paradoxical if art 57 and the 1952 Arrest Convention have taken us away from those provisions in 
holding that one is sent back to them by virtue of the reference in the 1952 Arrest Convention to our 
domestic law. The element of oddity or paradox is increased if one is being driven in this direction 
due to the inapplicability of sch 8 to the 1982 Act, that non -applicability resulting precisely from the 
acknowledgment in sch 9 that there will be admiralty causes in which the jurisdiction is based on 
arrestment in rem or ad fundandam jurisdictionem. [TJhe broad new codes regulating jurisdiction 
both in the Brussels Convention and in sch 8 to the 1982 Act leave unaffected the pre -existing 
domestic law of Scotland in admiralty causes where according to that pre- existing law arrestment 
ad fundandam jurisdictionem provided a basis for jurisdiction . 
91 R Evan -Jones, 'Mixed Legal Systems, Scotland and the Unification of Private Law 
in Europe' in JM Smits (ed), The contribution of mixed legal systems to European private law 
(Intersentia Antwerp 2001) 42 -43. 
92 Subject to statutory provisions, mostly deriving from international Conventions 
to which the United Kingdom is party, English courts recognise the general principle of 
party autonomy, as a direct application of the more general principle of freedom of contract, 
especially to choose the forum and the applicable law. English courts are willing to exercise 
jurisdiction even though the contract has no connection with England except for the choice 
of court agreement (Unterweser Reederei GmbH v Zapata Offshore Co (The Chaparral) [1968] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 158 (CA)). ' 
93 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL). 
94 Lord J Mance 'Is Europe Aiming to Civilise the Common Law ?' The Chancery Bar 
Lecture 27th March 2006. 
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6.4.2.1. Generalities 
It is generally acknowledged that the exercise of jurisdiction in maritime 
matters plays a far greater role in England than elsewhere in the United Kingdom 
or the rest of Europe.95 It jurisdictional trends have spread worldwide through the 
international Conventions where such approach to jurisdiction has been taken into 
account, remarkably, in the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions. 
In the maritime sphere since the late nineteen century until very recently all 
that was required for a claimant to raise an action in England was the defendant's 
or the ship presence within English territorial jurisdiction, however accidental or 
fortuitous this presence might have been.9ó English courts were insensitive to 
arguments to the effect that proceedings in England would be inconvenient or 
inappropriate for the factual circumstances of the case,97 even in the case of 
international parallel proceedings.98 This approach has undergone a very dramatic 
revision. In the Abidin Daver,99 Lord Diplock described this change in attitude of the 
95 P Schlosser (1979). 
96 Owners of the Atlantic Star v Owners of the Bona Spes (The Altantic Star and The Bona 
Spes) [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep 197 (HL). 
97 See the significant change in this regard in Vishva Abha [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 312 
(QBD (Admlty)); Caltex Singapore v BP Shipping [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 286 (QBD (Admlty)); 
Caspian v Bouygues [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 533 (CA); Owners of the Herceg Novi v Owners of the 
Ming Galaxy [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 454 (CA); The Kapitan Shvetsov [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 199 
(CA (HK)). 
98 It is in this sphere where the greatest changes in the English paradigm have taken 
place as of late. It used to be the case that parallel litigation in the international sphere was 
considered inconvenient in English law only when it was vexatious or oppressive, and it 
was not considered vexatious to bring an action in more than one country where there were 
substantial reasons of benefits to the claimant. In the words of Jesse! M R '...if there are 
substantial reasons to induce him [the claimant] to bring the two actions, why should we deprive 
him of that right ?...'(Peruvian Guano Company v Bockwoldt (1883) LR 23 Ch D 225 (CA)). In that 
sense, the imbalance between the parties was not particularly linked to one specific 
jurisdictional ground but it was embedded in the whole system, which was notoriously 
claimant- orientated. Arguably though, it still is so orientated; see A Scott, 'Substance and 
procedure and choice of law in torts' [2007] LMCLQ 44, 61, commenting on Harding v 
Wealands [2006] UKHL 32. 
99 Owners of the Las Mercedes v Owners of the Abidin Daver [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 339 
(HL). 
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English courts in the last quarter of the twentieth century: Judicial chauvinism100 
has been replaced by judicial comity and, in turn, that has amounted to the 
recognition and development of the Scottish legal doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.101 The path towards this new vision of the exercise of jurisdiction was 
not free from encumbrances. The House of Lords in its three -to -two decision in The 
Atlantic Star showed the resistance to open the door to its neighbour's doctrine.102 
In terms of legal technique, as discretion has such a central role it results in 
unpredictable litigation on jurisdictional points. Uncertainty is therefore an 
inherent component of the English common law jurisdictional system.103 In terms of 
priorities, the common law approach considers all the relevant connecting factors 
initially equally. The circumstances of the particular case will result in a certain 
factor having more relevance than the others but there are no definite rules to be 
drawn in general. Another fundamental difference between the European and the 
English (and indeed also the Scottish) paradigms of jurisdiction is the right to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction.104 
100 For a non -exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of England see Royal Bank of 
Canada v Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen- Boerenleenbank BA [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 471 (CA). 
101 The Abidin Daver (supra) 203. 
102 It was held by Lord Reid that in re the plea of forum non conveniens that even 
though it was desirable to diminish remaining differences between the law of the sister 
countries [England and Scotland]... 'I am not at all satisfied that it would be proper for this 
House to make such a fundamental change [by accepting the application of the plea in English law] or 
that it is necessary or desirable' The Atlantic Star [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep 197, 200. 
103 J Hill (2003) 58. 
104 A great scholarly work in this regard is J J Fawcett (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in 
Private International Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1995). Even though it seems that the right 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction is an unchallenged right of English courts, this has not 
always been so. In Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Eleftheria v Owners of the 
Eleftheria (The Eleftheria) [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 237 (PDAD) and in Aratra Potato Co Ltd v 
Egyptian Navigation Co (The El Amria) [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 119 (CA) the parameters on 
which English courts should exercise their discretionary powers to grant or refuse a stay of 
proceedings as enforcing a foreign choice of court agreement were first established by 
Brandon LJ 'who had made this area of the law particularly his own' (Baghlaf Al Zafer 
Factory Co BR for Industry Ltd v Pakistan National Shipping Co (No.1) [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 229 
(CA) (LJ Phillips). More recently the main rule in English law was expressed by the House 
of Lords in Donohue v Armco [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 234 (HL) 'But the general rule is clear: where 
parties have bound themselves by an exclusive jurisdiction clause effect should ordinarily be given to 
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The fact that the English Admiralty Court 'is one of the most famous and 
historic courts in the world'105 constitutes also part of the English paradigm. The 
welfare of England is ultimately at stake. Therefore, trying to keep its leadership as 
a centre for international litigation could be regarded as the 'public interest' 
attained in every decision on the matter. This leadership is almost incontestable 
and is usedlo6 by English courts both positively and negatively with the respective 
doctrines of forum conveniens and forum non conveniens. Changing theories and 
principles within a certain paradigm does not necessarily change the mentalité 
embedded in it; particularly in Admiralty issues the dramatic change insofar as the 
assumption of jurisdiction by English courts has not affected this idea of 
'superiority' of the Admiralty Court in England and forum arresti and ultimately the 
arrest of ships is very much fed by, and consequential upon, such feature of the 
English paradigm. 
6.4.2.1.1. Two Schemes under One Paradigm 
There are three different sources for bases of jurisdiction in England: case 
law, the rules of the Supreme Court, and statutes.107 And nowadays there are two 
different jurisdictional schemes, the 'traditional' and the 'intra- community' 
that obligation in the absence of strong reasons for departing from it' [24] and Turner v Grovit 
[2002] 1 WLR 107 (HL) and is that English courts will ordinarily secure compliance with an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause unless the party suing in the non -contractual forum can show 
'strong reasons' for suing in that forum. 
105 The Atlantic Star [1974] (HL) (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 
106 Judges and commentators agree in that the 'Admiralty court is a court to which 
suitors from a range of maritime countries have been accustomed or content to resort. No chauvinism 
is involved in recognizing as a fact that it has been at the choice of many ship owners form other 
countries that Admiralty cases have been brought in the English Admiralty Court' (The Atlantic 
Star (Lord Morris of Borth -y- Gest)). This kind of arguments have motivated the most critical 
reactions from non -English lawyers and scholars, who do see there chauvinism, indeed. 
Nonetheless, it is a fact that the exercise of jurisdiction in maritime matters has traditionally 
played a far greater role in the United Kingdom than elsewhere, as recognised by P 
Schlosser (1979) op cit [121]. 
107 Nowadays those statutes are the ones implementing the EC Regulation 44/2001. 
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(European) one. The complexity that derives from these two schemes under English 
law has underlined the need for an Admiralty Code.108 The critical issue is whether 
the existence of two different jurisdictional regimes is desirable in English law, or 
whether the Scottish approach -that is a more general revision of jurisdictional 
grounds in general, even outside the European framework- is preferable or 
defensible,709 or in the words of JACKSON, whether English maritime jurisdiction 
should fit into Europe or vice- versa.10 
6.4.2.2. Forum Arresti? 
In England a ship can be arrested whenever the claimant has the right to 
initiate an action in rem against the ship. The English implementation of the 1952 
Arrest Convention, through the reform in the Administration of Justice Act 1956 of 
the internal jurisdictional rules of the Admiralty Court, up to a certain extent 
served different purposes from that of the Convention itself. In plain contradiction 
to the Convention, the jurisdictional rules established in English law make arrest 
dependent on assertion of merits jurisdiction in rem. 
Strictly there is no forum arresti recognised under English jurisdictional 
rules. The link between arrest and action in rem does not make arrest a 
jurisdictional basis but instead, the basis is service of an in rem claim form.111 The 
108 D C Jackson (2005) 7. 
109 D C Jackson, 'Fitting English Maritime Jurisdiction into Europe -or vice versa? 
[2001] LMCLQ 219. 
110 Ibid 232. 
111 Jurisdiction for the arrest as an interim measure of protection, and jurisdiction for 
the merits of the dispute, have been clearly distinguished in England since Mike Trading and 
Transport Ltd V R Pagnan & Fratelli (The Lisboa) (1980) 2 Lloyds Rep 546 (CA). In that case 
Lord Denning M.R. made it clear that proceedings to obtain security were separable for 
proceedings to establish liability and, therefore, even when -as it was the case- there was an 
exclusive choice of forum as to the merits, this would not invalidate the jurisdiction of the 
forum arresti as to the arrest of the ship; bearing in mind that the purpose of the latter was to 
obtain security. In the opinion of Berlingieri, that decision is correct under the 1952 Arrest 
Convention. 
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paradox cannot be overestimated. The legal system that spread the forum arresti and 
fought for it in the international sphere does not exactly provide for it in a plain 
sailing way! 
Both substance and interim relief jurisdiction in England depend on the 
initial service of an in rem claim form. Following that, jurisdiction on the merits is 
previous to the arrest in English law instead of consequent upon arrest as it is in the 
international Conventions. The question is how this encompasses the application of 
Article 7 of the 1952 Arrest Convention through the lex specialis provision of the 
Brussels regime as already explained above. JACKSON has suggested that, as a 
consequence of the European regime, jurisdiction on the merits cannot be based on 
service of the in rem claim form but 'may require arrest or submission' ."2 In his words 
'this has brought the jurisdictional nature of security [arrest] to the fore' .13 
6.4.3. The Scottish Paradigm of Jurisdiction 
Civil Jurisdiction in Scotland after 1987 is a daunting area.14 The Scottish 
rules of jurisdiction are set out in Part III and Schedule 8 to the 1982 Act. These 
rules are of general application in patrimonial matters where neither the European 
scheme nor the scheme for allocation within the United Kingdom applies. These 
general rules are not to affect 'the operation of any enactment which confers 
jurisdiction on a Scottish court in respect of a specific subject- matter or specific 
grounds' (s 21(1)). This rule has the same aim as the lex specialis provision inserted 
112 D C Jackson (2005) 428. 
113 Ibid. In fact 'the jurisdictional nature of security' is itself a cumbersome 
expression entrenching two different (but of course inter -related) functions of arrest of 
ships, and showing the intermingled character of the measure. 
114 See L Edwards and J A K Huntley, 'Creating a Civil Jurisdiction Adviser' 51h 
BILETA (British and Irish Legal Technology Association) Conference, April 3 2005 available 
atwww.bileta.ac.uk /Document %2oLibrary /1/ Creating% 20Civil %20Jurisdiction %20Advisers. 
pdf (last accessed 1 September 2007) [2.3]. 
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in the European regime. Already more than ten years ago it was argued that a more 
far- reaching solution should be adopted to eliminate exorbitant jurisdictional bases 
-like arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem- and to use the provisions of the 
Brussels regime to resolve all jurisdictional disputes.115 
As well as in the English paradigm of jurisdiction, policy considerations are 
paramount. Indeed, the jurisdiction rationae rei situs was extended to personal 
obligations attaching movables unconnected therewith to encourage the commerce 
of the country.116 
6.4.3.1. Generalities 
In Scots law arrestment of a ship does not necessarily found jurisdiction. 
Indeed arrestment of a ship on the dependence as such does not; neither does an 
arrestment in rem in an action in personam. Only in an action in rem an arrestment in 
rem founds jurisdiction."? Apart from the latter case, an arrestment ad fundandam 
jurisdictionem needs to be ordered together with the warrant of arrestment of a ship 
on the dependence, or an arrestment in rem in an action in personam, to found the 
jurisdiction of the Scottish courts. 
The Scottish jurisdiction based on arrestment is primarily a common law 
one and wider than that provided for by the 1952 Arrest Convention. However, 
since the implementation of this Convention in the United Kingdom and moreover, 
since the entry into force of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, the 
special jurisdiction based on the arrestment of ships derives from a sequence of 
115 A E Anton and P Beaumont, Civil Jurisdiction in Scotland (2nd edn Green 
Edinburgh 1995) 21. 
116 Societé du Gaz de Paris v La Societe Anonyme de Navigation 'Les Armateurs Francais' 
11925] 23 Lloyd's Rep 209 (HL) (Lord Sumner). 
117 A E Anton, Private International Law Private International Law: A Treatise from the 
Standpoint of Scots Law (Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh 1967) 115 -117; Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 sch 5 [7] and sch 9 [6]. 
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statutory provisions. The Scottish arrestment jurisdiction in admiralty actions is 
expressly excluded from Schedule 8: Section 21(1) (b) provides that Schedule 8 does 
not apply to the proceedings listed in Schedule 9. In turn Schedule 9(6) provides for 
the exclusion of certain admiralty causes inter alia "[A]dmiralty causes in so far as 
the jurisdiction is based on arrestment in rem or ad fundandam jurisdictionem of a 
ship cargo or freight ". This exclusion follows a similar provision in Schedule 5(7) 
concerning 'Certain Admiralty proceedings in Scotland'. And its justification (and 
the different treatment compared to Admiralty jurisdiction in England) obeys to the 
fact that in England the arrest of ships is based on statutory provisions 
implementing the 1952 Arrest Convention. Proceedings therefore brought under 
these provisions would be excluded by the operation of the provision included in 
Schedule 5(6) (proceedings under certain Conventions). In turn the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 provides in Section 20 (1) that Schedule 8 has 
effect to determine in what circumstances a person may be sued in civil 
proceedings in the Court of Session or in a sheriff court. Notwithstanding, Section 
(21) establishes that Schedule 8 does not affect (a) the operation of any enactment 
which confers jurisdiction on a Scottish court in respect of a specific subject- matter 
on specific grounds; (b) without prejudice to the foregoing generality, the 
jurisdiction of any court in respect of any matter mentioned in Schedule 9. In turn, 
the latter (Proceedings Excluded From Schedule 8) in paragraph 6 includes 
admiralty causes in so far as the jurisdiction is based on arrestment in rem or ad 
fundandam jurisdictionem of a ship, cargo or freight. 
6.4.3.2. Arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem 
'There is perhaps no more curious doctrine in any legal system 
than the Scottish form of arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem, 
namely the procedure by which jurisdiction is established over a 
foreigner by arresting such of his goods as are situated in this 
country'.18 
18 A R G McMillan, 'The Theory of Arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem' (1922) 
SLT (News) 89. 
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This type of arrestment, also known as arrestment jurisdictionis fundandae 
causa, originated as a practice displaying the security and the jurisdictional function 
of arrestment, i.e. providing caution de judicio sisti et judicatum solvi. It existed as 
part of the lex mercatoria and was applied as early as in the thirteenth century by the 
pie -poudre Courts which sat in the great fairs which were held in England.119 It 
origins are inherently linked with commerce, transport and foreigners as these 
three relate with each other. It was certainly followed at a very early date in the 
Admiralty Court of Scotland.12° However, the original conception was already 
entirely departed from by the end of the nineteenth century.121 Since then122 it is 
solely a means of establishing jurisdiction against a defender that would otherwise 
not be subject to the Scottish courts on the basis of the presence123 within Scotland 
of moveable assets.124 Already in the 1920s it was criticised as running counter to 
one of the main planks of Scots law, namely actor sequitur forum rei.125 MCMILLAN 
argued that it was merely a legal fiction and as such not conforming with either the 
principles of the lex mercatoria from which it originated or to those of the civil law 
on which the law of Scotland is founded.126 Furthermore, he suggested that as a 
matter of principle it should be discarded entirely as a useless and indefensible 
theory, or the theory should be restored to its original substantial form as displayed 
in the lex mercatoria. None of these has happened and arrestment to found 
119 A R G McMillan (1922) 89. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Guthrie v Brunsgaard Kjosterud & Co (1896) 3 SLT 265 (IH (1 Div)). 
122 Fraser Johnston Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Jeffs (1920) 2 Lloyd's Rep 33 (IH (1 Div)). 
123 Already in 1896 Lord McLaren described its main features in the following terms 
'...(a]rrestment jurisdictionis fundandae causa does not attach the property arrested. ... It seems to 
me merely to attest the fact that the ship is at the time within the jurisdiction and that notice has been 
given that it is the intention of the person using the diligence to raise an action founding on the 
jurisdiction which results from the property being within the country. ... No disability is imposed 
upon the owner of the ship, and the master is put under no obligation to make the ship forthcoming. 
(t]hé action should fall if the party who had used the diligence had not followed up the arrestment 
within a reasonable time' (Guthrie v Burnsgaard Kjosterud & Co (1896)). 
124 G L Gretton, 'Diligence' Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (SME) (8) 75 [2491. 
125 A R G McMillan (1922) 89. 
126 Ibid. 
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jurisdiction continues to be a peculiarity of modern Scots law.122 Subject to a few 
exceptions728 arrestment to found jurisdiction may not be executed where the 
defender is domiciled in the U.K. or a European Union State.129 Arrestment to 
found jurisdiction confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Session and the sheriff 
courts of the place where the goods are located.130 In times gone by, the rationale of 
arrestment to found jurisdiction was that the pursuer has got hold of something 
that would satisfy a judgment in his favour.131 In modern times arrestment of 
movables to found jurisdiction has lost that function and is used instead along with 
an arrestment on the dependence of an action.132 It has been described as '...an 
127 As such, and particularly for the case of arrestment of ships against demise 
charterers, its competence has been recently provided for in Scots law; see Administration 
of Justice Act, Ch 46, s 47 H (Arrestment to Found Jurisdiction in Action against Demise 
Charterer) as introduced by Schedule 4 to the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 
2007. 
128 The exceptions are (a) In an action of reparation arising out of the collision or 
manoeuvring of ships or non compliance with ship collision regulations under s 45 of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1956 (b) in an Admiralty cause where the defender is 
domiciled in the U.K. or elsewhere except another European Union State. 
129 Arrestment to found jurisdiction is nowadays regarded as internationally 
unacceptable as an exorbitant ground of jurisdiction in non -maritime cases, and it is 
precluded within Europe by Regulation 44/2001. However, Rule 2 (8) of Schedule 8 to the 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 has preserved this jurisdictional ground for 
extra -UK and extra -EU cases. The Maxwell Committee despite the general 
acknowledgment of the fact that this jurisdictional basis is exorbitant considered that it was 
appropriate to retain it in relation to persons against whom there may be no other ground 
of jurisdiction to convene them to the Scottish Courts (Maxwell Report [13.164]). In this 
context the comments of Fernández Arroyo merit consideration '...European States should 
not be proud of keeping in their legislation certain criteria against which they have clearly objected. 
It is impossible to understand that, what is considered unacceptable in European (Brussels and 
Lugano) and world (Hague) transactions can be tolerable in other cases. With a fundamental right 
[such as the access to justice] the double standard is completely unacceptable. The motivations 
behind preserving exorbitant fora (which can be understood but not shared) should not prevent one 
from trying to eliminate them...' (D P Fernández Arroyo (2004) 186). 
130 Rules of the Court of Session 1994, as amended; Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 
1907, as amended. 
131 Union Electric Co Ltd v Holman & Co 1913 SC 954 (IH (1 Div) CS) (Lord President) 
957. 
132 G Maher and D J Cusine, The Law and Practice of Diligence (Butterworths 
Edinburgh 1990) 104 [4.58]. 
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anomalous procedure which should be strictly looked at and should not be extended...'133 
Proceedings are ex parte; no service is required; and the application is granted de 
plano.134 It may be argued that in terms of its doctrinal justification,135 the rationale 
behind, on the one hand, jurisdiction based on presence of moveable assets within 
Scotland and, on the other hand, jurisdiction based on the arrest /arrestment of a 
ship as understood in modern times, is different. The latter is justifiable in terms of 
the proximity principle; the former is based on commercial needs.136 Functionally, 
the differences are also considerable. Arrestment to found jurisdiction displays the 
'compelling' feature as described in Chapter 1, due to the fact that it 'renders the 
foreign owner liable to be convened in a process issuing from the Court of Session at the 
instance of the arrester for recovery of a personal debt'; 'but [differently from arrest of 
ships as provided for in the international Conventions] it does not necessarily 
guarantee that the subject arrested will remain within the jurisdiction'.137 This general 
jurisdictional basis has always been subject to the right of the court to decline 
jurisdiction on the principle of forum non conveniens.138 
133 Stenhouse London Ltd v Allwright 1972 SLT 255 (IH (2 Div)) 258 (LJ -C Grant). Cf. 
Leggat Brothers v Gray 1908 SC 67 (IH (1 Div)) 72; Alexander Ward & Co v Samyang Navigation 
Co Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL) (Lord Kilbrandon). 
134 A E Anton and P Beaumont, Private International Law (2nd edn Green Edinburgh 
1990) 189. 
133 For example, in North America, various theories have been developed to justify 
jurisdictional bases, the most noteworthy triad being the relational /sovereignty, power, and 
interest theories. For example, the relational theories have been used to explain jurisdiction 
based on domicile/habitual residence or nationality of the defendant; and the power theory 
has been used to explain inter alia art 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, which 
gives courts general jurisdiction based on the presence of assets of the defendant. 
136 As applied by the lex mercatoria in medieval times, it was the only effective 
method of subjecting itinerant merchants to the local jurisdiction of the territory within 
which they might at the time be situated (A R G McMillan (1922) 89). 
137 Mill v Fildes [1982] SLT 147 (OH). 
138 In present times as especially provided for in Section 22 (1) of the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. 
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6.4.3.3. Arrestment of Ships ad fundandam jurisdictionem 
The jurisdiction based on the arrestment of ships is provided for in the 
Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907, Chapter 51 s. 6 (c) 'Any action competent in the 
sheriff court may be brought within the jurisdiction...Where the defender is a person not 
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Scotland, and a ship or vessel of which 
he is owner or part owner or master, or goods, debts, money, or other moveable property 
belonging to him, have been arrested within the jurisdiction'. Looking at this provision 
alone it seems that jurisdiction based on arrestment of a ship is thereby established 
as a general jurisdictional ground. However, this has to be read in conjunction with 
the provisions mentioned above of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 Chapter 
46 Part V (Admiralty Jurisdiction and Arrestment of Ships in Scotland) s 47 (Arrest 
of ships on the dependence of an action in rem). Following that, jurisdiction based 
on the arrestment of ships in Scotland, despite arrestment being a general 
jurisdictional basis according to the 1907 Act, has become a specific ground of 
jurisdiction regarding admiralty actions by the operation of the 1956 Act. 
To conclude that jurisdiction based on the arrestment of ships in Scotland 
has become a special jurisdictional basis is indeed indispensable for its survival 
under the European regime. Only 'special' heads of jurisdiction can survive under 
the lex specialis provision of the Brussels regime. And even then, there is the more 
restrictive interpretation mentioned above that considers the survival of forum 
arresti through the lex specialis provision limited to the particular circumstances in 
which this jurisdictional basis is recognised in article 7 of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention regardless of the lex fori arresti; namely, if the claimant has (a) his 
habitual residence or principal place of business, or (b) the claim arose, in the 
country in which the arrest was made; (c) if the claim has arisen during the voyage 
of the ship during which the arrest was made; or in cases of (d) collision, (e) 
salvage, (f) mortgage or hypothecation. 
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Yet, in Ladgroup v. Euroeast Lines S.A.139 Lord Prosser dismissed a motion 
for recall of an arrestment of a ship on the dependence and ad fundandam 
jurisdictionem based on the argument that both, the Brussels Convention and 
Schedule 8 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, left unaffected the pre- 
existing law of Scotland in admiralty causes where arrestment ad fundandam 
jurisdictionem provided a basis for jurisdiction. 
In terms of its functional analysis, in modern times, it seems that the only 
operative function in this kind of arrestment is the jurisdictional one. However, the 
jurisdictional function is not consequential upon arrest as it is in the case of 
arrestment in rem but consequential upon the ship being fixed in Scotland; hence, 
the sole purpose and effect of an arrestment to found jurisdiction is to fix the 
locality of the subjects arrested in Scotland. As in modern practice arrestment to 
found jurisdiction and arrestment on the dependence can be sought 
simultaneously,140 the protective and security functions are displayed together with 
the jurisdictional one by virtue of one warrant, though technically arrestment to 
found jurisdiction precedes any other kind of measure since it is 
its pivotal ground in terms of the court assuming jurisdiction.141 
Even though the general rule in Scots law is that the subjects arrested must 
belong to the debtor in the capacity in which he is being sued,142 section 47 H of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1956 as introduced by Schedule 4 to the Bankruptcy 
and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007, has the effect that where a pursuer wishes to 
1391997 SLT 916. 
140 Rules of the Court of Session 1994, Ch 16, [16.15] as amended. 
141 Societé du Gaz de Paris v La Societe Anonyme de Navigation 'Les Armateurs Francais' 
[1925] 23 Lloyd's Rep 209 (HL). This is not peculiar to ships but according to the general 
theory of arrestment to found jurisdiction in traditional Scots law; in BELL'S terms '...in the 
case of a debtor abroad but whose effects are in Scotland, arrestment cannot be made on the 
dependence without a previous arrestment used for the purpose of founding jurisdiction...' (G J Bell 
(vol 2, 1870) 65). 
142 A E and P R Beaumont (1990) 190. 
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raise an action against a demise charterer to enforce a claim listed in section 47 (2) 
but the demise charterer is not within the jurisdiction of the court, the pursuer can 
arrest the ship under demise charter (providing it is within the court's territorial 
jurisdiction) to found jurisdiction for the action and allow it to be heard by that 
court. 
6.4.3.4. Forum Non Conveniens 
This is also a doctrine of general application in Scots law.143 In Sim v 
Robinow144 Lord Kinnear in a widely quoted passage explained that 'the plea can 
never be sustained unless the court is satisfied that there is some other tribunal, having 
competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interest of all 
the parties and for the ends of justice' .145 It was confirmed for the first time by the 
House of Lords in Societé du Gaz de Paris v La Societé Anonyme de Navigation "Les 
Armateurs Francais" where Lord Sumner put the rule rather differently in the 
following words, 
'...the court has to consider how best the ends of justice in the case 
in question and on facts before it, so far as they can be measured in 
advance, can be respectively ascertained and served....The object 
in the words 'non conveniens'... is to find that forum which is the 
143 It has been particularly preserved during the process of law reform that radically 
changed the law of Civil Jurisdiction in Scotland. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 
1982, which entered into force in 1987, has a supplementary provision that specially 
establishes: '(1) Nothing in Schedule 8 [Civil Jurisdiction in Scotland] shall prevent a court from 
declining jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens.' The doctrine has successfully 
developed in the United States of America; see among the leading cases Canada Malting Co 
Ltd v Paterson Steamships Ltd [1932] 285 US 413; and later on, in England. On the latest 
developments of the doctrine outside Britain see Lloyd's Underwriters v. Cominco Ltd 2007 
BCCA 249 (CA British Columbia); Sinochem International Co Ltd v Malaysia International 
Shipping Corp, 5 March 2007, 549 US (2007). For a recent illustration of its use within the 
United Kingdom, in the context of judicial review, see Tehrani v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department 2007 SC (HL) 1. For a survey of the development of the doctrine in other 
jurisdictions see D J B Svantesson, 'In Defence of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens' 
(2005) Hong Kong Law Journal 395. 
144 [1892] 19 R 665. 
145 at 668. 
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more suitable for the ends of justice, and which is preferable 
because pursuit of litigation in that forum is more likely to secure 
the ends of justicé . 146 
When it appeared the doctrine took various tags: forum non conveniens, forum 
conveniens and forum non competens. The earliest cases identified as the origins of the 
doctrine date from the 1830s.147 In Brown's Trs v Palmer148 an arrestment was used 
against funds in Scotland owed to an executor under a will executed under English 
law in India who had all along remained in India and subject to the jurisdiction of 
the courts there. The Scottish decision held, without referring to the doctrine by 
name, that the arrestment was not a sufficient authority to found the jurisdiction of 
the Scottish courts to hear the case.149 In TulIoch v William150 the first decree to use 
the expression 'forum competens' appeared; surprisingly, it was a case found on a 
jurisdictional ground other than arrestment. In Longworth v Hope15'the doctrine was 
developed a step further; in that case Lord Deas said that even though the question 
raised in the case had been named as forum competens or forum non competens, the 
plea was really not that the forum was incompetent but that the other forum ought 
to be preferred. A year later Lord Justice Clerk Inglis in Clements v 
Macaulay1S2asserted that for the ends of justice the case may more suitably be tried 
elsewhere; from then on the plea was labelled forum non conveniens and it was in 
that form that reached Sim v Robinow,153 where Lord Kinnear'51 made the doctrine 
146 [1925] 23 Lloyd's Rep 209 (HL) 213. 
147 The origins of the forum non conveniens have been taken from the account of Lord 
Hope of Craighead (HL), 'Forum non conveniens: where next ?' Conference Paper, Journal 
of Private International Law Conference 2007, Birmingham 26 June 2007. 
148 (1830) 9 S 224. 
149 On the same line see Macmaster y Macmaster (1833) 11 S 685 cf Peters v Martin 
(1825) 4 S 108. These cases have been referred to by Lord Hope of Craighead (HL) in 'Forum 
non conveniens: where next ?' Conference Paper, Journal of Private International Law 
Conference 2007, Birmingham 26 June 2007. 
150 (1846) 8 D 657. 
151 (1865) 3 M 1049. 
152 (1866) 4 M 583. 
153 (1892) 19 R 665. 
154 Ibid, 668. 
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'fit for export'155 providing the world with a valuable device to secure the ends of 
justice; and particularly, to contain far -reaching general jurisdictional bases. 
Interestingly enough the Scottish jurisdictional system has traditionally 
counted on, on the one hand, a broad jurisdictional basis such as arrestment ad 
fundandam jurisdictionem (as a general jurisdictional basis; and not limited to the 
arrestment of ships) and, on the other hand, a device to adjust it: forum non 
conveniens. The two make sense in terms of the other. That is why forum arresti does 
not fit so easily in legal systems that do not provide for a device to contain it and 
forum non conveniens is seen as jeopardizing legal certainty in jurisdictional systems 
that do not contemplate broad jurisdictional basis. 
6.5. FORUM ARRESTI: THE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
The approach taken in the in : rnationall Conventions dealing with the arrest 
of ships indicate that when arrest is consi 
be a basis of special jurisdiction only; oil 
ell d as a juri + ictionai ground it should 
avail biliity f arrest is always limited to a 
certain category of 'mari me claims', erefore, in rnational Conventions, 
no issue of general jurisdiction ever aria. 
Jurisdiction for the arrest is distin;, ished from jurisdiction on e merits 
expressly. Article 7 of both iinF rroational Arrest Conventions of 11952 and 1999 is 
apparent in this regard. The first paragraph deals with direct jurisdiction; the rest 
of the article's provisions deals with arrest iirn III I: context of judicial cooperation. 
The Conventions permit; rather than 
jurisdiction over the merits of 
°a(11li! ire, State parties to exercise 
claim iiIIn respect off which ships have been 
arrested within their waters. In ti sense it has been argued that 
dy,Lord (-lope of Craighead. (Hp) 5repra (20117), 4.. 
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jurisdictional 
function is at most consequential upon arrest. However, the importance of the 
jurisdictional function of arrest of ships should not be underestimated. 
Under the 1952 Arrest Convention such function arises (in the provided 
circumstances) upon effective arrest; there is no jurisdiction based on alternative 
security -differently from the 1952 Collision Convention.156 This has been changed 
in the 1999 Arrest Convention where the jurisdictional function operates if 'an 
arrest has been effected or security provided to obtain the release of the ship'. The 
CMI had proposed a deeper change, as to allow security 'to avoid arrest' to 
operate as a jurisdictional ground as much as effectual arrest and security to release 
the ship from arrest.147 This proposal faced with strong opposition at the 
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva;t58 hence, only security given to release the ship 
from arrest can be counted towards establishing jurisdiction on the merits. 
156 Article 1 (b) of the Collision (Civil Jurisdiction) Convention 1952 reads: '(1) An 
action for collision occurring between seagoing vessels, or between seagoing vessels and 
inland navigation craft, can only be introduced: (b) [b]efore the Court of the place where 
arrest has been effected of the defendant ship or of any other ship belonging to the 
defendant which can be lawfully arrested, or where arrest could have been effected and bail or 
other security has been furnished' [emphasis added]. 
157 Paragraph 1 of article 7 of the Draft prepared by the CMI International Sub - 
Committee read: 'The courts of the State in which an arrest has been made or security given 
to avoid arrest or obtain the release of the ship shall have jurisdiction to determine the case 
upon its merits...'(See The Travaux Préparatoires to the 1999 Arrest Convention in F 
Berlingieri (2006) 633). The definite drafting has deleted the mention to 'security to avoid 
arrest'. Clearly the English view on that issue is that alternative security in lieu of arrest 
should found jurisdiction as much as effectual arrest. On that line, art 36 (transitory 
provisions) of the Accession Convention 1978, pursuant to the accession of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom to the Brussels Convention, took such broader view into a 
black letter -though transitory- provision (D C Jackson (2005) 161). 
158 The travaux préparatoires of the 1999 Arrest Convention shows not only that there 
was no unanimous opinion as to this matter but also the strong opposition of Spain, 
supported amongst others by France and Italy as to the inclusion of wording allowing for 
security given to prevent arrest as a jurisdictional ground (see Proceedings of the Main 
Committee at the Diplomatic Conference held in Geneva, 5 March 1999 in F Berlingieri 
(2006) 638 -643). Apart from the particular result, and the triumph of the civil law countries 
in this aspect, it is noteworthy that forum arresti is still in present times being associated with 
'forum shopping', and because of that, the issue is still, and arguably it will always be, very 
sensitive to public policy considerations. 
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6.5.1. The 1952 Arrest Convention 
Already at the beginning of the twentieth century the question whether the 
courts of the country in which the arrest is made should have jurisdiction to 
determine the case upon its merits was one of the most seriously discussed ones,'" 
and the divided opinions did present a problem in the preparatory works pursuant 
to the 1952 Arrest Convention. The common law approach to jurisdiction has 
historically recognised arrest of ships as a means of obtaining jurisdiction, whilst 
civil law systems have not. However, the division was not a clear -cut one between 
common law and civil law, but between particular domestic legal systems. The 
legal systems of the United States, Scotland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
England contemplated arrest as a jurisdictional ground on the merits, while France 
and Italy clearly did not. The 'compromise''60 solution was to allow jurisdiction 
based on arrest in a limited number of cases. These limited number of cases were 
chosen following two different methodological veins: first, the admittance of the lex 
fori so as to allow legal systems (such as the English and the Scottish ones) 
providing for jurisdiction based on arrest to keep it; and secondly, the identification 
of particular connecting factors16' which constituted the 'substantive' link between 
the forum and the dispute. The result is article 7.'62 Article 7 identifies six different 
159 In the CMI International Sub -Committee Meeting in Antwerp in 1951 it created a 
position which would have meant the dropping of the Convention altogether; see The 
travaux préparatoires of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law With Respect to Collision Between Vessels 23 September 1910 and of the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of Sea -Going Ships, 
10 May 1952 (CMI 1997) 414. 
160 This 'compromise' is criticised by P Chauveau, Traité de Droit Maritime (Librairies 
Techniques Paris, 1958) [246]. 
161 For a detailed analysis of the individual connecting factors in relation to the way 
they operate insofar as certain maritime claims see F Berlingieri (2006) 282-290. 
162 Article 7 (1) 'The Courts of the country in which the arrest was made shall have 
jurisdiction to determine the case upon its merits: If the domestic law of the country in 
which the arrest is made gives jurisdiction to such Courts or in any of the following cases 
namely: (a) if the claimant has his habitual residence or principal place of business in the 
country in which the arrest was made; (b) if the claim arose in the country in which the 
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connecting factors. The first two are cumulative connecting factors, i.e. two factual 
circumstances need to be present in order to constitute a 'substantial' connection 
with the forum. These two are (a) the habitual residence or principal place of 
business of the claimant163 and (b) the place where the claim arose, if -and this 
condition is applicable to both- in the country in which the arrest was made. The 
third jurisdictional link is constituted by a connecting factor peculiar to the arrest of 
ships: (c) if the claim has arisen during the voyage of the ship during which the 
arrest was made; (c) if the claim concerns the voyage of the ship during which the arrest 
was made; (d) if the claim arose out of a collision or in circumstances covered by Article 13 
of the International Convention for the unification of certain rules of law with respect to 
collisions between vessels, signed at Brussels on 23rd September 1910; (e) if the claim is for 
salvage; (f) if the claim is upon a mortgage or hypothecation of the ship arrested. (2) If the 
Court within whose jurisdiction the ship was arrested has not jurisdiction to decide upon 
the merits, the bail or other security given in accordance with article 5 to procure the release 
of the ship shall specifically provide that it is given as security for the satisfaction of any 
judgment which may eventually be pronounced by a Court having jurisdiction so to decide; 
and the Court or other appropriate judicial authority of the country in which the arrest is 
made shall fix the time within which the claimant shall bring an action before a Court 
having such jurisdiction. (3) If the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to the 
jurisdiction of a particular Court other than that within whose jurisdiction the arrest was 
made or to arbitration, the Court or other appropriate judicial authority within whose 
jurisdiction the arrest was made may fix the time within which the claimant shall bring 
proceedings. (4) If, in any of the cases mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, the 
action or proceedings are not brought within the time so fixed, the defendant may apply for 
the release of the ship or of the bail or other security. (5) This Article shall not apply in cases 
covered by the provisions of the revised Rhine Navigation Convention of 17 October 1868'. 
163 Connecting factors related to the claimant rather than the defendant, are in 
modern times excluded from the 'white list' of acceptable jurisdictional bases. 'Black list' 
was the name given to exorbitant bases of jurisdiction in the ambitious Judgments Projected 
of the Hague Conference of Private International Law that finally resulted in the adoption 
of the Choice of Court Agreements Convention in 2005. In the EC sphere, Schlosser says 
that 'the list is so to speak the confessions of sins made by the member states' (P Schlosser, 
'Jurisdiction in International Litigation -The Issue of Human Rights in Relation to National 
Law and to the Brussels Convention' (1991) Rivista di diritto internazionale (RivDirint) 5). 
However, there is no intrinsic reason why a relational theory should focus only on the 
defendant (A T von Mehren (2002) 188). During the preliminary work to the 1952 Arrest 
Convention, the Italian and the Yugoslavian delegations strongly opposed to the inclusion 
of such jurisdictional basis, alleging that it does not represent a close connection between 
the claim and the forum (International Maritime Committee (CMI) Conferences (1947 -1951) 
(CMI Amberes 1951) 190). It could be easily labelled as exorbitant. It is the only connecting 
factor of a personal nature as opposed to the other relevant connecting factors that are 
related to the dispute -rather than related to the parties of the dispute -. J J Alvarez Rubio 
finds no justification for it (1999) 103. 
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arrest was made. Finally, the last three 'substantial' connections are related to the 
nature of the claim (d) collision; (e) salvage; (f) mortgage or hypothecation. 
The jurisdiction of the courts of the State where the ship is arrested is not 
exclusive, therefore, opening the door to concurrent jurisdiction. Yet, the 
Convention itself does not provide a solution for the case of parallel litigation. 
In practice, the results of this 'compromise' solution have not provided the 
degree of harmonisation intended when it was adopted. Since common law 
countries (notably England) retained their system and civil law countries could 
only avail themselves of arrest as a ground for acquiring jurisdiction in respect of 
certain claims with no specific reason, the solution has furthered the imbalance 
between the different countries.164 Furthermore, it is here submitted, from a 
technical point of view, that the particular connecting factors chosen add 
unnecessary complexity to the determination of jurisdictional grounds in the field. 
As most of these links provided for in article 7 are factual circumstances combined 
with legal concepts such as, for example, habitual residence or principal place of 
business, the process of establishing jurisdiction on the merits gets cumbersome; 
and, as the CMI recognised in 1994, there are no reasons to justify such added 
difficulty.165 
6.5.2. The 1999 Arrest Convention 
In this sphere there are several modifications in the new Convention that is 
not yet in force.166 The new regime moves forward to a plain recognition of the 
164 The CMI evaluated the results of the 'compromise' solution as non satisfactory, 
JIGE Seventh Session, 5 -9 December 1994, Report -Anex I; JIGE Ninth Session, 2 -6 December 
1996, Report- Anex II (F Berlingieri (2006) 635). 
165 Ibid, JIGE Seventh Session, 5 -9 December 1994, Report -Anex I. 
166 Article 7 sets out '1. The Courts of the State in which an arrest has been effected or 
security provided to obtain the release of a ship shall have jurisdiction to determine the case 
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jurisdictional power of the forum arresti, without any conditions, and not subject to 
its recognition by national laws. Moreover, the new Convention recognises party 
autonomy (choice of forum agreements or arbitration agreements), as the main 
jurisdictional basis taking priority over the jurisdiction of the forum arresti.1b7 
The plain recognition of the forum arresti could be seen as advancement of 
its theoretical legitimacy as a jurisdictional basis. However, the reasons for such a 
recognition eliminating the conditions set out in the 1952 Arrest Convention had to 
do with practicalities rather than abstract considerations. It was perceived as a 
drawback to uniformity to allow for different jurisdictional systems depending on 
the different national laws of the contracting parties.168 Bearing in mind that 
eliminating the forum arresti was not acceptable as a way of unification during the 
preliminary work pursuant to the 1952 Arrest Convention, the only possibility was 
to recognise it in general terms. Theoretically it does not represent any evolution of 
juridical thinking in this regard; it just reflects the importance that practicality has 
in admiralty jurisdiction. 
Another novelty of the new Convention is the acceptance of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens if permitted by national law.169 In fact, this represents the 
upon its merits, unless the parties validly agree or have validly agreed to submit the dispute 
to a Court of another State which accepts jurisdiction, or to arbitration. 2. Nonetheless, the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, the Courts of the State in which an arrest has been 
effected, or security provided to obtain the release of the ship, may refuse to exercise that 
jurisdiction where that refusal is permitted by the law of that State and a Court of another 
State accepts jurisdiction. 3. In cases where a Court of the State where an arrest has been 
effected or security provided to obtain the release of the ship (a) does not have jurisdiction to 
determine the case upon its merits; or (b) has refused to exercise jurisdiction in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, such Court may, and upon request shall, 
order a period of time within which the claimant shall bring proceedings before a competent 
Court or arbitral tribunal'. 
167 Compare this with the decision in The Bergen and in Erich Gasser v Missat. 
Doubtless the 1999 Arrest Convention is in line with the latest trends. 
168 F Berlingieri, opinion shared with the Ph.D. Candidate at interview held in 
Genoa, Italy on the 22nd of May 2006. 
169 It has been said that forum non conveniens, as many other PIL devices, is not good 
or bad in itself but it depends of the context where, and the way how, it is used. 
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adoption of the Scottish dual formula of forum arresti forum non conveniens in the 
field of arrest of ships. This home -grown Scottish doctrine crafted and named by 
Judges and practitioners:170 forum non conveniens, arose to contain a broad general 
jurisdictional basis available in Scots law at the time, namely, arrestment ad 
fundandam jurisdictionem.171 If this potentially excessive jurisdictional ground would 
have not existed in Scots law the doctrine of forum non conveniens might not have 
ever emerged.'n Following that, it may be argued that it is indeed the incorporation 
of this dual formula in the 1999 Arrest Convention that represents advancement at 
the international level; not because it has been taken from Scots law as a system of 
genius73 but because a far -reaching jurisdictional ground such as forum arresti has 
been combined with its natural correlative.14 
States parties of the EC are prevented from ratifying individually the 1999 
Arrest Convention due to the fact that it contains jurisdictional provisions which 
would affect the rules contained in EC Regulation 44/2001. Ratification hence stays 
with the EC as a whole.15 That is a consequence of PIL issues being moved from 
the third pillar to the first pillar; and explains why the lex specialis provision in the 
Regulation, differently from the Brussels Convention, is limited to Conventions 
entered into by the member States prior to the entry into force of the Regulation. In 
this context, the adoption of the home -grown Scottish dual formula forum arresti- 
170 Lord Hope of Craighead (HL), 'Forum non conveniens: where next ?' Conference 
Paper, Journal of Private International Law Conference 2007, Birmingham 26 June 2007. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 R Evan -Jones (2001) 44; 'Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth 
of the Genius of Scots Private Law' (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 228. 
174 See Lord Hope of Craighead (HL), 'Forum non conveniens: where next ?' 
Conference Paper, Journal of Private International Law Conference 2007, Birmingham 26 
June 2007. 
175 The ECJ has established the principle that where common rules have been 
adopted the Member States no longer have the right acting individually, or even collectively, 
to undertake obligations with non -member countries to affect those rules. In such case the 
Community also has exclusive competence to conclude international agreements (ECJ 
opinion issued on 7 February 2006 http: / /curia.eu.int ). That is the reason why since April 
2007 the EC is a member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. 
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forum non conveniens by the 1999 Arrest Convention could be seen as contrary to the 
European paradigm of jurisdiction, since forum non conveniens has been repeatedly, 
and arguably definitely, strike out of the European regime. However, article 7 (2) of 
the 1999 Arrest Convention authorises States parties to decline jurisdiction only 
'where that refusal is permitted by the law of that State' therefore the issue is left to 
the lex fori arresti. The problem here would be - as it is currently in the case of the 
1952 Arrest Convention - the scope of application of the lex specialis provision of the 
European regime. It is here submitted that, in the field of arrest of ships, as forum 
non conveniens should be seen as the natural correlative to forum arresti, the 
remission to the lex fori in the 1999 Arrest Convention should, de lege ferenda, be 
interpreted with a view to consolidate the dual formula. Yet, the fear is that even in 
this context, the deeply rooted civilian reluctance to decline jurisdiction would 
prevent this from happening. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the dual formula 
follows the fostering path that forum arresti has taken via the lex specialis provision 
thus helping to consolidate a well- balanced specific jurisdictional scheme for 
maritime claims in the European regime. 
6.6. THE AFTERMATH OF ARREST OF SHIPS AS A 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
English and Scottish practitioners, Judges and commentators might well be 
surprised that at the beginning of the 21st century somebody has considered that a 
theoretical justification of the forum arresti in the case of ships was necessary. 
However, if the one making that assessment is originally formed in a civil law 
system, the surprise disappears. A good example of the general 'distaste' of civil 
lawyers for jurisdictional rules based on the arrest /arrestment of the ship may be 
found in the opinion of the Advocate -General in the ECJ decision in The Tatrt.176 He 
176 Maciej Rataj (The Tatry) (Case C- 406/92) [19951 1 Lloyd's Rep 302 (ECJ) (Advocate 
General Mr. G. Tesauro, opinion of 13 July 1994). 
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expressed that the jurisdiction available under the 1952 Arrest Convention was 
'fortuitous', 'a matter of chance' and certainly encouraging 'forum shopping'. 'An 
unexpected assessment, one may think, of the provisions of an international Convention'.177 
Yet, it is not an uncommon opinion amongst civil lawyers. Hence, where would 
one look for such theoretical support as to be able to rebut such disapproval, if as 
such cannot be found in the preliminary work to the international Conventions, but 
in a PIL analysis of English and Scots law on the arrest of ships? 
6.6.1. Forum Arresti: A PIL Device 
The formulation of jurisdictional bases should not be an end in itself. One of 
the purposes of jurisdiction rules is to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in countries other than the country of origin.18 Put it in the words of 
HERBERT19 the aim is to recognise juridical continuity to legal relations. Doubtless, 
the downside of forum arresti is the augmentation of the possibility of parallel 
proceedings which in turn is a huge threat against that continuity since if two or 
more courts exercise jurisdiction over the same dispute there is the risk of them 
rendering irreconcilable judgments.t80 However, nowadays, the majority of States 
recognise -either by self limitation or by limitations assumed according to 
international obligations- that there are some cases where they should not 
intervene, or that in some other cases, other countries could assume competence as 
much as they could.181 That is why it is here seen as advancement that the dual 
formula of forum arresti forum non conveniens has been adopted by the 1999 Arrest 
Convention, allowing its States party to achieve that goal. 
177 A Briggs, 'The Brussels Convention Tames the Arrest Convention' Case and 
Comment The Tatry [1995] LMCLQ 161, 163 fn. 23. 
178 J Hill (2003) 61. 
179 R Herbert Herbert in D Opertti Badáan et al, Objeto y Método en el Derecho 
Internacional Privado (2nd ed FCU Montevideo 1990). 
180 Hill (2003) 61. 
181 D P Fernández Arroyo (2004) 141. 
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6.6.2. Forum Arresti: A Special Jurisdictional Basis 
In terms of legal technique, determining the more convenient jurisdiction in 
cases of concurrent jurisdiction is a difficult task at the present state of evolution of 
PIL. In most cases the courts involved will be internationally competent to hear the 
merits due to a close connection between the forum and the parties or the dispute. 
Which one should prevail requires a horizontal comparison between those 
connections. Doubtless, this is a field where no definite answers have been found 
yet, and further research in this sphere would go far beyond the scope of analysis 
of this thesis. Notwithstanding, it may be argued that the distinction between 
general and specific jurisdiction coined by the professors of Harvard more than 
forty years ago, that has been so influential in the development of jurisdictional 
theory in PIL in the United States, should be advanced further in Europe. 
It has been repeatedly recommended that specific basis of jurisdiction must 
be construed narrowly and should be justified by the close connection between the 
forum and the dispute.182 Yet, the survival of ,forum arresti for maritime claims in the 
crusade against exorbitant jurisdiction can be seen, not only as a victory of English 
law, but as development of a specific jurisdictional ground particularly suit to meet 
the needs of maritime commerce. Maybe it is time to overcome the myth of general 
jurisdiction and give a little bit more credit to specific jurisdictional grounds. °83 
Upon this background, it is possible to say that fbrurn arresti in the case of 
arrest of ships is suitable as a specific basis of jurisdiction. As such, its practical 
advantage is blatant: the presence of the defendant's asset (generally its only or 
182 Jenard Report (1979) 22. 
183 On this line see M Twitchell, 'The Myth of General Jurisdiction' (1988) 101 
Harvard Law Review (3) 610. 
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main asset184) in the forum makes the enforcement of the eventual judgment a lot 
easier. At this stage of evolution of international judicial cooperation where 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments -especially ad extra integrated 
areas- is not as straightforward as might be desired, this obvious advantage should 
not be underestimated. By contrast, it is difficult to find technical arguments in 
favor of the forum arresti as a general jurisdictional basis; not only in the 
preliminary work to the international Arrest Conventions but in legal literature in 
general. A forum that has jurisdiction based upon arrest /arrestment of the 
defendant's asset within a certain territory (such as jurisdiction based on 
arrestment of movables under Scottish rules of jurisdiction) is a forum that does not 
necessarily have an objective link to the parties, hence, as a general jurisdictional 
basis, it has been considered exorbitant. 
The reason for arguing in favour of fostering specific jurisdictions over 
general ones is supportable from a PIL perspective: a forum seized because it is 
related to the subject matter of the case has a closer link to the dispute than a forum 
that it has been seized because the defendant is domiciled or habitually resident 
within its territory. Jurisdiction should be based on the proximity between the 
forum and the case;185 as ascertained by FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO 'the general acceptance 
of a certain jurisdictional basis has a lot to do with the essential or principal character that 
the elements taken into account hold in the legal relationship'.186 In this sense, it may be 
argued that when jurisdiction is linked to the dispute (specific) instead of to the 
parties (general), the elements taken into account are germane to the particular 
legal relation and not only to one of the parties. Indeed, specificity in terms of 
jurisdiction is recognised in several international instruments and certainly is the 
184 As mentioned in Chapter 1, very often a shipping company sets up a separate 
subsidiary company to own each ship. 
185 P Lagarde (1986) 131 -132. 
186 D P Fernández Arroyo (2004) 170. 
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raison de être of the lex specialis provision of article 71 of EC Regulation 44/2001 
(former article 57 of the Brussels Convention). 187 
6.6.3. Forum Arresti: A Cooperative Forum 
A ship is elusive and the shipping chain makes her more so.188 The power to 
arrest in any port and consequentially, found jurisdiction therein, is as important in 
modern times with ships being owned singly and flying flags of convenience as it 
has always been due to the speed with which the defendant's asset can leave the 
jurisdiction. Many times there will be no other connection between the forum and 
the case than the ship being fixed by arrest in its territory; however, in many cases 
this prima facie not so strong connection is the strongest connection that the ship 
will ever have with any forum. 
187 On 27 September 1968 the Member States of the European Communities acting 
under what is now art 293 EC concluded the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. The Brussels 
Convention was amended on a number of occasions so as to provide for the accession of 
new Member States and to make other amendments. It was amended in 1978 on the 
accession of the United Kingdom. The Convention, as so amended, was given effect in the 
law of the United Kingdom by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. The 1952 
Arrest Convention has been recognised as being a 'convention on a particular matter' in 
terms of article 57 of the Brussels Convention (See P Schlosser, Report [1979] O.J. C59/71 
[238] n 59. 
188 The commercial management of ships places peculiar problems to those faced 
with an unpaid debt incurred in the course of shipping. In addition to the inherent mobility 
of ships as the main (and so frequently unique) asset of the debtor, there is the unawareness 
from the point of view of the creditor, to some extent, of whom he is doing business with 
and where the counterparty can be reached. The arrest of ships with the several functions 
discussed throughout this thesis attempts to make sure that some particular maritime 
claims can be secured by the accessibility to a provisional and protective measure while 
awaiting judgement, at the same time making sure that this security does not slip away. 
This is achieved through physical and legal obstacles being placed on the owner's or user's 
right to employ the ship. If the procedure simultaneously serves the purpose of establishing 
jurisdiction on the merits, better though. 
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The frequent allegation that arrest of ships increases the chances of 'forum 
shopping' deserves consideration in this context. It is submitted that the comments 
of Lord Reid in The Atlantic Star189 are sound. He said 'I would not regard a foreigner 
who arrests a ship in England as necessarily forum shopping. The right to arrest a ship is an 
ancient and often necessary right. Not only may there be difficulty otherwise in establishing 
jurisdiction in an appropriate forum, but the arrest gives to the arrester what may be a very 
necessary security.' 
Following the discussion in this chapter, it is possible to affirm that forum 
arresti190 based on the arrest /arrestment of a ship as a jurisdictional basis is not 
exorbitant but cooperative. It does not jeopardize the balance between the parties; it 
does not favour one party particularly linked with the forum. The element taken 
into account to determine competence is essential to the legal relation; is not merely 
accidenta1191 (and in that sense arrest /arrestment of a ship differs from the 
arrestment of movables as a general jurisdictional basis in Scots traditional law). Its 
recognition in the international Conventions guarantees that the reasonableness 
standard has been passed, i.e. agreement has been achieved on the convenience of 
the criterion. This feature is not enough by itself but it is to be considered as one of 
the tests to determine the legitimacy of a jurisdictional basis. Arguably, a forum 
selection criterion that could be regarded as exorbitant if exercised only by a 
limited number of States, it ceases to be excessive if exercised by all the States 
parties to an international Convention, since all of them would stand equally in 
189 Owners of the Atlantic Star y Owners of the Bona Spes (The Altantic Star and The Bona 
Spes) [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep 197 (HL) 201. 
190 Probably English lawyers would be surprised by the lack of novelty of such 
conclusions. It has for long been held in English case law that the Admiralty jurisdiction in 
rem founded by arrestment of a ship or substituted bail is not exorbitant. It is widely 
recognised and is accepted in international agreements (The Atlantic Star (Lord 
Kilbrandon)). Yet, as it has been explained in this Chapter, the fact that it has international 
acceptance does not justify it in theory; in fact it is a consequence of the aspiration of other 
maritime nations to 'share the pie with England'. 
191 The lack of such link between the element taken into account and the legal 
relationship has been taken as a criterion for defining an exorbitant forum, see D P 
Fernández Arroyo (2004) 171. 
261 
relation to that particular criterion. Nevertheless, this argument is only to be 
considered if the cooperativeness of a certain forum is to be analysed from the 
perspective of States. What about the parties to the case? It is submitted that it is 
from the perspective of the parties, and not the States, that the assessment should 
be conducted. 
The adoption of the 1999 Arrest Convention would represent therefore the 
availability of such a cooperative device to every State or Community of States that 
is willing to ratify the Convention regardless of the different domestic laws of the 
contracting Parties. 
6.7. CONCLUSIONS 
The main task of this chapter was to provide a theoretical assessment of the 
exercise of jurisdiction as a consequence of the arrest of ships. And the main 
question to be answered was whether arrest constituted a sufficient connection 
with the forum so as to justify the assumption of competence by that forum in the 
absence of any other relevant connections. The answer is negative when it comes to 
general jurisdiction and positive when analyzed as a specific jurisdictional ground. 
It follows from the discussion in the body of this chapter that the widest held 
opinion is that in terms of general jurisdiction the domicile or habitual residence of 
the defendant is 'the rule'. No arguments can be found to justify arrest of a ship as a 
general jurisdictional ground (or in Sir Phillimore words 'treating a ship as domiciled 
where it can be found') and to maintain forum arresti as a general jurisdictional basis 
denotes a non -balanced system. However, combining a general jurisdictional basis 
such as the defendant's domicile as an alternative to party autonomy with a 
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thoughtful scheme of specific jurisdictions should avoid a clash between the 
interests of the claimant and those of the defendant.192 
The paradigms of jurisdiction in which arrest of ships has developed its 
jurisdictional function have different standards to be considered when determining 
the legitimacy of a particular jurisdictional basis. Nevertheless, with its survival as 
a specific jurisdictional ground for maritime claims in the European regime, a 
further merger has taken place in its long chain of amalgamations, somehow 
building up a bridge among them. 
The ideal would be to envisage and create an internationally acceptable 
Convention that would find a middle point between the common law and the 
civilian approach; one in which a hybrid system which mixes hard -and -fast rules 
and discretion would work for the benefit of all. Unfortunately the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law after several years of fighting for the 
emergence of such a model has failed.193 In the international sphere the issues are 
in a state as to find universally accepted answers to what is an ideal 
jurisdictional system in international litigation. 
Therefore, smaller steps towards further achievements in this area need to 
be taken to prepare the arena for the future. One of these smaller steps that seem to 
be already consolidated in international Conventional law194 is the distinction 
192 Already forty years ago it was suggested that what was paramount for a real 
solution of the problem of exorbitant jurisdictions in international litigation was '...a well 
thought out and well balanced system of specific jurisdictions: jurisdictions which are closely linked 
with the legal relationship from which the action arises...' ( L I de Winter (1968) 719). 
193 C Kessedjian (1998); P Nygh and F Pocar, 'Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters' (2000) Prel Doc 11 
HccH. 
194 The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements adopted on 30 June 2005, which 
derives from the more ambitious 'Judgments Project' of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, does not actually itself regulate the topic of interim measures of protection; 
yet, it appears to espouse detachment of jurisdiction for interim relief from jurisdiction on the 
merits since parties remain free to seize any court provided it has jurisdiction under its 
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between, on the one hand, ancillary jurisdiction for the purposes of interim relief 
and, on the other hand, jurisdiction on the merits. The 1952 Arrest Convention has 
been a pioneer in fostering that distinction. The study turns to its analysis in the 
following Chapter. 
national law ((2003) Prel Doc 22 HccH 23). Article 7 (Interim measures of protection) provides 
'Interim measures of protection are not governed by this Convention This Convention neither 
requires nor precludes the grant refusal or termination of interim measures of protection by a 
court of a Contracting State and does not affect whether or not a party may request or a court 
should grant refuse or terminate such measures'. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Arrest of Ships, Judicial Cooperation 
and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Last but not least, this chapter is concerned with the third domain germane 
to PIL, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. As it has been 
acknowledged from the very first chapter of this thesis, the arrest of ships can be 
said to be a truly PIL institution. Its main rationale is to provide a useful device for 
international commerce and to compensate for the difficulty of enforcing judgments 
abroad. Therefore, the relation with the enforcement of foreign judgments is 
inherent to the legal institution itself. In turn, the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments should be looked at from the standpoint of international judicial 
cooperation. It is in this broader sphere where the arrest of ships as a provisional 
and protective measure plays a key role in maritime litigation. 
The distinction between jurisdiction on the merits and jurisdiction for the 
sole purpose of interim relief (ancillary jurisdiction) becomes paramount in this 
sphere. International judicial cooperation in this field is two -fold. 
On the one hand, there is ancillary jurisdiction and the possibility of a court 
that has no jurisdiction to hear the merits to grant provisional and protective 
measures in support of foreign proceedings. The 1952 Arrest Convention has been a 
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pioneer in fostering this possibility in the field of arrest of ships (article 7 (2));' 
arguably, as to confirm arrest of ships as a truly PIL institution, and in turn, 
maritime law as a fertile field for the development of this distinctive branch of the 
law. The Europeanization of PIL has brought further advancement of the distinction 
more generally into English and Scots law. There is a clear distinction between 
jurisdiction on the merits and jurisdiction for the purposes of interim relief in the 
European jurisdictional scheme, introduced first by the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions, and currently established in the EC Regulation 44/2001. 
On the other hand, there is the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments rendered in connection with the provisional and protective measures 
granted to support the foreign proceedings on the merits. Such supportive character 
is effective in the case of arrest of ships only if the eventual foreign judgment is 
going to be enforceable against the ship or the security given to release the ship 
from arrest. 
To put it another way, arrest of ships is essentially a territorial provisional 
and protective measure; in the context of the 1952 Arrest Convention and according 
to the European jurisdictional scheme, a court has jurisdiction to arrest a ship 
regardless of its international jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case, solely 
grounded on the principle of territorial proximity. Therefore, the core question in 
practice is not whether the arrest itself is going to be recognised abroad (one aspect 
theoretically important);2 or whether the decision on the merits of a court that has 
I 'If the Court within whose jurisdiction the ship was arrested has not jurisdiction to 
decide upon the merits, the bail or other security given in accordance with Article 5 to 
procure the release of the ship shall specifically provide that it is given as security for the 
satisfaction of any judgment which may eventually be pronounced by a Court having 
jurisdiction so to decide; and the Court or other appropriate judicial authority of the country 
in which the arrest is made shall fix the time within which the claimant shall bring an action 
before a Court having such jurisdiction.' 
2 In the sphere of interim measures of protection the stumbling block for consensus 
in the ambitious Hague Project of International Jurisdiction was their extraterritorial 
recognition and enforcement. 
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grounded its jurisdiction on the forum arresti is going to be recognised abroad 
(another aspect generally important);3 but whether the judgment on the merits of the 
maritime claim would be recognised and enforced in the legal system where the 
ship has been arrested or alternative security provided to prevent or release the 
arrest (this is practically the most important aspect of the problem). If the answer to 
this third question is negative the effectiveness of arrest as an interim measure of 
protection in support of foreign proceedings is severely jeopardised. Certainly, in 
the field of provisional and protective measures, international judicial cooperation is 
vital. 
The issue was at the centre of the discussion in the travaux préparatoires of the 
1999 Arrest Convention, and the results clearly reinforce the protective function of 
arrest and its provisional character. As this Convention is not yet in force, and the 
decision on its adoption by the European countries does not depend on the will of 
individual member States but rest with the European Community (EC), the issue is 
examined in the light of the relevant provisions of the European regime. 
This Chapter starts by continuing to examine the protective function of 
arrest of ships. The effectiveness of such function depends on the availability of 
jurisdiction for the sole purpose of interim relief (ancillary jurisdiction) in a certain 
legal system. 'Ancillary jurisdiction' is therefore defined and examined in this 
chapter in connection with the arrest of ships, in national, international and regional 
law. The consideration of the proximity principle as the foundation of the departure 
3 It has been suggested by F A P Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction 
Revisited After 20 Years (1984) 186 RdC 9, 55 that the test for the international validity of a 
jurisdictional basis should be to ask whether the court applying such a criterion would give 
effect to a foreign judgment based on a corresponding type of jurisdiction, being the ideal 
rule the complete congruity between both sides of the same problem. On the same token, D 
P Fernández Arroyo 'Exorbitant and Exclusive Grounds of Jurisdiction in European Private 
International Law: Will They Ever Survive' in Festschrift für Erik Jayme (Sellier Munich 2004) 
169, 186 stresses that European countries should not be proud of keeping in their legislation 
certain criteria against which they have clearly objected. With a fundamental right such as 
the access to justice double standards are completely unacceptable. 
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from general principles of international jurisdiction in the sphere of interim relief is 
looked at. Finally, the specific problems connected to indirect jurisdiction, i.e. the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, is also looked at in the national, 
international and regional frameworks. Bearing in mind the Europeanization of 
PIL, and the benefits that the 1999 Arrest Convention could bring to the European 
countries, in terms of legal certainty and further harmonization in the field, what is 
interesting in this sphere is to discuss the consistency between the current European 
regime and the enforcement and recognition provision of the 1999 Arrest 
Convention, in view of the possible adoption of the latter by the EC. 
7.2. THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION OF ARREST OF SHIPS 
In the first chapter it was submitted that it is the speed with which the 
defendant's main asset -the ship- could leave the jurisdiction that arrest of ships is 
primarily trying to counteract. It should be added that in the current state of affairs 
of international judicial cooperation this protective function is not limited to one 
forum particularly connected to the dispute but could be exercised by any 
jurisdiction that provides for the arrest of ships in its legal system, at least in 
Europe. This is a direct consequence of characterizing arrest of ships as a 
provisional and protective measure. 
In English law, however, the protective function of arrest of ships does not 
appear so straightforward, even though, in general, ancillary jurisdiction is dealt 
with in a far -reaching manner. By and large, the most recent reforms in English civil 
procedure reveal a remarkable convergence between the common law and the civil 
law.4 It is regrettable that such convergence has left arrest of ships aside and another 
4 R Stürner,'Anglo- American and Continental Civil Procedure: The English Reform as 
a Model for Further Harmonization ?' in M Andenas, N Andrews and R Nazzini (eds) The 
Future of Transnational Civil Litigation, English Responses to the ALI /UNIDROIT Draft Principles and 
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opportunity5 has been missed to bring arrest of ships in line with the latest trends in 
the field of provisional and protective measures. This calls out for reform. 
In Scots law, there is little authority on whether or how far ancillary 
proceedings connected with maritime claims should be treated as admiralty 
actions.6 Yet, it is clear in Scots law that ancillary jurisdiction can be exercised 
without the need to initiate an action on the merits when the arrest of the ship is 
sought in Scotland for the sole purpose of interim relief. 
7.3. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION 
7.3.1. The Concept of Ancillary Jurisdiction? 
Ancillary jurisdiction in this context could be defined as the jurisdictional 
basis upon which interim relief is granted to support proceedings on the merits 
sought in another jurisdiction. A court exercising ancillary jurisdiction is not in the 
same position as the court hearing the merits.8 The former court's function is a 
Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
London 2004) 11. 
5 Jackson shows chronologically how English law has missed several opportunities 
to bring Admiralty jurisdiction into line with the 1952 Arrest Convention (D C Jackson, 
Enforcement of Maritime Claims (LLP London 2005) 5 -7). In his opinion, in the significant latest 
developments of civil procedure in English law 'nothing has changed in relation to the various 
fundamental and confused aspects of the approach to enforcement of maritime claims in English law', 
7. He stresses that the 1999 Arrest Convention (not yet in force) represents a further 
opportunity for a comprehensive framework change. 
6 The Scottish Law Commission Report on Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty 
Arrestments (Scot Law Corn Report No 164 (1998)) [7.42]. 
7 The ideas formulated in this regard have been previously published by the Ph.D. 
Candidate with authorization from the School of Law in V Ruiz Abou -Nigm, 'Ancillary 
Jurisdiction for Interim Measures of Protection in Support of Cross -Border Litigation' (2005) 
4 Uniform Law Review 759 -784. 
8 A good example on this distinction in recent international conventional law is the 
UNIDROIT Convention on Mobile Equipment (Cape Town Convention) in force since the 
30th of March 2006 (Chapter XII ruling on Jurisdiction establishes (art 42 - choice of forum) 
'Subject to arts 43 and 44 the courts of a Contracting State chosen by the parties to a 
transaction have jurisdiction in respect of any claim brought under this Convention whether 
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limited one, and is intended to be supportive only9. Legal systems, whether 
national, regional or international provide for ancillary jurisdiction based on the 
location of the assets or the person affected by the order. Regardless of the fact that a 
given court might not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case, that court is 
still empowered to grant provisional and protective measures in relation to property 
or persons located within its territorial jurisdiction. The granting of the measure is 
in itself a way of cooperating with proceedings abroad, and no issue of recognition 
or enforcement of the provisional measures arises in principle, 10 since the measure 
is ordered where it is meant to take effect. It has been submitted that this 
competence is a matter of sheer practical necessity.11 
In some legal instruments, namely, the Inter -American Convention on 
Execution of Preventive Measures,12 this kind of international judicial cooperation is 
or not the chosen forum has a connection with the parties or the transaction. Such 
jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless otherwise agreed between the parties (art 43 - 
jurisdiction under art 13 (1)). 'The courts of a Contracting State chosen by the parties and the 
courts of the Contracting State on the territory of which the object is situated have 
jurisdiction to grant relief under Article 13 (1)(a), (b), (c) and Article 13 (4) in respect of that 
object. 2. Jurisdiction to grant relief under Article 13 (1) (d) or other interim relief by virtue of 
Article 13 (4) may be exercised either (a) by the courts chosen by the parties or (b) by the 
courts of a Contracting State on the territory of which the debtor is situated being relief 
which by the terms of the order granting it is enforceable only in the territory of that 
Contracting State. 3. A court has jurisdiction under the preceding paragraphs even if the 
final determination of the claim referred to in Article 13 (1) will or may take place in a court 
of another Contracting State or by arbitration'. 
9 A Johnson, 'Interim Measures under the Draft Principles and Rules of Transnational 
Civil Procedure: Some Reflections from the English Perspective' in BIICL (ed), The Future of 
Transnational Litigation, English Responses to the ALI /UNIDROIT Draft Principles and Rules of 
Transnational Civil Procedure (British Institute of International and Comparative Law London 
2004) 112 -113. 
10 The issues related to the extraterritorial effect of interim relief are complex. They 
usually do not arise in the case of arrest of ships since the latter is essentially a territorial 
measure. 
11 B Hess, Study No. JAI /A3/2002/02 on European Enforcement prepared for the EU 
Commission by the Institute of Foreign Private International and Comparative Law of the 
University of Heidelberg, General Report December 2003, available at http: / /eur- 
lex.europa.eu /en /index.htm last accessed 14th August 2007. 
12 Inter- American Convention on Execution of Preventive Measures (Montevideo, 
1979) adopted under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), available on 
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meant to be exceptional and is justified by territorial proximity in matters of 
urgency.13 In this Convention, the main ground for justifying the departure from the 
general principles of international jurisdiction is the maximum efficiency of the 
protective measure. The arrest of ships is generally taken as the most obvious 
example: if the ship is in a certain port of a jurisdiction that is not internationally 
competent (to explain it in terms of Inter -American legal parlance) to hear the 
merits, for just a few days or hours, it would be useless to request its arrest before 
the court internationally competent, because the entire proceedings (requesting the 
measure from the court deciding on the merits and waiting for that court to forward 
it - complying with all the formalities - to the court of enforcement) would take too 
long, and the ship would take off before the measure could be enforced against her. 
In those cases 'urgent competence' is justified. In this conception, therefore, this 
jurisdictional basis is exceptional; the court seized on the merits retains absolute 
control of the case management; a certain time is usually allowed to initiate the case if 
it has not already been initiated; and last but not least, measures taken are always 
territorial in nature. 
7.3.2. The Regional Framework (Europe) 
Interestingly enough, the European regime takes a radically different 
approach from that of the Inter -American Convention to the subject- matter of 
ancillary jurisdiction. It provides for completely detached -from -merits jurisdiction 
in the case of provisional or protective measures, without further conditions. 
Provisional measures in the European regime can be ordered either by the court 
having jurisdiction on the merits or by any other court exercising ancillary 
jurisdiction. And no urgency requirement is imposed by the scheme for a court to 
line in English at www.oas.org /juridico /English /treaties/b- 42.html last accessed on 14th 
August 2007. 
13 Urgency has been considered relevant in this sphere also by the English 
Arbitration Act 1996, s. 44 (1) (2) (e); see L Collins (ed) (2006) [8 -034, 8 -035] 221. 
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assume jurisdiction for the sole purpose of interim relief. The availability and the 
requirements concerning such measures are left entirely to the lex fori of the court 
granting the provisional and protective measure.14 This is provided for in Article 31 
of EC Regulation 44/2001 (formerly Article 24 of the 1968 Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions) stating: 
'Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting 
State for such provisional, including protective, measures as 
may be available under the law of that State, even if under 
this Convention, the courts of another Contracting State 
have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.' 
The question that arises with regard to this provision is whether the 
provision itself provides a jurisdictional basis for ancillary jurisdiction or if, even 
though the possibility as such is allowed, jurisdictional grounds are left to national 
law.15 In other words, what is at stake is whether ancillary jurisdiction is imposed on 
Member States by the Regulation or if the provision merely constitutes permission 
for Member States to exercise ancillary jurisdiction in accordance with their own 
national laws. As far as legal doctrine is concerned, the most widely accepted 
opinion is that this provision leaves the question to national law, and that it is not by 
itself a basis of ancillary jurisdiction. In this context, it follows that, where national 
law does not provide for ancillary jurisdiction in support of foreign proceedings in 
the field of interim measures of protection, there are no bases on which to grant it. 
Therefore, as there is no jurisdictional ground specially mentioned in terms of 
ancillary jurisdiction,16 all heads of jurisdiction could theoretically be used in this 
regard, even, for example, the head of jurisdiction based on the locality of property 
14 This is also different in the above -mentioned Intér- American Convention on 
Execution of Preventive Measures (CIDIP II Montevideo 1979) where the final word as 
regards the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the measure lies exclusively with the 
court of the main proceedings which must be informed promptly of any such measure 
granted by the court exercising ancillary jurisdiction (art 10). 
15 G Maher and B J Rodger, 'Provisional and Protective Remedies: The British 
Experience of the Brussels Convention' (1999) 48 ICLQ 306. 
16 Here there is another difference with the model used by the Inter -American 
Convention since territorial proximity is therein the only jurisdictional ground that justifies 
the departure from general principles of international jurisdiction. 
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belonging to the debtor that is banned in the scheme for the purposes of merits 
jurisdiction. In the opinion of MANN this is perfectly compatible with a well 
balanced jurisdictional system. General principles of public and private 
international law 'have never had any objection against protective measures in the country 
in which the debtor's property is located, even if neither party has any other connection with 
ít.'77 
This interpretation has been criticised, since it makes easier for Member 
States to resort to exorbitant bases of jurisdiction for the sake of interim measures of 
protection. This has been seen as a circumstance that jeopardises coordination and 
makes international judicial cooperation more difficult.18 Furthermore, it has been 
submitted that this position enables the requested court to decline jurisdiction on 
the grounds of the 'inexpediency' of the measure to safeguard the rights it purports 
to protect.19 Following that, there is another school of thought sustaining that Article 
31 itself provides a direct jurisdictional rule enabling Member States courts to order 
interim measures of protection in support of foreign proceedings regardless of their 
national procedural laws.20 Spanish authors in particular have argued in favour of 
this position.21 Their arguments are based in the consideration of the better position 
in terms of territorial proximity of the requested forum to adopt such measures. 
Arguably, in the case of the arrest of ships in the States parties to the 
international Arrest Convention, the basis for granting the arrest exercising ancillary 
jurisdiction does not need to be found in national law since it is expressly provided 
for in the convention. In that sense it could be claimed that the effect of former 
article 57 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and current article 71 of the EC 
17 F A P Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After 20 Years 186 
RdC 9 (1984) 58. 
18 Hess (2003) General Report 132 -133. 
19 F J Garcimartin Alferez, El régimen de las medidas cautelares en el comercio internacional 




Regulation 44/2001 covers not only direct jurisdiction to hear the merits, but also, 
the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction if so provided by a specialised convention since 
it does not go against the European scheme in any sense. The only limitation in this 
regard set by the jurisprudence of the ECJ in the Van Udem 22 case is the need of a 
'real connecting link' 23 between the subject -matter of the provisional and protective 
measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the requested court. 
The Van Udem decision suggests different aspects that are relevant to our 
analysis. First and foremost, it reconfirms the distinction between jurisdiction on the 
merits and jurisdiction for the purposes of interim measures of protection. Secondly, it 
could lead to the affirmation that the Brussels system itself provides a basis of 
ancillary jurisdiction (supporting the 'Spanish' position), in so far as this 'real 
connecting link' would be a criterion derived from the Brussels system itself, and not 
left to national law. Interestingly enough, the ECJ held that the courts of the place 
where the assets subject to the measures sought were located, were those best able to 
assess the circumstances that might lead to the granting or refusal of these measures, 
or to the laying down of procedures and conditions for the claimant to observe in 
order to guarantee the provisional and protective character of the measures 
authorised. This could lead Member States courts, in cases falling under Article 31 of 
the Regulation, to restrict the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to territorial orders to be 
enforced against assets in the territory of the granting State only.24 Indeed this 
approach is more restrictive than that of the provision taken on its own. Even though 
it does not affect ancillary jurisdiction in the case of arrest of ships where such 'real 
connecting link' is as clear as it could get, and the measure is necessarily of a 
22 Van Uden Maritime BV v. Kommanditgesellschaft (Deco -Line) Case C- 391/95 (ECJ) 
[1998] ECR I -7091. 
23 In England it has been signalled that when it comes to testing the practical 
meaning of 'real connecting link' in certain cases, such as freezing injunctions, the criterion is 
not really helpful, see A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements (3rd edn LLP 
London 2002) 409. 
24 A Johnson (2004) 115. 
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territorial character, such restrictive conclusion is not possible in general terms. The 
European Court of Justice itself refrains from going as far as this 25 
The European regime was introduced into English and Scots law in this area 
through the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. 
7.3.2.1. England (Sections 25 and 26 of the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982) 
Section 25 (1) was enacted in order to give effect to article 24 of the Brussels 
Convention, but it has been amended26 and since 199727 it has applied in relation to 
proceedings world -wide; with these provisions a serious gap in English procedural 
law was filled.28 The scope of application of section 25 is very broad and the statue 
itself provides for a discretion allowance in order to contain it, via the so called 
'expediency test'. According to the latter, the court may refuse to grant the relief if, 
in the opinion of the court, the fact that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the 
merits of the case makes it inexpedient for the court to grant it.29 Yet, as examined in 
Chapter 4, arrest of maritime property is expressly excluded from the scope of 
application of section 25 (s 25 (7)) and it is regulated by section 26 of the same Act3° 
25 C Kessedjian, 'Note on Provisional and Protective Measures in Private 
International Law and Comparative Law' (1998) Prel Doc 10 HccH 52. 
26 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991, s.3, Sch.2, [12]; SI 2001/3929, Sch.2, Pt 
IV, [10]. 
27 SI 1997/302. 
28 L Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (14th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell London 2006) 215. 
29 [bid, 218; for an application of the test with a 'passed' result (the Court of Appeal 
held that it was not 'inexpedient' to grant the interim relief in that case) see Crédit Suisse Fides 
Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818 (CA). 
30 S 26 (1) 'Where in England and Wales or Northern Ireland a court stays or 
dismisses Admiralty proceedings on the ground that the dispute in question should be 
submitted to arbitration or to the determination of the courts of another part of the United 
Kingdom or of an overseas country, the court may, if in those proceedings property has been 
arrested or bail or other security has been given to prevent or obtain release from arrest - (a) 
order that the property arrested be retained as security for the satisfaction of any award or 
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and section 11 of the Arbitration Act 1996. In turn, these provisions are similar to 
article 7 (2) of the 1952 Arrest Convention.31 Section 26 of the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 authorises the starting of proceedings in reni for the sole 
purpose of obtaining security in support of substantive proceedings to be heard in a 
foreign court or in arbitration. A claimant who successfully uses the in reni 
procedure to secure its claim is not thereby obliged to have the substantive claim 
heard by the Admiralty Court. It may apply to stay the substantive proceedings, in 
the same manner as this possibility is open to the defendant. Where a stay is 
ordered, the relevant procedural rules32 provide for the continuance of any arrest or 
the maintenance of any security, unless the court orders otherwise. The Court 
should follow one of two options when faced with this kind of cases. Under sub -s 
(1) (a) it can order the retention of the arrested property as security; alternatively, 
under sub -s (1) (b) the court can make the stay conditional on the provision of 
alternative security. The latter option is not available to the Court when the 
defendant is entitled to a mandatory stay.33 
provision issue of 
ancillary jurisdiction in the field of arrest of ships.34 It undermines the distinction 
judgment which - (i) is given in respect of the dispute in the arbitration of legal proceedings 
in favour of which those proceedings are stayed or dismissed; and -(ii) is enforceable in 
England and Wales or, as the case may be, in Northern Ireland; or -(b) order that the stay or 
dismissal of those proceedings be conditional on the provision of equivalent security for the 
satisfaction of any such award of judgment'. 
31 In The Nordglimt [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 470 (QBD (Admlty)) it was held that s 26 of 
the 1982 Act should be construed in accordance to the provisions of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention; it was also held that s 26 applied where the foreign proceedings or arbitration 
had already been commenced at the time of the institution of the proceedings in England. 
See also The Jalamatsya [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164 (QBD (Admlty)). 
32 Civil Procedure Rules Pt 61.12. 
33 The defendant is entitled to a mandatory stay where the parties have agreed to 
submit their disputes to arbitration (Arbitration Act 1996, s 9) or where they have concluded 
a choice -of -court agreement in favour of the courts of a member State of the European 
regime. The same would apply if the English court is under a duty to decline jurisdiction, 
where proceedings have first been commenced in another State of such scheme. 
34 As Jackson criticises (D C Jackson (2005) 3) it is indeed surprising that English law 
has not been able to make arrest of ships available to arbitration without the cumbersome 
need to start proceedings in rem and afterwards apply for them to be stayed. 
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between ancillary jurisdiction and jurisdiction on the merits, making arrest available 
only after initiating the substantive claim. Consequently, the jurisdictional and the 
protective functions of arrest get intermingled, and most importantly, English law 
neither clearly complies with the international obligations assumed under the 1952 
Arrest Convention, nor provides a basis for ancillary jurisdiction in the case of arrest 
of ships. Particularly in the case of choice -of -court agreements or arbitration 
agreements, that clearly provide for a jurisdiction different from that where the 
arrest is being pursued, the procedure for the claimant should be distinctive enough 
so as not to be understood as an infringement of the agreements, not only according 
to English law but elsewhere. Furthermore, this mechanism might not achieve the 
speed and secrecy which is often necessary to make protective remedies effective. 
To be forced to initiate proceedings on the merits against such clauses, followed by 
the need to apply for them to be stayed afterwards, confirms what JACKSON has 
called the 'schizophrenic'35 approach to maritime claims in English law. To put it in 
the words of Lord Reid, '... [w]hy should we tell lies when the truth will serve our purpose 
equally well if only we give a little care to the formulation of our principles ?'36 It may be 
argued that the problem is indeed the lack of such principles in English law in this 
regard. 
Noteworthy is the important difference in so far as to the discretion of the 
English courts in the case of the arrest of ships in the frame of ancillary jurisdiction. 
If arrest of the ship is requested for the sole purpose of interim relief the court is 
empowered with discretion not to grant the measure; whereas, as it was examined 
in Chapter 4, in a different context, that of arrest in the 'truly' framework of the 
action in rem, the mainstream considers that the entitlement of the maritime 
claimant is a matter of right. 
35 D C Jackson (2005) 240. 
36 '...During early stages of the development of a legal system legal fictions have been 
invaluable...But in this day and age I dislike them intensely. Why should we tell lies when the truth 
will serve our purpose equally well if only we give a little care to the formulation of our principles...' 
((1968) 54 Proceedings of the British Academy 189, 200 as quoted by Scot Law Corn No. 164 
(1998) 186). 
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The legitimacy of ancillary jurisdiction was recognised in English law even 
before the 1982 Act entered into force. In The Lisboa37 a bill of lading included a 
choice of court agreement designating London as the competent jurisdiction. The 
claimant's ship, Lisboa, was on a voyage from Buenos Aires (Argentina) to Chioggia 
(Italy), with a cargo of wheat owned by the defendant. During the voyage the vessel 
broke down off Tunisia and was towed to Chioggia, and the cargo- owners claimed 
a large amount for towage expenses. They raised legal proceedings in Venice in 
breach of the jurisdiction clause in the bill of lading, and the court of Venice 
authorised the arrest of the ship. The ship- owners then sued in England for 
damages for the unlawful arrest of the vessel in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause, and furthermore, the cargo- owners raised proceedings in England on the 
merits of the case claiming that the vessel was unseaworthy. The ship- owners 
applied for an injunction to restrain the cargo- owners from proceeding with the 
arrest of the ship. The Court of Appeal reached a unanimous decision rejecting the 
grant of an injunction. Lord Denning MR invoked the 'maritime law of the world' in 
order to reach a fair and just result in this case. He expressed: 'It seems to me that, by 
the maritime law of the world, the power of arrest should be, and is, available to a creditor - 
exercising it in good faith in respect of a maritime claim -wherever the ship is found -even 
though the merits of the dispute have to be decided by a Court in another country of by an 
arbitration tribunal in another country...'.38 In this case the main argument raised up 
by the three members of the court was that no injunction should be granted for 
otherwise the cargo- owners would be deprived of their security. It is regrettable 
then that being ancillary jurisdiction so settled in English law in the field of arrest of 
ships at common law and also at present statutory provisions, the latter have not 
provided for a straight- forward mechanism for the Courts to so exercise it. Scots 
law, arguably due to the fact that arrest of ships as a provisional and protective 
37 [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 546 (CA). 
38 At 549 -550. 
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measure pertains to the broader category of arrestment, provides a better solution 
for the issue of ancillary jurisdiction in this sphere. 
7.3.2.2. Scotland (Sections 27 and 28 of the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982) 
Article 24 of the Brussels Convention was given effect as to Scots law by 
sections 27 and 28 of the 1982 Act. According to section 27 the Court of Session may 
grant a warrant for the arrestment of any assets situated in Scotland where 
proceedings have been commenced elsewhere. Originally this jurisdiction was 
limited in that the foreign proceedings must have been in the United Kingdom or in 
another Member State of the European Community 39 however, by virtue of the 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Provisional and Protective Measures) 
(Scotland) Order 19974° this jurisdiction is currently exercisable in relation to 
proceedings world -wide. 
It has been explained that under these provisions the Court of Session can 
grant warrant of arrestment only where the foreign proceedings have already been 
commenced.41 It may be argued that in the case of arrest of ships these provisions 
should be read together with article 7 (2) of the 1952 Arrest Convention, therefore, 
ancillary jurisdiction extends to the cases where the foreign proceedings or the 
arbitration proceedings are yet to be started. 
39 G Maher and D J Cusine, The Law and Practice of Diligence (Butterworths Edinburgh 
1990) 87; G Maher, 'Provisional and Protective Measures in Respect of Foreign Proceedings' 
(1998) 29 S.L.T. (News) 225. 
40 SI 1997/2780. 
41 G Maher (1998) 226; H Raulus, 'Questionnaire on Provisional Measures: Scottish 
Report' in B Hess, Study No. JAI /A3 /2002/02 on European Enforcement, prepared for the EU 
Commission by the Institute of Foreign, Private International and Comparative Law of the 
University of Heidelberg, available at www.ipr.uni -heidelberg.de last accessed September 
11, 2007. Professor Maher expresses that it is not clear why Scots law is so restrictive in this 
area; the limitation is not present either in the European regime or in the way that it has been 
introduced in English law. 
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An area of concerned highlighted by MAHER is the role that the European 
Court of Justice would have in relation to the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction of the 
Scottish courts. The underlying principles of any decision of the European Court 
must be given effect whenever the Scottish courts are interpreting a provision of the 
Brussels regime42, and this duty applies to questions of interpreting sections 27 and 
28 of the 1982 Act. The issue is whether Scottish courts would or should apply the 
European case law to actions involving these provisions but which are outwith the 
scope of the European regime either because the action involves a non- contracting 
state or because its subject matter is beyond the scope of the regime. MAHER argues 
that the courts should as far as possible apply the principles advanced by ECJ 
decisions even in these types of case with a view to achieve general consistency of 
approach to these provisions.43 His submission is to be supported. 
Pursuers under section 27 are not entitled to arrestment as of right.44 In 
Clipper Shipping Co y San Vicente Partners 45 it was held that the court had power to 
refuse to grant a warrant under that section on the ground that granting it would be 
oppressive.46 At present this is consistent with what was examined in Chapter 4, in 
so far as in Scots law the competency of arrestment of a ship on the dependence 
depends upon there being a colourable case set out in the pleadings, and this 
applies also in the context of ancillary jurisdiction.47 In Motordrift A/S y Trachem 48 
arrestment was used on the dependence of an action related to a contract providing 
for the case to be subject to arbitration in England. It was correctly held that the 
arbitration agreement did not oust the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts for the 
purposes of interim relief. 
42 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 3 (1). 
43 G Maher (1998) 227. 
44 Stancroft Securities Ltd v McDowall 1990 SC 274(IH (2 Div)). 
45 1989 SLT 204 (OH). 
46 G Maher and D J Cusine (1990) 88. 
47 G Maher and D J Cusine (1990) 88. 
48 1982 SLT 127 (OH); see also Svenska Petroleum AB v HOR Ltd 1986 SLT 513 (IH (1 
Div)); Mendok BV v Cumberland Maritime Corpn 1989 SLT 192 (OH). 
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The considerable advantage of Scots law as compared to English law is that 
in the case of arrestment of ships it is not necessary to initiate substantive 
proceedings if the arrestment is sought as a provisional and protective measure in 
support of foreign proceedings or arbitration. Certainly, Scots law represents in this 
regard a better balanced system. 
7.3.3. The International Arrest Conventions 
It is evident from the discussions during the preliminary work pursuant to 
the 1952 Arrest Convention, that the issue of ancillary jurisdiction for interim 
measures of protection was far from as developed as it is in present times. The mere 
convenience of the distinction between ancillary jurisdiction and jurisdiction for the 
sole purpose of interim relief was at stake in those days.49 Nevertheless, article 7 of 
the Convention clearly distinguishes between direct jurisdiction on the merits (in its 
paragraph 1), and arrest as a provisional and protective measure in support of 
foreign proceedings or arbitration (paragraphs 2 to 4). Reflecting the legal 
development in the field of interim relief, ancillary jurisdiction is furthered in the 
1999 Arrest Convention in article 2 (3).50 
49 M Clunet, The travaux préparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law With Respect to Collision Between Vessels 23 September 
1910 and of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the 
Arrest of Sea -Going Ships, 10 May 1952 (CMI 1997) 400 -401. 
'A ship may be arrested for the purpose of obtaining security notwithstanding 
that, by virtue of a jurisdiction clause or arbitration clause in any relevant contract, or 
otherwise, the maritime claim in respect of which the arrest is effected is to be adjudicated in 
a State other than the State where the arrest is effected, or is to be arbitrated, or is to be 
adjudicated subject to the law of another State.' 
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7.3.4. The Principle of Territorial Proximity Revisited 
Already MCMILLAN in 1926 considered that where there was reason to 
believe that the ship will have sailed before the measure could be enforced against 
her, it might 'be expeditious to proceed in the Sheriff Court of the sheriffdom within which 
the vessel is situated'.51 Even though this reasoning concerned the distribution of 
domestic Scottish jurisdiction, rather than international one, it is clear that the 
rationale is sound also internationally in present times. Indeed, it has brought about 
the adoption of the principle of territorial proximity in the field of interim relief 
more generally. Such principle has been adopted in the international arena by the 
Inter -American Convention on Execution of Preventive Measures.52 As such is 
known in Inter -American Spanish legal parlance as 'principio de jurisdicción más 
próxima', referring to its underlying rationale: it is manifest that territorial 
proximity in cases of urgency constitutes the only ground for the exception to the 
general rule on international competence based on a substantial connection between 
the case and the forum. 
The underpinnings of the principle of jurisdicción más próxima can be found 
in the earliest work of OPERTTI BADÁN, who outlined his ideas on the issue in 1965.53 
5' A R G McMillan, Scottish Maritime Practice (Hodge Edinburgh 1926) 12. 
52 CIDIP II (Montevideo 1979) art 10 authorizes the courts of the State Parties to 
'order and execute all preventive or urgent measures of a territorial nature whose purpose is 
to guarantee the result of a pending or potential suit' regardless of which is the court 
competent as to the merits if the asset or the person to whom the measure is addressed is 
located within the territory of the court granting the order And 'jiff the case is pending the 
court that ordered the measure shall immediately inform the judge or court of the principal 
proceedings If proceedings have not been instituted the judge or court that ordered the 
measure shall set a date by which the petitioner must appear in court to assert his rights: he 
must abide by the final judgment on them rendered by the judge competent in the 
international sphere in any of the States Parties'. 
53 Analysing, in particular, the case of an embargo on foreign assets, he suggested 
that to submit the enforcement of embargoes (when granted as interim measures of prote- 
ction) to prior verification as to international competence on the merits by the court 
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Already then, he submitted that times would come where the regulation of ancillary 
jurisdiction would be completely autonomous. He predicted that when that 
happened, it would be important, in order to secure the balance required in 
regulating ancillary jurisdiction, to ensure that policy considerations with regard to 
the lex rei sitae did not impair the effectiveness of interim measures of protection.54 
Doubtless, empowering courts to adopt urgent territorial measures of protection 
regardless of international jurisdictional rules as to the merits of the case is very 
important as a device in international judicial cooperation, and it does not adversely 
affect the general principles on international jurisdiction.55 
7.4. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS 
In international litigation, the analysis of provisional and protective measures 
such as the arrest of ships, intended to ensure that the final award56 or judgment can 
be enforced by preserving the defendant's property, could not be disassociated from 
the examination of recognition and enforcement mechanisms in connection with the 
final award or judgment they are meant to protect. This type of consideration led the 
international community to introduce a new paragraph on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments into article 7 of the 1999 Arrest Convention, in the 
case where an arrest has been granted to secure such judgment in a different 
enforcing the measure on its territory would be not only a technical error but a mistake in 
practical terms. 
54 D Opertti Badán, Exhortos y Embargo de Bienes Extranjeros. Medios de Cooperación 
Judicial Internacional (Amalio Fernández Montevideo 1976); Opertti explains in the Foreword 
that the volume largely corresponds to his thesis submitted in 1965. 
55 D Opertti Badán, Actas y Documentos Segunda Conferencia Especializada Interamericana 
sobre DIP -CIDIP II- (vol 2 OAS Washington) 52. 
56 Enforcement of arbitration awards is outwith the scope of this thesis; it is 
governed principally by the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 as applicable in English law (Arbitration Act 1996) and in 
Scots law (Arbitration Act 1975). 
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country from the country dealing with the merits. This inclusion is perfectly 
consistent with the express recognition of ancillary jurisdiction by the Convention in 
article 2 (3) mentioned above, and shows the intimate connection between, on the 
one hand, ancillary jurisdiction and, on the other hand, the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, in the field of arrest of ships -as well as in PIL 
cases more generally -. PIL, as built on the foundations of international judicial 
cooperation, implies the need to implement worldwide expeditious mechanisms for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.57 
Not infrequently, 'international comity' or 'judicial comity', 58 are resorted 
to in order to justify international judicial cooperation. These concepts are deeply 
rooted in sovereignty- related ideas and therefore, outdated. Even as long as thirty 
years ago, the sovereignty concept was rejected as an argument for disallowing 
extraterritorial enforcement of the attachment of assets.59 Today, rather than resting 
on comity, some judicial cooperation instruments rest on reciprocity. 60 Yet, 
reciprocity has also been criticised in this area.61 It is found to reduce the scope for 
cooperation and to be devoid of meaning as a criterion, since litigants rather than 
countries are the ones concerned, and, taken to extremes, reciprocity could amount 
57 D P Fernández Arroyo, 'Exorbitant and Exclusive Grounds of Jurisdiction in 
European Private International Law: Will They Ever Survive' in Festschrift für Erik Jayme 
(Sellier Munich 2004) 169, 183. 
58 See eg A Johnson, 'Interim Measures under the Draft Principles and Rules of 
Transnational Civil Procedure: Some Reflections from the English Perspective' in The Future 
of Transnational Litigation, English Responses to the ALI /Unidroit Draft Principles and Rules of 
Transnational Civil Procedure (BIICL London 2004) 112 -113. Under principles of comity, 
courts of one jurisdiction give effect to the judicial decisions of other jurisdictions, not as a 
matter of obligation but, out of deference and respect. 
59 D Opertti Badán (1976) 322; F K Juenger, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 
(Transnational Publishers New York 2001) 319. 
60 Eg Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, s 9; Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982; arguably the Brussels regime also rests on reciprocity; see N Andrews, 
'Provisional and Protective Measures: Towards a Uniform Protective Order in Civil Matters' 
[2001] Unif. L. Rev. 932. 
61 In Uruguay, reciprocity has been eliminated as a criterion in the case of enforcement 
and recognition of foreign judgments (E Tellechea Bergman, La dimension judicial del caso 
privado internacional en el ambito regional (Montevideo FCU 2002) 67). 
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to a denial of justice, just what international judicial cooperation is trying to avoid.62 
It is submitted that neither comity nor reciprocity should be indispensable prima facie 
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.63 Both concepts, by 
establishing a territorial limit to justice, would only protect the evasive defendant 
rather than the national sovereignty they seemingly purport to advance. Judicial 
cooperation is an autonomous concept per se and there is no need to justify it by 
having recourse to any other concept. It is an 'imperative factual concept' which does 
not need further underpinnings.64 
7.4.1. The United Kingdom Framework 
Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in this field in the United 
Kingdom are based on statutes, rules of Admiralty and common law, and the level 
of assistance needed from the courts of the place of enforcement depends on the 
country where the judgment originated. Two concentric circles need to be drawn; 
the first to govern the recognition and enforcement of English, Scottish and 
Northern Ireland judgments; the second to govern the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments within the EC.65 Out with these two circles, common law rules and 
particular statutory schemes apply in England and in Scotland. 
62 D Opertti Badán (1976) 55. 
63 Reciprocity could only be justified, for example, in the battle against exorbitant 
fora. Fernández Arroyo suggests that States should avail themselves of certain 'protection' in 
terms of reciprocity i.e. in addition to prohibit its own exorbitant fora adopt a common legal 
regime about it, in which it would be clearly stated that legal decisions from any State in the 
world based on exorbitant jurisdiction shall not be recognised nor executed therein (D P 
Fernández Arroyo 'Exorbitant and Exclusive Grounds of Jurisdiction in European Private 
International Law: Will They Ever Survive' in Festschrift für Erik Jayme (Sellier Munich 2004) 
169, 186). 
64 D Opertti Badán (1976) 56 -57. 
65 EC Regulation 44/2001 and the Brussels and Lugano Convention where 
appropriate. 
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7.4.1.1. Intra -UK Judgments 
In the case of judgments within the United Kingdom, the rules are to be 
found in section 18 and schedules 6 and 7 to the 1982 Act. As a general rule, a 
judgment of a court in civil proceedings given in one part of the United Kingdom 
may be recognised or enforced in another part on registration of a certified copy of 
the judgment. Registration gives the judgment for the purpose of its enforcement 
the same force and effect as if the judgment had originally been given by the 
registering court.66 This rule excludes recognition and enforcement of provisional 
measures other than an order for interim payment,67 and foreign judgments 
registered for enforcement.68 One important reform introduced in this sphere by the 
1982 Act69 is the place of an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the original court. Prior to 
the Act, review of jurisdictional competence was permitted in connection with 
foreign UK judgments (as any other foreign judgments, since it was the principal 
criterion for recognition and enforcement under common law), and foreign UK 
judgments were only recognised if the foreign court had jurisdiction according to 
the PIL rules of the enforcement court. Yet, the 1982 Act following the Brussels 
regime, allows review of jurisdictional competence up to a very limited extent. 
Indeed, in the latter, 'absence of a right to query the jurisdiction of the court of origin is a 
leitmotif .70 
66 Sch 6 [6]; sch 7 [6]. 
67 S 18 (5) (b) (d). 
68 S 18 (7). 
69 S 19 (1). 
70 E B Crawford and J M Carruthers, International Private Law in Scotland (Green 
Edinburgh 2006) 209. 
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7.4.1.2. Extra- communitarian Judgments 
In the case of judgments of other states, enforcement is available through 
two different mechanisms: (a) by an action on the foreign judgment; (b) through 
registration, in the case of judgments in personam directing the payment of a sum of 
money, according to various statutory frameworks applicable to judgments of 
courts of countries parties to various conventions to which the United Kingdom is a 
party. The second mechanism is based on reciprocal arrangements with the United 
Kingdom as a whole, therefore, applicable in English and Scots law generally in the 
same fashion.71 The first mechanism is common law based, therefore the differences 
between English and Scots law in this sphere are not very profound.72 
English or Scottish courts may be asked to enforce a foreign judgment 
against a ship under arrest within their respective jurisdictions. In English law, to 
recognise and enforce such judgment they will take into account the nature of the 
foreign proceedings and decide whether in common law terms they were in rem or 
in personam.73 Prerequisites for and the defences against recognition and 
enforcement are in principle the same as the general principles in the recognition 
and enforcement of any other civil judgment, and are equally applicable to 
judgments in connection with actions in rem and in personam.74 The prerequisites are, 
(a) The foreign court had jurisdiction to hear the claim as recognised by 
English PIL rules as far as English courts; and Scots IPL rules as far as Scottish 
71 Administration of Justice Act 1920; Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) 
Act 1933. 
72 An important difference disappeared when the non -merger rule of English law 
was abolished by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 s 34. 
73 D C Jackson (2005) 728. 
74 D C Jackson (2005) 728. Jackson argues that the application of the label 'judgment 
in rem' to Admiralty actions is erroneous since in his opinion 'a judgment declaring a lien to 
exist is no more a judgment in rem than is a judgment recognising a proprietary interest in 
any asset' [27.311. 
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courts.75 Yet, in Scotland the criterion to judge the jurisdiction of the adjudicating 
court seems to be more internationally -minded since what it is required is 
compliance with a 'broad international standard of justice'.76 
(b) The judgment must be final according to the law of the court where it 
was given. 
(c) If in personam, the judgment must be for a fixed sum; 
(d) The judgment must not be for tax or a penalty. 
Only in as far as the requirement of the foreign court jurisdiction there is a 
distinction between actions in rem and in personam. In the case of judgments in 
personam, a court will be recognised as having jurisdiction if the defendant is either 
present in the jurisdiction of the adjudicating court or submitted to the jurisdiction 
of the court (English law); 'broad international standard of justice' (Scots law); 77 
whereas in the case of judgments in rem,78 both in English and Scots law, jurisdiction 
depends on the foreign court having physical control of the res at the time of the 
judgment.79 
Interestingly enough, since neither an English nor a Scottish court will 
enquire the substance the foreign judgment, foreign liens will be (indirectly) 
recognised in England and in Scotland.80 
In English law, '...subject to any jurisdiction requirements and where the subject 
matter falls within the Admiralty jurisdiction, an English court will enforce a judgment in 
rem through an action in rem'. '... [Als it is now recognised that an action in rem is against 
75 See G Maher, 'Recognition and Enforcement of Non -Scottish Judgments' The Laws 
of Scotland, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (SME) (8)153 [405]. 
76 E B Crawford and J M Carruthers (2006) 212. 
77 Nonetheless, this internationally -minded criterion see Wendel y Moran 1993 SLT 44 
(OH) where Lord Cullen disregarded the place of occurrence of delict as a sufficient 
jurisdictional basis for the courts of New York (adjudicating court) since the defendant was 
neither present in the jurisdiction nor submitted to it. He stressed also that in so far 
recognition and enforcement there was no significant difference between Scots and English 
law (48). 
78 'Decrees in rem stands unaided contra mundum' (E B Crawford and J M Carruthers 
(2006) 205). 
79 D C Jackson (2005) 730 -732. 
80 Minna Craig Steamship Co and James Laing y Chartered Mercantile Bank of India London 
and China [1897] 1 QB 55. 
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a person, any judgment must be focused on that person. The bringing of an action in rem to 
enforce the judgment must be against the owner of the ship at that time'.8' Indeed, the only 
in rem aspect of a judgment in an action in rem is the title conferred by sale by the 
court. A judgment conferring title by such sale is 'good against the world'. The 
enforcement of a sale ordered by a foreign court will be through the recognition of 
the effect of that sale. In English law there is uncertainty about the jurisdiction to 
accomplish this by an action in rem. In The Despina GK82 jurisdiction was founded on 
the 'sweeping up' clause in the Supreme Court Act 1982. Yet, it has been doubted 
whether the jurisdiction maintained by the Act in respect of pre -Act jurisdiction 
includes jurisdiction in rem;83 if jurisdiction in rem is not available to enforce foreign 
judgments of an in rem nature, the main disadvantage lies in the inaccessibility of 
arrest. Arguably though, arrest of the ship in such context would no longer be an 
interim measure of protection since there is already a judgment. 
7.4.2. The Regional Framework (Europe) 
The European Council in October 1999 established that enhanced mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions and judgments would facilitate cooperation 
between authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights, and agreed that 
the principle of mutual recognition should become 'the cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union'.B4 One of the first 
EU regulatory measures to result from this effort was EC Regulation 44/2001, which 
covers all areas of civil and commercial law except for those that are expressly 
excluded from its scope,B5 adopted on 22 December 2000. 
81 D C Jackson (2005) 732 -733. 
82 [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 553 (Sheen J.) 
83 D C Jackson (2005) 728. 
84 Paragraph 33 of the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, 16 October 
1999 (Press: Nr: 200/1/99). 
85 H Ringbom, 'EU Regulation 44/2001 and its Implications for the International 
Maritime Liability Conventions' (2004) 35 JMLC (1). 
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While an order for the arrest of a ship is in principle within the scope of 
application of the European framework, since the definition of judgment is wide 
enough to cover interim measures of protection, recognition and enforcement of an 
arrest order is an obligation only if defendant have had the opportunity to put his 
case before the court made the order (therefore ex parte orders are excluded). 
The underlying principles of the European regime are that, save for specified 
exceptions, jurisdictional enquiry is for the adjudicating court only. Subject to 
specific and limited exceptions, once a judgment is given on a civil and commercial 
matter by a court of a contracting State, and is enforceable there, it is to be 
recognised and enforced in each contracting State. Recognition and enforcement 
may be refused only (i) if such recognition and /or enforcement is manifestly 
contrary to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought; (ii) in 
the case of default of appearance or lack of 'due process' in the adjudicating court; 
(iii) in the case of irreconcilability of judgments.B" The paradigmatic English 
distinction between in rem and actions in personam is irrelevant in this 
context, a point made clear in the decision of the ECJ in The Maciej Rataj.87 
7.4.2.1. The Lex Specia /is Provision Revisited 
The lex specialis provision of the European regime examined in Chapter 6 is 
not limited to direct jurisdictional rules but includes indirect jurisdictional rules, i.e. 
provisions on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. In this context is 
where the 1999 Arrest Convention, and the possibility of its adoption by the EC, 
becomes relevant. 
86 Art 34 Regulation 44/2001. 
87 Maciej Rataj (The Tatry) (Case C 406/92) [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 302 (ECJ). 
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7.4.3. The 1999 Arrest Convention 
The 1999 Arrest Convention has introduced in its article 7 new paragraphs 
dealing with recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in relation to the 
cases where an arrest has been granted to secure such judgment in a different 
country from the country dealing with the merits. As mentioned above this 
inclusion adds to the coherency amongst the Convention's provisions. Differently 
from the provision dealing with ancillary jurisdiction (article 2 (3)) which was 
adopted without considerable discussion,88 the provision relating to recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments was debated extensively. It may be argued that 
these different reactions on the part of States representatives evidences that ancillary 
jurisdiction, on the one hand, and, the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, on the other hand, represent different stages of judicial cooperation 
between States. 
The central issue was the need for such a provision to fill a gap left by the 
1952 Arrest Convention. It was argued that without a provision of this nature arrest 
as a provisional and protective measure seemed meaningless.A9 Proposals were 
made to leave the matter to the lex fori of the country where the ship was arrested 
(lex fori arresti). Fortunately, this 'disruptive' temptation was overcome, and 
recognition and enforcement were finally provided for in article 7 paragraphs 5 and 
6. 
Paragraph 5: 'If proceedings are brought within the period of time 
ordered in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article, or if proceedings 
before a competent Court or arbitral tribunal in another State are brought 
in the absence of such order, any final decision resulting there from shall 
be recognised and given effect with respect to the arrested ship or to the 
security provided in order to obtain its release, on condition that: a. the 
defendant has been given reasonable notice of such proceedings and a 
reasonable opportunity to present the case for the defence; and b. such 
recognition is not against public policy (ordre public).' 
88 The Travaux Préparatoires, see F Berlingieri (2006) 536 -537. 
89 The Travaux Préparatoires, see F Berlingieri (2006) 644 -647. 
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Paragraph 6: 'Nothing contained in the provisions of paragraph 5 of this 
article shall restrict any further effect given to a foreign judgment or 
arbitral award under the law of the State where the arrest of the ship was 
effected or security provided to obtain its release.' 
It is interesting to note that the approach taken by the 1999 Arrest 
Convention towards recognition and enforcement, even when it is fully consistent 
with the purpose of the Convention, is not the only possible approach to the matter. 
It denotes quite a high standard of international judicial cooperation. A different 
example is given by the aforementioned 1979 Inter -American Convention on 
Execution of Preventive Measures. In the latter, the judge adopting the 'urgent 
measure' exercising ancillary jurisdiction is not obliged to recognise or enforce the 
final judgment. It is understood that recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments 'is a different stage of international judicial cooperation' (different from 
the adoption of preventive measures), therefore, ruled by its own provisions and not 
necessarily connected.90 Notwithstanding the different phases of international 
judicial cooperation, it is here submitted that the approach taken by the 1999 Arrest 
Convention is to be preferred, particularly in Europe, where the predictions of 
OPERTTI BADÁN, who in 1965 submitted that times would come where the 
regulation of ancillary jurisdiction would be completely autonomous, have become 
black letter in the European jurisdictional scheme. 
7.5. FINAL REMARKS 
Ancillary jurisdiction in the field of interim measures of protection should be 
regarded as a paramount instrument of judicial cooperation. The bases of jurisdiction 
to grant measures intended to ensure that the final award or foreign judgement can be 
enforced by preserving the defendant's assets or property, could be of a more far- 
90 See R Herbert and C Fresnedo de Aguirre, 'El Arresto de Buques y el Principio de 
Jurisdicción Mas Próxima' [19931 Revista de Transporte y Seguros 165. 
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reaching nature than jurisdictional grounds to sustain jurisdiction on the merits of the 
case in the international arena. As mentioned above MANN assessed that this was 
perfectly compatible with a well balanced jurisdictional system.91Yet, it is here 
submitted that this is so if the distribution of competences amongst the different 
jurisdictions involved were so conceived as to serve proportionality, expediency, 
supportiveness and a good overall management of the case on the merits. 
Moreover, and with a view to furthering international uniformity in 
questions relating to the enforceability of security interests in ships, it should be 
stressed that comparative case law related to the arrest of ships in this sphere shows 
that ancillary jurisdiction as examined in this chapter is a fertile field for procedural 
harmonization.92 It is here submitted that English and Scots law would both benefit 
if a foreign claimant /pursuer would face similar conditions in order to arrest a ship 
in England or in Scotland for the sole purpose of interim relief. The current need to 
start proceedings on the merits in English law, and the fact that ancillary jurisdiction 
in Scotland seems to be limited to foreign proceedings or arbitral proceedings that 
have already been commenced, do not but jeopardise the protective function of 
arrest of ships in the international arena. 
In the eventuality that the 1999 Arrest Convention is adopted by the EC, its 
recognition and enforcement regime would overlap with the EC Regulation 44/2001, 
but they would not collide, since both instruments approach the issue of recognition 
and enforcement at the same level of commitment between States. Thus, in the 
European context, the 1999 Arrest Convention would advance international judicial 
cooperation in the field. In turn, this would enhance maximum efficiency in case 
management as the recognition and enforcement of the judgment on the merits by 
the courts adopting the provisional and protective measure is indeed the necessary 
91 F A P Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After 20 Years 186 
RdC 9 (1984) 58. 
92 See V Ruiz Abou -Nigm, 'Ancillary Jurisdiction for Interim Measures of Protection 
in Support of Cross -Border Litigation' (2005) 4 Uniform Law Review 759 -784. 
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corollary to the degree of judicial cooperation achieved in Europe in terms of 
ancillary jurisdiction. However, this is not a decision for the States of the 
Community93 to make on their own but for the EC as such to make the decision once 
and for all. 
93 According to article 72 of the EC Regulation 4/2001 the preservation of provisions 
which govern the recognition or enforcement of judgments in Conventions on particular 





This study started from the postulate' that arrest of ships can be said to be a 
truly PIL institution. The international community has taken this view since the 
1930s, therefore, harmonisation efforts have been put forward in this sphere, and 
international Conventions have been agreed. The 1952 Arrest Convention is 
currently in force in most of the shipping countries. Yet, the success of this 
Convention, despite its more than eighty ratifications, is debatable. Procedure is a 
culture -bond matter, reflecting the fundamental values, sensibilities and beliefs of a 
certain society.2 And this affirmation gets even stronger when it comes to Admiralty 
jurisdiction in Great Britain. However, this research has been conducted on the 
premise that different systems are becoming increasingly harmonised in the 
procedural mores. The study shows that arrest of ships, and its evolution over the 
centuries, represents an excellent example of the characteristics of a harmonization 
process. Yet, the choice -of -law methodology still has a paramount role to play in 
this context. 
8.1. The arrest of ships is a very distinctive institution. It is not 
treated along with interim measures of protection in English law, and it does not 
' 'Any argument in defence or support of a given proposition, however good or bad the 
argument may be, makes conscious or unconscious use of other propositions, and the status of these in 
the argument, because they are there consciously or unconsciously taken for granted, is the status of 
postulates', CJ Keyser quoted in W W Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 
(Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 1942) 48. 
2 O G Chase, 'American "Exceptionalism" and Comparative Procedure' (2002) 50 
AJCL 277. 
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adjust perfectly to the law of diligence in Scots law. Its functions, namely, its 
protective, security and jurisdictional functions, as examined in this thesis, go 
beyond interim relief. Yet, this thesis stresses that the characterization of arrest of 
ships as a provisional and protective measure is a necessary part of the substantive 
unification sought by the international community in this field. The international 
Arrest Conventions, rather than creating an organised concept of arrest of ships, 
have put together distinct causes of action linked by common factors. That is the 
reason why characterization problems arise, and the need to delineate the scope of 
arrest of ships as a PIL category becomes clear. In the Conventions, arrest of ships 
includes arrest as a protective measure 'to secure payment of a maritime claim'; 
arrest as a preventive measure to enforce maritime liens; and arrest as a provisional 
measure 'to secure the res'. After studying these three different types of measure 
and their different functions, the research shows that it is the provisional character 
of arrest of ships and not its functions that provides the scope of arrest of ships as a 
PIL category in the Conventions. 
Notwithstanding the different functions of arrest of ships as examined in this 
thesis, the research shows they are very much interconnected; these functions are 
best understood if looked at in terms of one another. The protective function is the 
most obvious one and without it arrest of ships could not display the other two 
functions. Arguably that is the reason why arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem 
is 
not technically diligence in Scots law. In turn, the jurisdictional function is, 
from a 
PIL perspective, its central one, yet it would not be as effective in the 
international 
sphere as a cooperative device if arrest of ships would not give the 
claimant /pursuer 
a certain kind of security for his claim; that is the reason why 
the security function 
of arrest of ships has been considered as its most relevant. 
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8.2. While it is often assumed that Scots law will always follow 
English law in admiralty matters3 this thesis shows that this statement is not 
necessarily correct; indeed, in the sphere of arrest of ships, it is particularly 
inaccurate. The differences are not only historical but conceptual. The main 
difference is that admiralty arrestment in Scots law forms part of the general law of 
diligence, which has no English counterpart. This has, in turn, advantages and 
disadvantages on both sides of the borders. Having a conceptual framework helps 
to understand the different functions and effects of the measure; however, these 
general concepts - with a clear Romanist mark - were not crafted to meet the needs 
of maritime commerce; whereas that, indeed, can be said about arrest of ships as 
developed in English law. 
Most of the differences, however, have been harmonised by the 1952 Arrest 
Convention as enacted in the United Kingdom by the Administration of Justice Act 
1956, now in England consolidated in the Supreme Court Act 1981. The remaining 
differences are not so much between English law and Scots law but between arrest 
of ships to enforce a maritime lien or a mortgage, hypothecation or other charge of 
the same nature; arrest of ships to protect the status quo in the case of claims related 
to possession, title or forfeiture of the ship herself; and arrest of ships as a true 
provisional and protective measure, i.e. a measure to secure a maritime claim. The 
study shows that such differences are hidden within the international Conventions 
and within English law; arguably in the former due to the influence of the latter. It is 
the action in rem that gives arrest of ships to enforce maritime liens distinctive 
features which, it is here submitted, should not be extended to cases where such 
'real' linkage between the res and the dispute does not exist. It is also submitted that 
the indiscriminate approach of English law in this regard is the reason why the main 
3 Boettcher y Carron Co 1861 23 D 322; Currie y McKnight [1897] AC 97 (HL); SS 
Blaimore Co Ltd y Macredie (1898) 25 R (HL) 57, 59; Clydesdale Bank Ltd y Walker & Bain 1926 SC 
72, 82; The Goring [1988] 1 AC 831 (HL) 853. 
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functions of arrest of ships as identified in this thesis are attributed to the in rem 
claim rather than to arrest in English law.' 
In Scots law, the distinction between the different functions of arrestment of 
ships is clearer. Furthermore, recent law reform has brought the arrestment of ships 
in Scotland into line with the latest international trends in the sphere of provisional 
and protective measures. 
8.3. One of the questions considered in this thesis, de lege ferenda, 
is whether it is more convenient to approach the arrest of ships as pertaining to a 
broader category (interim relief /diligence /provisional and protective measures) or if 
is it preferable, for the sake of adjustment to the particular needs of maritime 
commerce, to treat it as a category of its own - as it is done in English law. The 
research shows that the modern Scottish approach that treats admiralty arrestment 
within the general law of diligence but as a separate category seems to be the best 
option. It is here submitted that arrest of ships as an institution in the international 
sphere would be advanced by meeting the minimum standards of provisional and 
protective measures. The advantages would be twofold. (i) For the purposes of 
interpretation, in the case of questions concerning matters governed by the 
international Arrest Conventions which are not expressly settled in them, recourse 
could be taken to general principles of transnational civil procedure. (This approach 
is not against an in ordinem interpretation in as far as those general principles do not 
go against anything that has been specifically agreed in the particular Convention). 
(ii) To bring arrest of ships in line with the referred international standards would 
advance the ultimate aim of the international Conventions: uniformity in 
application. 
4 To put it another way, in English law arrest as such only displays the protective 
function; it is for the in rem claim as a distinctive Admiralty procedure to display the three, 
in this order: the security function (issuance of the in rem claim form), the protective function 
(arrest) and the jurisdictional function (service of the in rem claim). 
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On the one hand, this thesis shows that the ex facie conceptualization of 
arrest of ships as an interim measure of protection in the Conventions, has not been 
as effective as it could have been, since it was not applied with consistency. 
Furthermore, the lack of a broader conceptual framework in which arrest of ships 
could develop (arguably as a provisional and protective measure), has represented a 
setback to uniformity, and more importantly, has left arrest of ships far behind the 
most accepted international standards with regard to provisional and protective 
measures. The research suggests that these drawbacks could be overcome if the 
transnational origin of arrest of ships as an institution, and its 'mixed legal' nature, 
were borne in mind whenever the Conventions are to be applied. 
On the other hand, treated as a category of its own, its distinctive features 
become its defining features, and in this sense the unimportant role of fumus boni 
iuris and periculum in mora in English law could maybe find justification in the 
pressing needs of maritime commerce. Yet, there is not even such justification for 
the absence of a cross -undertaking in damages in the case of arrest of ships in 
English and in Scots law; that represents a needless imbalance between the parties 
to the dispute. The study shows that this feature is a result of the confusion between 
arrest of ships, maritime liens and the action in rem. If it was possible to look at the 
three as separable legal concepts, a cross -undertaking in damages by the claimant 
could be required in the ordering of an arrest of ships as an interim measure of 
protection; whereas if arrest is sought to enforce a maritime lien through an action 
in rem, it would no longer be treated as an interim measure of protection but as an 
inherent part (as the preventive phase) of an enforcement procedure. Thus, no cross - 
undertaking in damages would be required in those cases. 
It is regrettable that Scots law has not taken the opportunity of the recent law 
reform to enhance this possibility. Having done so would have been consistent 
with 
the latest trends in the sphere of provisional and protective measures established 
by 
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the international community as of late. Surely the decision is grounded in the fear 
that having done so would have made Scotland a less favourable place to arrest a 
ship as compared to England. Certainly, policy considerations in this matter 
outweigh technical ones. 
8.4. English law requires a distinction between arrest as an interim 
measure of protection, and arrest of ships to enforce a maritime lien. The linkage 
between arrest and the in rem claim has fewer advantages than disadvantages. This 
linkage has undermined the correct application of the 1952 Arrest Convention in 
English law. This dysfunctional approach to maritime claims severely jeopardises 
harmonisation. JACKSON is of the opinion that the civil law approach is preferable in 
this regard, i.e. to abandon the fallacious distinction between in rem and in personam 
claims; to recognise the real targets as those interested in the ship; and to confer 
priority to certain kind of maritime claims.' His analysis has been pivotal to this 
thesis. Certainly, the decision of the House of Lords in The Indian Grace No.26 shows 
that the system evolves in that direction. However, the research suggests that it 
would certainly take much more for English Admiralty jurisdiction to depart from 
its most deeply rooted traditions and to allow for the arrest of ships, in certain cases, 
to be a truly provisional and protective measure characteristic of maritime 
commerce, but first and foremost a provisional and protective measure. This thesis 
emphasises the importance of such distinction in the international sphere with a 
view to enhancing the protective function of arrest of ships in the context of 
international judicial cooperation. 
5 D C Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime Claims (4th edn LLP London 
2005) 240. 
6 [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL). 
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8.5. In Scots law arrestment of ships as part of diligence on the 
dependence has moved towards a new system of judicial authorisation of the 
diligence, thus following emerging international standards on the field. When the 
research for this thesis was being undertaken no steps had been taken in Scotland to 
give legislative effect to the Scottish Law Commission's Report on Diligence on the 
Dependence and Admiralty Arrestments. Fortunately such steps were eventually 
taken and the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, which improves 
diligence on the dependence in Scotland and brings it into line with the most 
accepted international trends in the field, has emerged. Schedule 4 introduced by 
section 213 of the Act modifies various enactments relating to admiralty actions and 
the arrestment of ships. However, so far as concerns the requirements of arrest of 
ships in the 1952 Arrest Convention, Scots law seems to be departing from it rather 
than aligning to it; this thesis shows that the 1952 Arrest Convention is the one that 
is not in line with international trends of provisional and protective measures more 
generally. 
8.6. Most of the inconsistencies of the current law of arrest of 
ships in England and in Scotland are owed to the lack of attempt to recognise that 
the institution has been constantly changing since its very origins. The arrest of 
ships, as a mixture of ancient doctrines and new developments, national, 
international, supranational and a- national, belongs to the lex maritima of all times. 
This characteristic of the institution has encouraged the backward- looking approach 
that has historically dominated Admiralty decisions in this field, and that has 
sometimes generated less evolution than confusion. The research shows that 
changes over the centuries have been in the way of transposition and cross - 
fertilisation. Consequently, lack of historical accuracy was a common drawback 
found in many dicta in the nineteenth century in England and in Scotland that 
created perplexity and inconsistency. And from then until present times Admiralty 
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jurisprudence has been trying to reshape, to describe and to understand the arrest of 
ships. It is here submitted that at present arrest of ships as a PIL category in the 
international sphere has the characteristics of a mixed -legal institution. It does not 
derive wholly from any principle borrowed from any particular legal family and it 
is not capable of analogy to any other institution providing for similar functions. It 
is the creature of the amalgamation of different legal systems, policies, theories and 
practices throughout the centuries. It could be argued that every institution crafted 
in the international sphere, and particularly for international commerce, is 
inherently mixed due to the fact that it has been created as a compromise amongst 
the different legal systems of its creators. However, it is not the mixture but the 
degree of mixture and the degree to which the influences from the different 
traditions remain readily identifiable that makes arrest of ships a mixed legal 
institution. 
8.7. Arrest of ships is a means of obtaining security for a claim. 
This thesis examines that assertion from a PIL perspective as the effects of the 
security function of arrest of ships are left to the lex fort arresti whereas the security - 
related effects in the adjacent field of maritime liens present applicable law 
problems that do not have a definite answer yet. The inconsistencies in this sphere 
cannot be overestimated. One of the arguments advanced in this thesis is that in 
modern PIL, where principles rather than legal fictions are necessary, the line 
between substance and procedure, and right and remedy, should not be drawn 
arbitrarily as to evade the application of foreign law. Hence, there is no place to 
consider maritime liens as procedural; moreover, there is no place either to consider 
the priorities they imply as remedial. Consequently, neither the right nor the 
priorities intrinsically adjudged to the right should be treated as meriting a knee - 
jerk reference to the lex fort. Both right and priority are inherently substantive and 
should coherently be governed by the lex causae. That is, a fragmented approach to 
the characterization of maritime liens in PIL, either through the distinction between 
substance and procedure or right and remedy, should be resisted; it enhances the 
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undesirable consequences of 'forum shopping'. In the 21st century a maritime lienee 
should not be in a position of having his claim substantially satisfied or entirely shut 
out, depending upon the legal system of the jurisdiction in which the ship is 
arrested and sold. Against this background, the far -reaching concept of 'procedure' 
in English law as to cover the existence of maritime liens should be seen as a thing 
of the past. Furthermore, this thesis submits that it is inconvenient to refer the 
connected issues of existence and ranking of maritime liens to different laws; it 
could lead to incoherencies that would not advance the policies underlying neither 
the lex causae nor the lex fori. The thesis shows that time is ripe for the re- 
examination of PIL rules in this sphere, and it is suggested that the fact that in Scots 
law the functions of arrest of ships are easier to separate could, de lege ferenda, make 
a difference in its 'IPL' rule in this regard. It should lead to the adoption of a 
conflicts solution more consistent with the international approach that has 
distinguished IPL in Scotland. 
8.8. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the research shows that, 
particularly in the sphere of ranking of maritime claims, the choice -of -law 
methodology hardly attains the most appropriate solution to the conflict of laws in 
that sphere with a view to the juridical continuity of legal relations. The 
'internationalist' methodological approach to the conflict of laws is that whenever 
unanimity is not attainable in the international sphere insofar as to achieve a 
uniform solution in a certain field, the choice -of -law methodology remains the only 
solution. In the field of ranking of maritime claims, this thesis shows that the 
relationship between the two main methods of PIL works also in the contrary sense. 
The research demonstrates that in this sphere the choice -of -law methodology points 
at the law of the flag as the only possible option to provide foresee -ability and 
decisional harmony. That is why, following the internationally accepted link 
between a ship and the country of her flag for registered securities, it has been 
strongly argued that all issues of property in a ship should be referred to the law of 
the flag. Nevertheless, one of the arguments advanced in this thesis is that looking 
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at the reality of ship registration systems, and bearing in mind that most ships 
nowadays fly flags of convenience, adopting such a connecting factor could be 
regarded as anachronistic. Moreover, applicable law issues connected to maritime 
liens could end up being governed by the law of a legal system totally unconnected 
to the case. The ' uniformity' method imposes itself as the only mechanism to achieve 
not only foresee -ability and decisional harmony but, arguably, also a more 
equilibrate final outcome obtained via a legal instrument especially created to strike 
the difficult balance between the interests of all types of organizations concerned 
with shipping, namely, financing, construction, ownership and supplying of ships. 
Furthering uniformity in this sphere, however, has proved to be a difficult 
endeavour; the entry into force of the 1993 MLM Convention in 2004 is a first step. 
8.9. Arrest of ships is a typical jurisdictional basis in the maritime 
sphere. Despite it has for long been part of the lex maritima it has not been free from 
criticism. One of the aims of this thesis was to provide the theoretical underpinnings 
of the exercise of jurisdiction as a consequence of the arrest of ships, and to assess 
the convenience of its survival in the process of Europeanization of PIL. The main 
question to be answered was whether arrest constituted a sufficient connection with 
the forum so as to justify the assumption of 'competence' by that forum in the 
absence of any other relevant connections. This thesis submits that the survival of 
forum arresti as a specific jurisdictional basis for maritime claims, in the context of 
the Europeanization of PIL, is positive. By contrast, the assessment is negative when 
it comes to general jurisdiction in any context (i.e. the assessment is not limited to 
the European framework). No arguments can be found to justify the arrest of a ship 
as a general jurisdictional ground in any case; to put it another way, for the purpose 
of establishing general jurisdiction there is no room in modern PIL 'to treat a ship as 
domiciled where it can be found''. Therefore, to maintain forum arresti as a general 
jurisdictional basis denotes a non -balanced system. However, international 
' See W Phillimore, The travaux préparatoires of the 1952 Arrest Convention (CMI 
1997) 400. 
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adjudication of jurisdiction is not an aim of its own, but a way of assuring juridical 
continuity to international legal relations. Combining a general jurisdictional basis 
such as the defendant's domicile as an alternative to party autonomy with a 
thoughtful scheme of specific jurisdictions should avoid a clash between the 
interests of the claimant and those of the defendant. This is exactly what the 
European regime has attempted to do. In that context, it is submitted that forum 
arresti in the case of arrest of ships is a specific cooperative forum. A ship is elusive 
hence the power to arrest in any port and consequentially ground jurisdiction 
therein is as important in modern times with ships being owned singly, and flying 
flags of convenience, as it has always been, due to the speed with which the 
defendant's main asset could leave the jurisdiction. Many times there will be no 
connection between the forum and the dispute other than the ship being fixed by 
arrest in its territory i.e. in most cases this prima facie not so strong connection is the 
strongest connection that the ship will ever have with any forum. 
8.10. To make that assessment the thesis examines the 
proximity principle as it operates in the law of jurisdiction in this context. The role 
of the proximity principle in this sphere is two- sided: to justify jurisdiction on the 
merits following the arrest of the ship (direct jurisdiction) and to justify the adoption 
of arrest as a provisional and protective measure, regardless of a court's lack of 
jurisdiction on the merits (ancillary jurisdiction). The thesis examines these two 
applications of this principle and concludes that the rationale in each situation is 
completely different. In the context of ancillary jurisdiction, territorial proximity is 
used to tackle urgency; in the sphere of direct jurisdiction, territorial proximity 
constitutes the connection between the dispute and the forum. The 1999 Arrest 
Convention takes account of both sides of the question. 
8.11. As for the counter -argument that forum arresti 
enhances 'forum shopping', this thesis shows that such a practice is encouraged the 
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most by the lex fori approach to the conflict of laws rather than by a specific 
jurisdictional ground such as forum arresti in the case of ships. Arguably, in the 
process of Europeanization of PIL, where the room for considerations as to the 
appropriateness of the forum in relative terms (as opposed to the abstract rules of 
jurisdiction prescribed by the regime) is getting tighter, the lex fori approach to 
applicable law issues represents a very real incentive to 'forum shopping'. The role 
of the lex fori arresti has been visited and revisited throughout this thesis. Outwith 
the natural domain of procedure, and, except for the times when it is truly applied 
qua lex causae, its influence is unhelpful. The research shows that as applied in the 
context of the 'uniformist' methodology via lex fori characterization it poses a 
drawback to the uniformity sought by the international community. Moreover, as a 
choice -of -law methodology of its own, it benefits only those litigants who are in the 
position to take the best out of 'forum shopping' opportunities. 
8.12. Judicial cooperation in the sphere of interim measures 
of protection in the international mores is paramount. The thesis examines the 
doctrinal underpinnings of the distinction between jurisdiction on the merits and 
jurisdiction for the sole purpose of interim relief. It names the latter as 'ancillary 
jurisdiction' since its main rationale is to be supportive of a good case management 
on the merits. The 1952 Arrest Convention has been a pioneer in fostering this 
distinction in the field of arrest of ships; arguably to confirm arrest of ships as a PIL 
institution, and in turn, maritime law as a fertile field for the development of this 
distinctive branch of the law. The Europeanization of PIL has brought further 
advancement of the distinction more generally into English and Scots law. The 
thesis suggests that this has the potential to enhance the protective function of arrest 
of ships. For that actually to happen, arrest of ships should be provided for as a true 
provisional and protective measure in support of foreign proceedings or arbitration 
in English and Scots law, without the limits currently imposed by the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments 1982 Act; the need to start proceedings on the merits in 
English law, and the fact that arrestment in the context of ancillary jurisdiction in 
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Scotland seems to be limited to foreign proceedings or arbitral proceedings that 
have already been commenced, jeopardise the protective function of arrest of ships 
in the international arena. 
8.13. What does the future hold for the arrest of ships in the 
European context? If the EC was to adopt the 1999 Arrest Convention advancement 
would be brought to the enforcement of maritime claims within Europe. First and 
foremost, the new scheme moves forward to a plain recognition of the forum arresti 
as a specific jurisdictional ground, thus allowing all State parties to be on an equal 
footing to try to 'share the pie with England'. Furthermore, it would represent the 
adoption at the international level of the way Scots law has historically dealt with 
arrestment as a jurisdictional ground. This thesis suggests that the dual formula 
forum arresti forum non conveniens in the case of arrest of ships could help to 
consolidate a well -balanced specific jurisdictional scheme for maritime claims in the 
European regime.8 In a nutshell, this thesis suggests that the adoption of the 1999 
Arrest Convention would represent the availability of a cooperative PIL device, 
forum arresti, to all member States regardless of their different domestic laws. 
Moreover, it would represent also the availability in this sphere of forum non 
conveniens, 'as distilled and matured in Scotland... one of the country's best known 
exports'.9 Hence, it would mean fitting the European admiralty scheme into English 
and Scottish traditions. The result would have a very recognisable British taste; a 
good one, though. 
8 The problem that this thesis envisages is that, even if the 1999 Arrest Convention is 
adopted by the EC, the deeply rooted civilian reluctancy to decline jurisdiction would 
advance a restrictive interpretation of the forum non conveniens allowance of the 1999 Arrest 
Convention in its application via the lex specialis provision of the European regime, so as to 
prevent forum non conveniens to end up winning a battle (even if it is only a battle, not the 
war). Notwithstanding this fear, the wishful thinking is that as present times are times of 
integration rather than battles or wars there will be no winners or loosers but only 
Europeans for the ECJ to think of when deciding on the interpretation of these provisions. 
9 Lord Hope of Craighead (HL), 'Forum non conveniens: where next ?' Conference 
Paper, Journal of Private International Law Conference 2007, Birmingham 26 June 2007, 1. 
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Postscript 
Modern times require a smooth blend between common law and civil law. 
As examined in this thesis, the arrest of ships as a mixed legal institution is an 
amalgamation that works in practice, even when the master blenders70 do not follow 
the same rules when deciding on the composition of the blend. Yet too often sight of 
the main objective, consistency, is lost. In the 'evolutionary process' of 
Europeanization of PIL, consistency is more important than ever before, not only 
within one national legal system, but within the European regime seen as a whole. 
10 A master blender is an individual who decides on the composition of blended 
spirits For example in the Scottish whisky industry master blenders choose which single 
malts and grain whiskies are combined to make particular blended whisky. 
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